Results for 'Eric Beno��t'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  46
    The Experimenters' Regress: From Skepticism to Argumentation.Benoı̂t Godin & Yves Gingras - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):133-148.
    Harry Collins' central argument about experimental practice revolves around the thesis that facts can only be generated by good instruments but good instruments can only be recognized as such if they produce facts. This is what Collins calls the experimenters' regress. For Collins, scientific controversies cannot be closed by the ‘facts’ themselves because there are no formal criteria independent of the outcome of the experiment that scientists can apply to decide whether an experimental apparatus works properly or not.No one seems (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  2.  51
    Self-Critical Federal Science? The Ethics Experiment Within the U.S. Human Genome Project: ERIC T. JUENGST.Eric T. Juengst - 1996 - Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (2):63-95.
    On October 1, 1988, thirty-five years after co-discovering the structure of the DNA molecule, Dr. James Watson launched an unprecedented experiment in American science policy. In response to a reporter's question at a press conference, he unilaterally set aside 3 to 5 percent of the budget of the newly launched Human Genome Project to support studies of the ethical, legal, and social implications of new advances in human genetics. The Human Genome Project, by providing geneticists with the molecular maps of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3.  24
    Humberstone’s Paradox and Conjunction.Eric T. Updike - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   250 citations  
  5. Eric T. Olson Warum Wir Tiere Sind.Eric Olson - manuscript
    Was sind wir? Wie immer man sich zu dieser Frage stellt, eines scheint offenkundig: Wir sind Tiere, genauer gesagt: menschliche Tiere, Mitglieder der Art Homo sapiens. Dabei mag es überraschen, daß viele Philosophen diese vermeintlich banale Tatsache abstreiten. Plato, Augustinus, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant und Hegel, um nur einige herausragende zu nennen, waren alle der Meinung, wir seien keine Tiere. Es mag zwar sein, daß unsere Körper Tiere sind. Doch sind wir nicht mit unseren Körpern gleichzusetzen. Wir sind etwas (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  22
    Therapeutic Reasoning: From Hiatus to Hypothetical Model.Sanjay W. Bissessur, Eric C. T. Geijteman, Muhammad Al-Dulaimy, Pim W. Teunissen, Milan C. Richir, Alf E. R. Arnold & Thep P. G. M. De Vries - 2009 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15 (6):985-989.
  7. What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  8. Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500-503.
    There is much to admire in this book. It is written in a pleasingly straightforward style, and offers insight on a wide range of important issues.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  9. Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
    Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  10. The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1):112-113.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   204 citations  
  11. Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Personal identity deals with questions about ourselves qua people (or persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it. (There is also a rich literature on personal identity in Eastern philosophy, which I am not competent (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  12. What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology.Eric T. Olson - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions. What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  13.  91
    Critical Notice of T. Merricks, Objects and Persons. [REVIEW]Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43 (4):292-99.
  14.  7
    T. Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman, Eds. Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven[REVIEW]James T. Turner Jr - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):726-731.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  74
    What Am I? Free Will and the Nature of Persons.Daniel C. Dennett, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Ray Kurzweil & Michael Huemer - 2009 - In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. An Argument for Animalism.Eric T. Olson - 2003 - In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    The view that we are human animals, " animalism ", is deeply unpopular. This paper explains what that claim says and why it is so contentious. It then argues that those who deny it face an awkward choice. They must either deny that there are any human animals, deny that human animals can think, or deny that we are the thinking things located where we are.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  17. Why I Have No Hands.Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):182-197.
    Trust me: my chair isn't big enough for two. You may doubt that every rational, conscious being is a person; perhaps there are beings that mistakenly believe themselves to be people. If so, read ‘rational, conscious being’ or the like for 'person'.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  18. Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355.
    It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological, and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  19. Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):738–752.
    What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts--fourdimensionalism--unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures in orthodox four-dimensionalism: temporal parts must (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  20.  2
    Your Affectionate Son in St Dominic Eric Gill T.S.D.Bede Bailey O. P. - 1982 - New Blackfriars 63 (745-746):298-304.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Animalism and the Corpse Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74.
    The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  22. The Extended Self.Eric T. Olson - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):481-495.
    The extended-mind thesis says that mental states can extend beyond one’s skin. Clark and Chalmers infer from this that the subjects of such states also extend beyond their skin: the extended-self thesis. The paper asks what exactly the extended-self thesis says, whether it really does follow from the extended-mind thesis, and what it would mean if it were true. It concludes that the extended-self thesis is unattractive, and does not follow from the extended mind unless thinking beings are literally bundles (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  23. Was I Ever a Fetus?Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
    The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  24.  6
    The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric T. Olson (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press USA.
    A very clear and powerfully argued defence of a most important and surprisingly neglected view."--Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford. "If Dr. Olson is right, we are living animals and what goes on in our minds is wholly irrelevant to questions about our persistence through time....[Should] transform philosophical thinking about personal identity."--Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  25. The Rate of Time's Passage.Eric T. Olson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):3-9.
    Many philosophers say that time involves a kind of passage that distinguishes it from space. A traditional objection is that this passage would have to occur at some rate, yet we cannot say what the rate would be. The paper argues that the real problem with time’s passage is different: time would have to pass at one second per second, yet this is not a rate of change. This appears to refute decisively not only the view that time passes, but (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  26.  91
    Can Enhancement Be Distinguished From Prevention in Genetic Medicine?Eric T. Juengst - 1997 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (2):125-142.
    In discussions of the ethics of human gene therapy, it has become standard to draw a distinction between the use of human gene transfer techniques to treat health problems and their use to enhance or improve normal human traits. Some dispute the normative force of this distinction by arguing that it is undercut by the legitimate medical use of human gene transfer techniques to prevent disease - such as genetic engineering to bolster immune function, improve the efficiency of DNA repair, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  27. Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. pp. 21-40.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  28.  92
    Narrative and Persistence.Eric T. Olson & Karsten Witt - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):419-434.
    ABSTRACTMany philosophers say that the nature of personal identity has to do with narratives: the stories we tell about ourselves. While different narrativists address different questions of personal identity, some propose narrativist accounts of personal identity over time. The paper argues that such accounts have troubling consequences about the beginning and end of our lives, lead to inconsistencies, and involve backwards causation. The problems can be solved, but only by modifying the accounts in ways that deprive them of their appeal.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):189-207.
    In this essay I explore the idea that the solution to some important problems of personal identity lies in the philosophy of language: more precisely in the nature of first-person reference. I will argue that the “linguistic solution” is at best partly successful.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  30.  17
    Colin Ruloff, Ed. Christian Philosophy of Religion: Essays in Honor of Stephen T. Davis.Eric T. Yang - 2017 - Journal of Analytic Theology 5:956-960.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Epicurean View of Death.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):65-78.
    The Epicurean view is that there is nothing bad about death, and we are wrong to loathe it. This paper distinguishes several different such views, and shows that while some of them really would undermine our loathing of death, others would not. It then argues that any version that did so could be at best vacuously true: If there is nothing bad about death, that can only be because there is nothing bad about anything.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32.  99
    The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning.Eric T. Olson - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):24-40.
    Conjoined twinning is said to show that the number of human people—the number of us—can differ from the number of human organisms, and hence that we are not organisms. The paper shows that these arguments either assume the point at issue, rely on dubious and undefended assumptions, or add nothing to more familiar arguments for the same conclusion.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  33.  42
    Manipulating the Alpha Level Cannot Cure Significance Testing.David Trafimow, Valentin Amrhein, Corson N. Areshenkoff, Carlos J. Barrera-Causil, Eric J. Beh, Yusuf K. Bilgiç, Roser Bono, Michael T. Bradley, William M. Briggs, Héctor A. Cepeda-Freyre, Sergio E. Chaigneau, Daniel R. Ciocca, Juan C. Correa, Denis Cousineau, Michiel R. de Boer, Subhra S. Dhar, Igor Dolgov, Juana Gómez-Benito, Marian Grendar, James W. Grice, Martin E. Guerrero-Gimenez, Andrés Gutiérrez, Tania B. Huedo-Medina, Klaus Jaffe, Armina Janyan, Ali Karimnezhad, Fränzi Korner-Nievergelt, Koji Kosugi, Martin Lachmair, Rubén D. Ledesma, Roberto Limongi, Marco T. Liuzza, Rosaria Lombardo, Michael J. Marks, Gunther Meinlschmidt, Ladislas Nalborczyk, Hung T. Nguyen, Raydonal Ospina, Jose D. Perezgonzalez, Roland Pfister, Juan J. Rahona, David A. Rodríguez-Medina, Xavier Romão, Susana Ruiz-Fernández, Isabel Suarez, Marion Tegethoff, Mauricio Tejo, Rens van de Schoot, Ivan I. Vankov, Santiago Velasco-Forero, Tonghui Wang, Yuki Yamada, Felipe C. M. Zoppino & Fernando Marmolejo-Ramos - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  34. The Paradox of Increase.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):390-417.
    It seems evident that things sometimes get bigger by acquiring new parts. But there is an ancient argument purporting to show that this is impossible: the paradox of increase or growing argument.i Here is a sketch of the paradox. Suppose we have an object, A, and we want to make it bigger by adding a part, B. That is, we want to bring it about that A first lacks and then has B as a part. Imagine, then, that we conjoin (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  35.  20
    Personalized Genomic Medicine and the Rhetoric of Empowerment.Eric T. Juengst, Michael A. Flatt & Richard A. Settersten - 2012 - Hastings Center Report 42 (5):34-40.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  36.  26
    Was I Ever a Fetus?Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
    The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  37. In Search of the Simple View.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press.
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  38.  40
    Crowdsourcing the Moral Limits of Human Gene Editing?Eric T. Juengst - 2017 - Hastings Center Report 47 (3):15-23.
    In 2015, a flourish of “alarums and excursions” by the scientific community propelled CRISPR/Cas9 and other new gene-editing techniques into public attention. At issue were two kinds of potential gene-editing experiments in humans: those making inheritable germ-line modifications and those designed to enhance human traits beyond what is necessary for health and healing. The scientific consensus seemed to be that while research to develop safe and effective human gene editing should continue, society's moral uncertainties about these two kinds of experiments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39.  81
    The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In A. Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Philosophia.
    In The Human Animal I argued that we are animals, and that those animals do not persist by virtue of any sort of psychological continuity. Rather, personal identity in this sense consists in having the same biological life. And I said that a human life requires a functioning brainstem. Rina Tzinman takes this and other remarks to imply that personal identity consists in the continued functioning of the brainstem, which looks clearly false. I say it doesn’t follow. But Alan Shewmon (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  12
    Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):337-355.
    It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  41. The Person and the Corpse.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oup Usa. pp. 80.
  42. Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 409-423.
    This paper—written for nonspecialist readers—asks whether life after death is in any sense possible given the apparent fact that after we die our remains decay to the point where only randomly scattered atoms remain. The paper argues that this is possible only if our remains are not in fact dispersed in this way, and discusses how that might be the case. -/- 1. Life After Death -- 2. Total Destruction -- 3. The Soul -- 4. Body-Snatching -- 5. Radical Resurrection (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  43. The Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press.
    Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that it conflicts (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  44.  8
    Leaving Us to Wonder: An Essay on the Questions Science Can't Ask.Linda Wiener & Ramsey Eric Ramsey - 2004 - State University of New York Press.
    This exciting collaboration between a biologist and a philosopher explores the meaning of the scientific worldview and how it plays out in our everyday lives. The authors investigate alternatives to scientism, the view that science is the proper and exclusive foundation for thinking about and answering every question. They ask: Does the current technoscientific worldview threaten the pursuit of living well? Do the facts procured by technoscientific systems render inconsequential our lived experiences, the wisdom of ancient and contemporary philosophical insight, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Against Person Essentialism.Eric T. Olson* & Karsten Witt - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):715-735.
    It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. There is No Problem of the Self.Eric T. Olson - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.
    Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  47. What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity?Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):682-698.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  48. Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences.Eric Schwitzgebel, Joshua Rust, Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Alan T. Moore & D. Justin Coates - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):331 - 340.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  49. A Compound of Two Substances.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  50. Relativism and Persistence.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):141-162.
    Philosophers often talk as if what it takes for a person to persist through time were up to us, as individuals or as a linguistic community, to decide. In most ordinary situations it might be fully determinate whether someone has survived or perished: barring some unforeseen catastrophe, it is clear enough that you will still exist ten minutes from now, for example. But there is no shortage of actual and imaginary situations where it is not so clear whether one survives. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000