In this article, we propose a philosophical exploration on the main problems involved in two neurorights that concern autonomous action, namely free will and cognitive liberty, and sketch a possible solution to these problems by resourcing to a holistic interpretation of human actions. First, we expose the main conceptual and practical issues arising from the neuroright to “free will,” which are far from minor: the term itself is denied by some trends participating in the neurorights debate, the related concept of (...) ultimate control is also disputed, the understanding of free will depends on cultural context, and the exercise of being free to act in several domains may be covered by other regulations. Second, we analyze the historical origin of cognitive liberty, its current status, and its relation with free will. Third, we criticize the concept of decision in mainstream action theory and propose to conceive action as a unified process constituted by three explanatory, non-sequential dimensions: intention, decision, and action realization. Fourth, we discuss two possible cases involving neurotechnologies and suggest ways to interpret them according to a unified framework in which free will and cognitive liberty fall under a single neuroright to personal autonomy. Finally, we outline a recommendation to introduce freedom of thought and personal autonomy as complementary neurorights to protect both the internal and external dimensions of thought and action. (shrink)

In line with the book On the Essence by Xavier Zubiri, this paper examines his metaphysical approach to the essence. The project explaines what is meant by the essence being unfounded, founding the rest of the notes, needing the non-essential or being closed. This reflection is carried out from two perspectives: the first considers the essence in itself and the second considers the relation of the essence with the rest of the notes. The analysis reaches its height with the characterization (...) of the essential unity and the description of its function in the construct state. On the one hand, this project proves that the theory of substantivity must be crowned and sustained by the essential unity; on the other hand, it shows that the characterization of the essential subsystem and the constitutional system are not contradictory if we keep in mind the criteria used to assert their closure. (shrink)

The most common definition of belief is taken from analytical philosophy, which understands it as a proposition that is considered as true. Such a broad definition is ambiguous for some fields of empirical research, like psychology, which deals with the mental state of the believer when holding the belief. This article aims to reach an operationalization of beliefs to pinpoint their distinctive features with respect to similar concepts. We summarize the most influential interpretations of belief in psychology and psychiatry, which (...) are mainly based on Immanuel Kant and analytical philosophy. We also expose the problem that arises from putting the mental states of beliefs, knowledge, opinions and preferences in the same bag. Our proposal is that a belief is: a proposition that is taken to be true; and which the subject is willing to hold even if irrefutable evidence were hypothetically argued against it. We introduce a narrower interpretation to reliably discriminate the mental state of believing, which is intended to be applied to empirical psychology, neuroscience, behavioral economics, sociology and related sciences. (shrink)

Para el transhumanismo, la humanidad es una etapa que, guiada por la evolución biológica, estuvo precedida por otras anteriores y a la que seguirán otras nuevas. Según el transhumanismo hemos de romper la inercia de causas ciegas que gobierna la evolución y, a través de la biotecnología, alcanzar lo que denominan una “vida mejor”. Los autores afines a esta corriente desarrollan sus propuestas negando la existencia de una naturaleza humana, pero sin abandonar la convicción de que resulta posible definir en (...) qué consiste una “vida mejor”. En este artículo analizamos la claridad y el rigor con la que presentan el fin último de su propuesta, la relación entre el fin y los medios planteados para alcanzarlo, y, finalmente, pondremos de manifiesto algunas inconsistencias derivadas de su rechazo de que la naturaleza humana pueda tener valor normativo. (shrink)

Presentamos, a modo de introducción al número, algunos aspectos que ayuden a enmarcar la aproximación al estudio comparado de las propuestas filosóficas de Xavier Zubiri y Polo. Mostramos la influencia que tuvieron en ambos las corrientes renovadoras del primer tercio del siglo XX y el interés de ambos en continuar y, a la vez, renovar, el pensamiento filosófico anterior, siempre en continuo diálogo con la tradición clásica. Hacemos también mención a las particularidades de la recepción de sus filosofías y a (...) las inquietudes intelectuales comunes ante el problema de Dios, la creación y la persona y su trascendencia. (shrink)