As published, the authorship for this article is incorrect. Coauthor Hilda Helena Soares Bentes was omitted due to an editorial error. The correct citation is:Bentes, Hilda and Salles, Sergio. Paul Ricoeur e o humanismo jurídico moderno: O reconhecimento do sujeito de direito. Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies vol. 2, no. 2 (2011): 106–117.The online version reflects these changes.

This article suggests a new approach to understanding the self-formation of subjectivity in the work of Michel Foucault that emphasizes the influence of his mentor, the philosopher and historian of science Georges Canguilhem. I argue that Foucault adapts Canguilhem’s biological–epistemological notion of ‘error’ in order to achieve two things: to provide a notion of subjective self-formation compatible with the claims of his ‘archaeology of knowledge’ and ‘genealogy of power’, and to provide an alternative to the phenomenological theory of the subject. (...) The notion of ‘error’ accomplishes these goals because it posits that experience is the result of knowledge, not vice versa. To illustrate the notion of ‘erroneous’ subjectivity, I turn to two volumes edited by Foucault: I, Pierre Rivière, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother… and Herculine Barbin; Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth- Century French Hermaphrodite. Both juxtapose ‘subjective’ accounts of ‘abnormal’ individuals with ‘objective’ documents written by judges, psychiatrists and medical professionals in order to show how ‘erroneous subjectivities’ may transgress epistemological limits and form new concepts. (shrink)

Paul Boyer shared a Nobel Prize in 1997 for his work on the mechanism of ATP synthase. His earlier work, though (which contributed indirectly to his triumph), included major errors, both experimental and theoretical. Two benchmark cases offer insight into how scientists err and how they deal with error. Boyer's work also parallels and illustrates the emergence of bioenergetics in the second half of the twentieth century, rivaling achievements in evolution and molecular biology.

The bulk of Bastiat’s scientific work is contained in Economic Harmonies, a work generally overlooked or underestimated. Thsi paper would contribute to its comprehensive rehabilitation by re-examining and reappraising Bastiat’s theory of value.Bastiat defined value as “the relationship existing between two services that have been exchanged.” He respected the principle of objective or intrinsic value, of materiality or durability, utility, scarcity. “Products” have no value if not traded, and the exchange is not between two products but two services mutually produced, (...) traded and subjectively compared by two persons. The origin of the value is the “effort”, which transforms the gifts of nature, and consists in providing services to others in return for services desired.Bastiat’s criticism of Smith and Say anticipated recent developments in contemporary economics. By stressing the importance of services rather that of products, he laid the groundwork for a new approach to consumer theory. By abandoning the reference to production and concentrating on exchange, he has been joined by some Austrian Economists.However, Bastiat in his eagerness to blunt the socialist criticism of private property, was on a wrong fast in making the prediction that the area of property and value will decrease with the progress in civilization, since the efforts will be smaller and smaller, and the action of Nature will play a larger and larger role. Errare humanum Le talent scientifique de Bastiat s’exprime et s’apprécie dans Les Harmonjes Economiques, oeuvre posthume et injustement méconnue.En 1850, sa théorie de la valeur est d’avant garde. Bastiat réfute les conceptions courantes à l’époque qui rattachent la valeur aux caractéristiques d’un produit, qu’elles soient le travail requis, ou l’utilité ou la rareté. Pour lui la valeur naît de la comparaison subjective entre services échangés par deux individus. “Les services s’échangent contre des services”. L’échange est luimême le résultat d’un “effort”, c’est-àdire d’une action humaine tendant à rapprocher besoins à satisfaire et moyens de les satisfaire. Ainsi Bastiat annonce-t-il à la fois les nouvelles approches de la rationalité du consommateur et la théorie de la création entrepreneuriale et de la subjectivité des Autrichiens.Bastiat a été moins heureux dans sa prospective : pour répondre aux socialistes révoltés par la propriété privée, il diagnostique que le progrès de la civilisation, grâce au génie de l’homme, nous conduira vers moins d’efforts et d’échanges, donc moins de propriété, et plus de dons gratuits offerts par la nature, plus de communauté. Il se jugeait lui-même : Errare humanum... (shrink)

George Boolos, Crispin Wright, and others have demonstrated how most of Frege's treatment of arithmetic can be obtained from a second-order statement that Boolos dubbed ‘Hume's principle’. This note explores the historical evidence that Frege originally planned to develop a philosophical approach to numbers in which Hume's principle is central, but this strategy was abandoned midway through his Grundlagen.

Artificial intelligence, as a nonhuman entity, is increasingly used to inform, direct, or supplant nursing care and clinical decision‐making. The boundaries between human‐ and nonhuman‐driven nursing care are blurred with the advent of sensors, wearables, camera devices, and humanoid robots at such an accelerated pace that the critical evaluation of its influence on patient safety has not been fully assessed. Since the pivotal release of To Err is Human, patient safety is being challenged by the dynamic healthcare environment like never (...) before, with nursing at a critical juncture to steer the course of artificial intelligence integration in clinical decision‐making. This paper presents an overview of artificial intelligence and its application in healthcare and highlights the implications which affect nursing as a profession, including perspectives on nursing education and training recommendations. The legal and policy challenges which emerge when artificial intelligence influences the risk of clinical errors and safety issues are discussed. (shrink)

Pythian 11 is usually reckoned to be a particularly problematic Pindaric ode. I hope to show that it is not, and in the process make some points which will have a bearing on interpretation of some of Pindar's other odes. Rather than go through the whole poem step by step, I shall concentrate on the main problems and on some particular passages. The most disputed problem is the myth. What is the relevance of the story of Agamemnon's return from Troy, (...) his murder by Clytemnestra, and her murder by Orestes, all of which takes up the central part of the poem? The myth appears even more irrelevant because after telling it Pindar seems to acknowledge that it was a mistake to have told it in the first place. What does he mean by saying that he went off course when he told it? The second major problem comes after the myth and again concerns Pindar's apparently veering off suddenly into irrelevance. No sooner has he catalogued the victories of the winner's family than he launches into a denunciation of tyrannies and announces his support of moderation . Why does he do that? The poem ends, after the social and political comments, with an epode devoted to Castor and Polydeuces, Spartan heroes, and the Theban hero Iolaos. Are they a sign that Pindar puts his hope in an alliance of Thebes with Sparta to win freedom from Athens? And was Pindar in the myth ‘telling us not only what Thrasydaios of Thebes the victor is, but also what he is not: he is not exposed to the kinds of peril that plagued the great house of Atreus?’. (shrink)

The relation between seeing, knowledge, and language has concerned philosophers and artists throughout history. The current article examines the relation between word, image, and knowledge in some prominent Renaissance artworks. It is argued that the shift from revelatory truth in the word to evidence in “seeing the real” as Leonardo da Vinci (1452 -1519) argues in his writings, marks a moment in history in which the human being takes center stage as the interpreter of knowledge. In the search for perfect (...) proportionality and beautiful harmony, Renaissance artists, therefore, did not just create an aesthetic dimension yet were central in a process leading to a reevaluation and alternative modes of knowledge about the human being. (shrink)

Les écrits de Fernand Deligny ont circulé entre plusieurs mains bien avant d’être publiés. Félix Guattari et Jean Oury l’ont accueilli à la clinique de La Borde de 1965 à 1967. En juillet 1967, Deligny quitte la clinique de La Borde pour s’installer dans la propriété de famille des Guattari à Gourdas dans les Cévennes. C’est ainsi que la tentative et non l’institution des Cévennes dirigée par Deligny commence. Il s’agit d’une tentative parce que Deligny refuse toute forme d’institutionnalisation. Plus (...) tard, Mannoni, Dolto et d’autres lui confieront des enfants. Il est indéniable que la conception de la cartographie delignienne a profondément marqué et influencé celle de Guattari et par voie de conséquence la lecture deleuzienne et guattarienne de la carte comme dispositif territorial. Nous sommes effectivement dans des agencements collectifs d’énonciation et peu importe le nom d’auteur. (shrink)

Current precursors in the development of lethal, autonomous systems (LAS) point to the use of biometric devices for assessing, identifying, and verifying targets. The inclusion of biometric devices entails the use of a probabilistic matching program that requires the deliberate targeting of noncombatants as a statistically necessary function of the system. While the tactical employment of the LAS may be justified on the grounds that the deliberate killing of a smaller number of noncombatants is better than the accidental killing of (...) a larger number, it may nonetheless contravene a reemerging conception of right intention. Originally framed by Augustine of Hippo, this lesser-known formulation has served as the foundation for chivalric code, canon law, jus in bello criteria, and the law of armed conflict. Thus it serves as a viable measure to determine whether the use of lethal autonomy would accord with these other laws and principles. Specifically, examinations of the LAS through the lenses of collateral damage, the principle of double effect, and the principle of proportionality, reveal the need for more attention to be paid to the moral issues now, so that the promise of this emerging technology—that it will perform better than human beings—might actually come to pass. (shrink)

This essay proposes that legitimacy (on at least one understanding of the protean term) is centrally a right to err: a right to make mistakes that harm interests of others that are ordinarily protected by rights (Section 1). Legitimacy so understood is importantly distinct from authority, the normative power to impose binding (or enforceable) rules at will (Section 2). Specifically, legitimate institutions have a distinctive liberty right to harm others’ interests that other agents normally lack. Their subjects in turn lack (...) certain permissions to avoid, or redirect, the costs of the institutions’ mistakes in ways that would otherwise be permissible (Section 3). Legitimate institutions have this liberty right because, and insofar as, they act for their subjects (in a specific sense), and do so only for the subjects’ sake. As a matter of fairness, (some of) the costs of the institutions’ actions are borne by the subjects for whom they are undertaken (Section 4). In turn, where an institution fails to act for its subjects in the relevant way, it (and its officials) may have to bear the costs of its errors, which the subject is morally permitted to redirect by acts of resistance (Section 5). (shrink)

Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) refers to technologies that track daily activities of persons in need of care to enhance their autonomy and minimise their need for assistance. New technological developments show an increasing effort to integrate automated emotion recognition and regulation (ERR) into AAL systems. These technologies aim to recognise emotions via different sensors and, eventually, to regulate emotions defined as “negative” via different forms of intervention. Although these technologies are already implemented in other areas, AAL stands out by its (...) tendency to enable an inconspicuous 24-hour surveillance in the private living space of users who rely on the technology to maintain a certain degree of independence in their daily activities. The combination of both technologies represents a new dimension of emotion recognition in a potentially vulnerable group of users. Our paper aims to provide an ethical contextualisation of the novel combination of both technologies. We discuss different concepts of emotions, namely Basic Emotion Theory (BET) and the Circumplex Model of Affect (CMA), that form the basis of ERR and provide an overview over the current technological developments in AAL. We highlight four ethical issues that specifically arise in the context of ERR in AAL systems, namely concerns regarding (1) the reductionist view of emotions, (2) solutionism as an underlying assumption of these technologies, (3) the privacy and autonomy of users and their emotions, (4) the tendency of machine learning techniques to normalise and generalise human behaviour and emotional reactions. (shrink)

Scott Aikin ABSTRACT: The Stoics held that the wise person does not err. This thesis was widely criticized in the ancient world and runs afoul of contemporary fallibilist views in epistemology. Was this view itself an error? On one line, the view can be modified to accommodate many of the critical lines against it. Some ….

The Stoics held that the wise person does not err. This thesis was widely criticized in the ancient world and runs afoul of contemporary fallibilist views in epistemology. Was this view itself an error? On one line, the view can be modified to accommodate many of the critical lines against it. Some of these lines of modification are consistent with traditional Stoic value theory. However, others require larger modifications to Stoic axiology. A version of the no errors thesis emerges as (...) defensible against the criticisms of the view, but there is then the question as to whether it is an orthodox Stoicism. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the cartographical method as a political option able to destroy the linguistic and semiotic empire of sense. Starting from the difference between map and tracing, Deleuze and Guattari understood the power of a rhizomatic expression, commonly represented by the obsessive and compulsive gesture of autistics, or their impossibility of speaking correctly. This phenomenon has been deeply analysed by Fernand Deligny through his experience in the Cévennes, where he inaugurated his personal anti-psychoanalytic and anti-linguistic method. During (...) this collective living, the wanderings of the autistic children, called Lignes d’erre, were traced and gathered in a cartography in which action overtakes word and speech, and human gestures are reterritorialized. Characterized by movement without finality, life in Cévennes becomes a “life raft”, where the raft is no more the shipwreck of humanity, but the shelter for no- speakers. Therefore, a new spatial configuration is given, where the bonds between people and with objects exist exactly as the pieces of wood in the raft: namely slacken, rhizomatic. (shrink)

ResumoEste artigo procura discutir a possibilidade de uma biopolítica que não seja apenas a descrição dos mecanismos disciplinares de administração dos corpos e de gestão calculista da vida, mas possa fornecer um fundamento para a crítica social do capitalismo contemporâneo. Para tanto, trata-se de derivá-la do vita lismo de Georges Canguilhem e de suas discussões a respeito da normatividade vital, das relações entre o normal e o patológico e da errância própria à atividade vital. Ao fim desse processo, veremos como (...) a processualidade interna ao conceito de vida poderá aparecer como fator determinante para a reorientação do pensamento crítico e de uma teoria sobre o conceito de norma.This article aims to discuss the possibility of a bio-political approach that wouldn't be just the description of disciplinary mechanisms of bodies' administration and the calculating administration of life, but that could provide the ground for a social criticism of contemporary capitalism. This bio-political approach is derived from Georges Canguilhem's vitalism with its discussions about vital normativity, the relationship between normal and pathological and the characteristic errancy of vital activity. At the end, we will see how the inner process of the concept of life could appear as a major strategy for the reorientation of critical thought and a theory on the concept of norms. (shrink)

Esse ensaio apresenta algumas possibilidades do pensamento sobre hospitalidade-acolhimento enunciado pelo filósofo Jacques Derrida. Considera a teoria dos Encontros na collage como um modo de avançar nas obscuras relações entre hospede e hospedeiro. Para tanto essas duas figuras são comparadas analogamente com as figuras da espera e da errância, conforme as apresentadas em A collage como trajetória amorosa. Procura-se mostrar que, a questão da hospitalidade tem a propriedade de unir as diferenças, porém conservando-as enquanto diferenças. Dessa maneira, a espera e (...) a errância seriam consideradas entidades indissociáveis uma da outra. (shrink)

Erratum for the Volume 6, Number 1, 2015.

Après avoir erré quelques années, étudiant férocement studieux mais aussi très anarchiste, après avoir déambulé le long des docks du port de Glasgow, alors du dernier stade de la révolution industrielle, entouré d'une drôle de musique où les accents de Rimbaud («Je me crois en enfer») et de Hölderlin («Ce que tu veux, c'est un monde») se mêlaient aux phrasés grinçants de L'Opéra de quat'sous de Bertolt Brecht, je me posais la question : que faire? Que faire de fondamental? D'abord (...) pour donner un fondement et un mouvement à une existence individuelle, mais aussi pour tenter de changer le cours des choses, sur les plans culturel, civilisationnel et sociopolitique. Pendant le XIXe et le XXe siècle on a cru, malgré tout, que l'Histoire était synonyme de Progrès. Qu'elle menait quelque part : à un grand Etat, au communisme universel, à un Supermarché du bonheur. Personne n'a plus confiance dans l'Histoire. D'où un grand vide existentiel et culturel. Sans utopisme, sans réenchantement facile, Kenneth White entreprend une navigation hauturière dans un espace de vie et de pensée, qui a toujours existé au large de l'Histoire. Les escales de ce voyage sont au nombre de cinq : une analyse socio-politique de la fin de la modernité ; une investigation qui remonte aux origines de la culture ; l'examen de diverses tentatives de refondation sociale à travers le monde ; la question, posée encore trop timidement par l'écologie, de l'habitation de la Terre ; et enfin, une critique de la situation contemporaine de l'art. (shrink)

They are correct that punctuated equilibria apply to sexually reproducing organisms and that morphological evolutionary change is regarded as largely (if not exclusively) correlated with speciation events. However, they err in suggesting that we attribute stasis strictly to "developmental constraints," which represent only one of a set of possible mechanisms that we have suggested for the causes of stasis. Others include habitat tracking and the internal structure of species themselves [for example, (2)].

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. (...) Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned with current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area. (shrink)

Introduction (english version) of ERRS 2020 11 1, “Paul Ricœur: Penser au risque du langage / Paul Ricœur: The Challenges of The Language”.

Kant famously distinguishes between the methods of mathematics and of metaphysics, holding that metaphysicians err when they avail themselves of the mathematical method. Nonetheless, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, he insists that mathematics and metaphysics must jointly ground ‘proper natural science’. This article examines the distinctive contributions and unity of mathematics and metaphysics to the foundations of the science of body. I argue that the two are distinct insofar as they involve distinctive sorts of grounding relations – mathematics (...) pertains to formal grounding, while metaphysics concerns material grounding – while they are unified insofar as they treat motion, the fundamental determination of the science of body. (shrink)

Conscience can err. Yet erroneous conscience still seems binding in that it is likely to be morally wrong to ignore the call of conscience. Meanwhile, it seems equally wrong to act according to such a wrong judgment of conscience. The moral dilemma of erroneous conscience poses a challenge to any coherent theory of conscience. In light of this, I will examine Aquinas’s reflections on the psychological mechanism of erroneous conscience and reconstruct a sophisticated explanation of the obligatory force of erroneous (...) conscience, in which the conscientious integrity of the agent is intimately integrated with the sovereignty of divine law. Next, I will appeal to Aquinas’s distinction between the judgment of conscience (iudicium consentiae) and that of free decision (iudicium liberi arbitrii) to show that the judgments pertaining to conscience are purely cognitive rather than affective. This analysis will also help specify in what sense we can tolerate conscience’s wrong judgments. (shrink)

Introduction to ERRS 2019 10 2 “Practical Wisdom”.

Inroduction à ERRS 2019 10 2 “La sagesse pratique”.

Introduction (version française) à ERRS 2018, 9, 2, “Affectivité, initiative, fragilité et vulnérabilité dans l’anthropologie philosophique de Ricœur”.

Introduction (english version) of ERRS, 2018, 9, 2, “Affectivity, Initiative, Fragility and Vulnerability in Ricœur’s Philosophical Anthropology”.

ABSTRACTI consider objections to the use of living wills based upon the discontinuity of personal identity between the time of the execution of the directive anbd the time the person becomes incompetent. Recent authors, following Derek Parfit's “Complex View” of personal identity, have argued that there is often not sufficient identity interests between the competent person who executes the living will and the incompetent patient to warrant the use of the advance directive. I argue that such critics err by seeking (...) personal identity in a purely descriptive manner. By exploring Buchanan and Brock's concept of “surviving interests”, an argument is developed that certain future‐oriented acts have a normative force that contributes to the narrative unity which is constitutive of personal ideality. This narrative concept of the self is entailed by many of the our ordinary practices and challenges the philosophical consensus to view the self in a more dynamic and communitarian manner. (shrink)

A new ethics of human finitude developed through three experimental essays. As ethical beings, we strive for lives that are meaningful and praiseworthy. But we are finite. We do not know, so we hope. We need, so we trust. We err, so we forgive. In this book, philosopher John T. Lysaker draws our attention to the ways in which these three capacities—hope, trust, and forgiveness—contend with human limits. Each experience is vital to human flourishing, yet each also poses significant personal (...) and institutional challenges as well as opportunities for growth. Hope, Trust, and Forgiveness explores these challenges and opportunities and proposes ways to best meet them. In so doing, Lysaker experiments with the essay as a form and advances an improvisational perfectionism to deepen and expand our ethical horizons. (shrink)

Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God is examined. It is concluded that Anselm errs in assuming the greatest "thing" must be a sentient being. The existence of God, then, is not established by Anselm’s argument, and is concluded to be unlikely for other reasons as well, one being that a perfected sentient being would be a logical impossibility. An afterlife and personal immortality are not precluded however; these goals could be reached by future scientific means. For now (...) cryonics is advocated as a means to reach a more advanced future when death may be physically overcome. (shrink)

This response to “Morality or Moralism?” by Emilie Hache and Bruno Latour takes issue with their distinction between two kinds of morality. Hache and Latour see a difference between morality as sensitivity and morality as principled claims regarding moral considerability. They then argue for form-content contradiction/harmony between these purportedly opposing senses. In responding, Zamir argues that these operations can be construed as distinct kinds of sensitivity. Arguments that advocate bringing nonhuman animals into moral consideration can be abstract and general. But (...) this does not mean that such arguments or those who make them are insensitive. Some kinds of sensitivity are attuned to general facts rather than to particulars. Hache and Latour thus err by reducing moral sensitivity to a response to particulars, which leads them to perceive form-content tensions where these do not exist. Zamir's response also argues against a tendency in posthumanist animal ethics—a tendency shared by Hache and Latour's article—to refuse descending to discuss the actual practical questions regarding animals that Anglo-American animal ethics explores. Zamir examines (and rejects) some possible posthumanist arguments that might support remaining philosophically uninvolved in these discussions. (shrink)

The precautionary principle (“the Principle”) has been widely embraced as the new paradigm for contending with biological and environmental risk in the context of emerging technologies. Increasingly, it is being incorporated into domestic, supranational, and international legal regimes as part of a general overhaul of health and environmental regulation.1 Codifications of the Principle typically are vague, with their content intentionally left for scholars to debate, decision makers to interpret, and the courts to flesh out through case law. Generally speaking, the (...) Principle holds that scientific uncertainty will not be a bar to preventive regulatory action, and that decision makers should err on the side of .. (shrink)

In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on (...) symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets. (shrink)

It would be unwise to dismiss the possibility of human brain organoids developing sentience. However, scepticism about this idea is appropriate when considering current organoids. It is a point of consensus that a brainstem-dead human is not sentient, and current organoids lack a functioning brainstem. There are nonetheless troubling early warning signs, suggesting organoid research may create forms of sentience in the near future. To err on the side of caution, researchers with very different views about the neural basis of (...) sentience should unite behind the “brainstem rule”: if a neural organoid develops or innervates a functioning brainstem that registers and prioritizes its needs, regulates arousal, and leads to sleep-wake cycles, then it is a sentience candidate. If organoid research leads to the creation of sentience candidates, a moratorium or indefinite ban on the creation of the relevant type of organoid may be appropriate. A different way forward, more consistent with existing approaches to animal research, would be to require ethical review and harm-benefit analysis for all research on sentience candidates. (shrink)

Recent literature on the ethics of medical error disclosure acknowledges the feelings of injustice, confusion, and grief patients and their families experience as a result of medical error. Substantially less literature acknowledges the emotional and relational discomfort of the physicians responsible or suggests a meaningful way forward. To address these concerns more fully, I propose a model of medical error disclosure that mirrors the theological and sacramental technique of confession. I use Aquinas’ description of moral acts to show that all (...) medical errors are evil, and some accidental medical errors constitute venial sins; all sin and evil should be confessed. As Aquinas urges confession for sins, here I argue that confession is necessary to restore physicians to the community and to provide a sense of absolution. Even mistakes for which physicians are not morally culpable ought to be confessed in order to heal the physician–patient relationship and to address feelings of professional distress. This paper utilizes an Episcopal theology of confession that affirms verbal admission and responsibility-taking as freeing and relationally restoring acts, arguing that a confessional stance toward medical error both leads to better outcomes in physician–patient relationships and is more compassionate toward physicians who err. (shrink)

Thought experiments are ordinary argumentation disguised in a vivid pictorial or narrative form. This account of their nature will allow me to show that empiricism has nothing to fear from thought experiments. They perform no epistemic magic. In so far as they tell us about the world, thought experiments draw upon what we already know of it, either explicitly or tacitly; they then transform that knowledge by disguised argumentation. They can do nothing more epistemically than can argumentation. I defend my (...) account of thought experiments in Section 3 by urging that the epistemic reach of thought experiments turns out to coincide with that of argumentation and that this coincidence is best explained by the simple view that thought experiments just are arguments. Thought experiments can err—-a fact to be displayed by the thought experiment - anti thought experiment pairs of Section 2. Nonetheless thought experiments can be used reliably and, I urge in Section 4., this is only possible if they are governed by some very generalized logic. I will suggest on evolutionary considerations that their logics are most likely the familiar logics of induction and deduction, recovering the view that thought experiment is argumentation. Finally in Section 5 I defend this argument based epistemology of thought experiments against competing accounts. I suggest that these other accounts can offer a viable epistemology only insofar as they already incorporate the notion that thought experimentation is governed by a logic, possibly of very generalized form. (shrink)

Thought experiments in science are merely picturesque argumentation. I support this view in various ways, including the claim that it follows from the fact that thought experiments can err but can still be used reliably. The view is defended against alternatives proposed by my cosymposiasts.