In Soph. 237b7–239a11 Plato lays out a sequence of arguments that are generally considered homogenous. An analysis of each argument can shed light on the need to differentiate their respective nature. Firstly, it will be shown that the arguments do not work only at the linguistic level, contrary to the way these passages are interpreted by most of commentators. The meta–linguistic nature of the third argument will be particularly emphasised. Secondly, it will be argued that the three arguments follow each (...) other according to a crescendo. The implications of this argumentative structure will be specifically appreciated. Both these results of the analysis induce to attribute a crucial importance to the notion of medamos on: the arguments do not aim to definitively exclude the possibility of a Parmenidean non–being; they play a positive role within the inquiry of the Stranger of Elea, inasmuch the thematisation of Parmenidean non–being is seriously taken into account and embraced at this stage of the dialogue. In fact it is only through this dialectical step that the Stranger gains the chance to proceed in the direction of a relational ontology and a new concept of non–being. The positive role played by the medamos on presupposes that this expression and the equivalent ones are not mere absurdities and can find place in the Platonic use of language; this implies that the notion of medamos on must have a justification in the framework of Platonic relational ontology and conception of language. The consideration of this aspect eventually gives the opportunity to return to the three arguments and present an explanation of their positioning in that stage of the dialogue. (shrink)

L'article vise à déterminer si le nóos dans sa valeur volitionnelle a été attribué par Xénophane non seulement au theós, mais aussi aux humains. Dans ce but, l'étude commence avec l'examen du fr. 25, où un nóos volitionnel est clairement reconnu comme une caractéristique de la nature divine : le fragment suggère que la spécificité du theós tient dans sa capacité à provoquer des effets sur toute chose, et cela, sans effort. L'analyse se tourne alors vers l’examen des fragments de (...) Xénophane sur le thème du savoir et sur la description des dieux, afin de démontrer que des capacités noétiques, en général, et du nóos volitionnel en particulier, sont attribuables aux humains : elle s'appuie sur le contraste entre la nature absolue du divin et celle purement comparative de la dimension humaine, La relation étroite qui, selon Xénophane, lie la sophíe à la areté et à ses implications pratiques est aussi une clé pour comprendre quels pourraient être les effets réels du nóos volitionnel de l’homme. (shrink)

The interpretation of Eth. Nic. C 1, and particularly of the notion of ``voluntariness'' and ``involuntariness'' is often distorted by the inappropriate overlap of questions deriving from modern moral philosophy. Firstly, this paper presents the scholarly debate on the topics frequently connected with the Aristotelian concepts of ἑκούσιον/ἀκούσιον (determinism/indeterminism, mixed acts and dirty hands theory, mixed acts vs. instrumental acts, role of circumstances, etc.). The next step is the analysis of the relevant passages of Eth. Nic. through a close examination (...) of the relationship between the notions of ``choice'' and ``voluntariness'': what is crucial for the voluntariness of an action is the individuation of the efficient cause. On this basis it is possible to clarify the role and the significance of mixed acts and of other kinds of actions described by Aristotle. Finally, the topics previously displayed are re-examined in order to shed some light on the distortions arising from the adoption of inadequate lens in interpreting ancient texts. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the basic meaning of ousia in Plato’s philosophical use of the term. “Basic” is not intended as “the strongest”, let alone “exclusive”, insofar as the semantics of ousia encompasses a variety of philosophical meanings. On the contrary, the basic meaning is proposed to be the elementary semantic component of ousia, which is present in the background of Plato’s quasi‑technical use of the term and marks the difference from its ordinary meaning. In view (...) of this, a “genetic” aspect is firstly considered, that is, the connection with the Socratic question “What is X?”. Thereafter, a brief mention to Plato’s conception of language and its relation to reality is made, focusing on the notion of eponymy. This because Plato’s coinage of the philosophical semantics of ousia gives this term the role of an eponym, in the sense that its prominent value is the reference to the Forms, but this does not exclude that it may refer to other types of entities. In the last two sections of the paper, a number of passages from Plato’s works are examined to show that the basic meaning of ousia ultimately is “determined existence”, inasmuch as it designates any thing existing with its own peculiar feature. For ousiai can be empirical things as well as Forms, which implies that the meaning of Plato’s ousia should not be understood in the light of an substance/accident relation. (shrink)