38 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Emma C. Gordon [38]Emma Catherine Gordon [1]
  1. Extended emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  2. Openmindedness and truth.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224.
    While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  3. Understanding in Epistemology.Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Understanding in Epistemology Epistemology is often defined as the theory of knowledge, and talk of propositional knowledge has dominated the bulk of modern literature in epistemology. However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship … Continue reading Understanding in Epistemology →.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  4.  39
    Human Enhancement and Augmented Reality.Emma C. Gordon - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (1):1-15.
    Bioconservative bioethicists (e.g., Kass, 2002, Human Dignity and Bioethics, 297–331, 2008; Sandel, 2007; Fukuyama, 2003) offer various kinds of philosophical arguments against cognitive enhancement—i.e., the use of medicine and technology to make ourselves “better than well” as opposed to merely treating pathologies. Two notable such bioconservative arguments appeal to ideas about (1) the value of achievement, and (2) authenticity. It is shown here that even if these arguments from achievement and authenticity cut ice against specifically pharmacologically driven cognitive enhancement, they (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    'Knowledge-First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea that knowledge per se should not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts (e.g., justification, belief), but rather that these and other notions should be analysed in terms of the concept of knowledge. This volume features a substantive introduction and 13 original essays from leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6. On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Bioethics 28 (1):153-161.
    In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio-enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio-enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  7. Objectual understanding, factivity and belief.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 423-442.
    Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  8. Is There Propositional Understanding?Emma C. Gordon - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):181-192.
    Literature in epistemology tends to suppose that there are three main types of understanding – propositional, atomistic, and objectual. By showing that all apparent instances of propositional understanding can be more plausibly explained as featuring one of several other epistemic states, this paper argues that talk of propositional understanding is unhelpful and misleading. The upshot is that epistemologists can do without the notion of propositional understanding.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  9. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
    We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey ( 2010 ) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding , rather than knowledge, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  10.  70
    Cognitive enhancement and authenticity: moving beyond the Impasse.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (2):281-288.
    In work on the ethics of cognitive enhancement use, there is a pervasive concern that such enhancement will—in some way—make us less authentic. Attempts to clarify what this concern amounts to and how to respond to it often lead to debates on the nature of the “true self” and what constitutes “genuine human activity”. This paper shows that a new and effective way to make progress on whether certain cases of cognitive enhancement problematically undermine authenticity is to make use of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12.  58
    Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity?Emma C. Gordon - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4955-4972.
    In Chapter 3 of True Enough, Elgin outlines her view of objectual understanding, focusing largely on its non-factive nature and the extent to which a certain kind of know-how is required for the “grasping” component of understanding. I will explore four central issues that feature in this chapter, concentrating on the role of know-how, the concept of endorsement, Elgin’s critique of the factivity constraint on understanding, and how we might use aspects of Elgin’s framework to inform related debates on the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  13. Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology.Mona Ioana Simion, Johanna Schnurr & Emma C. Gordon - 2021 - Synthese 198 (15):3553-3564.
    Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14.  26
    When Monitoring Facilitates Trust.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):557-571.
    It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; Wanderer and Townsend 2013; Nguyen forthcoming; McMyler 2011, Castelfranchi and Falcone 2000; Frey 1993; Dasgupta 1988, Litzky et al. 2006) — especially three-place trust (i.e., A trusts B to X), but sometimes also two-place trust (i.e., A trusts B, see, e.g., Baier 1986). Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  27
    When Monitoring Facilitates Trust.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):557-571.
    It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; Wanderer and Townsend 2013; Nguyen forthcoming; McMyler 2011, Castelfranchi and Falcone 2000; Frey 1993; Dasgupta 1988, Litzky et al. 2006) — especially three-place trust (i.e., A trusts B to X), but sometimes also two-place trust (i.e., A trusts B, see, e.g., Baier 1986). Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2013 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):122-135.
    If Savulescu's controversial principle of Procreative Beneficence is correct, then an important implication is that couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into existence. Both defenders as well as some critics of this normative entailment of PB have typically accepted the comparatively less controversial claim about non-disease traits: that there are non-disease traits such that testing and selecting for them would in fact contribute to bringing about the child who is expected to have (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  17.  19
    High altitude, enhancement, and the ‘spirit of sport’.Emma C. Gordon & Connie Dodds - 2023 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 50 (1):63-82.
    The World Anti-Doping Code (2021) includes a substance on the prohibited list if it meets at least two of the following: (1) it has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; (2) it represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete; (3) it violates the spirit of sport. This paper uses a case study to illustrate points of tension between this code and enhancements that are appropriate to ban; we argue that there are banned drugs (e.g., acetazolamide (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8).
    Epistemic relativists often appeal to an epistemic incommensurability thesis. One notable example is the position advanced by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969). However, Ian Hacking’s radical denial of the possibility of objective epistemic reasons for belief poses, we suggest, an even more forceful challenge to mainstream meta-epistemology. Our central objective will be to develop a novel strategy for defusing Hacking’s line of argument. Specifically, we show that the epistemic incommensurability thesis can be resisted even if we grant the very insights (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19.  7
    On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson.Emma C. Gordon & J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Bioethics 29 (3):153-161.
    In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio‐enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio‐enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.
    Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502.
    This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement and Cheapened Achievement: A New Dilemma.Emma C. Gordon & Lucy Dunn - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):409-421.
    Recent discussions of cognitive enhancement often note that drugs and technologies that improve cognitive performance may do so at the risk of “cheapening” our resulting cognitive achievements Arguing about bioethics, Routledge, London, 2012; Harris in Bioethics 25:102–111, 2011). While there are several possible responses to this worry, we will highlight what we take to be one of the most promising—one which draws on a recent strand of thinking in social and virtue epistemology to construct an integrationist defence of cognitive enhancement.. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  50
    Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Practical Proposal.Emma C. Gordon & Viola Ragonese - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (3):474-487.
    According to Persson and Savulescu, the risks posed by a morally corrupt minority's potential to abuse cognitive enhancement make it such that we have an urgent imperative to first pursue moral enhancement of humankind – and, consequently, if we are a long way from safe, effective moral enhancement, then we have at least one good reason to consider opposing further cognitive enhancement. However, as Harris points out, such a proposal seems to support delaying life-saving cognitive progress. In this article, we (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Virtual reality and technologically mediated love.Emma C. Gordon - unknown
    An emerging line of research in bioethics questions whether enhanced love is less significant or valuable than otherwise, where "enhanced love" generally refers to cases where drugs (e.g., oxytocin, etc.) are relied on to maintain romantic relationships. Separate from these debates is a recent body of literature on the philosophy and psychology of "Virtual Reality (VR) dating," where romantic relationships are developed and sustained in a way that is mediated by VR. Interestingly, these discussions have proceeded largely independently from each (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. The moral epistemology of trust and trustworthiness.Emma C. Gordon & Mona Simion - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
  26.  78
    Trust and Psychedelic Moral Enhancement.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Neuroethics 15 (2):1-14.
    Moral enhancement proposals struggle to be both plausible and ethically defensible while nevertheless interestingly distinct from both cognitive enhancement as well as (mere) moral education. Brian Earp (_Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement_ 83:415–439, 12 ) suggests that a promising middle ground lies in focusing on the (suitably qualified) use of psychedelics as _adjuncts_ to moral development. But what would such an adjunctive use of psychedelics look like in practice? In this paper, I draw on literature from three areas where techniques (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  35
    Gender, race, and moral enhancement.Emma C. Gordon - 2023 - In Mary L. Edwards & S. Orestis Palermos (eds.), Feminist philosophy and emerging technologies. New York, NY: Routledge.
  28.  17
    In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification.Anne Meylan, J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis - 2017 - In . pp. 246-258.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  64
    Pharmacological cognitive enhancement and the value of achievements: An intervention.Emma C. Gordon & Rebecca J. Willis - 2022 - Bioethics 37 (2):130-134.
    Pharmacological cognitive enhancements nontherapeutically improve cognitive functioning, though recent critics have challenged their use by claiming that cognitive success, aided by the use of cognitive enhancement, is less valuable than otherwise. We criticize two recent responses to this objection, due to Carter and Pritchard and Wang, and propose a different response on behalf of proponents of cognitive enhancement that is shown to be more promising.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  41
    The ethics of cognitive enhancement.Emma C. Gordon - forthcoming - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  12
    Understanding of the norm of political discourse.Emma C. Gordon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-13.
    It is argued that understanding is the norm of political discourse, and it is shown why political assertions can be epistemically problematic within a liberal democracy even when asserted knowledgeably.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  40
    Intellectual humility and assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 335-345.
    Recent literature suggests that intellectual humility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically-viz., from a point of view where epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectual humility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectual humility might have implications for how we (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  43
    Intellectual humility and assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Recent literature suggests that intellectual humility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically-viz., from a point of view where epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectual humility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectual humility might have implications for how we (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  7
    The Moral Psychology of Pride.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (eds.) - 2017 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    This book demonstrates pride's unique profile in philosophical theory as both an emotion and an element of human virtue, and includes a range of represented perspectives: psychology; philosophy; sociology; and anthropology.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  22
    The Moral Psychology of Pride.Joseph Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (eds.) - 2017 - London: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book demonstrates pride's unique profile in philosophical theory as both an emotion and an element of human virtue, and includes a range of represented perspectives: psychology; philosophy; sociology; and anthropology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  18
    Correction to: When Monitoring Facilitates Trust.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):573-573.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  32
    Human Enhancement and Well-Being: A Case for Optimism.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Routledge.
    This book outlines and criticises the six main contemporary arguments for scepticism about the role of human enhancements in promoting well-being. It also defends important and concrete ways in which enhancement-permissive policies should be embraced with the aim of promoting well-being.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Meylan, Anne (2017). In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification. In: Carter, J Adam; Gordon, Emma C; Jarvis, Benjamin. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 246-258.Anne Meylan, J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.) - 2017
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark