This paper uses several case studies to suggest that two prominent definitions of data do not on their own capture how scientists use data and a novel perspectival account of data is needed. It then outlines some key features of what this account could look like. Those prominent views, the relational and representational, do not fully capture what data are and how they function in science. The representational view is insensitive to the scientific context in which data are used. The (...) relational account does not fully account for the empirical nature of data and how it is possible for data to be evidentially useful. The perspectival account surmounts these problems by accommodating a representational element to data. At the same time, data depend upon the epistemic context because they are the product of situated and informed judgements. (shrink)
In the Antiatticista, as we call the scanty excerpt of a lexicon of the second century A.D., so abbreviated as to be often unintelligible, we find on p. 86. 20 the following article: Γενέσια оσης тε έоρтς &lsqbтς&rsqb δημотελоũς 〈έν &rsquoΑθήνααις, ΒоB7δρоγιѿνоς ΠέμΠтηι, Γενέσια καλоυένμς, καθόтι øησί Φιλόχоρоς καί Σόλων έν тоȊς &rsquoΑξоσι, καί тς тоũ όνόμαтоς χρήσεως оσης &rsquoΕλλ:ηνικς, тί κιλúει μή μόνоν έΠ тς δημотελоũς έоρтς á»á καί έΠί тςίδίας έκáσтоυ тáσσεσθα&iota. What rouses our interest in this note (...) is not the domestic quarrel between the Atticists of a stricter and of a more lenient observance about the meaning and the use of the word, but the facts themselves, which in the present case are fortunately clear enough. The lexicographer knows two entirely different facts: a material fact, the existence of a State festival in Athens called Genesia and celebrated on the 5th of Boedromion; a linguistic fact, the ’Ελλινικǹ χασις which denotes by Γενέσια not this State festival but some private celebration. For the latter, it is important to observe that by &rsquoΕλλνικ χασις the lexicographer does not mean Hellenistic Greek nor the usage of his own day, but the occurrence of the word in those authors whom the strict Atticists do not take as models of style, or who are not held to be Attic writers: it is to such authors, at least, that the lexicographer appeals in the preceding gloss: he there quotes ΕριΠίδης “Іωνι for γενέθλια and Herodotos for γενέσια. The latter passage could be the evidence for his linguistic fact, that ‘Hellenic usage’ applies the word γενέσια to a private celebration. (shrink)
For the life of the poet Ion we have more certain dates than for most of the Other writers of the fifth century. He produced his first tragedy in the 82nd Olympiad, 452after the death of Perikles and when the revolt of Lesbos was imminent7dgr; 'Aa fact which seems significant of the position which Athens had won for herself by the foundation of the Delian League. At the same time this fact clearly indicates that his father Orthomenes, whom they called (...) Xuthos, had whole-heartedly espoused the cause of Athens. He bequeathed his loyalty to his son Ion, who adhered to Athens through all vicissitudes of fortune, and he in his turn bequeathed it to his son Tydeus, who paid for it with his life. (shrink)
Perspectivism in Science Perspectivism, or perspectival realism, has been discussed in philosophy for many centuries, but as a view about science, it is a twenty-first-century topic. Although it has taken many forms and even though there is no agreed definition, perspectivism at its heart uses a visual metaphor to help us understand the scope and … Continue reading Perspectivism in Science →.
In determining the time of Archilochos it is useless to begin with the eclipse—an event which strongly appeals to the modern mind, as it seems open to exact astronomical and mathematical computation. Even granted from the first and as a matter of course that Archilochos saw the eclipse and that it was total or nearly total in the place where he saw it, there are two objections: the astronomical data for the two eclipses of 711 B.C. and 648 B.C. are (...) as yet insufficient even for Paros and Thasos; we do not know for certain where the eclipse poem was written: probably it was in Paros, as the speaker is Lykambes, but it may be Thasos, not to mention Euboia, Crete, or Sicily. The whole thing is elusive, and Alan Blakeway, when he stated the case for 711—perhaps ‘too emphatically’, as he concedes—is quite clear in this respect. The most he affirms is that ‘there is nothing to choose between the two eclipses astronomically’; and what he asks for is a new examination of ‘the literary evidence without that unconscious bias in favour of the 648 B.C. eclipse which so far has influenced it’. That is quite a reasonable demand, and it is only with Blakeway's re-examination of the literary evidence that I find fault. (shrink)
This paper uses scientific perspectivism as a lens for understanding acid experiments from the Chemical Revolution. I argue that this account has several advantages over several recent interpretations of this period, interpretations that do not neatly capture some of the historical experiments on acids. The perspectival view is distinctive in that it avoids discontinuity, allows for the rational resolution of disagreement, and is sensitive to the historical epistemic context.
In determining the time of Archilochos it is useless to begin with the eclipse—an event which strongly appeals to the modern mind, as it seems open to exact astronomical and mathematical computation. Even granted from the first and as a matter of course that Archilochos saw the eclipse and that it was total or nearly total in the place where he saw it, there are two objections: the astronomical data for the two eclipses of 711 B.C. and 648 B.C. are (...) as yet insufficient even for Paros and Thasos; we do not know for certain where the eclipse poem was written: probably it was in Paros, as the speaker is Lykambes, but it may be Thasos, not to mention Euboia, Crete, or Sicily. The whole thing is elusive, and Alan Blakeway, when he stated the case for 711—perhaps ‘too emphatically’, as he concedes—is quite clear in this respect. The most he affirms is that ‘there is nothing to choose between the two eclipses astronomically’; and what he asks for is a new examination of ‘the literary evidence without that unconscious bias in favour of the 648 B.C. eclipse which so far has influenced it’. That is quite a reasonable demand, and it is only with Blakeway's re-examination of the literary evidence that I find fault. (shrink)
In re-opening the case of the authorship of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus I am afraid I must state at once that you will find that there is not much in it, at least nothing new. The few pages, recently published by Vittorio Bartoletti, from a papyrus book which evidently contained the same work as P. Oxy. 842 have not changed the state of the problem. They confirm the two primary facts known about the author in question: that he is a (...) continuator of Thucydides—a fact which was inferred at once from the very exceptional use of Thucydides' war-year, and which, incidentally, does not allow of the further inference that he intended merely to complement Thucydides, ending his work with the fall of Athens, as it is often assumed that Xenophon originally did; that he was the main source of Ephoros for the period for which Thucydides was no longer available. But, unfortunately, they do not contain a title-page or subscription; and it does not help that in the remains of col. ii the anonymous author seems to quote Thucydides. Quotations of prose writers by name are extremely rare in the fifth and even in the fourth century, but they do occur: Herodotus quotes Hekataios for a special point, and Thucydides quotes Hellanikos for a special period, though it is worth while mentioning that both quotations are polemical. (shrink)
In re-opening the case of the authorship of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus I am afraid I must state at once that you will find that there is not much in it, at least nothing new. The few pages, recently published by Vittorio Bartoletti, from a papyrus book which evidently contained the same work as P. Oxy. 842 have not changed the state of the problem. They confirm the two primary facts known about the author in question: that he is a (...) continuator of Thucydides—a fact which was inferred at once from the very exceptional use of Thucydides' war-year, and which, incidentally, does not allow of the further inference that he intended merely to complement Thucydides, ending his work with the fall of Athens, as it is often assumed that Xenophon originally did; that he was the main source of Ephoros for the period for which Thucydides was no longer available. But, unfortunately, they do not contain a title-page or subscription; and it does not help that in the remains of col. ii the anonymous author seems to quote Thucydides. Quotations of prose writers by name are extremely rare in the fifth and even in the fourth century, but they do occur: Herodotus quotes Hekataios for a special point, and Thucydides quotes Hellanikos for a special period, though it is worth while mentioning that both quotations are polemical. (shrink)
The aim of this article is to use a model from the origin of life studies to provide some depth and detail to our understanding of exploratory models by suggesting that some of these models should be understood as indeterminate. Models that are indeterminate are a type of exploratory model and therefore have extensive potential and can prompt new lines of research. They are distinctive in that, given the current state of scientific understanding, we cannot specify how and where the (...) model will be useful in understanding the natural world: in this case, the origin of life on Earth. The purpose of introducing indeterminacy is to emphasize the epistemic uncertainty associated with modeling, a feature of this practice that has been under emphasized in the literature in favor of attempts to understand the more specific epistemic successes afforded by models. (shrink)
For the life of the poet Ion we have more certain dates than for most of the Other writers of the fifth century. He produced his first tragedy in the 82nd Olympiad, 452–448 B.C., another in the year of the archon Epameinon 429/428 B.C. —after the death of Perikles and when the revolt of Lesbos was imminent—and his death is fixed for us by a passage in the Peace of Aristophanes, which we may well call an obituary, in summer 422 (...) or even in winter 422/421 B.C. The approximate date of his birth we learn from his own words in a story preserved by Plutarch, and deriving no doubt from the book to which later librarians gave the title 'Επι7dgr;ημίαι or 'Υπομνήμαтα: 5 συδειπνσαι δè тι Κίμωνί ησιν Ἴων πανάπασιν μειράκιον ἢκων ες 'Aθήνας Χίου παρà Ααομέδονтι. Hence he was about fifteen years of age when he first came to Athens, apparently in order to get his higher education there—a fact which seems significant of the position which Athens had won for herself by the foundation of the Delian League. At the same time this fact clearly indicates that his father Orthomenes, whom they called Xuthos, had whole-heartedly espoused the cause of Athens. He bequeathed his loyalty to his son Ion, who adhered to Athens through all vicissitudes of fortune, and he in his turn bequeathed it to his son Tydeus, who paid for it with his life. (shrink)
Epistemic standards purport to tell us under what conditions we should adopt specific beliefs. In the scientific case, we might understand an epistemic standard as telling us what beliefs we should or even must adopt when faced with such-and-such evidence. It is an open question whether and to what extent science, or scientists, form beliefs based upon standards so construed. Epistemic relativism gives two strong arguments against a robust role for epistemic standards in science. This paper assesses these arguments and (...) argues that even if we accept them, epistemic standards play a strong, normative role and that failure to adhere to epistemic standards, in a sense to be clarified, risks irrationality. To make this argument, we must abandon the idea that standards determine in a strong sense what beliefs scientists must adopt and instead think of them as a guide for choosing between beliefs. If we think of standards in this way, then they can play a role in rational scientific discourse. This conception of standards is inspired by Kuhnian values and helps arbitrate between relativism and more rational conceptions of evidence and justification. The Chemical Revolution provides illustration of this view. (shrink)
