A emoção sempre foi definida como um estado afetivo que se contrapõe à cognição ou à atividade racional. Tal distinção é hoje radicalmente negada pelas pesquisas em neurociências. As emoções, stricto sensu, se expressam sob forma de manifestações intensas, abruptas, inesperadas. Convém, por isso, reconhecer que a emoção envolve uma experiência sensorial e uma dimensão comportamental ou expressiva representada pela resposta motora que ela suscita . Assim, as emoções comportariam sentimentos e/ou atitudes , cujas manifestações variam segundo a intensidade, as (...) circunstâncias e a natureza dos agentes desencadeadores. Dessa gama enorme de possibilidades depende a caracterização precisa dos estados mentais que tais sensações suscitam e as formas de conduta que elas engendram. A atitude emocional, todavia, nem sempre se distingue do comportamento voluntário, aquele guiado pela decisão do agente. Algumas emoções não somente desencadeiam certas formas de comportamento, como são modos apropriados de os indivíduos se adaptarem às situações vividas. É dessa interação que trata o nosso trabalho. (shrink)

The changes and general alarm of the current COVID-19 pandemic have amplified the sense of precariousness and vulnerability for family members who, in addition to the emotional trauma of the cancer diagnosis, add the distress and fear of the risks associated with infection. The primary objectives of the present study were to investigate the psychological impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the parents of pediatric cancer patients, and the level of stress, anxiety, and the child’s quality of life perceived by (...) the parents during the COVID-19 epidemic. The parents of 45 consecutive children with solid and hematological tumors were enrolled. Four questionnaires were administered to the parents at the beginning of the pandemic lockdown. A 75% of parents exhibited remarkable levels of anxiety, with 60 subjects in state scale and 45 subjects in trait scale having scores that reached and exceeded the STAI-Y cut off. The bivariate matrix of correlation found a significant positive correlation between the IES-R and PSS scores. There was a positive correlation between the PSS and PedsQL scale and a negative correlation between IES-R and STAI-Y. The results confirm that parents of pediatric cancer patients have a high psychological risk for post-traumatic symptoms, high stress levels, and the presence of clinically significant levels of anxiety. (shrink)

Propomos comparar as respostas de Schopenhauer e Freud à questão do significado do prazer e desprazer, dadas por eles, respectivamente, em A ordem da salvação (W II) e Além do princípio do prazer. Ambos lhe respondem concordantemente, pois assinalam que a conduta humana ou os processos psíquicos se dilatam entre a busca do prazer e a fuga da dor (em Schopenhauer, a partir da afirmação da Vontade, e em Freud, conforme o princípio de prazer), e a busca da dor e (...) fuga do prazer (em Schopenhauer, no ascetismo ou graças ao “destino”, conduzido pela Vontade inconsciente, e em Freud, a partir da compulsão à repetição). Mesmo que na contradição schopenhaueriana se expresse mais uma polaridade entre o intelecto e a Vontade, e na freudiana, duas tendências subordinadas ao instinto de morte, defenderemos que ambos os autores estão mais afinados nesse tema do que no do dualismo entre Morte e Eros. (shrink)

Este trabalho analisa a influência tributária na definição do modelo constitucional de atribuição dos resultados econômicos da exploração do petróleo offshore, no Brasil. Além da abordagem constitucional do tema, destaca-se a participação dos entes federativos estaduais nas rendas da produção de petróleo, sua federalização e, em decorrência, a redução das rendas dos entes federativos subnacionais, implicando num movimento compensatório pela via da utilização de elementos de natureza tributária, tais como o extinto Imposto Único sobre Minerais e o regime constitucional especial (...) de cobrança na origem do ICMS devido nas operações de combustíveis e derivados de petróleo. (shrink)

One of the most common strategies in philosophical dispute is that of accusing the opponent of begging the question, that is, of assuming or presupposing what is to be proved. Thus, it happens quite often that the credibility of a philosophical argument is infected by the suspicion of begging the question. In many cases it is an open question whether the suspicion is grounded, and the answer lurks somewhere in the dark of what the proponent of the argument does not (...) say. This is why it may take years, or even centuries, before the begging of the question is brought to light. But few philosophers would deny that once it is established that a certain argument begs the question, that argument has to be rejected without hesitation: question-begging arguments are bad arguments, hence one should not appeal to them. Logicians traditionally classify begging the question as a fallacy, that is, as a bad reasoning that seems good at first sight. The fallacy is known under the name of petitio principii. This paper originated in our dissatisfaction with definitions of petitio principii found here and there in logic textbooks. Although it is uncontroversial that there is something wrong with begging the question, it is not clear from those definitions what is wrong. (shrink)

The Dog Schema is the translation of the Italian text Lo schema del cane, originally published in Rivista di Estetica in 1998. The text presents the debate among the philosophers Umberto Eco, Maurizio Ferraris, and Diego Marconi concerning the dog schema. The debate develops through a reflection on Kantian schematism and conceptual applications, showing three different points of view on the subject.

Putnam and others have argued that semantic externalism extends to artifactual kind words such as “pencil” or “doorstop”. I first show that, even with natural kinds, externalism applies to words for ground level kinds. The issue then arises of which categories of artifacts should be identified as kinds in the relevant, restricted sense. I argue that, though there are natural taxonomies of artifactual categories at least some of which have well-defined ground levels, even words for such kinds do not appear (...) to have externalist semantics, as they do not support ignorance or error arguments. Some think that membership to any kind is determined by objective features. Against this, I argue that the makers’ productive intentions are often crucial in selecting which pattern of features counts as constitutive of a kind. Though externalists may insist that membership to a kind is ultimately determined by sharing objective features, the resulting version of externalism can hardly be distinguished from internalism. (shrink)

Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an artifactual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features, and (b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension independently of whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or can accurately describe them (error). However, many common artifactual words appear to be so used that features that are universally shared among members of their extensions are hard to come by, and even fewer can (...) be plausibly regarded as necessary; morevoer, it is highly doubtful that a speaker could manage to refer to kind A while being utterly ignorant of the role the As play in the A-producing community, and it is no less doubtful that an artifactual word that was used to refer to certain objects would keep referring to them (and be regarded as having referred to them) once it has been shown that the associated description is utterly false of such objects, the reason being that we could easily make things that do fit the associated description. Against generalized externalism, it is suggested that artifactual words come in (at least) three different semantic varieties: a few have an externalist semantics, others have an internalist semantics, still others have neither but rather behave as “family names” in Wittgenstein’s sense. (shrink)

"Diego Marconi analizza in questo saggio alcune tappe fondamentali della riflessione di Wittgenstein, illlustrando i motivi per cui gran parte della discussione filosofica odierna risalga all'esperienza intellettuale del filosofo di Vienna: dal "sapere senza fondamenti" al "pensiero debole", dalla filosofia analitica all'ermeneutica.

This paper reports on the investigation of the effects of neuronal shape, at both individual cell and network level, on the behavior of neuronal systems. More specifically, two-dimensional biologically realistic neuronal networks are obtained that take explicity into account the position and morphology of neuronal cells, with the respective behavior for associative recall being simulated through a diluted version of Hopfield's model. While a specific probability density function is used for the placement of the cell bodies, images of real neuronal (...) cells (namely alpha and beta ganglion cells from the cat retina) are used to obtain biologically realistic models. Several morphological measures – including fractal dimension, the excluded volume, and integral geometry functionals–are estimated for the considered cells, and their values are correlated with the potential of the network for associative recall, which is quantified in terms of the overlap between distorted version of the trained patterns and their original version. Such an approach allows the quantitative and objective characterization of the relationship between neuronal shape and function, an important issue in neuroscience. The obtained results substantiate interesting relationships between the neural morphology and function as determined by the performance of the network. (shrink)

. David Chalmerss version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at setting up a unified semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out such a project, and that Chalmerss theory does not coherently fit any of the three patterns. I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, (...) is not easily identified with straightforward semantic ambiguity). (shrink)

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein addressed the issue of beliefs that are not to be argued for, either because any grounds we could produce are less certain than the belief they are supposed to ground, or because our interlocutors would not accept our reasons. However, he did not address the closely related issue of justifying a conclusion to interlocutors who do not see that it follows from premises they accept. In fact, Wittgenstein had discussed the issue in the Remarks on the (...) Foundations of Mathematics; his view had been that certain inferential practices are constitutive of our notions of thinking and inferring. I argue that his treatment of unfounded beliefs in On Certainty essentially replicates, mutatis mutandis, his treatment of basic logical inference. (shrink)

What's the relation between being a P and being called 'P', for example, between being a cat and being called 'cat'? Surely something might be a cat without being called 'cat'; indeed, cats as such might not be called 'cats'. If the word 'cat' disappeared from the language, the event would not entail the disappearence of cats. What about the converse implication? Does being called 'cat' entail being a cat? It would seem so. For suppose 'cat' refers to certain objects, (...) and let Moon be one such object. Consider the statement that Moon is a cat. The statement is true just in case Moon is one of the objects that 'cat' refers to, which she is. Hence, the statement is true, therefore Moon is a cat. Being among the objects that 'cat' refers to entails being a cat. However, it is one thing to say that 'cat' refers to certain objects, and (possibly) a different thing to say that certain objects are called 'cats'. Spiders are often called 'insects', yet 'insect' does not refer to spiders: it is not correct to call spiders 'insects'. "Being called" is often intended as a descriptive notion: whether something is, or is not called 'P' is just a fact that can be stated in terms of people's behavior or patterns of behavior. Reference, on the other hand, may not be descriptive in this sense. Philosophers have often been trying to characterize the quasi-technical notion of reference by suitably restricting or qualifying the everyday, descriptive notion of "being called". Success in such an enterprise would amount to showing that being called* 'P' -a suitably modified version of being called 'P'- entails being P. Whether the enterprise is bound to fail is not the topic of this article. Here, I would like to show that one such attempt did fail, whereas another, more recent attempt that would seem to be bound to fail for analogous reasons does not fail; or not for such reasons, anyway. A few decades ago, some philosophers believed that being called 'P' was (with some qualifications) a sufficient condition for being a P.. (shrink)

Different notions of analysis have been both theorized and put to use in early analytic philosophy. Two of them stand out: connective analysis and analysis as paraphrase. The latter played a central role in the development of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond. With the advent of formal semantics of natural language in the 1970s, paraphrase came to be characterizable as translation into a formal “target language”. While I claim that the method cannot achieve its original philosophical aims, (...) I insist that, in spite of them, it is far from being a theoretically empty operation and that it lives on in some contemporary philosophical enterprises. (shrink)

In questa comunicazione, non intendo contribuire all’analisi di questa o quella classe di espressioni linguistiche. Vorrei invece dare un contributo alla nostra consapevolezza (chiamiamola pure “filosofica”) della funzione che il concetto di forma logica svolge nelle nostre analisi. Più in particolare, vorrei mettere in guardia contro certe possibili conseguenze di quello che a me pare un uso “metafisico” dell’idea di forma logica. Vorrei dimostrare che una certa eredità filosofica, per lo pi...

In this article I first sketch what I take to be two Quinean arguments for the continuity of philosophy with science. After examining Wittgenstein’s reasons for not accepting the arguments, I conclude that they are ineffective on Wittgenstein’s assumptions. Next, I ask three related questions: Where do Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical views essentially diverge? Did Wittgenstein have an argument against the continuity of science with philosophy? Did Wittgenstein believe until the end of his philosophical career that scientific results are philosophically (...) irrelevant? It will be seen that all three questions are related with Wittgenstein’s distinction between conceptual and factual issues. I conclude that the opposition between Quinean philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy is genuine. (shrink)

O que se segue é uma apresentação e a tradução de Das Ziel alles Lebens ist der Tod - Schopenhauer und Freuds Todestrieb, de Marcel Zentner, publicado em: RAINER, Specht. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993, vol. 75, p. 319 – 340. Trata-se de um detalhamento dos problemas que envolvem o tópos criado por Freud de que, com seu dualismo dos instintos de vida e de morte, exposto em Além do princípio do prazer, “desaguara no porto (...) da filosofia de Schopenhauer”. As diferenças fundamentais desse dualismo com a dicotomia schopenhaueriana da afirmação e negação da Vontade merecem um esclarecimento pormenorizado – defende Zentner, para que não se perca de vista o fato de que a principal antecipação schopenhaueriana de Freud concerne, antes, ao complexo conceitual articulado em torno à primeira teoria dos instintos, a teoria da repressão e o “modelo estrutural da psique”. (shrink)

Diego Marconi; VIII*—On the Structure of Lexical Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 131–150, https://do.

The connection between sense, verification, and mode of verification never entirely disappeared from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However, there was a time – the years 1929– 1932 – when Wittgenstein upheld explicitly verificationist views: he identified a proposition’s meaning with the mode or method of its verification, and he said that to understand a proposition is to know how the proposition is verified. This has been regarded as puzzling, in view of the fact that the Tractatus is usually considered not to be (...) committed to verificationism; indeed, it is usually regarded as incompatible with verificationism. Several people have proposed to revise such a received view: Michael Wrigley (1989) has claimed that verificationism must be implicit in the Tractatus; and P. M.S. Hacker (1986) has argued that the Tractatus, though not verificationist, is not as distant from verificationism as it has been taken to be. In another paper (Marconi, forthcoming) I discuss their views. Here I will just notice that, even if one regards the Tractatus as implicitly verificationist, the problem remains of explaining why and how did Wittgenstein reach the explicitly – indeed, blatantly – verificationist outlook of the early Thirties. This is the first question I would like to try to answer in this paper. The second question is, why was such rampant verificationism short-lived? Or in other words, why was verificationism de-emphasized so that, although verificationist themes are undoubtedly present in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, the extreme formulations of the early Thirties tend to disappear after 1933? (shrink)

The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...) of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. (shrink)

I discuss Paolo Casalegno's objections to my views about semantic normativity as presented in my book Lexical Competence (MIT Press, 1997) and in a later paper. I argue that, contrary to Casalegno's claim, the phenomenon of semantic deference can be accounted for without having to appeal to an “objective” notion of reference, i.e. to the view that words have the reference they have independently of whatever knowledge or ability is available to or within the linguistic community. Against both Casalegno and (...) Timothy Williamson, I argue that a semantic norm based on objective reference would be really inapplicable, even though a speaker might believe to be guided by such a norm. (shrink)

Chinese traditional characters share with Peirce’s existential graphs the fact of being endowed with an object-language that they describe through a nonlinear syntax and in an iconic way. Here iconicity is not restricted to images and perceptive similarity since diagrams and graphic metaphors are iconic too. The graphs are shown to be a borderland between Western traditional logic and Chinese traditional writing and culture, so the écart (Jullien’s concept for cultural distance) between characters and graphs is preserved even though graphs (...) break with the Western prejudice in favor of conventionality at the expense of iconicity in logical systems. The take-home lesson for the study of writing systems is to substitute the orality-writing duality with the interplay among orality, writing, and pictures thus shifting from a linguistic typology to a semiotic one. (shrink)

Je m’efforcerai de donner plus de poids aux doutes de Pascal Engel relatifs à deux affirmations de Timothy Williamson dans Philosophy of Philosophy: que les expériences de pensée philosophiques portent sur une possibilité métaphysique par opposition à une possibilité conceptuelle, et que le raisonnement contrefactuel joue un rôle crucial pour atteindre les conclusions modales pertinentes dans les arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée. Dans le premier cas, je soutiendrai qu’à moins de comprendre la notion de conceptuel dans un sens (...) psychologique, il est difficile de saisir la différence entre des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des concepts » ou possibilités conceptuelles et des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des êtres réels » ou possibilités métaphysiques. Dans le second cas, je soutiendrai qu’il n’est pas clair que les contrefactuels sont des prémisses indispensables dans des arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée ou que le raisonnement contrefactuel prend l’avantage sur le raisonnement déductif ordinaire pour atteindre des conclusions modales. (shrink)

Je m’efforcerai de donner plus de poids aux doutes de Pascal Engel relatifs à deux affirmations de Timothy Williamson dans Philosophy of Philosophy: que les expériences de pensée philosophiques portent sur une possibilité métaphysique par opposition à une possibilité conceptuelle, et que le raisonnement contrefactuel joue un rôle crucial pour atteindre les conclusions modales pertinentes dans les arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée. Dans le premier cas, je soutiendrai qu’à moins de comprendre la notion de conceptuel dans un sens (...) psychologique, il est difficile de saisir la différence entre des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des concepts » ou possibilités conceptuelles et des expériences de pensée qui « portent sur des êtres réels » ou possibilités métaphysiques. Dans le second cas, je soutiendrai qu’il n’est pas clair que les contrefactuels sont des prémisses indispensables dans des arguments fondés sur des expériences de pensée ou que le raisonnement contrefactuel prend l’avantage sur le raisonnement déductif ordinaire pour atteindre des conclusions modales. (shrink)

In questa comunicazione, non intendo contribuire all’analisi di questa o quella classe di espressioni linguistiche. Vorrei invece dare un contributo alla nostra consapevolezza (chiamiamola pure “filosofica”) della funzione che il concetto di forma logica svolge nelle nostre analisi. Più in particolare, vorrei mettere in guardia contro certe possibili conseguenze di quello che a me pare un uso “metafisico” dell’idea di forma logica. Vorrei dimostrare che una certa eredità filosofica, per lo pi...