This book is a philosophical commentary on Schopenhauer's "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," dealing with each of Schopenhauer's principal ...

Towards the close of Book V of theRepublicPlato tells us that the true philosopher has knowledge and that the objects of knowledge are the Forms. By contrast, the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’, he tells us, have no more than belief, the objects of which are physical particulars. He then goes on to present us with some very radical-sounding assertions about the nature of these physical particulars. They are bearers of opposite properties, he says, in so thorough-going a manner that (...) we cannot say of them that they are nor that they are not: they lie somewhere between being and utter non-being.This passage of theRepublic still awaits an agreed interpretation and I want to suggest as a reason for this that it is usually interpreted in isolation. I will argue that it becomes easier to understand when seen against the background of Plato's developing thought. To be more precise, it makes sense when taken as a rejection by Plato of one of his earlier beliefs: namely, a doctrine of essentialism to be found in thePhaedo.The greater part of this paper then will be an attempt to show thatRepublicV is a rejection of thePhaedo'sdoctrine of essences. Its concluding part will try to explain why that doctrine was rejected. (shrink)

In this paper there are two claims that I wish to defend. One is that in Socrates’ much discussed “causal” theory concrete particulars are more central than Forms. The other is that these concrete particulars are held by Plato to be not simply bundles of characteristics, not mere meeting-points of Forms, but independent individuals, existing in their own right.It will not, I believe, be questioned that from one point of view the prime concern of the Phaedo is with concrete particulars; (...) not with Forms, characteristics, or anything else. For, the overriding aim of the dialogue is, surely, to persuade us each to care for his own soul; it is for this reason that arguments are put forward to show that souls are indestructible. But there is no doubt that these souls are particulars. (shrink)

In Cornford's opinion, the theory of Forms as put forward in theParmenides is identical with the theory as stated in the Pbaedo—both of them expressing thethat concrete things are the bearers, simultaneously, of contrary characters. Christopher Kirwan has recently denied this identity, in a paper which, if hisis accepted, will upset many traditions and greatly alter our understandingLthe middle dialogues.

In this paper I wish to argue for a view that, despite its traditional standing, has not yet in any detail been defended. The view is briefly that in the Republic, at the point where Plato is engaged in contrasting the true philosopher with the “lover of sights and sounds”, he characterises sensible particulars — referred to as “the many” — as being bearers of opposite properties in so radical a manner that they can be said neither to be nor (...) not to be: they lie somewhere between being and utter non-being.There are two related reasons why this traditional view should now be closely scrutinised. The first is that, whatever the outcome, the passage of the Republic in question — 475a-480a — is quite crucial to our understanding of the development of Plato's thought about sensible particulars. The second’ is that it has been suggested recently, and ably argued, that Plato is not in fact talking about particulars at all; rather about types or sorts of particulars. (shrink)

Book Information Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics. Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics C.D.C. Reeve Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000 xviii + 322 US$34.95 By C.D.C. Reeve. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. Pp. xviii + 322. US$34.95.

A long overdue translation of Schopenhauer's 1913 thesis, the only philosophical work of the corpus not previously available in English. The translation, which keeps a fine balance between readability and philosophical accuracy, is accompanied by a commentary enabling students as well as established scholars to follow Schopenhauer's thought with comparative ease.

Presenting the text of the transcendental deduction of the categories part by part, often only a few lines at a time, this book follows each part with explanation, commentary, and criticism where this is necessary in bringing out Kant's thought. It also contains chapters on the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction, and a chapter on the contemporary philosophical relevance of Kant's arguments.

There are two basic objections to Plato's account of love in the Phaedrus, both raised by Gregory Vlastos, both metaphysically important in their own right, and both still unanswered. The first is that the Phaedrus sees men as mere images of another world, making it folly or even idolatry to treat them as worthy of love for their own sakes. The other is that it considers the love that we bear for our fellow men to be the result of human, (...) temporal deficiency. If only we could be free of this deficiency, the objection runs, we would have no reason to love anything or anyone except the Forms: seen face to face, these by themselves would absorb all our love. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)