Examining dialogue, one may underline its being amicable or not, intellectual or not, useful or useless, plainly transferring message or hinting metamessage, serving social or private goals etc. However, speaking about dialogue in general we speak in terms of semiotics.Considering globalization in general one should adopt the semiotic framework within which globalization is not just a collection of cases, and globalistics is not only a catalogue registering it. It will turn globalization into the subject of philosophical interest. The paper presents (...) a specific basis for semiotic investigations. This basis postulates inter alia the fourth part , not widely known, called sigmatics, dealing with the construction of adequate ontologies. It can help to explain in a complete way what we observe in the present and to foresee the prospects of the future, including the integrated problems of dialogue, globalization and tolerance which are the main concern of the presented considerations. Some special characteristics of the semiotic research and of globalistics in Russia are displayed in two Appendixes. (shrink)

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractual exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensational exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be (...) no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. (shrink)

The theory suggested in the article is revealed in terms of existential materialism finding its source in Aristotle’s maxim that philosophy is a study of the essential unity of the grounds of being and consciousness. This theory still makes use of the old principle of reflection postulating the subject/object dyad. The here-proposed theory points out that there is not really a dyad, but a triad of a cognitive relationship: subject–language-object. To cope with the main epistemological problem of truth, we postulate (...) that not only the paradigmatic, but also the syntagmatic axis be considered. The basic syntagma of gnoseology is contemplation on the absolute and relative in true knowledge, but not in a Hegelian way. (shrink)

We consider a normal-form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. The actions representing other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the sovereign, individual control of the players. We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are stated and (...) we identify conditions under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent. We apply this framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly, typically, a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium. The paradox vanishes if the cartel attains a leadership position. For international pollution abatement treaties, cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash’s best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. (...) We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return. (shrink)