Results for 'Epistemic Justification'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   246 citations  
  2. Epistemic Justification.Richard Swinburne - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Richard Swinburne offers an original treatment of a question at the heart of epistemology: what makes a belief rational, or justified in holding? He maps the rival accounts of philosophers on epistemic justification ("internalist" and "externalist"), arguing that they are really accounts of different concepts. He distinguishes between synchronic justification (justification at a time) and diachronic justification (synchronic justification resulting from adequate investigation)--both internalist and externalist. He also argues that most kinds of justification (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   104 citations  
  3. Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues.Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa - 2003 - Oxford, England and Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  4. Accessibility, Implicit Bias, and Epistemic Justification.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1529-1547.
    It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.
    Many of us care about the existence of ethical facts because such facts appear crucial to making sense of our practical lives. On one tempting line of thought, this idea does more than raise the metaethical stakes: it can also play a central role in justifying our belief in those facts. In recent work, David Enoch has developed this tempting thought into a formidable new proposal in moral epistemology, that aims to explain how the deliberative indispensability of ethical facts gives (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist Approach.Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (13):3111-3141.
    The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  7. The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 98-124.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  8. Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.Kevin McCain - 2014 - Routledge.
    Evidentialism is a popular theory of epistemic justification, yet, as early proponents of the theory Earl Conee and Richard Feldman admit, there are many elements that must be developed before Evidentialism can provide a full account of epistemic justification, or well-founded belief. It is the aim of this book to provide the details that are lacking; here McCain moves past Evidentialism as a mere schema by putting forward and defending a full-fledged theory of epistemic (...). In this book McCain offers novel approaches to several elements of well-founded belief. Key among these are an original account of what it takes to have information as evidence, an account of epistemic support in terms of explanation, and a causal account of the basing relation that is far superior to previous accounts. The result is a fully developed Evidentialist account of well-founded belief. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  9. The Logic of Epistemic Justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.
    Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases – predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  10.  44
    Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. Epistemic Justification.Ernest Sosa - 2003 - Wiley.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  12.  24
    Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  14.  70
    Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology.William P. Alston - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):249-251.
  15. Non-Epistemic Justification and Practical Postulation in Fichte.Steven Hoeltzel - 2014 - In Tom Rockmore & Daniel Breazeale (eds.), Fichte and Transcendental Philosophy. pp. 293-313.
    In this essay I argue that in order to secure some of his system’s key commitments, Fichte employs argumentation essentially patterned after the technique of practical postulation in Kant. This is a mode of reasoning that mobilizes a distinctly Kantian notion of nonepistemic justification, which itself is premised upon a broadly Kantian conception of the nature of reason. Succinctly stated, such argumentation proceeds essentially as follows. (1) By the basic nature and operations of rationality, every rational being is, as (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  86
    Graded Epistemic Justification.John Hawthorne & Artūrs Logins - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1845-1858.
    The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):57-89.
    Justification, or at least ‘justification’, bulks large in recent epistemology. The view that knowledge consists of true-justified-belief has been prominent in this century, and the justification of belief has attracted considerable attention in its own right. But it is usually not at all clear just what an epistemologist means by ‘justified’, just what concept the term is used to express. An enormous amount of energy has gone into the attempt to specify conditions under which beliefs of one (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  18.  81
    Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
  19.  24
    Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper puts forward a novel pluralist theory of epistemic justification that brings together two competing views in the literature—probabilistic and non-probabilistic accounts of justification. The first part of the paper motivates the new theory by arguing that neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts alone are wholly satisfactory. The second part puts forward what I call the Functional Theory of Justification. The key merit of the new theory is that it combines the most attractive features of both (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2015 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.
    Many of us care about the existence of ethical facts because they appear crucial to making sense of our practical lives. On one tempting line of thought, this idea can also play a central role in justifying our belief in those facts. David Enoch has developed this thought into a formidable new proposal in moral epistemology: that the deliberative indispensability of ethical facts gives us epistemic justification for believing in such facts. This chapter argues that Enoch’s proposal fails (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  21. The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
  22.  75
    The Function of Epistemic Justification.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.
    Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  23. The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  24. Responsible Belief and Epistemic Justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.
    For decades, philosophers have displayed an interest in what it is to have an epistemically justified belief. Recently, we also find among philosophers a renewed interest in the so-called ethics of belief: what is it to believe responsibly and when is one’s belief blameworthy? This paper explores how epistemically justified belief and responsible belief are related to each other. On the so-called ‘deontological conception of epistemic justification’, they are identical: to believe epistemically responsibly is to believe epistemically justifiedly. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  25. Epistemic Justification and Methodological Luck in Inflationary Cosmology.C. D. McCoy - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1003-1028.
    I present a recent historical case from cosmology—the story of inflationary cosmology—and on its basis argue that solving explanatory problems is a reliable method for making progress in science. In particular, I claim that the success of inflationary theory at solving its predecessor’s explanatory problems justified the theory epistemically, even in advance of the development of novel predictions from the theory and the later confirmation of those predictions.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification: A Reassessment.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2219-2241.
    This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  27.  87
    Epistemic Justification.Nicholas Everitt - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):572-575.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  28.  95
    Epistemic Justification.Alvin Plantinga - 1986 - Noûs 20 (1):3-18.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  29.  4
    Epistemic Justifications for Belief in the Unobservable: The Impact of Minority Status.Telli Davoodi, Yixin Kelly Cui, Jennifer M. Clegg, Fang E. Yan, Ayse Payir, Paul L. Harris & Kathleen H. Corriveau - 2020 - Cognition 200:104273.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
    According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  31.  5
    Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge.Hamid Vahid - 2005 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book explores the concept of epistemic justification and our understanding of the problem of skepticism. Providing critical examination of key responses to the skeptical challenge, Hamid Vahid presents a theory which is shown to work alongside the internalism/externalism issue and the thesis of semantic externalism, with a deontological conception of justification at its core.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs.Luca Moretti - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
    This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33.  15
    Epistemic Justification.Jonathan E. Adler - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):739-742.
  34.  68
    Epistemic Justification and Psychological Realism.James E. Taylor - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230.
    The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  35.  99
    A Theory of Epistemic Justification.Jarrett Leplin - 2009 - Springer.
    This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  36. A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification.David B. Annis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
    David Annis is professor of philosophy at Ball State University. In this essay, Annis offers an alternative to the foundationalist-coherent controversy: "contextualism." This theory rejects both the idea of intrinsically basic beliefs in the foundational sense and the thesis that coherence is sufficient for justification. he argues that justification is relative to the varying norms of social practices.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  37. Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  38. Epistemic Justification.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 25--36.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39. Epistemic Justification and the Ignorance Excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.
    One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Ignorance does not always excuse, however, for sometimes ignorance is culpable. One of the most natural ways to think of the difference between exculpating and culpable ignorance is in terms of justification; that is, one’s ignorance is exculpating only if it is justified and one’s ignorance is culpable only if it not justified. Rosen :591–610, 2008) explores this idea by first offering a brief account of justification, and then two cases (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  95
    Epistemic Justification and Reflection. [REVIEW]Hilary Kornblith - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):793-803.
    Smithies presents an account of justification that ties it to an idealized view of reflection. I argue that no such account can work. More than this, I argue that the kind of idealization which Smithies offers loses contact with the very phenomenon of reflection which he intends to illuminate. I also discuss how Smithies's view bears on the internalism/externalism controversy.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  47
    Epistemic Justification Revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):1-16.
    In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy. In this paper I argue that none of his arguments taken singly, nor the collection as a group, gives us a reason to abandon the traditional idea that there is a property of epistemic justification. I conclude by suggesting how Alston’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  26
    Epistemic Justification and Deductive Closure.Samir Okasha - 1999 - Critica 31 (92):37-51.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  43.  46
    Epistemic Justification, Rights, and Permissibility.Anthony Booth & Rik Peels - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):405-411.
    Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing a proposition serves one (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44.  83
    Think of the Children! Epistemic Justification and Cognitively Unsophisticated Subjects.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    I undermine the argument that ‘high’ epistemic standards are false because children and other cognitively unsophisticated subjects possess justification while lacking certain logical and epistemic concepts. I argue, instead, that the standards we often use to attribute logical and epistemic concepts to ordinary, cognitively sophisticated adults can easily be seen to cover many unsophisticated subjects; therefore, the alleged lack of certain concepts is no basis for rejecting ‘high’ epistemic standards. Whether or not such standards are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45.  49
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
    Epistemic Justification illuminates in a deep way some core issues in contemporary epistemology. Its two authors disagree sharply about the nature of epistemic justification: both are foundationalists but whereas BonJour is a staunch defender of a traditional version of internalist foundationalism, Sosa argues for an externalist virtue reliabilism. In spite of their differences they speak the same language and employ the same rigorous standards for philosophical interchange. They most assuredly do not talk past each other. In (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  80
    Hybrid Expressivism and Epistemic Justification.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2349-2369.
    Epistemic expressivists maintain, to a first approximation, that epistemic assertions express non-cognitive mental states, like endorsements, valuations, or pro-attitudes, rather than cognitive mental states such as beliefs. Proponents of epistemic expressivism include Chrisman, Gibbard, Field, Kappel, and Ridge, among others. In this paper, I argue for an alternative view to epistemic expressivism. The view I seek to advocate is inspired by hybrid expressivist theories about moral judgments, Copp Oxford studies in metaethics, 2009), Finlay, Strandberg ). According (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  47.  52
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
    Epistemic Justification illuminates in a deep way some core issues in contemporary epistemology. Its two authors disagree sharply about the nature of epistemic justification: both are foundationalists but whereas BonJour is a staunch defender of a traditional version of internalist foundationalism, Sosa argues for an externalist virtue reliabilism. In spite of their differences they speak the same language and employ the same rigorous standards for philosophical interchange. They most assuredly do not talk past each other. In (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  36
    Epistemic Justification: Its Subjective and its Objective Ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.
    Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  50. Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000