At a time when more corporate employers are using genetic information as a cornerstone of their hiring practices, when workers find their chromosomes considered alongside their resumes, the ramifications of genetic testing demand further examination. Risky Business analyzes health screening in the workplace - three major types of testing are examined: genetic screening in which job applicants and employees are tested for inherited traits that may predispose them to the disease:genetic monitoring that aims to detect genetic damage among current employees (...) that could indicate exposure to dangerous chemicals; and teratogenic risk in which laboratory cultures and animals are used to provide evidence of the effects of chemical exposure on humans. (shrink)

Drawing on insights of thinkers in the natural rights tradition, Draper analyzes numerous hypothetical cases including those involving a runaway trolley, then seeks to determine if killing civilians in war is ever justified. In his consideration of this issue he avoids appealing to the principle of double effect. Having considered hypothetical cases at length, he leaves it to others to decide if any option to go to war is justifiable. In this regard he himself is sceptical.

Part philosophical meditation, part cultural critique, The Body in Pain is a profoundly original study that has already stirred excitement in a wide range of intellectual circles. The book is an analysis of physical suffering and its relation to the numerous vocabularies and cultural forces--literary, political, philosophical, medical, religious--that confront it.Elaine Scarry bases her study on a wide range of sources: literature and art, medical case histories, documents on torture compiled by Amnesty International, legal transcripts of personal injury trials, (...) and military and strategic writings by such figures as Clausewitz, Churchill, Liddell Hart, and Kissinger, She weaves these into her discussion with an eloquence, humanity, and insight that recall the writings of Hannah Arendt and Jean-Paul Sartre.Scarry begins with the fact of pain's inexpressibility. Not only is physical pain enormously difficult to describe in words--confronted with it, Virginia Woolf once noted, "language runs dry"--it also actively destroys language, reducing sufferers in the most extreme instances to an inarticulate state of cries and moans. Scarry analyzes the political ramifications of deliberately inflicted pain, specifically in the cases of torture and warfare, and shows how to be fictive. From these actions of "unmaking" Scarry turns finally to the actions of "making"--the examples of artistic and cultural creation that work against pain and the debased uses that are made of it. Challenging and inventive, The Body in Pain is landmark work that promises to spark widespread debate. (shrink)

Many find the prospect of death distressing at least partly because they believe that death deprives its subject of life’s benefits. Properly qualified, the belief is surely true. But should its truth lead us to conclude that there is something dreadful or awful about death, something that merits distress?

In this paper, we aim to get clear about why renewal is needed in philosophy of religion and how to achieve it. We begin with a fundamental distinction between someone’s perspective in the field and the perspective of the field, arguing that any philosopher of religion is responsible to both. Then we identify eight problems that should prevent the status quo in philosophy from appearing acceptable to anyone who takes the perspective of the field, as well as seven practical suggestions (...) which, if implemented, would help to solve these problems. The problems include such things as tribalism, ignorance about religion, and viewing issues exclusively in terms of what is religiously familiar; the mitigations such things as allowing non-Christians to join the Society of Christian Philosophers, broadening the education of philosophers of religion, and paying more attention to the deep history of religion. (shrink)

Social scientific evidence suggests that labor migration can increase resilience to climate change. For that reason, some have recently advocated using labor migration policy as a tool for climate adaptation. This paper engages with the normative question of whether, and under what conditions, states may permissibly use labor migration policy as a tool for climate adaptation. I argue that states may use labor migration policy as a tool for climate adaptation and may even have a duty to do so, subject (...) to two moral constraints. First, states must also provide acceptable alternative options for adaptation so that the vulnerable are not forced to sacrifice their morally important interests in being able to remain where they are. Second, states may not impose restrictive terms on labor migrants to make accepting greater numbers less costly for themselves because doing so unfairly shifts the costs of adaptation onto the most vulnerable. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss three probabilistic arguments for the existence of multiple universes. First, we provide an analysis of total evidence and use that analysis to defend Roger White's "this universe" objection to a standard fine-tuning argument for multiple universes. Second, we explain why Rodney Holder's recent cosmological argument for multiple universes is unconvincing. Third, we develop a "Cartesian argument" for multiple universes. While this argument is not open to the objections previously noted, we show that, given certain highly (...) plausible assumptions about evidence and epistemic probability, the proposition which it treats as evidence cannot coherently be regarded as evidence for anything. This raises the question of whether to reject the assumptions or accept that such a proposition cannot be evidence. (shrink)

Hitchcock advances a diachronic Dutch Book argument (DDB) for a 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Bradley and Leitgeb argue that Hitchcock’s DDB argument fails. We demonstrate the following: (a) Bradley and Leitgeb’s criticism of Hitchcock is unconvincing; (b) nonetheless, there are serious reasons to worry about the success of Hitchcock’s argument; (c) however, it is possible to construct a new DDB for 1/3 about which such worries cannot be raised.

The argument that a permanent vegetative state equates to death because it marks the death of the person is not a new one, but I wonder whether Ravelingien et al1 need to regard those in a PVS as dead to make a case for animal to human transplantation trials taking place in such people. It is not an argument likely to convince anyone who refuses to accept that only human persons have inherent value, dignity or a right to life, and (...) the arguments on both sides have been well rehearsed, with no sign of reconciliation. My own view is that people in a PVS are still alive, albeit with a poor quality of life. I see no objection in principle to the proposal that competent people can decide, in advance, to participate in research when they become incompetent. At the present time, it is generally accepted that an advance refusal of consent should be respected. Some controversy exists on whether someone can insist on treatment in advance, but in Ravelingien et al’s1 paper, what is being proposed is not that people can insist on becoming research participants, but rather that they can signal a willingness to become such a participant in the future. Indeed, this principle can be extended to competent people such as those with early …. (shrink)

The distinctive role played by William Eden in the penal reform debate of the late eighteenth century is examined and his emphasis on leniency in the exercise of punishment is identified. Eden is found to have introduced the notion of ‘public virtue’ into a rights theory paradigm and the implications of this development are explored. Eden's contribution to English penal theory is illustrated by a comparison of his position with those of other leading theorists of the period, and the extent (...) to which Eden's ideas affected English practices of punishment is assessed. (shrink)

Medical student learning is dependent on an unwritten agreement between patients and the medical profession, in which students “practise” upon real patients in order that, when they are doctors, those same patients will benefit from the doctors’ skills. Given the increasing propensity for patients to refuse to take part in such learning, there is a danger that doctors will qualify without being truly competent. As patients, we must all ask ourselves, when asked to take part in medical teaching: if this (...) student/trainee doesn’t learn now, on me and under supervision, how will the person be truly competent next time, when this is for real, and the patient might be me or my loved one?We argue that a new and more explicit agreement is needed, in which the default should be that all patients are willing to help in the education of medical students, while we ensure that all such students are already competent in simulation before first practising upon real patients. (shrink)

Just Business provides the first comprehensive, reasoned framework for resolving questions of business ethics and corporate governance. Innovative, accessible, and global in scope, its powerful Ethical Decision Model can be used to manage the ethical problems of business as they arise in all their complexity and variety. Just Business combines business realism with philosophical rigor, and demonstrates that it is not necessary to emasculate or to adulterate business for business to be ethical. The book benefits from Elaine Sternberg's extensive (...) experience as an academic philosopher, an international investment banker, and head of successful businesses. She is now Principal of a London-headquartered consultancy firm, and Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Leeds. (shrink)

This article develops a normative theory of the status of ‘internally displaced persons’. Political theorists working on forced migration have paid little attention to internally displaced persons, but internally displaced persons bear a distinctive normative status that implies a set of rights that its bearer can claim and correlate duties that others owe. This article develops a practice-based account of justice in internal displacement, which aims to answer the questions of who counts as an internally displaced person and what is (...) owed to internally displaced persons (and by whom). The first section addresses the question of who counts as an internally displaced person by offering an interpretation of the conditions of non-alienage and involuntariness. The second section articulates an account of what is owed to internally displaced persons that draws on and refines the idea of ‘occupancy rights’. The third section sets out an account of the role of the international community in supplementing the protection of internally displaced persons by their own states. (shrink)

Work in philosophy of religion exhibits at least four symptoms of poor health: it is too partisan, too polemical, too narrow in its focus, and too often evaluated using criteria that are theological or religious instead of philosophical. Our diagnosis is that, because of the emotional and psychosocial aspects of religion, many philosophers of religion suffer from cognitive biases and group influence. We support this diagnosis in two ways. First, we examine work in psychology on cognitive biases and their affective (...) triggers. This work supports the view that, while cognitive biases are no doubt a problem in all inquiry and in all areas ofphilosophy, they are particularly damaging to inquiry in philosophy of religion. Second, we examine work in social and evolutionary psychology on religious sociality and its attendant emotions. This work establishes that the coalitional features of religion are correlated with group bias, and we contend that this bias is also harmful to inquiry in philosophy of religion. We close by offering both a prognosis and recommendations for treatment. (shrink)

Patients have not been entirely ignored in medical ethics. There has been a shift from the general presumption that ‘doctor knows best’ to a heightened respect for patient autonomy. Medical ethics remains one–sided, however. It tends (incorrectly) to interpret patient autonomy as mere participation in decisions, rather than a willingness to take the consequences. In this respect, medical ethics remains largely paternalistic, requiring doctors to protect patients from the consequences of their decisions. This is reflected in a one–sided account of (...) duties in medical ethics. Duties fall mainly on doctors and only exceptionally on patients. Medical ethics may exempt patients from obligations because they are the weaker or more vulnerable party in the doctor–patient relationship. We argue that vulnerability does not exclude obligation. We also look at others ways in which patient responsibilities flow from general ethics: for instance, from responsibilities to others and to the self, from duties of citizens, and from the responsibilities of those who solicit advice. Finally, we argue that certain duties of patients counterbalance an otherwise unfair captivity of doctors as helpers. (shrink)

A contribution to the sixth installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Apology for Quietism,” this article focuses on the early-twentieth-century Quaker historian and philosopher of mysticism, Rufus Jones, who treated Quietism as in polar opposition to the work of Quakerism “here in this world.” Consequently, he placed Quietism within a negatively-constructed framework of belief, identifying much of its influence in Quaker history on the spiritual teachings of the Miguel de Molinos, Madame Guyon, and François Fénelon. This article examines Jones's premise (...) that Quietism was “no more than a noble mood, too rare and abstract to be translated into real human life.” It contends that Jones's aversion to Quietist influences in Quaker history had more to do with his own personal ambivalences, his response to the violence of World War I, his modernizing agenda, and his distorted understanding of Quietist spirituality than with anything inherent to Quietism itself. (shrink)

This article sketches a taxonomy of the activities in which bioethics academics engage, including activities that may make their own research more impactful, from little or no engagement outside academia to activism or extreme activism. This taxonomy, the first of its kind, may be useful in determining what obligations bioethics academics have in relation to activism and activities that fall short of activism.

People who suffer from eating disorders often have to be treated against their will, perhaps by being detained, perhaps by being forced to eat. In this paper it is argued that whilst forcing compliance is generally acceptable, there may be circumstances under which a sufferer's refusal of consent to treatment should be respected. This argument will hinge upon whether someone in the grip of an eating disorder can actually make competent decisions about their quality of life. If so, then the (...) decision to refuse therapy may be on a par with other decisions to refuse life‐prolonging therapy made by sufferers of debilitating chronic, or acute onset terminal illness. In such cases, palliation might justifiably replace aggressive therapy. The argument will also draw heavily on the distinction between competent refusal of therapy and passive euthanasia, and the distinction between incompetent and irrational decisions. Both distinctions will then be applied to decisions to refuse food. The extent to which sufferers from anorexia nervosa can be categorised as either incompetent or irrational will be examined. It is against this background that it will be argued that at least some of those who suffer from eating disorders should have their refusals respected, even if they may die as a result. (shrink)

Chapter Redeeming the Present Elaine Graham What does it mean to do feminist moral philosophy with notions of utopia and transformation as points of..

Within the last five years, a number of specific growth factors have been localized in developing lesions of atherosclerosis. This localization of growth factors that is not observed in normal vessels, together with the pleotrophic activities of growth factors, have suggested a role for growth factors in atherosclerotic lesion progression. However, based on in vitro studies, many of the growth factors identified in lesions have overlapping target cells and are derived from the same cellular sources. What is the relative role (...) of the specific growth factors identified? How is the their activity altered by the local conditions in the vessel wall? How do different risk factors for atherosclerosis alter the balance between growth factors and their natural regulators? Evidence for the involvement of specific growth factors in the progression of lesions of atherosclerosis is discussed, as well as the multiple levels at which the activities of these growth factors may be regulated by the vessel wall. (shrink)

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, (...) the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. (shrink)

The NHS differs from a private business in not aiming at profits and in being obliged to provide only the single product of health care. How radically does this affect the requirement to be “business‐like” and adopt business values? Dr Draper is Lecturer in Biomedical Ethics at The Medical School, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT. She wishes to thank Tom Sorell for his comments on the first draft of this article.

Within the human and social sciences, the analysis of gender is treated as an essential aspect of human behaviour. By contrast, within the church there has been little sustained or disciplined attention to the nature and underlying significance of gender, theological discourse and church policy all too often displaying their ignorance and unexamined assumptions about the crucial issues involved. Elaine Graham attempts a more detailed and critical inquiry into how an analysis of gender can affect policy, practice and discourse (...) with the church. (shrink)

It is widely claimed in recent years that science and theology can and do interact harmoniously. This chapter, however, explores some areas of potential conflict. Specifically, it asks whether the relationship between science and metaphysical naturalism is sufficiently close to cause trouble in the marriage of science to theistic religion, trouble that supports a decision to divorce even if it does not logically require it. Several popular positions about “methodological naturalism” are examined. While metaphysical naturalists claim there are no supernatural (...) entities, methodological naturalists claim only that, when scientists attempt to explain natural phenomena, they should do so without appealing to any supernatural entities. One popular position about methodological naturalism is that it cannot be reconciled with the traditional theistic view of divine action in the world. A second position is that God’s power and wisdom or God’s faithfulness or even God’s generosity makes divine intervention in the world unlikely at best and thus supports methodological naturalism. A third position is that methodological naturalism can be justified by an appeal to the nature or goals of science. Powerful objections can be raised to all three of these positions. Of course, if neither the nature of God nor the nature or goals of science support methodological naturalism, then it is tempting to conclude, as many conservative Christian thinkers do, that the commitment of contemporary science to methodological naturalism is grounded in a prior commitment, perhaps even an irrational one, to metaphysical naturalism. The chapter ends by rejecting this conclusion in favor of the view that the past success of both non-scientists and scientists in discovering natural causes for natural phenomena justifies a modest methodological naturalism and at the same time provides significant support for metaphysical naturalism. (shrink)