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  1.  29
    Conjunction Conditionalization and Irrelevant Semifactuals.Lars B. Gundersen & Eline Busck Gundersen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):284-295.
    Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents trivially true? The principle of Conjunction Conditionalization →) is highly controversial. Many philosophers view it as an attractive feature of Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals that it can easily be modified to avoid this principle. However, Walters and Williams beg to differ. They argue that Conjunction Conditionalization is an indispensable ingredient of any Lewisian semantics, since CC is entailed by standard Lewisian theorems and a plausible semantic claim about irrelevant semifactuals. If this is true, (...)
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  2.  94
    The chameleon’s revenge: Response-dependence, finks and provisoed biconditionals.Eline Busck Gundersen - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):435-441.
    Response-dependence theses are usually formulated in terms of a priori true biconditionals of roughly the form ‘something, x, falls under the concept ‘F’ ↔ x would elicit response R from subjects S under conditions C’. Such formulations are vulnerable to conditional fallacy problems; counterexamples threaten whenever the C-conditions’ coming to obtain might alter the object with respect to F. Crispin Wright has suggested that such problems can be avoided by placing the C-conditions in a proviso. This ensures that any changes (...)
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    The chameleon’s revenge: Response-dependence, finks and provisoed biconditionals.Eline Busck Gundersen - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):435 - 441.
    Response-dependence theses are usually formulated in terms of a priori true biconditionals of roughly the form 'something, x, falls under the concept 'F' ↔ x would elicit response R from subjects S under conditions C'. Such formulations are vulnerable to conditional fallacy problems; counterexamples threaten whenever the C-conditions' coming to obtain might alter the object with respect to F. Crispin Wright has suggested that such problems can be avoided by placing the C-conditions in a proviso. This ensures that any changes (...)
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