Reasoning about underlying causal relations drives responsibility judgments: agents are held responsible for the outcomes they cause through their behaviors. Two main causal reasoning approaches exist: dependence theories emphasize statistical relations between causes and effects, while transference theories emphasize mechanical transmission of energy. Recently, pluralistic or hybrid models, combining both approaches, have emerged as promising psychological frameworks. In this paper, we focus on causal reasoning as involved in third-party judgements of responsibility and on related judgments of intention and control. In (...) particular, we used a novel visual paradigm to investigate the combined effects of two well-known causal manipulations, namely omission and pre-emption, on these evaluations. Our findings support the view that people apply a pluralistic causal reasoning when evaluating individual responsibility for negative outcomes. In particular, we observed diminished responsibility when dependence, transference, or both fail, compared to when these mechanisms are upheld. Responsibility judgement involves a cognitive hybrid of multiple aspects of causal reasoning. However, important differences exist at the interindividual level, with most people weighting transference more than dependence. (shrink)

In this paper, we will present an analysis of the Oswald example that takes a closer look at the antecedents of the Oswald minimal pair. We will argue that diverging foci in the antecedents of the Oswald example result in different truth conditions of the conditionals, explaining the difference in truth values between the two sentences. Although the explanation will incorporate aspects of Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals, it will go beyond Stalnaker’s analysis of the Oswald example on one crucial point. (...) The difference in focus assignments between the two sentences will not be explained by a difference in appropriateness conditions between indicative and subjunctive mood. Instead, the diverging foci will stem from pragmatic requirements imposed on the presuppositions of indicative and subjunctive antecedents. This analysis will be further confirmed by extending it to similar examples with ascriptions of hopes and wishes, pointing towards a more clear-cut separation of and the effect of the Oswald example conditionality. (shrink)