I propose a new argument for the existence of God. God is defined as a conscious being that is the first cause of reality. In its simplified initial form, the argument has two premises: all possible truths are knowable, and it is impossible to know that the proposition that God does not exist is true. From and it follows that the proposition that God exists is necessarily true. After introducing the argument in its crude initial form and laying out the (...) core intuitions behind its premises, I point to two difficulties that this simplified version faces. I then go on to show how the argument can be revised to handle these difficulties. I defend the revised argument from various objections. (shrink)
In his 2012 book God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason Herman Philipse argues that all known deductive versions of the cosmological argument are untenable. His strategy is to propose a few objections to two classical deductive cosmological arguments. The first argument is from the impossibility of there being contingent entities that are the sufficient cause for the existence of a contingent entity. The second argument is from the impossibility of there being an infinite causal regress. (...) In this article I argue that Philipse’s attempt to write off all deductive cosmological arguments fails. (shrink)
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Scientism and metaphysics Who deals with scientism soon discovers that scientism can be interpreted in many different ways. Most interpretations of scientism are so radical that they can hardly be defended, or so modest that they are nothing more than trivial platitudes nobody would disagree with. This poses a dilemma for adherents of scientism. Yet, in this article I will propose a particular interpretation of scientism that does seem prima facie defensible, while at the same time cannot be put away (...) as being merely a trivial platitude. Having such a maximally fruitful interpretation of scientism does not help the adherents of scientism, though. For it entails a falsehood, namely that metaphysics cannot give us insights in the overall structure and nature of reality. I shall argue for this by fleshing out an interpretation of metaphysics, on which we can certainly say that metaphysics enables us to acquire said insights. Finally, I will discuss and assess a number of objections against my refutation of the aforementioned maximally fruitful interpretation of scientism. (shrink)