Alors que Xénophon a toujours accordé la plus grande importance à l’ enkrateia (« maîtrise de soi »), l’intérêt de Platon pour cette notion ne se manifeste pas avant, semble-t-il, le Gorgias et il se confirme ensuite dans les dialogues ultérieurs, notamment la République et les Lois. La présente étude cherche à mettre en lumière le lien étroit qui existe, chez Platon, entre la partition de l’âme et la reconnaissance de la pertinence de l’ enkrateia. Aussi longtemps que (...) Platon a considéré que l’âme est homogène et qu’elle consiste essentiellement en la raison, il n’a pas reconnu le bien-fondé et l’utilité de l’ enkrateia, puisque l’exercice de la raison suffit à garantir un comportement vertueux. La réhabilitation de l’ enkrateia suppose que l’âme est constituée d’au moins deux « parties » et que l’une d’elles, les désirs, doit être maîtrisée et contrôlée. (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on both the foundations and the consistency of the position regarding akrasia Xenophon attributes to Socrates in the Memorabilia. As does Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates maintains that akrasia is impossible in the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, he differs from the platonic Socrates by granting to enkrateia, instead of knowledge, the role of foundation for virtue. If enkrateia is the very condition for acquiring knowledge and virtue, consequently the responsibility for (...) countering akrasia falls to enkrateia. (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on both the foundations and the consistency of the position regarding akrasia Xenophon attributes to Socrates in theMemorabilia.As does Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates maintains thatakrasiais impossible in the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, he differs from the platonic Socrates by granting toenkrateia,instead of knowledge, the role of foundation for virtue. If enkrateia is the very condition for acquiring knowledge and virtue, consequently the responsibility for counteringakrasiafalls toenkrateia.

Practical conflicts include conflicts in agents who judge, from the perspective of their own values, desires, beliefs, and the like, that one prospective course of action is superior to another but are tempted by what they judge to be the inferior course of action. A man who wants a late-night snack, even though he judges it best, from the identified perspective, to abide by his recent New Year's resolution against eating such snacks until he has lost ten pounds, is the (...) locus of a practical conflict. So is a woman who judges it best (in the same way) to run a mile this morning but is tempted to spend the entire morning working in her office instead. The topic of this essay is practical outcomes of conflicts of this kind. My concern, more specifically, is with outcomes of two general kinds: akratic (from the classical Greek term akrasia: want of self-control) and enkratic (from enkrateia: self-control) actions. (shrink)

El estudio de la akrasía o incontinencia que Aristóteles abre en el libro VII de Ética a Nicómaco es una de las primeras aproximaciones filosóficas al problema de la maldad específicamente humana. Este artículo comienza identificando el tipo humano que revela la akrasía, señalando su importancia filosófica y exponiendo brevemente la explicación aristotélica del fenómeno. Después categoriza las diferentes formas que puede asumir la transgresión de los propios principios morales, según dos criterios independientes. Por un lado, el tipo de deseo (...) que vence a la razón. Por otro lado, el momento del razonamiento práctico en el que tiene lugar la akrasía. Cruzando ambos criterios, encontramos una tipología rica y matizada de la akrasía, así como de la enkráteia. Asimismo, se ofrece una interpretación del valor moral de esta tipología, en el que cada uno de los tipos akrásicos merece una determinada calificación ética. Finalmente, esta evaluación ilumina la propia concepción ética y antropológica de Aristóteles. (shrink)

프로디코스는 자신의 『시기들』이라는 글에서 인간이라면 마땅히 취해야 하는 인간적 삶의 방향을 제안한다. 그 글 안에서 아레테와 카키아라는 두 신적인 존재가 등장하여 헤라클레스에게 각각 자신이 제안하는 삶의 길을 따르라고 요청한다. 아레테가 제안하는 길은 노고 및 땀으로 이루어진 삶인 반면, 카키아가 제안하는 길은 즐거움과 함께 하는 쉬운 삶이며, 둘 모두 궁극적으로는 자신들의 길을 통해 행복(eudaimonia)에 이르리라 약속한다. 그리고 헤라클레스는 아레테의 길을 선택한다. 이러한 내용으로 인해 프로디코스의『시기들』은 인간의 자제력(enkrateia)을 중요시하며, 이를 통해 탁월함(덕)에 이를 수 있다는 인본주의적 성격을 담고 있다고 이해되어 왔다.BR 전통적 (...) 신관과는 달리, 프로디코스는 인간의 생존에 유익함을 보장하는 것들을, 예를 들어 음식과 음료 그리고 해와 달 등을, 신으로 강조하는 논의를 펼쳤다고 전해진다. 이와 함께 그는 ‘용어의 옳음’(orthoepeia)이라 알려진 언어론적 입장 또한 고수했다고 알려지고 있다. 그의 언어론에 따를 경우, 가령 ‘플레그마’(phlegma: 점액)는 본성상 그 의미가 ‘페플레크타이’(pephlechthai: 끓는)인 대상에 부응하고 그 대상으로부터 어원의 형태가 일관되기에 옳다는 논의처럼, 각 용어는 그것이 가리키는 대상과 의미에서 본성적 일관성을 유지해야 하며 동시에 용어 자체의 형태에서도 일관성이 갖추어진 경우에만 옳다. 이와 같은 프로디코스의 신론적 및 언어론적 입장을 고려할 경우, 두 신적인 존재가 행복으로서의 ‘즐거움’을 다루는 『시기들』에 담지된 인본주의적 성격은 인간 한정적 유익함으로서의 탁월함 완수가 곧 결과론적 즐거움으로서의 행복이라는 내용으로 보다 구체화될 수 있다. (shrink)

In this review I argue that there are three 'tests' for maxims in Kant: the Categorical Imperative test; what I call the 'Esteem' test; and what I call the 'Temptation' test. The first test is a test for what Kant calls "legality", but what we may call the moral permissibility of acting on a maxim. The second test is a test for what Kant calls "morality", but what we may call the presence of a "good will," or the motive of (...) duty, which is the only motive that elicits our esteem. The third test - which is the subject of this book - is a test for the presence of "virtue," or a lack of conflict between my sensible inclinations and the motive of duty. If there is a conflict and I nevertheless act from the motive of duty, I have strength of will (enkrateia). If there is no conflict, and I act from the motive of duty, then I have virtue. God, who has an "infinite holy will" and who is not subject to sensible inclinations, and Jesus Christ, embodied angels, and possibly other rational finite beings in the universe, who have a "finite holy will" and who lack the propensity to subordinate respect for humanity to sensible inclinations, do not have virtue. (shrink)

El debate en torno a Aristipo de Cirene, cuya concepción de la felicidad coloca en el centro de la escena al placer, pone en tela de juicio las afirmaciones propias de aquellas éticas nucleadas bajo el epíteto de eudemonistas. Con el desplazamiento de la felicidad del sitial del fin, Aristipo reformula la dimensión ética tradicional: a través del ejercicio de la enkráteia, y lejos de caer en un relativismo subjetivista, intenta construir una ética que tenga como base un objetivismo gnoseológico. (...) Demostraremos, además, que al ejercicio de la enkráteia cirenaica subyace la noción de autosuficiencia (autárkeia) -entendida en términos aristotélicos- del individuo. Esto nos enfrentará, irremediablemente, a la noción aristotélica de felicidad (en estrecho vínculo con la noción de enkráteia), la cual no comporta una noción de autosuficiencia individual sino que restringe la posibilidad de la autárkeia a la autosuficiencia de la pólis. The debates on Aristippus of Cyrene, whose happiness' conception puts pleasure in the center of the scene, questions the claims of those ethical nucleated under the epithet "eudemonists". Through the shift of happiness from the shrine of the goal, Aristippus reformulates the traditional ethical dimension: by the enkráteia's exercising -and far from falling into a subjective relativism- he tries to build an ethic based on an epistemological objectivity. We are going to demonstrate also that the self-sufficiency concept (autárkeia) -speaking in Aristotelian terms- of individual underlies the exercise of Cyrenaic enkráteia. It will face us inevitably to the Aristotelian concept of happiness (in close connection with the enkráteia's concept), which doesn't involve a notion of individual self-sufficiency, but rather it restricts the possibility of autárkeia to the pólis' self-sufficiency. (shrink)

Este trabajo distingue entre tres tipos de experiencia psicológica: deseos que son estimulados por el placer; emociones como la cólera, la gratitud, la vergüenza y también el miedo, que implican valoraciones, ya sean pragmáticas o éticas; y abatimiento o _athumia_, que es inducida por una sensación de impotencia y aporía. La primera de ellas se rige por el autocontrol, _enkrateia_ o _sôphrosunê,_ como la virtud correspondiente. Las emociones están sujetas a un mecanismo psíquico diferente, que implica una evaluación adecuada de (...) las condiciones que las provocan. Finalmente, el desaliento o _athumia_ constituye otra categoría más, como un estado de pasividad, de pérdida de agencia. (shrink)

El debate en torno a Aristipo de Cirene, cuya concepción de la felicidad coloca en el centro de la escena al placer, pone en tela de juicio las afirmaciones propias de aquellas éticas nucleadas bajo el epíteto de eudemonistas. Con el desplazamiento de la felicidad del sitial del fin, Aristipo reformula la dimensión ética tradicional: a través del ejercicio de la enkráteia, y lejos de caer en un relativismo subjetivista, intenta construir una ética que tenga como base un objetivismo gnoseológico. (...) Demostraremos, además, que al ejercicio de la enkráteia cirenaica subyace la noción de autosuficiencia ( autárkeia ) –entendida en términos aristotélicos– del individuo . Esto nos enfrentará, irremediablemente, a la noción aristotélica de felicidad (en estrecho vínculo con la noción de enkráteia ), la cual no comporta una noción de autosuficiencia individual sino que restringe la posibilidad de la autárkeia a la autosuficiencia de la pólis. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue (...) that this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned. (shrink)

This paper serves both as a discussion of Henry’s (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255–270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia – knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway – and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotle’s account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henry’s interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the (...) real world, while maintaining non-trivial distinctions between temperance (sôphrosunê), self-indulgence (akolasia), self-control (enkrateia) and akrasia. There are, however, some interpretive challenges that follow from Henry’s account and this paper is intended to explain and resolve those. (shrink)

Vingt ans après le premier numéro de Philosophie Antique, consacré aux « Figures de Socrate », le panorama des études socratiques semble avoir été profondément modifié par certaines nouveautés en matière de contenu et de méthode, issues d’une meilleure compréhension du phénomène des logoi sokratikoi et de son importance dans l’histoire culturelle et politique athénienne des ve et ive siècles.L’usage de la méthode intertextuelle a non seulement contribué à briser le monopole platonicien dans la transmission du patrimoine socratique, mais également (...) à dépasser une lecture doctrinale des textes platoniciens, au profit d’une lecture plus attentive à la forme dialogique de l’écriture et à la logique interne de la représentation proposée par l’auteur : une mise en scène du débat éthique et politique du passé récent d’Athènes, dans lequel Socrate joue le rôle de conscience critique de la cité alors que Platon est tout simplement absent. Compte tenu de l’importance de cette reconstruction de la mémoire commune, dans le cadre des conflits d’idées et de références politiques qui impliquent certainement les socratiques, cet essai se propose de relire des aspects particuliers de la représentation platonicienne de Socrate : 1) la solitude du philosophe, obtenue aussi en minimisant et en discréditant la présence des socratiques autour de lui ; 2) l’« atopie » de Socrate, en tant que pratique du paradoxe incluant le renversement des canons traditionnels du savoir et du pouvoir ; 3) la vertu comme enjeu d’un défi dont dépend le choix des meilleurs hommes d’Athènes pour le gouvernement politique ; un défi dans lequel le Socrate platonicien prend une position très différente de celle d’Antisthène et de Xénophon, qui soulignent en revanche l’importance morale des vertus les plus dures (enkrateia, karteria), en évoquant un monde de valeurs semblable au modèle lacédémonien. Le but de cette recherche est de montrer que Platon expose une perspective politique divergente (par rapport à la cité démocratique et par rapport aux autres socratiques) à travers les choix pratiqués par son Socrate en matière de vertu. Ce sont des choix qui développent de manière cohérente le paradoxe de l’« atopie » de Socrate, nous permettant de tracer les lignes d’un dessin unitaire à travers différents contextes, y compris entre des dialogues traditionnellement considérés comme distants les uns des autres : entre le Protagoras et la République, ou entre le Criton, le Gorgias et le Politique. Le renversement des canons traditionnels trouve également son expression esthétique dans le masque de Socrate en Silène. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential for psychic conflict within Seneca's moral psychology. Some scholars have taken Seneca's explicit claim in De Ira that the soul is unitary to preclude any kind of simultaneous psychic conflict, while other interpreters have suggested that Seneca views all cases of anger as instances of akrasia. I argue that Seneca's account of anger provides the resources for accommodating some types of simultaneous psychic conflict; however, he denies the possibility of psychic conflict between two action-generating impulses, (...) thus rejecting the phenomena of genuine akrasia and enkrateia. Although superficially counterintuitive, Seneca's cognitivist account of anger, according to which anger is complex and requires assent to the propositions that ‘I have been wronged’ and ‘I ought to seek revenge’, renders his denial of akrasia and enkrateia more plausible. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Xenophon and the Socratic Question The Main Differences Between SocratesX and SocratesP SocratesX and Enkrateia Reworking of Socratic Themes on the Basis of Enkrateia Akrasia Enkrateia and Autarkeia One Socrates and Many.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Listening to Reason”:The Role of Persuasion in Aristotle’s Account of Praise, Blame, and the VoluntaryAllen SpeightAristotle connects praise and blame closely to the voluntary, but the question of how his discussion of these terms should be construed more broadly in the context of a theory of responsibility has been much disputed. There are some well-known difficulties with the coherence of Aristotle's views in this regard: animals and children, for (...) example, are said to be voluntary agents, but are not held to be responsible;1 moreover, praise and blame seem to be important for what might be thought to be incompatible purposes—on the one hand, for behavioral improvement and correction (a usually prospective concern) and, on the other hand, for assessment of moral responsibility in terms of what an agent merits or deserves for what he or she has done (a retrospective concern).2One of Aristotle's first examples of the use of praise and blame in the Nicomachean Ethics captures some of the difficulty commentators have found in trying to understand his position. In drawing an analogy to illustrate the difference between parts of the soul, Aristotle comments that "in morally strong and morally weak men we praise (epainoumen) the reason that guides them and the rational element of the soul, because it exhorts them to follow the right path and to do what is best" (NE 1102b13-15). There is, he thus claims, an appetitive part of the soul thatpartakes of reason insofar as it complies with reason and accepts its leadership (hē(i) katēkoon estin autou kai peitharchikon); it possesses reason in the sense that we say it is "reasonable" to accept the advice of a father and of friends, not in the sense that we have a "rational" understanding of mathematical propositions. That the irrational element can be persuaded (peithetai) by the rational is shown by the fact that admonition (nouthetēsis) and all manner of rebuke (epitimēsis) and exhortation (paraklēsis) are possible. If it is correct to say that the appetitive part, too, has reason, it follows that the rational element of the soul has two subdivisions: the one possesses reason in the [End Page 213] strict sense, contained within itself, and the other possesses reason in the sense that it listens to reason as one would listen to a father.(NE 1102b31-1103a)I will argue that this image of listening and persuasion is more significant for Aristotle's conceptions of voluntariness and responsibility than is often thought. The image suggests not only that Aristotle is interested in both prospective moral education and retrospective assessments of responsibility, but that a crucial (and, in the literature to this point, quite neglected) term that he offers as a gloss for understanding his conception of the voluntary—the notion of peithō or persuasion—is in fact central to his employment of the categories of praise and blame in both prospective and retrospective senses. Aristotle's use of the concept of persuasion is not merely a casual gloss, but gives him instead an unusually helpful category for understanding the range of types of action within his philosophy of agency and how they fit within the larger scheme of parts of the soul in the Ethics and the distinctions among actions that stem from virtue, vice, moral weakness, and moral strength.In what follows, I will first examine how Aristotle uses peithō to explain the related notions of the voluntary (as to hekousion is usually translated) and the noncompulsory in the Nicomachean Ethics, III.5, and the Eudemian Ethics, II.8. I will then explore how Aristotle appeals to peithō and its cognates to address one of the most vexing problems his theory of voluntary agency must work out—the problem of akrasia and enkrateia (moral weakness and moral strength)—and, next, more widely how these related concepts become relevant for his account of the parts of the soul and gradations of action.I. Persuasion and the Voluntary (EE II.8 and NE III.5)Aristotle appears to link closely the notions of voluntariness (to hekousion)and persuasion (hē peithō).Bonitz's Index takes the two terms straightforwardly... (shrink)

Tidak bisa disangkal bahwa filsafat Barat dewasa ini hampir identik dengan wacana filosofis (philosophical discourse), berupa konsep, teori, atau sistem, yang umumnya berkembang dinamis dan dipelajari sebagai disiplin keilmuan dalam lingkungan akademis melalui satuan kurikulum perguruan tinggi modern. Maka tidak mengherankan bila filsafat cenderung identik dengan filsafat akademis (academic philosophy). Namun berkat dua buku Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) kita terbantu untuk menyadari hilangnya sebagian besar pemahaman filsafat itu sendiri terutama wawasan klasik yang mengungkapkan fokus utama penghayatan maupun lintasan peralihan fokus utama (...) tersebut dalam perkembangan sejarah. Hadot berpendapat bahwa filsafat pada awalnya adalah bios atau way of life (manie de vivre). Filsafat sebagai way of life terungkap dalam serangkaian latihan rohani (melete dalam arti Platonis, askesis dalam arti Stoa dan Kekristenan Yunani, atau exercitium spirituale dalam arti Kekristenan Latin awal), dengan mengembangkan berbagai wacana filosofis sebagai sarana panduan untuk membentuk (to form) alih-alih hanya menginformasikan (to inform) pilihan hidup dan kebebasan eksistensial seseorang menurut bingkai penghayatannya dalam sekolah filsafat. Tujuannya adalah memandu pilihan hidup dan mengembangkan kebebasan eksistensial mereka sesuai kodrat insaninya (phusis tou anthropou), seperti menguasai diri (enkrateia) atau kemandirian diri (autarkheia) di hadapan pengaruh eksternal, serta menyadari tempat (topos) mereka dalam kosmos (phusis tou kosmou). Nilai absolut aktivitas berfilsafat lebih menekankan tindakan baik alih-alih mengetahui kebaikan. Berwacana filosofis tanpa pembalikan sekaligus penentuan arah baru (peristrophe - periagoge) melalui pelatihan rohani hanya akan membentuk seseorang menjadi sofistik atau ahli retorika alih-alih sosok filsuf. Pihak pertama dalam sejarah Yunani antik abad kelima dan keempat SM memang dikenal sebagai sosok terpelajar yang licin bersilat kata (elenkhos) memperdagangkan seni kecakapan dan pengetahuan demi memuaskan hasrat ego. Namun, pihak terakhir sosok filsuf selalu sadar akan ketidaktahuan maupun kekurangan diri (bahwa ia bukan sage atau orang bijak) sehingga ia selalu memandu hasratnya untuk terus mencintai dan mendekatkan diri ke arah kebijaksanaan. Hadot berupaya menjelaskan pandangannya, filsafat sebagai way of life, setidaknya melalui dua pembacaan. Dalam PWL (4 bagian dan 11 bab), ia membingkai pandangannya melalui pembacaan eksegese untuk menguraikan klaimnya dengan mengembangkan metode, materi, tokoh, dan tema terkait. Dalam PAW (3 bagian dan 12 bab), ia mengembangkan pembacaan eksegesenya dengan menelusuri fenomena kerohanian dalam sejarah filsafat Barat, meliputi awal kemunculannya pada era antik, peralihannya pada monastisisme Kristen, keterputusannya pada Abad Pertengahan, dan jejak kesinambungannya pada era modern. [] Akhirnya, dalam PWL dan PAW, Hadot benar-benar menyajikan bingkai pemahaman yang kokoh terhadap klaimnya mengenai filsafat sebagai way of life, termasuk implikasinya dalam merangsang diskusi lebih lanjut baik untuk mengungkap persetujuan atau bantahan maupun kemungkinan alternatif atas klaim tersebut berdasarkan sumber teks serupa. Selain itu, layak untuk diperhatikan bahwa melalui uraiannya yang rinci dan seksama dalam mendekati setiap konteks lintasan filsafat seturut Sitz im Leben, Hadot rupanya juga menawarkan pesan inspiratif dan relevan bagi pembaca budiman ahli, pengajar, pelajar, peminat filsafat, atau siapa saja yang selalu berhasrat mencintai kebijaksanaan untuk bertanya: apa makna berfilsafat dewasa ini? (Haryanto Cahyadi, peneliti filsafat dari Keuskupan Timika, Papua.). (shrink)