In the long history of the interpretations of Hume's theses on the self and personal identity, it is by now widely accepted that the conclusions reached in the first book of the Treatise must be considered in light of what the philosopher adds on these themes in the second and third books. Furthermore, there is no longer much support for the reading, which saw a contradiction here, given that while in the Book 1 he denies the reality of the self (...) or of personal identity, he then accepts that reality when he turns to his discussion of the passions. In presenting a more comprehensive reading of the theses of Hume on the self in the Treatise as a whole, it is essential not to lose sight of what Hume himself declared in Book 1, that "we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves". But having recognized the necessity of integrating the theses on the self of Book 1 with those advanced in the latter two books, there are still divergent opinions on what meaning should be assigned to this integration. The relationship between what Hume writes on the self in Books 2 and 3 and the discussion of that topic in Book 1 has been seen, variously, as a mere continuation, as a new development in a continuous interpretation, or, rather, as a completely new posing of the question, with its own new solution. (shrink)

In the “Foreword” to the publication in 1739 of the first two parts of the Treatise on _Human Nature_, devoted to the intellect and the passions, Hume promised, “If I am fortunate enough to be successful, I will proceed to examine morality, politics and criticism, an examination that will complete this Treatise on Human Nature”. This essay takes a general look at Hume's aesthetic reflection, highlighting its dominant developments and crucial passages, in an attempt to show how the methodological and (...) gnoseological premises for Humean research on the beautiful were already anticipated in the Treatise project itself. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Origin of Justice The Particular Motivation for the Obligatory Nature of Justice The Whole of Artificial Virtues: Property, Promises, Government, and Chastity References Further Reading.

The article surveys the interpretation of Dewey in Italian new-enlightenment and in particular the contributions of Aldo Visalberghi and Antonio Santucci. Visalberghi develops a number of Deweyan insights on the connexions between the methodology of the sciences and the process for the justifications of evaluations. Santucci shows the analogies between Dewey’s pragmatism and Hume’s sceptical empiricism. Both thinkers enrich the attempt by 20th century Italian philosophy of a recover of the Enlightenment’s heritage with the help of Dewey’s ideas.

In this brief review it is not possible to do full justice to this lively and lucidly presented study. It is fair to say, I think, that the considerable merits of this work rest primarily with its intelligent and reliable selection of material, most of which is already available and familiar. This study does not aim to challenge any orthodoxies or present new material of some significant kind. Rasmussen does not need to do this since his real concern is to (...) tell a story about two great thinkers in an engaging manner – a task which he achieves with great success. This is a book that scholars will thoroughly enjoy and appreciate and which will also find many appreciative readers well beyond these boundaries. (shrink)