It is argued that we cannot understand the notion of proper functions of artefacts independently of social notions. Functions of artefacts are related to social facts via the use of artefacts. The arguments in this article can be used to improve existing function theories that look to the causal history of artefacts to determine the function. A view that takes the intentions of designers into account to determine the proper function is both natural and often correct, but it is shown (...) that there are exceptions to this. Taking a social constitutive element into account may amend these backwards looking theories. An improved theory may either have a disjunctive form—either the history or collective intentions determine the proper function—or, as is suggested in the article, be in the form of an encompassing account that views the designers’ intentions as social, in so far as they are accepted by the users. Designers have authority, which is a social fact. The views argued for here are applied to two existing theories of artefact functions, a causal historic approach and an action theoretic approach.Keywords: Function; Artefact; Evaluative judgement; Action; Collective intentionality. (shrink)

Classification of sciences; Moslem scholars; Africa, North.

In Practicing Safe Sects F. LeRon Shults provides scientific and philosophical resources for having “the talk” about religious reproduction: where do gods come from – and what are the costs of bearing them in our culturally pluralistic, ecologically fragile environment?

Current perspectives on attractiveness-related prosocial biases emphasize the contribution of evolutionarily shaped mating drives. Here, we extend these concepts by highlighting the pivotal role of the hypothalamic peptide oxytocin in augmenting the salience and rewarding value of social stimuli, including the partner's face, thereby fostering social bonding in general and the stability of monogamous pair bonds and offspring care in particular.

Since Foucault introduced the notion of biopolitics, it has been fiercely debated—usually in highly generalized terms—how to interpret and use this concept. This article argues that these discussions need to be situated, as biopolitics have features that do not travel from one site to the next. This becomes apparent if we attend to an aspect of biopolitics that has only received scant attention so far: the knowledge practices required to constitute populations as intelligible objects of government. To illustrate this point, (...) the article focuses on processes of biopolitical bordering: the delineation of the target population that is to be known via statistical practices. Drawing on the example of Estonia I show that methodological decisions involved in this work have important biopolitical implications as they affect the size and composition of the population, thus shaping the design of programmes of government aiming at its regulation. (shrink)

Mainstream historians in recent decades have often treated formal categories and rules as something to be 'used' by individuals, as one might use a stick or stone, and the gains of an earlier legal history are often needlessly set aside. Anthropologists, meanwhile, have treated rules as analytic errors and categories as an imposition by outside powers or by analysts, leaving a very thin notion of 'practice' as the stuff of social life. Philosophy of an older vintage, as well as the (...) work of scholars such as Charles Taylor, provides fresh approaches when applied imaginatively to cases beyond the traditional ground of modern Europe and North America. Not only are different kinds of rules and categories open to examination, but the very notion of a rule can be explored more deeply. This volume approaches rules and categories as constitutive of action and hence of social life, but also as providing means of criticism and imagination. A general theoretical framework is derived from analytical philosophy, from Wittgenstein to his critics and beyond, and from recent legal thinkers such as Schauer and Waldron. Case-studies are presented from a broad range of periods and regions, from Amazonia via northern Chad, Tibet, and medieval Russia to the scholarly worlds of Roman law, Islam, and Classical India. As the third volume in the Legalism series, this collection draws on common themes that run throughout the first two volumes: Legalism: Anthropology and History and Legalism: Community and Justice, consolidating them in a framework that suggests a new approach to rule-bound systems. (shrink)

Die Herrschaft des Behaviorismus in der Psychologie ist gebrochen! Das ist die Ausgangsthese dieses Buches, die im Rahmen des Modells revolutionärer Wissenschaftsentwicklung (Kuhn) als Behauptung eines Paradigmawechsels präzisiert wird. Die Argumentation beschränkt sich nicht nur auf den Nachweis des Niedergangs des Behaviorismus, sondern gibt auch konstruktiv das mögliche neue Paradigma an: als Psychologie des reflexiven Subjekts, das wie der Wissenschaftler (subjektive) Theorien aufstellt, überprüft, bewertet. Der Aufriss einer solchen Psychologie des epistemischen Subjekts unter allgemein-, sozial-, pädagogisch- und klinisch-psychologischem Aspekt thematisiert (...) vor allem: die Rationalität der Reflexionen, Normenkritik und -begründung im Austausch von wissenschaftlichen und naiven Theorien sowie die Berücksichtigung von Reflexivität in der therapeutischen Praxis. Die Rückwendung dieser pychologisch-metatheoretischen Perspektiven auf die Wissenschaftstheorie führt auch zu einer neu. (shrink)

'Community' and 'justice' recur in anthropological, historical, and legal scholarship, yet as concepts they are notoriously slippery. Historians and lawyers look to anthropologists as 'community specialists', but anthropologists often avoid the concept through circumlocution: although much used by historians, legal thinkers, and political philosophers, the term remains strikingly indeterminate and often morally overdetermined. 'Justice', meanwhile, is elusive, alternately invoked as the goal of contemporary political theorizing, and wrapped in obscure philosophical controversy. A conceptual knot emerges in much legal and political (...) thought between law, justice, and community, but theories abound, without any agreement over concepts.The contributors to this volume use empirical case studies to unpick threads of this knot. Local codes from Anglo-Saxon England, north Africa, and medieval Armenia indicate disjunctions between community boundaries and the subjects of local rules and categories; processes of justice from early modern Europe to eastern Tibet suggest new ways of conceptualizing the relationship between law and justice; and practices of exile that recur throughout the world illustrate contingent formulations of community. In the first book in the series, Legalism: Anthropology and History, law was addressed through a focus on local legal categories as conceptual tools. Here this approach is extended to the ideas and ideals of justice and community. Rigorous cross-cultural comparison allows the contributors to avoid normative assumptions, while opening new avenues of inquiry for lawyers, anthropologists, and historians alike. (shrink)

'Community' and 'justice' recur in anthropological, historical, and legal scholarship, yet as concepts they are notoriously slippery. Historians and lawyers look to anthropologists as 'community specialists', but anthropologists often avoid the concept through circumlocution: although much used by historians, legal thinkers, and political philosophers, the term remains strikingly indeterminate and often morally overdetermined. 'Justice', meanwhile, is elusive, alternately invoked as the goal of contemporary political theorizing, and wrapped in obscure philosophical controversy. A conceptual knot emerges in much legal and political (...) thought between law, justice, and community, but theories abound, without any agreement over concepts.The contributors to this volume use empirical case studies to unpick threads of this knot. Local codes from Anglo-Saxon England, north Africa, and medieval Armenia indicate disjunctions between community boundaries and the subjects of local rules and categories; processes of justice from early modern Europe to eastern Tibet suggest new ways of conceptualizing the relationship between law and justice; and practices of exile that recur throughout the world illustrate contingent formulations of community. In the first book in the series, Legalism: Anthropology and History, law was addressed through a focus on local legal categories as conceptual tools. Here this approach is extended to the ideas and ideals of justice and community. Rigorous cross-cultural comparison allows the contributors to avoid normative assumptions, while opening new avenues of inquiry for lawyers, anthropologists, and historians alike. (shrink)

The use of artefacts by human agents is subject to human standards or norms of conduct. Many of those norms are provided by the social context in which artefacts are used. Others are provided by the proper functions of the artefacts. This article argues for a general framework in which norms that are provided by proper functions are related to norms provided by the (more general) social context of use. Departing from the concept, developed by Joseph Raz, of “exclusionary reasons” (...) it is argued that proper functions provide “institutional reasons” for use. Proper use of artefacts (use according to the proper function) is embedded in the normative structures of social institutions. These social normative structures are complementary to traditional norms of practical rationalityand are a kind of second-order reasons: exclusionary reasons. It is argued that proper functions of artefacts provide institutional reasons, which are up to a certain extent similar to exclusionary reasons. The most notable difference concerns the fact that proper functions not so much exclude other types of use, but rather place that use (and the user) in particular social structures with particular rights and obligations. An institutional reason not only gives a reason for action, it also provides reasons for evaluating actions according to such reasons positively (and other negatively). The upshot of the analysis is that it provides an additionaltool for understanding and evaluating the use of artefacts. (shrink)

A new English translation of Schelling’s unfinished magnum opus, complete with a contextualizing introduction by the translator.

A closer look at recent reports of “modern slavery” in the Sahara, particularly the exploitation of sub-Saharan migrants in contemporary southern Libya, shows that they speak of other forms of captivity, such as debt bondage, forced prison labor, and hostage taking for ransom. Such forms of exploitation have an equally long history in the region but are more obviously enmeshed with contemporary phenomena: repressive migration policies, state incarceration, and the worldwide ranking of nationalities. This article seeks to understand them for (...) what they are, using fieldwork and historical examples. Understanding shifts the blame for the migrants’ plight from “local culture” to the international political economy and grants migrants a degree of agency that blanket condemnations of slavery often deny. It also opens up more general questions about links between labor, mobility, and captivity; the relationship between state and nonstate systems of political control, their boundaries and overlaps; and the different ways value is accorded to individual lives—or actively created, negotiated, or denied—in the Sahara and beyond. (shrink)

Modern methods of information storage up completely new possibilities for the systematics of biology, understood in the widest sense. The construction of identification codes for use with punchcards must be considered against the wider background of these new possibilities. A critical pre-condition for the use of these modern methods is that questions of terminology and classification should be fundamentally restudied. The book for flowering plants “Flora von Deutschland” has been used as a basis for developing several punch-card codes. These codes (...) have made it possible to establish sets of IBM punchcards, totalling about 3000 in all, for German flowering plants. Современные методы хранения информации раскрывают для биологической систематики совершенно новые возможности. Составление ключов определения использующих пуншкарты следует рассматривать в связи с этими новыми возможностями. Для применения новых способов бесусловно требуется основное изучение вопросов терминологии и классификации. Посредством определителя цветных растений „Flora von Deutschland” .составились разные ключи определения для пуншкарт. С помощью этих ключов изготовились системы ИБМ пуншкарт для цветных растений Германии. Die modernen Methoden der Wissensspeicherung erschließen für die gesamte biologische Systematik völlig neue Möglichkeiten. Der Aufbau von Bestimmungsschlüsseln für Lochkarten muß in dem durch diese neuen Möglichkeiten gegebenen größeren Zusammenhang gesehen werden. Eine entscheidende Voraussetzung für die Anwendung der modernen Verfahren ist die erneute und gründliche Beschäftigung mit den Fragen der Terminologie und der Ordnungslehre. Ausgehend von dem Bestimmungsbuch für Blütenpflanzen „Flora von Deutschland“ wurden verschiedene Lochkartenschlüssel entwickelt. Mit Hilfe der Schlüssel konntenIBM-Karteien von insgesamt rund 3.000 Lochkarten über deutsche Blütenpflanzen aufgestellt werden. (shrink)

The society depicted in the Icelandic family sagas has often been characterised as the archetype of a ‘feuding society’. The disputing strategies found in the sagas have therefore served as an argument that the prescriptions of the laws which curb revenge were irrelevant in socio-legal practice. This dominance of the feud as the actual ‘law’ crystallising in saga disputes is questioned through a close analysis of gender roles. While ‘classical’ sagas frequently apply the motif of the female whetter who forces (...) a male character to take action or lose his manly honour, thus stabilising the feuding mechanism, the contemporary sagas and non-canonical family sagas display a wide variety of male-female interaction in the negotiation of social resources and legal obligations. The systematic look at non-canonical passages reveals a discourse of counsel, in which gender roles are fluid and interchangeable. This fluidity reveals an implicit theory of ‘law’ in the sense of doing conflict which stresses the stabilising forces supporting written law opposed to the motif of the whetter, which comes to form a central element of the imagination of the Icelandic heroic age. (shrink)

It is argued that the explanatory gap argument, according to which it is fundamentally impossible to explain qualitative mental states in a physicalist theory of mind, is unsound. The main argument in favour of the explanatory gap is presented, which argues that an identity statement of mind and brain has no explanatory force, in contrast to "normal" scientific identity statements. Then it is shown that "normal" scientific identity statements also do not conform to the demands set by the proponent of (...) the explanatory gap. Rather than accept all such gaps, it is argued that we should deny the explanatory gap in a physicalist theory of mind. (shrink)

Politically, Europe has been unable to address itself to a constituted polity and people as more than an agglomeration of nation-states. From the resurgence of nationalisms to the crisis of the single currency and the unprecedented decision of a member state to leave the European Union, core questions about the future of Europe have been rearticulated: Who are the people of Europe? Is there a European identity? What does it mean to say, “I am European?” Where does Europe begin and (...) end? and Who can legitimately claim to be a part of a “European” people? The special issue seeks to contest dominant framings of the question “Who are the people of Europe?” as only a matter of government policies, electoral campaigns, or parliamentary debates. Instead, the contributions start from the assumption that answers to this question exist in data practices where people are addressed, framed, known, and governed as European. The central argument of this SI is that it is through data practices that the EU seeks to simultaneously constitute its population as a knowable, governable entity, and as a distinct form of peoplehood where common personhood is more important than differences. (shrink)

The use of artefacts by human agents is subject to human standards or norms of conduct. Many of those norms are provided by the social context in which artefacts are used. Others are provided by the proper functions of the artefacts. This article argues for a general framework in which norms that are provided by proper functions are related to norms provided by the (more general) social context of use. Departing from the concept, developed by Joseph Raz, of “exclusionary reasons” (...) it is argued that proper functions provide “institutional reasons” for use. Proper use of artefacts (use according to the proper function) is embedded in the normative structures of social institutions. These social normative structures are complementary to traditional norms of practical rationalityand are a kind of second-order reasons: exclusionary reasons. It is argued that proper functions of artefacts provide institutional reasons, which are up to a certain extent similar to exclusionary reasons. The most notable difference concerns the fact that proper functions not so much exclude other types of use, but rather place that use (and the user) in particular social structures with particular rights and obligations. An institutional reason not only gives a reason for action, it also provides reasons for evaluating actions according to such reasons positively (and other negatively). The upshot of the analysis is that it provides an additionaltool for understanding and evaluating the use of artefacts. (shrink)

Part novella, part philosophy, Clara was Schelling's most popular work during his lifetime, and appears here in English for the first time.