This paper is an evaluation of C. S. Peirce’s late essay “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”, based on the two logical values that he calls “productiveness” and “security.” After reviewing the unique logical form of “abduction” and noting that it is a formal fallacy—and so enjoys less “security” than deduction or induction—I turn to the extraordinary case of abduction that is found in “A Neglected Argument.” I argue that the productiveness of the Neglected Argument is found in (...) its ability to instigate practical results. The security of the Neglected Argument, on the other hand, is rooted in an activity Peirce calls “musement,” a kind of rational intuition. Moreover, I suggest that Peirce’s notion of “musement,” which has remained something of a mystery in Peirce studies, arose from hisearly reading of Friedrich von Schiller’s aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper examines the meaning of what Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II calls “The Law of the Gift,” namely, “Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, can fully find himself only through a sincere gift of himself.” After explaining what it means to be “willed for itself,” I consider how “finding oneself only through a gift of self ” is justified. I then argue that in his theory of self-gift,Wojtyła/John Paul II espouses an “embodied” altruism. (...) Two objections to Wojtyła/John Paul II’s account are also addressed: (1) the idea that finding fulfillment (moral goodness) through self-giving is incompatible with altruism and (2) that reciprocal self-giving is incompatible with altruism. I defend Wojtyła/John Paul II’s notion of self-giving against these objections in several ways, but focus on evidence for the compatibility of subjective enrichment and altruism. (shrink)