Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...) that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve her intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...) extends to the environment. Then I will expand the notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially extended. (shrink)

In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...) predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman's claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. (shrink)

Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...) says about those practices is correct in relation to the appropriateness of making knowledge claims, but that the skeptic is interested in the truth of those claims. In this paper, we argue that Stroud’s defense of the alleged requirement smuggles in a commitment to a kind of internalism, which asserts that the perceptual justification available to us can be characterized independently of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In our reading of Austin, especially of Sense & Sensibilia, he rejects that kind of internalism by an implicit commitment to what is called today a “disjunctive” view of perception. Austin says that objectivity is an aspect of knowledge, and his disjunctivism is part of an explanation of why the alleged requirement is not necessary for a knowledge claim. Since both Stroud and Austin are committed to the objectivity of knowledge, Stroud may ask which view of perceptual knowledge is correct, whether the internalist or the disjunctive. We argue that by paying closer attention to what Austin says about our practices of knowledge attribution, one can see more clearly that it is grounded not only on a conception of objectivity, but also on a conception of ourselves as information agents, a conception that is as deeply rooted as that of the objectivity of knowledge. This gives us moral and practical reasons to favor the disjunctive view of perception. (shrink)

The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...) depth discussion about how to conceive perception. If we conceive the perceptual capacity disjunctively, even the weaker conclusion that we sometimes perceive sense-data does not hold. In response to Austin, Ayer claimed that the strong conclusion of the argument from illusion could be sustained by the method of the possibility of error. I argue that this method alone does not sustain that conclusion and the controversy turns back to the conflict between different conceptions of perception. The argument from illusion is philosophically interesting by putting in evidence the problem of how the perceptual capacity should be articulated and conceived. Although matters of fact are relevant to this question, they alone do not decide it. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...) knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa’s integrative project. It’s not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest. (shrink)

The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...) the case, shared know-how can belong to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-how. I also suggest that responsiveness to others, which is a fundamental element of shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...) maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf’s criticism that information registered in Otto’s notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of (...) epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether. (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...) takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...) condition for knowledge - the possession of the capacity to situate a perceptual state in the logical space of reasoning - does not commit him to intellectualism. In this paper, I defend that McDowell's internalism is not entirely exempt from intellectualism, and that internalism is more reasonable not only without intellectualism, but also without reflexivity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how perceptual experience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that perceptual experience justifies non-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discuss this question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. (...) But I will defend that there is no such need. The content can be non-conceptual and even so the experience can justify beliefs non-inferentially. I will try to explain how this is possible and at the end I will assess my approach in the face of Sellars' claim that empiricism assumes a triad of inconsistents thesis. I will recast these thesis in accordance with the approach defended and I will conclude that this present version of empiricism is free from Sellars's criticism. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.

In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...) becoming sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the former only in some respects—are different in nature. I show then how the distinguishability problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism. (shrink)

The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...) pretends that its application is suitable for the preference of a hypothesis. I argue that the nature of this vindication is such that it may be applied also to induction. Thus, to be a popperian is a good reason also to be an inductivist. (shrink)

The foundationalist needs to deal with two fundamental problems: (i) to explain how a justificator grants justification without itself need justification and (ii) to determine the justificator’s epistemic status. Burdzinski (Burdzinski 2007), following Sellars and Bonjour, argues that the perceptive experience could not be a response to the first problem, because if its content was not propositional it would not grant justification and if its content was propositional it would grant justification and would require justification. My proposal is that perceptual (...) experience justifies in virtue of its representational nature. The act of taking the content of a perception by its face value is justified until there is a reason to the contrary, ie, this act is prima facie justified. This forces us to answer the second problem by saying that the basic justificator is not infallible. This falibilist response dislike the skeptic, but it is the best foundationalist answer to epistemic regress. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo identificar e discutir alguns encontros e desencontros existentes entre a epistemologia qualitativa, a fenomenologia e a pesquisa-ação, no que diz respeito à natureza, aos objetivos e procedimentos adotados. Nesse sentido, realizamos uma revisão teórica para identificar as características comuns e divergentes entre as categorias de pesquisa investigadas. Para tanto, buscamos as contribuições teóricas de González Rey acerca da teoria da subjetividade e de sua epistemologia qualitativa, de Moreira e seus estudos sobre a fenomenologia e, (...) por fim, de Thiollent, que apresenta as principais características da pesquisa-ação. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...) while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë's actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call 'space of actions' to the logical space of reasons. (shrink)

ObjectiveThis study aims to analyze sociohistorically how the normative patterns of hegemonic masculinity produced impacts on men’s health/mental health in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsA qualitative study from a socio-historical perspective was conducted with 50 men based on an online survey. A semistructured form was applied. The data were analyzed by the Collective Subject Discourse method, interpreted in the light of the context of epidemic disease and hegemonic masculinity.ResultsThe experience of the pandemic exposed the normative patterns of masculinities from (...) the consummation of acts representative of the pandemic context, which incited men to deny the existence of COVID-19 disease and to delay the understanding and adoption of measures to protect and control COVID-19. As a repercussion, men presented conflicts in the regulation of emotions; presented emotional suppression; were more reactive; felt threatened regarding the loss of the role of family provider, virility; and revealed a sense of invulnerability, added to the weakening of self-care.ConclusionThe discourse revealed that the men’s behaviors are consistent with the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, but express signs of recognition that this behavior causes harm to themselves and their health. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...) circumstances. Relying on Austin position, I argue that self-knowledge does not have any epistemic privilege in relation to knowledge of the external world. These kinds of knowledge equally depend on objective circumstances of the utterance situation. (shrink)

Neste texto, apresento e examino as principais ideias que animam a abordagem ecológica da percepção. Primeiro, na Seção 2, apresento a visão instantânea da percepção, contra a qual Gibson articula e propõe a abordagem ecológica. Em seguida, na Seção 3, apresento e discuto a noção de informação ecológica. Nas seções 4 e 5 articulo a teoria das affordances e discuto a aprendizagem perceptiva. Por fim, na Seção 6, exponho e discuto a possibilidade de estender a teoria das affordances para explicar (...) a cognição social. (shrink)

Há pelo menos três modos pelos quais o debate sobre a conduta doxástica se relaciona com a ética. O primeiro e menos contencioso assinala que o ato de crer, analogamente às ações morais, responde a um tipo de normatividade, não necessariamente moral. Por exemplo, as normas para o ato de crer podem ser puramente epistêmicas. Nesse caso, essas normas diriam respeito a como o agente deve visar ou buscar a verdade. O segundo modo como o debate da ética da crença (...) se relaciona com a ética diz respeito à fundamentação das normas para crer. A ideia é que a adoção dessas normas se fundamenta com base em razões morais e sociais. Por fim, o modo mais substancial consiste em sustentar que o ato de crer, ao menos em alguns casos, é em parte um fenômeno essencialmente moral e que, portanto, razões morais incidem diretamente sobre a legitimidade da crença. Por razões morais, alguém poderia ser recriminado por sustentar uma crença ainda que tivesse evidência favorável para ela. Neste verbete, tangenciando o clássico debate entre Clifford e William James e reações mais contemporâneas ao debate, apresentaremos e discutiremos cada um desses aspectos da ética da crença. (shrink)

Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...) e, assim, adquirir conhecimento perceptivo acerca do mundo. A importância desse conhecimento acerca do que está ao nosso alcance perceptivo é inestimável para a nossa sobrevivência e a condução de nossos projetos cotidianos. Contudo, podemos querer saber (1) se de fato temos acesso ao mundo físico circundante por meio das nossas experiências perceptivas, e (2) se e como essas experiências justificam as nossas crenças acerca do que percebemos. Esses problemas são centrais para a epistemologia da percepção, embora não sejam os únicos. Nessa entrada, abordaremos esses dois problemas. (shrink)

A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição (...) da psicologia ecológica, eu defendo que a percepção se estende ao meio ambiente. Então, apoiado no fenômeno da atenção conjunta, eu estendo a noção de affordance para encorporar affordances sociais. Assim, a percepção pode, em algumas situações, ser também estendida socialmente. (shrink)

O presente artigo deseja evidenciar que, ainda que a libido e a sexualidade tenham sido incluídas no conceito de Eros a partir de Além do princípio do prazer, a sexualidade no interior no pensamento freudiana não perdeu seu caráter disruptivo e não deixou de ser considerada como causa de profundas perturbações para a vida psíquica humana. Para tal, serão reconstruídos os argumentos sobre a natureza conservadora das pulsões e se procurará propor a ideia de que os conceitos de expansão, (...) repetição e conservação, intimamente associados à dinâmica pulsional, não podem ser vistos como elementos que teriam retirado à sexualidade sua natureza disruptiva e conflitiva no interior da obra freudiana. (shrink)

Em poucos anos, Olavo de Carvalho, figura obscura, sem projeção e sem qualquer reconhecimento acadêmico, passa a ocupar o centro do poder político brasileiro. Considerado o guru ideológico do governo Bolsonaro, é responsável pela indicação de pelo menos dois ministros e vem sendo o mentor intelectual de vários ocupantes de cargos na administração e na política. Olavo simboliza hoje os contraditórios valores conservadores brasileiros e, no passo disto, instiga algumas das mais destrutivas estratégias na guerra cultural que ele e (...) seus discípulos empreendem. Através do olhar incisivo de Heloisa de Carvalho, a filha mais velha deste guru e testemunha ocular destes relatos, a faceta sombria e controversa de Olavo, que ele tanto tentou ocultar, se expõe: seus vínculos com escandalosas seitas esotéricas, sua vida errática e desregrada, o grave abandono intelectual dos filhos, e toda uma trajetória pessoal e profissional centrada no culto à própria personalidade que, contra todas as expectativas e quase que desafiando a lógica, tornou-se uma incontornável referência intelectual da chamada "Nova Direita" do país. Um novo que aponta para o passado - para a longínqua Idade Média -, concorrendo para o retrocesso dos avanços sociais a tão alto custo conquistados pelo povo. Esperamos que as revelações biográficas de Heloísa sejam uma gota no oceano da necessária frenagem da difusão e defesa dessas ideias torpes e contraditórias. Não nos importa o homem, mas sua trajetória tem a ver com suas ideias e suas práticas, daí a importância da leitura desse livro. (shrink)

Corria o ano de 2007 quando o jornalista britânico Peter Trickett publicou na Austrália um livro no qual atribuía a descoberta da Austrália ao português Cristóvão de Mendonça, ainda durante a primeira metade do século XVI. Já nos anos setenta do século XX tinha havido uma acalorada discussão entre historiadores acerca da eventual descoberta da Austrália por portugueses, mas o assunto tinha ficado adormecido durante algumas décadas. Quando em 2008 se publicou, em Portugal, Para Além de Capricórnio. Como os navegadores (...) portugueses descobriram e cartografaram secretamente a costa da Austrália e da Nova Zelândia, 250 anos antes da chegada do Capitão Cook, a tradução do livro de Trickett para português, o Museu da Ciência da Universidade de Coimbra reuniu especialistas de diversas áreas para discutirem o tema. No presente livro encontram-se reunidas algumas das contribuições desse colóquio, Portugueses na Austrália. (shrink)

O texto apresenta um mapeamento exploratório inicial da realidade do ensino de filosofia no ensino fundamental e médio na rede de ensino público e privado de Teresina/PI, realizado no ano de 2000, objetivando disponibilizar dados para a organização dessa área de saber como o campo de atuação dos profissionais de filosofia e servir de subsídios à projeção das atividades da universidade na formação desses profissionais e na formulação de políticas de atuação do Departamento de Filosofia/UFPI junto ao ensino básico. O (...) resultado da pesquisa se apresenta na forma de diagnóstico exploratório de natureza quantitativa, especificando aspectos capazes de configurar a realidade da prática pedagógica do ensino de filosofia, tais como: a presença da disciplina no currículo escolar, a carga-horária conferida ao trabalho didático-pedagógico de filosofia, a formação acadêmica dos professores e professoras que ministram a disciplina, os conteúdos programáticos que predominam nos programas da disciplina, a bibliografia básica utilizada como apoio ao trabalho docente, a metodologia deste ensino e a recepção da disciplina entre os estudantes. (shrink)

Resumo Neste artigo, procura-se analisar os fatores envolvidos na determinação da natureza substancial do organismo vivo, em Aristóteles. Tais fatores seriam, por um lado, a forte unidade e coesão interna composicional e, por outro, o elevado caráter de independência quanto às propriedades essenciais ou formais, relativamente às propriedades dos componentes materiais, por meio dos quais o organismo vivo vem a ser formado, ou com referência aos outros tipos de particularidades de seres. Com esta análise, pretende-se mostrar, ao mesmo tempo, que (...) a unidade do composto orgânico-animado, de um modo geral, é constituída por um complexo arranjo de camadas estratificadas, no qual as camadas ou os tipos de composições materiais apresentam, entre si, um forte grau de interdependência. Tal interdependência entre as partes materiais, que formam uma rede composicional complexa e bem-articulada, faz com que as propriedades essenciais ou formais do todo orgânico se diferenciem sobremaneira das propriedades essenciais dos tipos de componentes que integram esse todo, caracterizando, assim, o caráter substancial da composição orgânica.In this paper, I will try to analyze the factors involved in determining the substantial nature of the living organism in Aristotle. Such factors would be, on the one hand, the strong unity and compositional internal cohesion and, on the other hand, the high character of independence as regards the essential or formal properties, relative to the proper properties of the material components through which the living organism comes to be formed, or relative to other types of particularities of beings. With this analysis, it is intended at the same time to show that, in a general way, the unity of the organic-animate compound is constituted by a complex arrangement of stratified layers, in which the layers or types of material compositions have a strong degree of interdependence among themselves. Such interdependence between the material parts, which form a complex and well-articulated compositional network, makes the essential or formal properties of the organic whole very different from the essential properties of the types of components that make up the whole, thus characterizing the substantial character of organic composition. (shrink)

Il est couramment admis qu’il existe une corrélation, sinon un rapport de cause à effet, entre la fréquence lexicale d’une dérivation et sa productivité, mesurée à l’aune de sa force d’attraction analogique. Or cette thèse est démentie par l’examen détaillé des faits d’apophonie nominale en portugais. De deux alternances qui se partagent un sous-ensemble de nominaux, c’est la dérivation minoritaire, ainsi que le révèle l’analyse d’un corpus de 238 mots, qui, depuis le XIXème siècle, gagne lentement du terrain dans le (...) standard de Lisbonne, et y exerce une force analogique sur l’alternance majoritaire sans commune mesure avec le phénomène inverse. On déduira de cet apparent paradoxe et de sa spécificité dialectale que le véritable moteur du changement analogique ne réside pas dans le nombre d’entrées voire de sorties lexicales, mais dans l’existence, au sein de la grammaire du locuteur, de « schèmes dérivationnels » pouvant à l’occasion être mis en concurrence sous certaines conditions distributionnelles et sociolinguistiques. (shrink)

In The Deep History of Ourselves, Joseph LeDoux distinguishes between behavioral and physiological responses caused by the activation of defense circuits, and the emotion of fear. Although the former is found in nearly all bilateral animals, the latter is supposedly a unique human adaptation that requires language, reflective self-awareness, among other cognitive capacities. In this picture, fear is an autonoetic conscious experience that happens when defense circuit activation is integrated into self-awareness and the experience labeled with the “fear” concept. In (...) this commentary I will propose a different view, in which fear is a skillful activity that we coordinate with others as our social interactions unfold in time. If this is true, two important conclusions will follow. Firstly, the relevant brain circuits we should be looking for in our theory of emotions are those involved in affective social learning, social cognition, embodied intersubjectivity, and so on. Secondly, emotions may not be uniquely human, and may be present in any creature with the right kinds of social skills required for affective enactments. Therefore, although LeDoux is right to hold that emotions are not as deep as defense circuits, they are not as shallow as other cognitively sophisticated human capacities. (shrink)

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)

Cognitive sciences as an interdisciplinary field, involving scientific disciplines (such as computer science, linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, economics, etc.), philosophical disciplines (philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, analytic philosophy, etc.) and engineering (notably knowledge engineering), have a vast theoretical and practical content, some even conflicting. In this interdisciplinary context and on computational modeling, ontologies play a crucial role in communication between disciplines and also in a process of innovation of theories, models and experiments in cognitive sciences. We propose a model for (...) this process here. An ontological commitment is advocated as the framework of a scientific realism, which leads computational modeling to search for more realistic models, for a complex systems perspective of nature and cognition. In that way multiagent modeling of complex systems has been fulfilling an important role. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta exemplos de emissoras de rádio nas Américas que desempenharam um papel fundamental no processo de resistência ao poder estabelecido em seus territórios, com destaque para relatos de experiências nas quais os elementos não-verbais se mostraram expressivos para os roteiros de programas radiofônicos. Um dos objetivos é traçar um painel histórico das rádios que se opuseram ao poder constituído no século XX.

La Lectura Ordinaria super sacram scripturam attribuée à Henri de Gand fut conservée dans un seul manuscrit qui date de la fin du 13e ou du début du 14e siècle . Sa description et son histoire ont été faites par le dr. Raymond Macken en 1972, qui est aussi l'éditeur de l'ouvrage. L'édition critique du texte nous a permis de constater l'existence de certaines ressemblances entre son contenu et les autres œuvres d'Henri de Gand, sûrement authentiques. Déjà avant l’édition de (...) R. Macken, et etant donnée l'importance considérable de Platon et d'Avicenne dans les pages de la Lectura, Beryl Smalley parlait de l'attribution de l'ouvrage à Henri «as a working hypothesis». Cependant, nous devons d'abord à R. Macken, et après à Gordon A. Wilson, les examens les plus complets du problème de l'attribution résultant de la comparaison du texte avec les Quodlibeta et la Summa. (shrink)

Com este artigo, pretendo examinar a maneira pela qual ocorreria a necessidade natural, em seus diversos aspectos, nos distintos processos gerativos composicionais em Aristóteles. Em um caso, a necessidade natural se daria de um modo "sem mais", ou de um modo absoluto, por meio da qual se geram os agregados. Em outro, a necessidade natural se realizaria a partir de um princípio anterior regulativo ou determinante, que Aristóteles denomina de necessidade ex hupoteseos, com relação aos processos envolvidos na constituição dos (...) corpos homogêneos inanimados e, dos organismos vivos. No entanto, haveria uma diferença essencial relativamente ao acabamento composicional associado, por um lado, aos corpos homogêneos inanimados e, por outro, aos organismos vivos. Enquanto que o acabamento constituinte das composições homogêneas inanimadas se restringiria apenas ao todo composicional e suas propriedades características, o acabamento dos organismos vivos corresponderia ao todo composicional e as suas propriedades características, bem como este acabamento em vista da realização das atividades orgânico-funcionais, ou vitais. (shrink)

On the one hand, much has been written on Theodosius Dobzhansky’s central role in the development of the field of population genetics and modern evolutionary theory, as well as on his sociopolitical worldview in the middle of the Twentieth Century. On the other hand, much has also been written on Dobzhansky’s role in the institutionalization of genetics in Brazil, where he spent a considerable amount of time. Unfortunately, these literatures developed without any points of intersection or cross-reference. This article places (...) Dobzhansky’s work in Brazil in the broader contexts of the science and politics of its historical period. (shrink)

Neste artigo propomos uma reconceitualização do amor como um modo de engajamento intersubjetivo normativamente guiado pela busca constante do equilíbrio entre a sub- e a sobredeterminação de seu objeto, que se efetiva em relações deconfiança marcadas pelo cuidado com o(a) outro(a). Esta reconceitualização permite que o amor participe da epistemologia como uma virtude intelectual responsabilista, que nos torna membros mais confiáveis de nossas comunidades epistêmicas e nos aproxima de descrições verdadeiras sobre o mundo, ao deixar que diversos pontos de vista (...) sobre esses objetos sejam reconhecidos e valorizados. (shrink)

Resumo: O artigo investiga a seguinte hipótese: o homo friabilis tem se tornado uma nova condição para a compreensão humana emergente da experiência contemporânea. O homo friabilis é uma experiência de fragmentação, no sentido de friável, ou seja, aquilo que se fragmenta facilmente, esboroa-se, ou em sua aquisição mais figurativa, desagrega-se. Para tanto, parte-se de uma questão teórica situada por Deleuze e Guattari em Mil Platôs acerca da complexa relação da potência-impotência do poder na produção de subjetivação. Ver-se-á que tal (...) perspectiva diz respeito ao coeficiente afetivo dos sujeitos. Nesse caso, o sujeito contemporâneo estaria padecendo de uma cleptoafetividade, entendida como roubo da potência de agir e demanda maior à adaptação aos circuitos afetivos padronizados. Ao explorar esse cenário, o artigo sustenta que não se pode ignorar o impacto de tais mutações para se avançar nas pesquisas concernentes às ciências humanas. Palavras-chave: Subjetivação. Afetos. Homo friabilis. Condição humana. Deleuze e Guattari. The rise of homo friabilis: subjectivation in klepto affectivity times: The article investigates the following hypothesis: the homo friabilis has become a new condition for the emerging human understanding of contemporary experience. The homo friabilis is an experience of fragmentation, meaning friable, i.e., that which breaks up easily, crumbles up, or in its figurative acquisition, disintegrates. To this purpose, it starts from a theoretical question posed by Deleuze and Guattari in Thousand Plateaus about the complex power-powerlessness relation of power in the production of subjectivation. It will be seen that such perspective concerns the affective coefficient of the subjects. In this case, the contemporary subject would be suffering from klepto affectivity, understood as theft of the power to act and demands greater adaptation to the standardized affective circuits. In exploring this scenario, the paper argues that the impact of such mutations cannot be ignored to advance research on the humanities. Key-words: Subjectivation. Affections. Homo friabilis. Human condition. Deleuze and Guattari. La emersion del homo friabilis: subjetivación en tiempos de clepto afectividad Resumen: El artículo investiga la siguiente hipótesis: el homo friabilis se ha convertido en una nueva condición para la comprensión humana emergente de la experiencia contemporánea. El homo friabilis es una experiencia de fragmentación, en el sentido de friabilidad, es decir, lo que se fragmenta fácilmente, se desborda, o en su adquisición más figurativa, se desintegra. Con este fin, se parte de una pregunta teórica planteada por Deleuze y Guattari en Mil Mesetas sobre la compleja relación potencia-impotencia del poder en la producción de subjetivación. Se verá que tal perspectiva concierne al coeficiente afectivo de los sujetos. En este caso, el sujeto contemporáneo sufriría una clepto afectividad, entendida como robo de la potencia de actuar y demanda de una mayor adaptación a los circuitos afectivos estandarizados. Al explotar este escenario, el artículo argumenta que el impacto de tales mutaciones no puede ser ignorado para avanzarse en la investigación de las ciencias humanidades. Palabras clabe: Subjetivación. Afectos. Homo friabilis. Condición humana. Deleuze y Guattari. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo refletir sobre o racismo institucional que é perpetuado na manutenção da cobrança do Imposto sobre a Propriedade Territorial Urbana (IPTU) aos terreiros no município de Poções, na Bahia, bem como sobre a necessidade da implementação de políticas públicas e de uma hermenêutica jurídica decolonial que valorizem a cultura afrodiaspórica. O estudo se ancorou à luz da Constituição Federal de 1988, trazendo destaque para a discussão do racismo dentro das políticas públicas, os conceitos de tributo e (...) de imunidade tributária como um processo político e de decolonialidade. O percurso metodológico trilhou por uma abordagem qualitativa, de cunho bibliográfico, com base na legislação brasileira e em artigos científicos, dissertações e livros disponibilizados pela Internet. O recorte temporal corresponde aos dois últimos exercícios 2021 e 2022 para cobrança do IPTU dos imóveis urbanos do município de Poções. Por fim, considera-se que a insistente cobrança do IPTU em espaços de culto religioso de matriz africana, contrariando o cumprimento da Constituição federal de 1988 repercute os fortes resquícios patriarcais e racistas em que a sociedade brasileira ainda perpetua em suas práticas cotidianas. (shrink)

How can we explain our capacity to think about particulars in our external environment? Many philosophers have answered this question in terms of a sophisticated conception of space and time and the movement of objects therein. A more recent reaction against this view sought to explain this capacity solely in terms of perceptual mechanisms of object individuation. Neither explanation remains fully satisfactory. This book argues for a more desirable middle ground in terms of a pragmatist approach to demonstrative thought, where (...) this capacity is explained through graded practical knowledge of objects. This view allows us to do justice to important insights put forward by both positions criticized in the book, while avoiding their potential shortcomings. It also paves the way to a more pragmatist approach to the theory of mental representation, where the notion of practical knowledge is allowed to play a central role in our cognitive life. Finally, it shows how practical knowledge may be firmly rooted in neurobiological processes and mechanisms that conform to what the empirical sciences tell us about the mind. (shrink)