Higher education students experience high rates of negative emotions such as stress, anxiety, and depression. Although emotions are known to influence attitudes per se, previous research has not examined how emotionality may relate to attitudes toward plagiarism. This study sought to examine how positive and negative emotionality relates to students’ positive attitudes, negative attitudes, and subjective norms concerning plagiarism. University students completed the Attitudes Toward Plagiarism questionnaire and measures of anxiety, stress, depression, and negative and positive affect. Extending on previous (...) research, it was found that a lack of positive affect and negative emotionality, specifically stress, were significant predictors of attitudes toward plagiarism. Emotionality predicted 8.9% and 10% of the variance in positive plagiarism attitudes and subjective norms, respectively. Interestingly, gender was unable to predict subjective norms relating to plagiarism. Support for negative and positive emotionality predicting attitudes toward plagiarism challenges the assumption that emotions do not predict attitudes within the plagiarism context. These findings are practically relevant, as they highlight the necessity of implementing interventions directly targeting mental health within the higher education setting. (shrink)

Higher education students experience high rates of negative emotions such as stress, anxiety, and depression. Although emotions are known to influence attitudes per se, previous research has not examined how emotionality may relate to attitudes toward plagiarism. This study sought to examine how positive and negative emotionality relates to students’ positive attitudes, negative attitudes, and subjective norms concerning plagiarism. University students completed the Attitudes Toward Plagiarism questionnaire and measures of anxiety, stress, depression, and negative and positive affect. Extending on previous (...) research, it was found that a lack of positive affect and negative emotionality, specifically stress, were significant predictors of attitudes toward plagiarism. Emotionality predicted 8.9% and 10% of the variance in positive plagiarism attitudes and subjective norms, respectively. Interestingly, gender was unable to predict subjective norms relating to plagiarism. Support for negative and positive emotionality predicting attitudes toward plagiarism challenges the assumption that emotions do not predict attitudes within the plagiarism context. These findings are practically relevant, as they highlight the necessity of implementing interventions directly targeting mental health within the higher education setting. (shrink)

In this paper I have two main aims. My first aim is to introduce the notion of bounded emotionality. This notion is the analogue of that of bounded rationality in behavioural economics. Bounded rationality says, roughly, that human beings are cognitively limited with respect to their processing and memory capacities. Bounded emotionality says that we are limited in our emotional capabilities, notably in the intensity, duration, and possible combinations of our emotional states. Bounded rationality is a foundational notion in behavioural (...) economics and has played an important role in various fields of philosophy as well. In particular, in epistemology bounded rationality has been thought to have implications with respect to our doxastic norms. My second aim in this paper is to suggest that bounded emotionality also has an important role to play in philosophy. As a case in point, I discuss the implications that bounded emotionality has for our doxastic norms. In particular, I argue that one is not obligated to believe something or to stop holding a belief if one could not believe/fail to believe it without having an emotional response that exceeds one's bounded emotional capacities. (shrink)

The aim of the study was to verify hypotheses about time changeability of dream characteristics depending on the participants’ age and affective value of the dream. The study was conducted online. Participants of the study were 68 individuals between the age of 17 and 85. The participants were asked to prepare detailed descriptions of their dreams, next they had to identify elements of the dreams, refer them to their real life, and assess their affective value. In the dreams of late (...) adolescents, and young and middle-aged adults the most frequently recalled period in a positive context turned out to be late adolescence and early adulthood, whereas in a negative context the participants would recall their present developmental phase and the period of late childhood. Unpleasant dreams of older individuals were mainly connected with the period of middle adulthood, whereas those pleasant ones referred to various periods of their entire life. (shrink)

I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz and supported by myself which construes moral concepts and properties as a subset of emotion-dispositional properties. Given these claims, it follows that sincere moral judgements are necessarily motivating in virtue of their emotional constitution. I defend an indefeasible version of judgement motivational internalism which takes into consideration both positively and negatively valenced affective states (...) and how they promote both approach and avoidance motivation, respectively. On this view, in making sincere moral judgements agents are antecedently motivated by standing Desires to avoid or approach the stimuli picked out by their judgements. I also defend internalism against the objections from defeating circumstances and amoralists. As regards the former, I claim that the tendency of philosophers to frame the motivation debate in terms of positive moral judgements makes the argument from defeating circumstances appear more plausible than it is; as regards the latter, I claim the amoralist argument only has force if it is empirically well supported and that psychological data has hitherto been unconvincing. (shrink)

The emotional connotation of words is known to affect word and sentence processing. However, the when and how of the interaction between emotion and grammar are still up for debate. In this behavioural experiment, 35 female university students read noun phrases (NPs) composed by a determiner and a noun in their L1 (Spanish), and were asked to indicate if the NPs were grammatically correct (elmasc camareromasc) or not (*lafem tornillomasc; i.e. a gender agreement task). The type of gender (arbitrary/natural), the (...) emotionality (unpleasant/neutral), and the gender class (feminine/masculine) of the nouns were manipulated. We found an overall grammaticality effect, responses being faster in grammatically correct trials than in incorrect ones. However, the effects of emotionality and gender class varied depending on gender type. For arbitrary gender, the grammaticality effect was greater in feminine nouns than in masculine nouns and independent of emotionality. For natural gender, the grammaticality effect interacted with gender class and emotionality, this effect only emerging in unpleasant stimuli for feminine nouns. Our results reveal that it is possible to find emotional effects at the behavioural level in an intrinsically grammatical task. Yet, these effects depend on gender properties like the type of gender and the gender class. (shrink)

The phenomenon of psychopathy has been regarded as a putative challenge to motivational internalism, which asserts a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation. An increasingly popular internalist response to the psychopathy challenge is to argue that psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments because they lack moral emotions (e.g., sympathy and guilt), which are alleged to be causally constitutive of moral judgments. In this paper, I attempt to reject the emotion-based internalist response by appeal to most recent empirical research (...) on psychopathy, moral cognition, and moral dilemmas. I argue that emotion is not causally responsible for even normal people’s moral judgment (although emotion may titrate the severity of moral judgment). (shrink)

Michael Jackson has spent much of his career elaborating his rich conception of lifeworlds, mining his ethnographic and personal experience for insights into how our subjective and social lives are mutually constituted. In How Lifeworlds Work, Jackson draws on years of ethnographic fieldwork in West Africa to highlight the dynamic quality of human relationships and reinvigorate the study of kinship and ritual. How, he asks, do we manage the perpetual process of accommodation between social norms and personal emotions, impulses, and (...) desires? How are these two dimensions of lived reality joined, and how are the dual imperatives of individual expression and collective viability managed? Drawing on the pragmatist tradition, psychology, and phenomenology, Jackson offers an unforgettable, beautifully written account of how we make, unmake, and remake, our lifeworlds. (shrink)

Interactions between humans and machines that include artificial intelligence are increasingly common in nearly all areas of life. Meanwhile, AI-products are increasingly endowed with emotional characteristics. That is, they are designed and trained to elicit emotions in humans, to recognize human emotions and, sometimes, to simulate emotions. The introduction of such systems in our lives is met with some criticism. There is a rather strong intuition that there is something wrong about getting attached to a machine, about having certain emotions (...) towards it, and about getting involved in a kind of affective relationship with it. In this paper, I want to tackle these worries by focusing on the last aspect: in what sense could it be problematic or even wrong to establish an emotional relationship with EAI-systems? I want to show that the justifications for the widespread intuition concerning the problems are not as strong as they seem at first sight. To do so, I discuss three arguments: the argument from self-deception, the argument from lack of mutuality, and the argument from moral negligence. (shrink)

Despite receiving a great deal of research attention, the effect of corporate philanthropy on shareholder value remains inconclusive. To address this issue, the present paper examines emotionality as an important factor based on which investors infer about the firm’s motive as well as the beneficiary’s worthiness and react accordingly. Consistent with attribution theory, our event study shows that announcements with more emotional expressions are associated with higher cumulative abnormal stock returns and the effect is stronger when investor attention is greater. (...) We further find that the positive interaction effect between emotionality and investor attention is more pronounced for scandal-free firms than for firms with corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). The empirical evidence remains consistent under various robustness tests. The paper concludes with implications for future research and managerial practices. (shrink)

The main argument in this paper is that the philosophical tradition of phenomenology can provide a source for reflections on emotionality which points to a primordial emotional atmosphere in everyday work life. Within the phenomenological tradition, the paper mainly turns to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and his studies of an emotional atmosphere which “is there” as an essential part of our very way of being situated in the world, but Heidegger’s notion of Stimmung is also discussed.

This paper presents a moral–emotional critique of environmental restoration, through discussion of narratives of redemption. The importance of ‘redemption’ vis-à-vis other environmental discourses rests with its capacity to unpack how, why and in what circumstances the idea of ‘putting something back’ for nature exerts a hold on the popular imagination. This paper thus examines the ethical and emotional experiences bound up in restoration discourses, to identify the motives deployed to confront shame and an associated guilt, and achieve restitution. In turn, (...) the paper also offers new insights into the value of restored nature. (shrink)

This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz. I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing (...) of subjective emotional states as mind-independent properties. I present a linguistic analysis supporting the claim that moral properties and their related concepts are reducible to a subset of emotion-dispositional properties and concepts. This is grounded in the observation that utterances featuring moral predicates function linguistically and conceptually in analogous ways to emotion-dispositional predicates. It follows from this view that asserted moral utterances are truth-apt relative to ethical communities, but that speakers misconceive the extensions of predicates. I show how the framework of Cognitive Linguistics allows us to explain this error. Further analysis of moral and non-moral utterances exposes the deeper conceptual schemas structuring language through cognitive construal processes. An understanding of these processes, coupled with an emotionist elucidation of moral properties and concepts, makes the attribution error an expected upshot of the emotionist thesis, rather than an uncomfortable consequence. (shrink)

Synaesthesia has an emotional side. Many synaesthetes have a sense of certainty about the reality and accuracy of their experiences. Consequently, when their synaesthesia is mimicked in real life these synaeshtetes report a positive emotion whereas when the opposite is true, they experience discomfort. Synaesthesia can also be induced by emotions, and emotions can also be the synaesthetic experience. Here we review the research on these types of synaesthesia and study the current evidence for the true nature of these emotions (...) associated to synesthetic perceptions as studied in grapheme-colour synaesthesia. We begin by presenting evidence of how they can be measured in a laboratory setting and proceed to report studies showing that emotions are automatically activated and can vary in degree as a function of certain factors. We lastly review a study showing that these emerging emotions can be so strong and vivid that they can influence attitudes towards otherwise neutral stimuli. We conclude by presenting a model that could account for the findings reported here. (shrink)

The number of people suffering from type 2 diabetes has been growing recently. This chronic disease is connected with lower perceived quality of life and experiencing a lot of stressful situations. Some of these situations can be anticipated. Thus, it is possible to prepare oneself for future difficult situations by using proactive coping strategies. The aim of this research was to verify the level of satisfaction with various areas of life, the frequency of use of proactive coping strategies in the (...) case of type 2 diabetes patients and healthy individuals, as well as mediation role of these strategies in the relationship between positive emotionality, cognitive curiosity and perceived quality of life. One hundred and seventy four persons took part in the research: 85 persons with diabetes and 89 healthy individuals. We used instruments with recognized psychometric properties: The Proactive Coping Inventory, The World Health Organization Quality of Life Instrument-BREF, PANAS Questionnaire and State-Trait Personality Inventory. The analysis of the results showed, among other things, that people suffering from type 2 diabetes are the least satisfied with their health, and the most with their treatment and knowledge about the disease. Healthy individuals are the most satisfied with the physical domain and one’s present life, whereas the least satisfied with the environmental domain. Both groups differ in terms of using proactive coping strategies. People with diabetes most often adopt a preventive strategy, whereas healthy individuals a reflective one. Two strategies turned out to be able to mediate in the relationship of positive emotionality and life satisfaction in the diabetes group. It was a strictly proactive and preventive coping strategy. No mediation effect was found in the group of healthy people. The results show that in the face of anticipated difficulties, people with type 2 diabetes try to protect their current resources by resorting to their existing knowledge, the level of which they are most satisfied with. The higher the positive emotionality/cognitive curiosity among people with type 2 diabetes, the higher their satisfaction with life, which is due to the fact, that they more frequently use proactive or preventive strategies to cope with stress. (shrink)

It is argued that Mason and Capitanio (2012) are not clear on what would count as a “basic emotion,” and their reconstruction appears more geared toward emotionality in general. Their notion that species-typical outcome is the criterion of basicness requires making speculative assumptions about what is expected and average. Suggestions about an epigenetic approach to social construction of emotionality are also offered.

Becoming Human by Jennifer Greenwood is one of the most thought-provoking books on emotion and its expression I have read. At its core, it attempts to provide an account of the development of full human emotionality and in so doing argues the emotions are “transcranial.” Emotions are radically realized outside our nervous systems and beyond our skin. As children, we are functionally integrated affectively with our mothers; so much so that in a sense our emotions are not ours alone. Regardless (...) of whether one agrees with her radical claims, it is a must-read for those interested in emotion and expression. In order to appreciate the significance of this book, let me sketch its contents and raise a few criticisms.Many... (shrink)