This paper examines the relevance and importance of the large number of examples which Aristotle uses in his "Prior Analytics." In the first part of the paper three preliminary issues are raised: First, it investigates what counts as an example in Aristotle's syllogistic, and especially whether only examples expressed in concrete terms should be considered as examples or maybe also propositions and arguments with letters of the alphabet. The second issue concerns the kinds of examples Aristotle actually uses from everyday (...) life as well as from various scientific and philosophical forms of discourse; among these, it seems that biological examples, rather than mathematical ones, have a predominant place. Finally, I discuss what Aristotle himself has to say about the use of examples, and in particular about the similarity between the use of an example and the use of induction. The second part of the paper focusses on the functions of Aristotle's logical examples. It is of course obvious that some of the examples in the Prior Analytics are used to illustrate, and thus to clarify, a definition, a logical rule, a type of argument. However, I think that Aristotle's logical examples have another function, which is philosophically more interesting, namely as integral parts of the procedure of proving something. To support this claim, I analyse three passages from the "Prior Analytics" in which examples are used either in order to prove that something is not the case, i.e. as counter-examples, or in order to prove positively that it is possible for something to be the case. At the end, I argue that for such uses of examples Aristotle uses the notion of 'ekthesis', which seems to have a wider sense than usually suggested; that is to say, it is used to refer to any proof by means of an example, and not only for the procedure which Aristotle uses to reduce imperfect to perfect syllogisms. (shrink)

This paper examines the relevance and importance of the large number of examples which Aristotle uses in his "Prior Analytics." In the first part of the paper three preliminary issues are raised: First, it investigates what counts as an example in Aristotle's syllogistic, and especially whether only examples expressed in concrete terms should be considered as examples or maybe also propositions and arguments with letters of the alphabet. The second issue concerns the kinds of examples Aristotle actually uses from everyday (...) life as well as from various scientific and philosophical forms of discourse; among these, it seems that biological examples, rather than mathematical ones, have a predominant place. Finally, I discuss what Aristotle himself has to say about the use of examples, and in particular about the similarity between the use of an example and the use of induction. The second part of the paper focusses on the functions of Aristotle's logical examples. It is of course obvious that some of the examples in the Prior Analytics are used to illustrate, and thus to clarify, a definition, a logical rule, a type of argument. However, I think that Aristotle's logical examples have another function, which is philosophically more interesting, namely as integral parts of the procedure of proving something. To support this claim, I analyse three passages from the "Prior Analytics" in which examples are used either in order to prove that something is not the case, i.e. as counter-examples, or in order to prove positively that it is possible for something to be the case. At the end, I argue that for such uses of examples Aristotle uses the notion of 'ekthesis', which seems to have a wider sense than usually suggested; that is to say, it is used to refer to any proof by means of an example, and not only for the procedure which Aristotle uses to reduce imperfect to perfect syllogisms. (shrink)

Este artigo se divide em duas etapas. A primeira etapa tem o objetivo de apresentar, dos tópicos 1 ao 5, três métodos de prova e um de contraprova presentes nos Primeiros Analíticos de Aristóteles. Fornecendo uma notação de fácil acesso, compreensão e relativamente neutra à interpretações com o objetivo de demonstrar que a silogística preserva interessantes ferramentas de dedução e questões intuitivamente férteis para investigação filosófica, em especial, àqueles que desejam compreender leituras filosóficas à lógica de Aristóteles, como as presentes (...) em Łucasievicz e Corcoran. A segunda etapa consiste em oferecer uma interpretação inferencialista ao estilo de Robert Brandom para a silogística aristotélica. Para realizar esta tarefa, iniciaremos com a apresentação do contexto e dos elementos formais de desenvolvimento do método aristotélico de prova de argumentos chamado silogística. Em seguida, apresentarei o método direto de prova que envolve converter sentenças em silogismos imperfeitos e permutar a posição sujeito-predicado delas, de modo a obter um silogismo perfeito. Depois, apresentarei o método chamado reductio ad impossibile que se vale das regras do método direto, das relações semânticas entre sentenças categóricas e de hipóteses para provar a validade do silogismo. Por fim, apresento o método de prova chamado ekthesis, que envolve a introdução de categorias intermediárias e suas manipulações entre esquemas dedutivos a fim de provar a validade do silogismo. A segunda etapa, dos tópicos 6 ao 8, consiste na discussão da silogística como um sistema baseado em regras, inspirado nos trabalhos de Żłarnecka–Biały e Corcoran. A partir do qual exploro a possibilidade de interpretar a silogística de uma perspectiva inferencialista, como uma estratégia lógica de explicitação do “jogo de dar e pedir razões” que marcou a filosofia por cerca de dois milênios. (shrink)

This essay examines the main sources on the attitude of the Church of Cyprus in the so-called monoenergetic-monotheletic dispute. It is shown that the Church of Cyprus was a loyal and active partner in Constantinople’s policy of reconciliation with the Antichalcedonian churches of the East. Cyprus was also, especially under Archbishop Arkadios (624/25-641/2), a place of exile for opponents of this reconciliation, and in 636 also the venue of an important synod which was attended by legates of almost the whole (...) church. The resulting Ekthesis was approved also in Rome and Jerusalem. Even Maximos did not succeed, after 636, to influence the position of Arkadios through the Cypriot priest monk Marinos. His six letters to Marinos offer no evidence for a dyenergetic or dyotheletic position of the Church of Cyprus. A letter from 643, written by the successor of Arkadios, Sergios (642-655), clearly shows that there was until then no protest against the Constantinopolitan church policy in Cyprus in this time. This letter, which demonstrates the firm dyenergetic and dyotheletic position of the whole Church of Cyprus, was presented at the Lateran Synod of 649, but forged or completely rewritten for this Synod. Even after 643, there is no evidence for public dissent in the Church of Cyprus, nor should it actually be expected. (shrink)

Dieses Arbeitsinstrument bietet eine Aktualisierung des erstmals 1987 publizierten kritischen Überblicks über die Quellen zu dem im Titel genannten Streit. Es geht dem Verf. vor allem darum, den seit 1987 nicht unerheblichen Fortschritt in Editionen und Forschung zu dokumentieren. Die Regesten der Quellen (S. 45–184) werden zum einen durch einen knappen Bericht zur Forschungslage (S. 2–8), zum Wert der Quellen (S. 9–13), zum reichskirchlichen Ursprung des Streits im sog. Neuchalkedonismus (S. 13–21), zu seinen politischen Hintergründen (S. 21–33) und zu seinem (...) Verlauf (S. 34–44) eingeleitet und zum anderen durch prosopographische Hinweise zu den Regesten (S. 189–279) erschlossen, die, wie der Verf. S. VII feststellt, „durch die Vorarbeiten“ in der PmbZ (Prosopographie der mittelbyzantinischen Zeit) „wesentlich erleichtert“ wurden. Als Anhang bietet dieses Instrument eine Zeittafel, ein Glossar zu den wichtigsten Termini und ein Stellen- und Sachregister (S. 281–307). Eingearbeitet hat der Verf. vor allem die Edition der ACO II,2 von R. Riedinger (1992) und der Scripta saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia, die P. Allen und B. Neil im Band 39 des CCSG vorgelegt haben (1999). Auf Grund der bisher schwer zugänglichen Ausgabe von S.L. Epifanovic (Kiew 1917) und ihrer Wiedergabe in der CPG sind zumindest zwei Dubletten in die Regesten aufgenommen worden. Denn die Texte (1) Nr. 67, 67a (CPG 7697, 26); Nr. 90 (CPG 7707, 24) und (2) Nr. 89 (CPG 7697, 27); Nr. 91 (CPG 7707, 25) sind jeweils nur verschiedene Rezensionen. – Die Regesten zur Vorgeschichte des Streits im 6. Jahrhundert (Nr. 1–7), die als „Spitze eines Eisberges“ eingeführt werden (S. 9f.), sind nicht vollständig; insbes. fehlen hier die Zeugnisse aus Kaiser Justinians Schriften (vom Rez., Kaiser Justinian als Kirchenpolitiker und Theologe, Augustinianum 39, 1999, 5–83). Zurecht betont der Verf., dass der Streit schon im Konzil von Chalkedon (451) angelegt ist, sofern durch dessen „Verdammungen … der Grat für die weitere christologische Arbeit … sehr schmal geworden“ war (S. 15f.). Dass hier die historische Forschung ansetzen und ihre Begriffe schärfen muss, hat der Rez. in Studia Patristica 34, 2001, 572–604, gezeigt. Ausführlich belegen die Regesten zum einen die Aussagen von Maximos dem Bekenner, sieht man von seinen „vielen beiläufigen Bemerkungen“ ab (S. 45), und zum anderen den Streit der römischen Kirche seit „der Kampfansage“ unter Papst Johannes IV. (S. 32; Nr. 67b: Januar 641). Dabei wird der Verf. der historischen Kritik an Maximos gerecht, die 1967 mit W. Lackner's Beurteilung der griechischen Vita des Maximos (Nr. 171) begann, 1973 durch die Publikation der syrischen Vita (Nr. 172) einen neuen Anstoß erhielt, 1985 mit R. Riedinger's Nachweis, dass die Akten der Lateransynode von 649 (Nr. 110) „ein Werk der Byzantiner um Maximos“ sind, der diese Synode als 6. Ökumenisches Konzil bezeichnet hat (Nr. 113), und seit 1999 auf Grund der kritischen Ausgabe jener Dokumentation, die Maximos' Anhänger nach 655 publizierten (CCSG 39) zum Urteil geführt hat: „Maximos und seine Schüler“ sind „zu sehr einseitiger Darstellung und zu bewussten Irreführungen fähig gewesen“ (S. 13). Dies gilt auch dann, wenn man in der Beurteilung der theologischen Intentionen des Maximos nicht dem Verf. (S. 20f.), sondern W. Elert (1957), dessen Verdienste der Verf. zurecht würdigt, und anderen Autoren folgt und vor allem eine Entwicklung in Maximos' Christologie aufweist. Eine solche zeigt sich z.B. in Maximos' Interpretation des Geschehens von Gethsemani (Matth. 26,39) und der Oratio 30,12 des Gregor von Nazianz. Hier wäre auch Maximos' Korrektur an der neuchalkedonischen Basis (Nr. 102; CPG 7697, 9) zu nennen, die eine Entwicklung von 633 (Nr. 42; CPG 7699, 19) über den Höhepunkt der Krise um 640 (Nr. 60; CPG 7697, 20) voraussetzt. Wenn es zur zuletzt genannten Quelle heißt, Anastasios I. von Antiochien werde hier „als völlig orthodox beurteilt“, dann sollte man hinzufügen, dass Maximos der Nachweis nur über eine höchst subtile Interpretation gelingt, die auf die durch Anastasios' Text gestellte Frage nach dem einen Subjekt des Wirkens nicht eingeht. Es sei hier die Bemerkung erlaubt, dass es der Maximos–Forschung gut täte, wieder nach Entwicklungen im Denken dieses bedeutenden Theologen zu fragen. – Im Vergleich zum vorgenannten Dossier ist jenes des Anastasios Sinaites (Nr. 173; 175) nicht vollständig erfasst. Dies ist bedauerlich, weil dieser Autor kein Neuchalkedoniker ist und darum die Christologie Kyrills von Alexandrien und somit Chalkedon im Ausgang von der Unterscheidung von drei Klassen christologischer Aussagen der Bibel beurteilt, auf der die Union von 433 gründet, in der sich Kyrill mit den Orientalen verständigt hatte und auf die das Konzil von Chalkedon in der Einleitung zu seiner definitio fidei hinweist. Die dritte Klasse, jene der theandrischen Aussagen, erlaubte es Anastasios gegen seine reichskirchlichen Gegner in Ägypten und Syrien, von ihm Harmasiten genannt, den Tomus Leonis und so die antiochenische Christologie einzubringen und das Zeitalter Justinians und dessen Folgen einfach nicht zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, auch wenn er um das 5. Ökumenische Konzil von Konstantinopel wusste, dessen Sprache jene des sog. Neuchalkedonismus gewesen ist. Abschließend sei betont, dass dieses Arbeitsinstrument höchst sorgfältig zusammengestellt und eingeleitet ist. Dem Rez. ist nur eine Inkonsistenz aufgefallen. Der Verf. vertritt auf S. 23 als historisch gesichert, dass Kaiser Herakleios „später die Verantwortung für die Ekthesis von sich gewiesen hat“, und verweist dazu auf das in CPG 7736 wiedergegebene Zitat der Keleusis (Nr. 68; CPG 9382), dessen Authentizität er jedoch auf S. 97 zurecht bezweifelt. (shrink)

Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...) interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of the “Third Man” argument. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant's Transcendental Deduction by Alison LaywineKatherine DunlopAlison Laywine. Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. iv + 318. Hardback, $80.00.Alison Laywine's contribution to the rich literature on Kant's "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" stands out for the novelty of its approach and conclusions. Laywine's declared "strategy" is "to compare and contrast" the Deduction with the Duisburg Nachlaß, an important set of manuscript jottings from the 1770s (...) (10). But her approach is also deeply informed by Kant's writings on metaphysics from the 1750s and 1760s; moreover, she gives attention to ancient Greek geometry and its importance for Kant's thought.I believe Laywine's most important interpretative claim is that the Transcendental Deduction's "final step" addresses "the question of how nature is possible" (210). Here, 'nature' is understood in what Kant calls the "formal sense," as "the totality of rules under which appearances must stand if they are to be thought as joined in one experience" (Prolegomena, §36; cf. B 165). This constitutes a novel answer to the problem posed in Dieter Henrich's landmark 1969 paper "The Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction" (Review of Metaphysics 22 [1969]: 640–59): how to understand §§21–26 of the (B-edition) Deduction as proving more than the thesis already stated in §20 (that the manifold in an intuition necessarily stands under the categories).Crucial support for Laywine's interpretation comes from §26 of the Deduction, which claims the possibility of cognizing objects "a priori through categories... as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making [nature] possible," is now "to be explained" (B 159). Kant does not use the term 'world' in this passage (as he does in Prolegomena §36). But Laywine contends that here the word 'nature' "has unmistakable, deliberate, cosmological connotations," and in fact "means 'world' in the sense of Kant's early cosmology": roughly, a whole unified by means of laws (12–13).The "cosmological" language of §26 does not recur in the following, officially concluding, section of the Deduction. So, we might ask whether Kant's explanation of how the understanding prescribes laws to nature is integral to the Deduction; Henry Allison, for instance, describes this explanation as an "appendix" (Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015], 9). The question of whether it belongs integrally has bite because, as Laywine makes clear in her "Conclusion," the universal laws at issue are just the Analogies of Experience. Thus, the passage could be read as the "promissory note with a forward-looking reference to the System of Principles" that she finds missing from the Deduction (289). Laywine meets such worries by arguing that "the reappropriation [from the pre-Critical period] of the general cosmology is actually [End Page 162] doing... a lot of hard work" in the Deduction (13). This sustained argument comes to a head in chapter 4, which contends that each of the two steps into which Laywine divides the first half of the (B-edition) Deduction, treated in chapters 2 and 3 (respectively), relies on cosmological presuppositions.Chapter 2 analyzes the conception of knowledge as relation to an object that is asserted (in §17) to rely on the synthetic unity of apperception. Laywine traces this conception to the Duisburg Nachlaß's account of "exposition," which relates concepts a priori to appearances, in something like the way that geometrical construction relates them to pure intuition. (Laywine further connects the Latin term expositio to the Greek ekthesis, which expositio translates in the context of geometrical proof. She thereby gives the notion of ekthesis broader importance than does Jaakko Hintikka, who noted its relevance to Kant's philosophy of mathematics in "Kant on the Mathematical Method" [Monist 51 (1967): 352–75]. Laywine claims that Borelli's edition of Euclid could have been Kant's source for the term, but I doubt it was known to Kant and his contemporaries, since it is not among the editions cited by Christian Wolff; Commandino seems likelier to me. Chapter 2 is concerned to articulate the notion of... (shrink)