With the resurgence in recent years of Hegelian studies a veritable spate of new translations have appeared of that philosopher’s works. For a long time we have had Wallace’s inimitable version of the lesser Logic and the main text of the Philosophy of Mind. We have had also Johnson and Struther’s translation of the greater Logic, Baillie’s Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy done by E. S. Haldane and The Philosophy of History by Sibree, not to mention various fragmentary editions of (...) the Introduction. Besides these there have been Sir Malcolm Knox’s excellent translations of the Rechtsphilosophie and, more recently, of Lectures on Aesthetics. But in the last few years A. V. Miller has given us a new and much improved version of the Science of Logic and the hitherto untranslated Philosophy of Nature as well as a new and revised edition of Wallace’s Encyclopaedia Logic and his Philosophy of Mind with the addition now of the Zusätze in English. At the same time another translation of the Naturphilosophie by Petry appeared, with voluminous historical and explanatory notes. Now attention is being given to the earlier works, and new translations have appeared, under the imprint of the State University of New York Press, of Hegel’s Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophic and Glauben und Wissen, by Walter Cerf and Henry S. Harris, supplementing the Early Theological Writings earlier provided by Knox and Kroner. (shrink)

In Cosmos and Theos Professor Errol E. Harris develops the theological, ethical, and social implications of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle. He argues that the twentieth-century revolution in physics reinstates the traditional arguments for the existence of God that had been inevitably invalidated by the logic appropriate to Empiricism and the presuppositions of Newtonian science. Errol E. Harris stresses that the holism of contemporary science now demands a new dialectical logic and metaphysic, in the light of which old doctrines assume a (...) new aspect and gain fresh vitality. Professor Harris reviews the history of religion in relation to contemporary developments in science, contending that the conflict between the two, persistent since the seventeenth century, is largely the effect of the Copernican-Newtonian scientific paradigm rather than of any insuperable divergence of aim or dogma. He also reviews the salient arguments--and the criticism of them--that have been offered in the history of Western philosophy for God's existence. Cosmos and Theos concludes with a reinterpretation of Christian doctrine, intended to demonstrate the essential congruity between its tenets and the current conceptions of the Anthropic Principle. (shrink)

"This comprehensive and illuminating collection of essays by Errol E. Harris covers the entire range of Hegel's philosophy, emphasizing Hegel's contemporary relevance, elucidating difficult and controversial questions, and revealing Hegel's insight into key philosophical problems. It presents Hegel's philosophy as consistent, credible, and prophetic in its anticipation of modern scientific developments." "Professor Harris concentrates on key points of controversy and attempts to resolve them by stressing the prevailing consistency of Hegel's thought, interpreted as realistic holism. In this context Harris explains (...) Hegel's idealism as objective, in a way that reconciles the earlier oppositions of idealism to realism, rationalism to empiricism, and reason to revelation." "Much space and discussion is given to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature as the crucial issue in judging whether Hegel is a pure idealist, or is a realist in the same sense and to the same degree as A. N. Whitehead. The final chapter compares the philosophies of Hegel and Whitehead to throw light on this question and to underline the book's two main purposes: to highlight Hegel's contemporary relevance and to insist on the essential realism of this thought." "Key questions, such as those of the body-mind relationship, political liberalism, international relations, and the so-called end of history, are addressed in the course of what amounts to a general presentation of the character and scope of Hegel's philosophy."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Der Junge Hegel, a book of great scholarship and penetrating insight, was written as long ago as 1938, but the Second World War prevented its appearance until ten years later. In 1938 Lukács was a member of the Soviet Academy and he had, in an earlier work, maintained the thesis that many of the most important and crucial ideas in Marx’s philosophy were traceable back to Hegel. This contention brought upon him the disapproval of Soviet officialdom which declared his book (...) to be deviationist. As he had himself maintained that the constant duty of a true Communist was to accept the decision of the Party leadership, which was to be viewed as the authentic voice of the Proletariat, Lukács renounced his own published views. Not long after, the discovery of Marx’s early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts proved that Lukács was right, too late to vindicate him officially. In effect, then, Der Junge Hegel is a reaffirmation and a new demonstration of the truth of the original thesis, now put forward with greater confidence and more secure evidence. (shrink)

The final volume of the English translation of Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of religion contains Part 3: on the Christian religion - the revelatory, or consummate, or absolute religion.

It is hardly surprising that the translation of Part Two of Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion should be the last of the three volumes to appear. Part Two, on determinate religion, is the longest, the most complicated, and, in its various versions, the most diverse of the three parts of Hegel’s Religionsphilosophie, and it must have required much more effort and attention to detail on the part of the editor and translators than either of the other two parts.

In this study, originally presented as the Matchette Lectures at Tulane University in 1975, Harris builds his case for theism, which he understands as the conception of and the belief in an infinite and transcendent God, supernatural only in that he transcends the natural world.

Spinoza's writings on metaphysics, ethics, and politics have had a remarkably diverse reception in recent times and have contributed to the current dialogue among philosophers, intellectual historians, and literary theorists. Errol E. Harris has written a brief and simplified introductory presentation of the major branches of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza's ideas are put forward in plain language and supported by convincing argument. Technicalities are either clearly explained or entirely avoided. Professor Harris also shows the student how Spinoza succeeded in reconciling the (...) insights of both the British empiricists and the continental rationalists. (shrink)

An author writing overt, confessed, and unrepentant metaphysics is, in these days, very rare and very reassuring, as evidence that the true spirit of philosophy is still alive and is being resuscitated. Professor Sprigge gives short shrift to the current opponents of metaphysics, and marshals sober and trenchant arguments, to my mind unanswerable, against them in his Preamble. He boldly claims to be seeking the literal truth about things as they really are, thus once and for all disposing of the (...) prevalent relativism, agnosticism, and skeptical nihilism in so many professional philosophical circles today. (shrink)

To include Hegel as a process philosopher is not common, but is perfectly correct. Becoming, the unity of Being and Nothing, is the pervading principle of the dialectic, which, Hegel assures us, is in its turn “the principle of all movement, all life and all activity in the actual world”. The revival of Hegel studies in America and Britain is well under way and process studies have persisted healthily ever since the heyday of Whitehead, but this book is the first (...) attempt, to my knowledge, to bring the two together and to establish their unity of outlook. The attempt may cause some process philosophers a degree of unease, because Hegel has so long been misunderstood as advocating an Absolute exclusive of all but apparent movement and change; and some still do similarly misunderstand Whitehead as rejecting all ultimate wholeness and finality. A book which corrects these errors and stresses the similarity and close parallelism between the thought of these two great philosophers is to be welcomed. (shrink)

The term ‘Empiricism’ has had at least two different, though not unconnected, applications in modern thought, one to scientific method and the other to philosophical theory. My intention in this lecture is to try to show that, while these two applications of the term have a common source, their actual referents are widely divergent and in large measure even mutually incompatible.

This is an eminently sensible book with a clear and strightforwardly argued thesis, that to pursue ideals impossible to achieve in practice is not always irrational, but is often useful and productive of good results. Professor Rescher maintains that, while “must” in practical matters certainly implies “can,” “ought” does not; so that “cannot,” while it excuses failure, does not abrogate obligation to try. This, he claims disposes of many theoretical problems about moral dilemmas, which certainly may arise with respect to (...) what one should do, but which cannot exist with respect to what, in the given circumstances, one must do. To decide what the latter obligation is, is indeed difficult and complicated. It involves priorities unattainable in the prevailing conditions, for others considered more important. But once the priorities have been settled, what must be done is unequivocal and further conflict of duties is precluded. A moral code, says Rescher, is intended as a guide to conduct, which it could not be if it were specific in every detail. Rules must therefore be general, and particular situations require their modification in order to ensure the best results. This leaves room for, and requires, casuistry the balancing and harmonizing of potentially conflicting demands to achieve the best possible in the circumstances. (shrink)

No author could fail to be grateful for so considerate and thoughtful a review of his book as Professor di Giovanni has written of mine in the Spring 1985 Owl, with its generous praise in the first paragraph. But I am somewhat bewildered by his description of my interpretation of Hegel as “foreign.” To whom is it foreign? I ask myself. Clearly, from what di Giovanni says, it is not foreign to the British idealists and their epigoni. Is it foreign (...) to Americans, and if so, to which? Is it foreign to Germans? - surely not to such as Rudiger Bubner, with whom I usually find myself in close agreement. Is it foreign to Hegel? - if so, then I have certainly failed in my avowed purpose. (shrink)

The need for objective standards of judgement is acutely felt in the bewilderment created by the world situation of our time, a bewilderment that is partly the result of the rapid advance of the natural sciences, with its profound effects upon metaphysical doctrines, religious beliefs and moral attitudes, and partly due to the intractable problems which have arisen in social and political fields. The progress of the sciences, while it seems to have given us secure knowledge of the world about (...) us, has, at the same time, undermined confidence in the criteria of belief and judgement in the conduct of affairs which hitherto had served to guide mankind. Bereft of these the majority of men are unable to see a clear way through the complexities of modern political and economic life and are overwhelmed by the major problems that confront them. As examples of the major perplexities with which mankind is faced today, I shall mention only three:—. (shrink)

The category of being-for-self is central for the whole of Hegel's system. It is the category of wholeness, what Hegel calls the true infinite; and, in the preface to the Phänomenologie he has identified the truth as the whole in its self-generation, which is what the entire system of his philosophy presents. The exposition of this category in the Logic is therefore of singular importance, yet it is by no means easy to follow. Although we may be able to understand (...) how Hegel reaches this category, how it emerges from determinate being, the subcategories into which it evolves, and the transition to quantity that it presages, present nosmall difficulty. (shrink)

The paper by Hans-Christian Lucas on “The ‘Sovereign Ingratitude’ of Spirit toward Nature” in The Owl of Minerva, 23, 2 : 131-150, is of special interest, if only because, as Lucas says, the transition from nature to spirit is as important for Hegel as is the much criticized transition from the logic to nature. Moreover, the section on anthropology in the Geistesphilosophie is unique, difficult, and much neglected by commentators. My own interest in it dates back longer than I can (...) remember, but Lucas does not seem to be aware of my paper on the subject. He, however, has had access to more recent texts than were at that time at my disposal, from which he cites helpful passages. On these sources I am not in a position to comment, but I should like here to address afresh some of the points bearing on complaints Lucas makes against Hegel’s lack of argument and failure to demonstrate the links between the stages of the dialectic. (shrink)

There has been much discussion, one way and another, in recent philosophy, of what has come to be known as ‘the transcendental turn’. Apart from allegations of parallelism between Kant and Wittgenstein, there is the whole development of Phenomenology and Existentialism which relates to this issue. Husserl’s philosophy as a whole centres upon the phenomenological reduction, or epoche, which establishes the ultimate and irreducible nature of the transcendental subject, the primary constituting source of all conscious experience. This again has been (...) criticized by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who seek to substitute for the transcendental Ego a more ambiguous existential being-in-the-world to bridge the antithesis between the in-itself and the for-itself. (shrink)

An adequate review of a work as large and as complex as Dr. Petry’s translation of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie would need to perform at least three tasks. It should critically assess his account of Hegel’s development and philosophical system given in the long introduction; it should comment on the faithfulness and adequacy of the translation of the text, and it should estimate the value of the voluminous notes and commentary. So stupendous an accomplishment as Dr. Petry’s warrants a longer and more (...) detailed discussion than this reviewer can undertake, limited as he is in competence and the availability of space and time. But some attempt, even if too brief to be satisfactory, will be made to fulfill all three of the above tasks. This is the second full length translation of the Naturphilosophie that has appeared in English within a year - after nearly two centuries of complete dearth. So there is also some call for comparison between Dr. Petry’s translation and that of A. V. Miller, and so far as this can be done at all here, it will be only very partial and only when needed to throw light on special issues. (shrink)

1 My first teacher of philosophy, at what is now Rhodes University in South Africa, was Arthur R. Lord, a man who deserves to be well known, though today few people will ever have heard of him. He was himself a pupil of J.A. Smith and E.F. Carritt at Oxford in the early years of this century, during the heyday of British Idealism. In 1911 he won the Green Moral Philosophy Prize with a voluminous dissertation on the passions, which I (...) read in typescript when I was a student, but which was never published and disappeared after his death in 1940. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley was a self-confessed idealist, but as there is no clear consensus concerning just what idealism is, the term has been applied to a wide variety of doctrines, many of which Bradley repudiated. Solipsism, the view that all and the only reality consists of the content of my consciousness, is rejected by the vast majority of idealists, and by Bradley in particular on the grounds that direct experience affords no clear conception of a self, and so far as (...) it gives any at all it is already in correlation with a not-self. If direct experience is to be transcended we may as legitimately conclude to materialism as to “idealism”; and nothing in experience, whether direct or indirect, proves that immediate feeling is confined to my self. In Ethical Studies he refers to the view that material things and other people are merely ideas in the mind of the thinker as “a silly doctrine,” and asks how the solipsist would answer the questions: Is my consciousness something that goes beyond myself; and if so in what sense? and Had I a father? What do I mean by that, and how do I reconcile my assertion of it with my answer to question? Whatever our reaction to these criticisms, they give clear evidence that Bradley rejected what he took to be solipsism, the argument of which he states as follows: “I cannot transcend experience and experience must be my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond myself exists; for what is experience is its states.” Solipsism is the most extreme version of idealism, but for all idealists the crucial question remains whether their theories do not in the end reduce to something very like it; and if they do, they cannot be accepted, because solipsism is a patent self-contradiction, in that it reduces to the self what the very conception of a self must exclude from it. To this issue we shall have to return; let us meanwhile consider further what idealism meant for Bradley. (shrink)

The resignation from the editorship of the Owl by Frederick Weiss is news that will be received with much regret by all members of the Hegel Society and with dismay by quite a few. Under Rick’s direction the Owl has become something more than a simple news letter. Rather, I think we may claim that it is a distinguished and much valued organ of Hegelian studies in America and elsewhere, even despite its modest dimensions. From this source we have had (...) news, not only of the Society and its members, but of everything of interest and concern to Hegelian scholarship; and not only news, but also views and opinions about current literature and translations from the foremost Hegelian shcolars. Just how important a publication the paper has become was immediately felt when Rick’s predicament that led to his resignation resulted in a back-log and delays in the appearance of the newsletter. The Society’s Treasurer was at once inundated with inquiries about, and anxious requests for, forthcoming numbers, both from Libraries and from individuals. (shrink)

The vagaries of the postal system, British or American, or both, apparently, have prevented until now by seeing Professor Hodgson’s complaints about my review of his and his colleagues’ translation of Part 3 of the Religionsphilosophie. I am dismayed and not a little surprised that he should have taken my comments so amiss, for I had not the least intention of suggesting anything but that their translation was admirable, and that the immense work they had accomplished was a very valuable (...) contribution to the subject. I thought I had made that clear. The use of the phrase “liberties taken with the text” was, perhaps, unfortunate, but to say that it was “a careless and irresponsible misrepresentation” is surely rather extreme. For what translator trying to put Hegel’s involved and involuted German into readable and intelligible English can avoid taking liberties with the text? One of the best and most gifted, William Wallace, takes liberties in almost every sentence, yet succeeds in great measure in conveying Hegel’s thought correctly and in lucid English. (shrink)

A revival of interest in Hegel is long overdue. Both the Analytic movement and the post-World War II access of interest in Existentialism resulted from a reaction against Hegelian idealism, but disagreement with a philosopher’s theories is no good reason for neglecting to study them - in fact, to disagree without knowledge is to risk serious error, and to criticize without understanding is merely to reveal lack of scholarship. It is therefore all to the good that attention should be drawn (...) to Hegel’s writings, and Prof. Weiss has chosen an interesting way of doing this by writing a brief commentary on Hegel’s treatment, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, of Aristotle’s De Anima. This portion of Hegel’s writing is especially crucial for the understanding of his philosophy, for not only is he strongly influenced by Aristotle’s thought and, in a sense, himself the Aristotle of post-renaissance philosophy, but the conception of Mind or Spirit is the key notion of Hegel’s system, as ‘Ousia’ is that of Aristotle’s. Aristotle identifies this ultimately with pure activity, the realization of all potentiality, which is pure form without matter, the activity of God and of active reason in man; and this may be likened to Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. (shrink)

As in Düsseldorf in 1978, so in Montreal in 1983, the Hegel Society of America held a fringe meeting. But this last time it was more ambitious and more fully organized, a session lasting throughout the day of August 24. Lawrence Stepelevich opened the proceedings with a brief report of the development of the Owl from a nestling into a full-fledged journal. He then introduced the speakers on the subject: “The Trials of the Absolute Spirit.”.

Explanation of and commentary on Hegel’s Logic in English is rare and much needed. The Logic has been given far less attention than the Phenomenology, and such treatment as it has had from such writers as Stace, Findlay, Kaufmann, and Taylor has not always been adequate and has at times been misguided. The expectant reader will, therefore, approach Professor Burbidge’s book with high hopes. These, however, are at once mitigated by his confession that he gives only fragments of a commentary, (...) and, further, his approach is professedly and intentionally subjective and so one-sided. Nevertheless, a fresh look at the Logic is much to be welcomed if it can offer new insights and make Hegel more understandable and more acceptable. But, alas, this book hardly fulfills even the promise of its title. Fragmentary it certainly is, and not only in the sense intended by the author. The commentary is limited to the first major triad of each of the three main divisions of the Logic, omitting the second and the third triads in each case. This is singularly unfortunate because the very nature of the dialectic is such that the outcome always provides the explanatory principle of what precedes: the end is the explanation of the process, as well as the complete and adequate presentation of the prior, partial, and relatively obscure concepts which constitute its moments. Commentary restricted to the first portion of any section, therefore, is liable to miss the real significance of the whole doctrine. (shrink)

‘One of the guilding thoughts throughout this work’, writes the author, ‘is that G.F.W. Hegel is the philosopher of the modern age’.

There is a sense in which the philosophy of religion is the consummation and the final fruition of the whole of Hegel’s system of philosophy. It could not be superseded except by “the philosophy of philosophy” and that is the system as a whole. It is not without significance that Hegel embarked on these lectures late in his career and after he had thought out and publishd the entire system in two distinct forms, the Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia. And in (...) dealing with the philosophy of religion Hegel is, perhaps, at his best. His style is more lucid and understandable than anywhere else in the corpus of his writings, certainly much more so than in the Phenomenology, and the theory he unfolds rounds off and completes his entire doctrine, confirming his view that not only is religion essential to philosophy, but that essentially, and in the last resort, they are one and the same. To have at our disposal a good translation of this work into English is, therefore, of inestimable value and is long overdue. This is unquestionably a good translation, well and clearly set out, voluminously documented as to its various sources, leaving virtually nothing to be desired. (shrink)

Not unexpectedly, the October meeting of the Society at The Pennsylvania State University proved to be most enjoyable. The host institution, known for many years as a center of Hegelian scholarship, provided the Society with every opportunity and facility for the success of its meeting. The modern conference center, and its staff, was efficient without any sacrifice of cordiality. Certainly every member who attended the meeting and there were about one hundred, will recall the pleasant reception and banquet - both (...) of which were held in the attractive Nittany Lion Inn. Professor Joseph Kockelmans, as local chairman, has earned the gratitude of the Society. The book-display, organized by Kevin M. Clark, was both extensive and informative. (shrink)

Professor Errol E. Harris, past-President of The Hegel Society of America, accepted the invitation of the Philosophy Department of Villanova University to occupy their Chair of Christian Philosophy for the 1982 spring semester. The following paper was presented as his inaugural address to that department.