5 found
  1.  75
    Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning.Elliott O. Wagner - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):547-575.
    Common wisdom holds that communication is impossible when messages are costless and communicators have totally opposed interests. This article demonstrates that such wisdom is false. Non-convergent dynamics can sustain partial information transfer even in a zero-sum signalling game. In particular, I investigate a signalling game in which messages are free, the state-act payoffs resemble rock–paper–scissors, and senders and receivers adjust their strategies according to the replicator dynamic. This system exhibits Hamiltonian chaos and trajectories do not converge to equilibria. This persistent (...)
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  2.  41
    Conventional Semantic Meaning in Signalling Games with Conflicting Interests.Elliott O. Wagner - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):751-773.
    Lewis signalling games are often used to explain how it is possible for simple agents to develop systems of conventional semantic meaning. In these games, all players obtain identical payoffs in every outcome. This is an unrealistic payoff structure, but it is often employed because it is thought that semantic meaning will not emerge if interests conflict. Here it is shown that not only is conventional meaning possible when interests conflict, but it is the most likely outcome in a finite (...)
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  3.  40
    Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation.Elliott O. Wagner - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (1):81-94.
    Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot simply be reduced to the dynamics of the individual games and that (...)
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    1. On Ad Hoc Hypotheses On Ad Hoc Hypotheses (Pp. 1-14).J. Christopher Hunt, Kareem Khalifa, Ryan Muldoon, Tony Smith, Michael Weisberg, Michelle G. Gibbons, Elliott O. Wagner & Andreas Wagner - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (1):1-14.
    This article examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demonstrate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states among agents of the same type. This is quite different from Schelling-like behavior and suggests that segregation (...)
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  5.  78
    Brian Skyrms Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. [REVIEW]Elliott O. Wagner & Michael Franke - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axt004.