Ever since Parmenides, one of philosophy's riddles has been how we are able to direct our thoughts to non-being. Erhard uses the problem of non-existence as the starting point for an analysis of Husserl's phenomenology. He examines Husserl's interpretation of judgments about non-being as judgments made "under assumption" and his analysis of "free fantasy." Erhard thus demonstrates that Husserl is compatible with today's non-relational theories.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 204 Seiten: 145-172.

In this paper I argue that the almost forgotten early dissertation of the phenomenologist Hans Reiner Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem der Willensfreiheit engages with what I call the unity problem of activity. This problem concerns the question whether there is a structure in virtue of which all instances of human activity—and not only “full-blown” intentional actions—can be unified. After a brief systematic elucidation of this problem, which is closely related to the contemporary “problem (...) of action,” I elaborate and critically discuss two relevant threads running through Reiner’s work. The first view concerns the alleged motivational asymmetry between activity and passivity according to which it is essential only for active experiences to be motivated by an underlying passivity. The second view focuses on Reiner’s phenomenology of the will, especially on his notions of “ego-centrality” and “inner will” the latter being introduced in analogy to Brentano’s notion of “inner consciousness.” These two notions are supposed to unify all manifestations of the human will, including “full-blown” intentional actions and non-intentional doings such as laughter. Reiner’s extension of will-based actions to non-intentional activity is one of the most remarkable aspects of his early work. Finally, I show that Reiner ultimately answers the unity problem in the negative because he ends up with the view that besides will-based agency he also acknowledges so-called “motor activity” which is not intrinsically related to the will. I close with a couple of tentative proposals how volitional and motor actions might be unified nonetheless. (shrink)

Biofilms can be viewed as tissue‐like structures in which microorganisms are organized in a spatial and functional sophisticated manner. Biofilm formation requires the orchestration of a highly integrated network of regulatory proteins to establish cell differentiation and production of a complex extracellular matrix. Here, we discuss the role of the essential Bacillus subtilis biofilm activator RemA. Despite intense research on biofilms, RemA is a largely underappreciated regulatory protein. RemA forms donut‐shaped octamers with the potential to assemble into dimeric superstructures. The (...) presumed DNA‐binding mode suggests that RemA organizes its target DNA into nucleosome‐like structures, which are the basis for its role as transcriptional activator. We discuss how RemA affects gene expression in the context of biofilm formation, and its regulatory interplay with established components of the biofilm regulatory network, such as SinR, SinI, SlrR, and SlrA. We emphasize the additional role of RemA played in nitrogen metabolism and osmotic‐stress adjustment. (shrink)

1. Universi corporis pansophici caput summum --2. Arithmetische Beschreibung der Moral-Weisheit von Personen und Sachen.

Erhard Wiersing ; Literaturverz. S. [1013] - 1071 ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- PVA 2007.1762.

Dieses voluminöse Werk ist Abhandlung, Lehrbuch und Nachschlagewerk in einem! Vertretern unterschiedlicher Forschungsgebiete, vor allem aber denen der Pädagogik, liegt hier der im heutigen Wissenschaftsraum erstmals unternommene Versuch vor, das Phänomen »Menschenbildung« nicht allein erziehungswissenschaftlich, sondern umfassend humanwissenschaftlich zu begründen. Unter Berücksichtigung der naturgeschichtlichen, historisch-kulturellen wie historisch-gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen wird auf eine grundsätzliche Vergewisserung des Verständnisses von Menschenbildung hingearbeitet, um letztendlich auch eine neue Sichtweise auf das Phänomen Bildung zu ermöglichen. Praxis wird nur insoweit thematisiert, als sie Gegenstand der Theorie ist (...) und damit ihrer Aufklärung dient. Unter Bildung wird dabei jener alles umfassende Wirkungs- und Handlungszusammenhang verstanden, in dem das menschliche Individuum vom Anbeginn seines Lebens bis zu seinem Tode geformt wird und sich selbst formt. (shrink)

Individual questions of the institutional reforms of the representative-democratic parliamentary system, such as issues of electoral law, party law, and parliamentary law, are frequently discussed. But all these reflections - and this is the principal thesis of this article - must eventually remain without success, if they do not address the preceding basic problem concerning the democratically indispensable conditions of the mental constitution of the active citizen, the „civis“. There, a key role, consciously experienced like a paradox, falls upon the (...) renunciation of the claim to absolute truth of one’s own political convictions with regard to equally „relative-absolute“ claims for validity of others. On this base the psychological presuppositions of a modern pluralistic democracy are discussed, which thereupon are to be institutionalized: e. g. the capacity to compromise, the obligation of state neutrality in religious matters, the renunciation of hate speech, the rejection of „denial of reality“, and of allegedly „finalizing“ ideologies of history. (shrink)

Este artículo trata sobre la discusión en torno al conflicto entre la seguridad y la libertad, y, más concretamente, entre la prevención policial y los derechos de los ciudadanos. El autor va más allá de la mera afirmación de que entre esos dos polos existe una relación de tensión, e intenta fijar los elementos que en el Estado de Derecho son absolutamente irrenunciables si es que no se quiere abandonar este tipo de Estado. Analiza para ello, críticamente, la jurisprudencia del (...) Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán, con referencias al acervo normativo de la Unión Europea. Su conclusión es que la intervención del Estado en la esfera privada del ciudadano debe estar sujeta a límites infranqueables, también en lo que concierne al control preventivo de riesgos relacionados con el terrorismo. (shrink)

This paper analyses the change in the notion of fundamental and human rights in Germany and throughout the European Union during the process of European integration. This change, that can be summarized in the formula “from human rights to state tasks,” signifies the integration and partial amendment of the French Revolution's ideals (liberté, égalité, fraternité) with the new ideals of security, diversity and solidarity. These new ideals make it necessary for the state to play a positive role in devising, for (...) example, a policy of minority recognition and a long list of social rights. These rights are often translated into merely generic “norms on state objectives” and not directly binding law in force. This means that such rights increasingly become a political and legislative issue making it more difficult for the Courts to offer guarantees. (shrink)

Like Kant at his time, Jürgen Habermas wants to encourage the reader to use his „reasonable liberty“. There is no doubt, that the philosophical positions of Kant on the one hand and of Hegel on the other hand hold, until today, a key role in the development of the „discourse of modern age“. In order to oppose a short-circuited synthesis of both systems, which are obliged to the idea of liberty quite differently, this essay demonstrates the substantial differences regarding to (...) elementary concepts like peculiarity of the individual will, law and legislation, people and sovereignty of the people. That both philosophers differ in their interest of questioning becomes quite clear regarding to the citizen/state relation. While Hegel tries to describe the reality of the state as a „moral universe“ and therefore as „reality of reason“, Kant is interested in knowing about the potential state togetherness of individuals which have experienced in them the „radical evil“. The differences concerning the estimation of the „subjective“ individual will in its relationship to the „objective“ will of „generality“, concerning also the (Rousseauian) concept of contract and the citizens as „co-legislators“ are culminating in the relationship between „law“ and „morality“. Whereas Kant (wrongly) ignores ethos and history, Hegel is lacking the concept of „intersubjective communication“ (so Habermas states). From both insufficiencies conclusions are resulting which are important for coping with the actual difficulties with „inclusion“ and „integration“. (shrink)