Results for 'Epistemic value pluralism'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3.  91
    How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist.David Matheson - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):391-405.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  68
    A Militant Rationality: Epistemic Values, Scientific Ethos, and Methodological Pluralism in Epidemiology.Kelly Ichitani Koide - 2012 - Scientiae Studia 10 (SPE):141-150.
    Technoscientific research, a kind of scientific research conducted within the decontextualized approach (DA), uses advanced technology to produce instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures, that enable us to gain knowledge of states of affairs of novel domains, especially knowledge about new possibilities of what we can do and make, with the horizons of practical, industrial, medical or military innovation, and economic growth and competition, never far removed from view. The legitimacy of technoscientific innovations can be appraised only in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  6
    Value Pluralism in Research Integrity.Lex Bouter, Tamarinde Haven, Jeroen de Ridder & Rik Peels - 2019 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 4 (1).
    Both scientists and society at large have rightfully become increasingly concerned about research integrity in recent decades. In response, codes of conduct for research have been developed and elaborated. We show that these codes contain substantial pluralism. First, there is metaphysical pluralism in that codes include values, norms, and virtues. Second, there is axiological pluralism, because there are different categories of values, norms, and virtues: epistemic, moral, professional, social, and legal. Within and between these different categories, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  34
    Moral Coherence and Value Pluralism.Patricia Marino - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):117-135.
    This paper addresses the question of what value pluralism tells us about the pursuit of moral coherence as a method of moral reasoning. I focus on the status of the norm of ‘systematicity,’ or the demand that our principles be as few and as simple as possible. I argue that, given certain descriptive facts about the pluralistic ways we value, epistemic ways of supporting a systematicity norm do not succeed. Because it is sometimes suggested that coherence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  2
    The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability.Imke von Maur - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  34
    Values and Objectivity in Science: Value-Ladenness, Pluralism and the Epistemic Attitude.Martin Carrier - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (10):2547-2568.
  10. A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.
    In this essay, I aim to motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. At the core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of practical rationality put in the service of various epistemic goals. I begin by sketching some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. I then present my preferred version of the view and sketch some of its benefits. Thomas Kelly has raised challenging objections to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  11.  26
    When Democracy Meets Pluralism: Landemore's Epistemic Argument for Democracy and the Problem of Value Diversity.Stephen G. W. Stich - 2014 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 26 (1-2):170-183.
    ABSTRACTIn Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore makes an epistemic argument for democracy. She contends that, due to their greater cognitive diversity, democratic groups will engage in superior deliberation and information aggregation than will groups of experts; consequently, the quality of their policies will be better. But the introduction of value diversity into Landemore's model—which is necessary if the argument is to apply to the real world—undermines her argument for the epistemic superiority of democratic deliberation. First, the existence of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  18
    Radical Pluralism, Ontological Underdetermination, and the Role of Values in Species Classification.Stijn Conix - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Cambridge
    The main claim of this thesis is that value-judgments should play a profound role in the construction and evaluation of species classifications. The arguments for this claim will be presented over the course of five chapters. These are divided into two main parts; part one, which consists of the two first chapters, presents an argument for a radical form of species pluralism; part two, which comprises the remaining chapters, discusses the implications of radical species pluralism for the (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  73
    Value Management and Model Pluralism in Climate Science.Julie Jebeile & Michel Crucifix - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (August 2021):120-127.
    Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice.Göran Collste - 2019 - Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics 13 (2):1-12.
    For liberalism, values such as respect, reciprocity, and tolerance should frame cultural encounters in multicultural societies. However, it is easy to disregard that power differences and political domination also influence the cultural sphere and the relations between cultural groups. In this essay, I focus on some challenges for cultural pluralism. In relation to Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava, I discuss the meaning of cultural domination and epistemic injustice and their historical and moral implications. Bhargava argued that as a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  11
    Epistemic Injustice and Judicial Discourse on Transgender Rights in India: Uncovering Temporal Pluralism.Dipika Jain & Kimberly M. Rhoten - 2020 - Journal of Human Values 26 (1):30-49.
    This article examines how efforts at legal legibility acquisition by gender diverse litigants result in problematic and, at times, erroneous discourses on sex and gender that homogenize the litigants themselves. When gender diverse persons approach the court with a rights claim, the narrative they present must necessarily limit itself to a normative discourse that the court may understand and, therefore, engage with. Consequently, the everyday lived experiences of gender diverse persons are often deliberately erased from the narrative as litigants mould (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  18
    Validity and Scope as Criteria for Deliberative Epistemic Quality Across Pluralism.Andrew Knops - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (3):340-350.
    This paper examines the properties of the validity and scope of arguments as standards for evaluating the epistemic qualities of particular deliberative exchanges within a context of value pluralism where parties can hold differing views of the common good based on incommensurable basic values. In this context, the task of political decisions is to maximise the interests of all, only judging between internally coherent versions of the common good on the basis of their mutual impact. The paper (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. Attending to Others: Simone Weil and Epistemic Pluralism.Shari Stone-Mediatore - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (2):79-95.
    Since the 1980s, feminist epistemologists have exposed the cultural biases that have denied epistemic value to certain epistemic styles and agents while they have explored ways to reclaim the devalued epistemic modes--including more practical, emotionally invested, and community-situated modes of knowing--that many of us have found to be meaningful ways of engaging the world. At the same time, feminist critics have sought not merely to reverse received epistemic hierarchies but to explore more pluralistic epistemologies that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Pure Epistemic Proceduralism.Fabienne Peter - 2008 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1):33-55.
    In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism–the view that political equality is only instrumentally (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  20. On Pluralism and Conceptual Engineering: Introduction and Overview.Delia Belleri - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of pluralism when trying to characterise the very object(s) of conceptual engineering. Is it just concepts? Could concepts be pluralistically conceived for the purposes of conceptual engineering? Or rather, is it concepts and other representational devices as well? Second, one may wonder whether concepts have only one function in our mental life (representation) or, rather, a plurality of functions (including non-representational ones). Third, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The Nature and Value of Knowledge:Three Investigations: Three Investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   153 citations  
  22.  33
    A Plea for Epistemic Truth: Jaina Logic From a Many-Valued Perspective.Fabien Schang - 2009 - In A. Schuman (ed.), Logic in Religious Discourse. Ontos Verlag. pp. 54--83.
    We present the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication as a 7-valued logic, in which every logical value consists in a 3-tuple of opinions. A question-answer semantics is used in order to give an intuitive characterization of these logical values in terms of opinion polls. Two different interpretations are plausible for the latest sort of opinion, depending upon whether "non-assertability" refers to incompleteness or inconsistency. It is shown hat the incomplete version of JL_{G} is equivalent to Kleene's logic K3, whereas (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  33
    The Spectra of Epistemic Norms.Matt Weiner - 2014 - In Clayton M. Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-218.
    I argue that there is a wide variety of epistemic norms, distributed along two different spectra. One spectrum runs from the ideal to the practical and concerns the extent to which it is possible to follow the norm given our cognitive and epistemic limitations. The other spectrum runs from thin to thick and concerns the extent to which the norm concerns facts about our beliefs over and above the content of the belief. Many putative epistemic norms, such (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24.  51
    Pluralism and Liberal Politics.Robert Talisse - 2011 - Routledge.
    In this book, Robert Talisse critically examines the moral and political implications of pluralism, the view that our best moral thinking is indeterminate and that moral conflict is an inescapable feature of the human condition. Through a careful engagement with the work of William James, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and their contemporary followers, Talisse distinguishes two broad types of moral pluralism: metaphysical and epistemic. After arguing that metaphysical pluralism does not offer a compelling account of (...) and thus cannot ground a viable conception of liberal politics, Talisse proposes and defends a distinctive variety of epistemic pluralism. According to this view, certain value conflicts are at present undecidable rather than intrinsic. Consequently, epistemic pluralism countenances the possibility that further argumentation, enhanced reflection, or the acquisition of more information could yield rational resolutions to the kinds of value conflicts that metaphysical pluralists deem irresolvable as such. Talisse’s epistemic pluralism hence prescribes a politics in which deep value conflicts are to be addressed by ongoing argumentation and free engagement among citizens; the epistemic pluralist thus sees liberal democracy is the proper political response to ongoing moral disagreement. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  25. Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy.J. Katzav & K. Vaesen - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    Recently, mainstream philosophy journals have tended to implement more and more stringent forms of peer review, probably in an attempt to prevent editorial decisions that are based on factors other than quality. Against this trend, we propose that journals should relax their standards of acceptance, as well as be less restrictive about whom is to decide what is admitted into the debate. We start by arguing, partly on the basis of the history of peer review in the journal Mind, that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  26.  14
    The Epistemology of Democracy: The Epistemic Virtues of Democracy.Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (1):56-70.
    The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  28. Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal.David Ludwig - 2015 - Erkenntnis (6):1-20.
    The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  29. On Epistemic Agency.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
    Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  10
    The Epistemology of Democracy: The Epistemic Virtues of Democracy.Snježana Prijić Samaržija - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (1):56-70.
    The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  6
    Refining Value Sensitive Design: A (Capability-Based) Procedural Ethics Approach to Technological Design for Well-Being.Alessandra Cenci & Dylan Cawthorne - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (5):2629-2662.
    Fundamental questions in value sensitive design include whether and how high-tech products/artefacts could embody values and ethical ideals, and how plural and incommensurable values of ethical and social importance could be chosen rationally and objectively at a collective level. By using a humanitarian cargo drone study as a starting point, this paper tackles the challenges that VSD’s lack of commitment to a specific ethical theory generates in practical applications. Besides, it highlights how mainstream ethical approaches usually related to VSD (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection.Luca Moretti, Peter Hartl & Akos Gyarmathy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1453-1460.
  33. Legal Pluralism.Natalie Stoljar - 1994 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation argues for a position called "legal pluralism". According to legal pluralism, most legal decision-making, especially decision-making by judges in "hard cases", is best analyzed as the application of a plurality of legal values which often conflict. Moreover, legal pluralism claims that these conflicts often cannot be resolved, and therefore decision-making in law is genuinely indeterministic in many cases. The position contrasts with two common accounts of judicial decision-making in hard cases: the claim that judicial decision-making (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  20
    Meaning-Preserving Translations of Non-classical Logics into Classical Logic: Between Pluralism and Monism.Gerhard Schurz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
    In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are demonstrably without epistemic value. Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus non-classical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaning-preserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35.  28
    Recognizing the Epistemic Role of Experience in Ethics: Reflections Inspired by Putnam, McDowell, Wittgenstein, and Dewey. Tumulty - 2015 - The Pluralist 10 (2):172.
    Standard, or ordinary, modern philosophy, with its inadequately examined assumption of what amounts to a Cartesian-inspired epistemological stance accompanied today with materialist reductionist patterns of seeing and thinking, presents significant obstacles to recognizing the cognitive force of the diverse experiences that arise within and are made possible by our need and interest-based practices whose roots lie in our bio-social nature.1 This denial of epistemic value to experience has negative consequences in general but particularly for understanding the ethical dimension (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. In Defense of Liberal-Pluralism.Chidella Upendra - 2009 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    The book takes a critical view of the Kantian and the Neo-Kantian moral philosophers' preference to universalism, unity of morality, moral impartiality, consensus and common morality. The central claim of the book is if we treat human condition as complex and infested with irreducible choices and alternatives, then moral rightness and wrongness ought to operate beyond these binaries; giving epistemic status to Pluralism's multiple rationalities. Redefining liberal-pluralism, the book also argues that moral reasoning is necessarily bound by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  1
    Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus. [REVIEW]Douglas J. Den Uyl - 1995 - Review of Metaphysics 48 (4):926-927.
    It could be said that the book considers consensus in two basic ways: cognitively and socially. The latter would include ethics, value theory, political philosophy, and communication. The former considers the role of consensus in seeking and understanding the truth and would thus include epistemology and science. In all cases, consensus is a form of agreement. In the epistemological realm it emerges as some form of shared understanding, while in the social we see it as like-mindedness regarding procedures or (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  1
    Epistemic Commitments: Making Relevant Science in Biodiversity Studies.Isabelle Arpin & Céline Granjou - 2015 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 40 (6):1022-1046.
    We contribute to the exploration of diversity in interdisciplinary science by elaborating the notion of epistemic commitments to address researchers’ different views of knowledge that matters and how these views are embedded in research practices and networks. Based on previous science and technology studies and science-policy literature, we define epistemic commitments as reflexive commitments to regimes of relevant research. Drawing on an in-depth enquiry in the case of biodiversity studies in France, we describe four regimes of research, each (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Value Pluralism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Overview of the main issues about value pluralism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  40. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  42. The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  43. The Epistemic Value of Understanding.Henk W. de Regt - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):585-597.
    This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  44.  74
    Putting Knowledge in its Place: Virtue, Value, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Philip R. Olson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):241-261.
    Traditionally, the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists has centered on the value of knowledge and its justification. A value pluralist, virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology allows us to accept what I shall call the insight of externalism while still acknowledging the importance of internalists’ insistence on the value of reflection. Intellectual virtue can function as the unifying consideration in a study of a host of epistemic values, including understanding, wisdom, and what I call articulate reflection. Each (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  50
    Relativism Vs. Pluralism and Objectivism.Joseph Margolis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:95-106.
    Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x” (in accord with the usual reading of Plato’s Theaetetus). I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Epistemic Values and the Value of Learning.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.
    In addition to purely practical values, cognitive values also figure into scientific deliberations. One way of introducing cognitive values is to consider the cognitive value that accrues to the act of accepting a hypothesis. Although such values may have a role to play, such a role does not exhaust the significance of cognitive values in scientific decision-making. This paper makes a plea for consideration of epistemic value —that is, value attaching to a state of belief—and defends (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  47. Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2017 - In Jeffrey Dunn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  48. The Epistemic Value of Photographs.Catharine Abell - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press.
    There is a variety of epistemic roles to which photographs are better suited than non-photographic pictures. Photographs provide more compelling evidence of the existence of the scenes they depict than non-photographic pictures. They are also better sources of information about features of those scenes that are easily overlooked. This chapter examines several different attempts to explain the distinctive epistemic value of photographs, and argues that none is adequate. It then proposes an alternative explanation of their epistemic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  49. Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
    Critics of the ideal of value‐free science often assume that they must reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. I argue that this assumption is mistaken and that the distinction can be used to clarify and defend the argument from inductive risk, which challenges the value‐free ideal. I develop the idea that the characteristic feature of epistemic values is that they promote, either intrinsically or extrinsically, the attainment of truths. This proposal is shown to answer (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  50.  12
    Relativism Vs. Pluralism and Objectivism.Joseph Margolis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:95-106.
    Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x”. I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, however attenuated. By “objectivism” I understand the thesis that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000