Algunos de los últimos avances en el debate sobre la naturaleza de los colores han contribuido a una mejor comprensión de la doctrina platónica sobre los colores. Siguiendo esa estela revisionista, en la primera parte del artículo presento una interpretación de corte realista de dicha doctrina. En la segunda, argumento por qué ésta no puede intitularse más finamente, ni como fisicista ni como primitivista. A mi entender, ese ejercicio exegético permite justipreciar el valor contemporáneo de la doctrina de los colores (...) de Platón, ya que las incipientes propuestas realistas pueden ahora afirmar legítimamente que el antecedente histórico que parecía faltarles se encuentra, precisamente, en los diálogos platónico. /// Recent developments in the area of the metaphysics of color have led to a revisión of the interpretation of Plato's doctrine. Following this revisionist trend, I present a realist interpretation of his doctrine on colors and argüe why it cannot be further specified as either physicalist or primitivist. This exegetic exercise allows the appraisal of the contemporary valué of Plato's doctrine on color. Incipient realist theories of color can now legitimately claim that the historical antecedent that they seem to lack can be found, precisely, in the platonic dialogues. (shrink)

El debate entre representacionistas y fenomenistas acerca del realismo de los qualia parece no avanzar. Este artículo defiende una solución que no es ni representacionista ni fenomenista. En contra de los representacionistas mantenemos que no todo contenido perceptual es reducible a su contenido representacional. En contra de los fenomenistas sostenemos que todo contenido perceptual es contenido intencional. Negamos así la existencia de los qualia, de aquellos, al menos, caracterizados de manera más estándar. Finalmente, mostramos que nuestra propuesta --situada entre el (...) representacionismo y el fenomenismo-- no ha sido explorada, porque se ha asumido, erróneamente, que todo contenido no representacional debe ser contenido no intencional. \\\ The debate between representationalists and phenomenalists on the reality of qualia has stagnated. The present article argues for a solution that is neither representationalist nor phenomenalist. Unlike the representationalists, we hold that not all perceptual content is reducible to its representational content. Against the phenomenalists, we claim that all perceptual content is intentional content. We therefore discard the existence of qualia, at least in their standard guise. Finally, we show that our intermediate proposal has not been explored because until now all non-representational content has been erroneously understood to be non-intentional content. (shrink)

Physicalism claims that colors are physical properties of physical objects. For more than three centuries this philosophical stand has been denied because it was considered not to be “scientifically serious”. In this article we offer a critical review of the history of this accusation to conclude that the apparent incompatibility between the best science and physicalism must be, at least, re-examined.

In this article I provide some reasons to justify why the preferable ontological account about colors is that which respects the highest number of beliefs contained in the so-called default position, keeping in mind the relative weight of each one of them. The full system of associated beliefs about colors contained in the default position is also offered.

It remains highly controversial whether Plato sympathized with the existence of chromatic Forms. I argue that the naturalistic interpretation of Plato’s conception of colors as flames does not depend on his approval of their existence.