Everyday there are revelations of organizations behaving in discreditable ways. Sometimes these actions result in damage to an organization's reputation, but often they do not. In this article, we examine the question of why external stakeholders may overlook disclosed discreditable actions, even those entailing ethical breaches. Drawing on stigmatization theory, we develop a model to explain the likelihood of reputational loss following revelations of discreditable actions. The model integrates four properties of actions (perceived control, perceived certainty, perceived threat, and perceived (...) deviance), stakeholder motivation, and media coverage. Implications for theory and for practitioners concerned with reputation management are discussed. (shrink)

This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The (...) essays seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Seinfeld Waiting to Exhale Ellen Special News Broadcasts Radio Programs Outlaw Communities Talk Shows Conclusion.

Theory of health care ethics -- Principles of health care ethics -- The moral status of gametes and embryos : storage and surrogacy -- The ethical challenges of the new reproductive technology -- Ethics and aging in America -- -- Healthcare ethics committees : roles, memberships, structure, and difficulties -- Ethics in the management of health information systems -- Technological advances in health care : blessing or ethics nightmare? -- Ethics and safe patient handling and mobility -- Spirituality and healthcare (...) organizations -- A new era of health care : the ethics of healthcare reform -- Health inequalities and health inequities -- The ethics of epidemics -- Ethics of disasters : planning and response -- Domestic violence : changing theory, changing practice -- Looking toward the future. (shrink)

In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a distinctive kind of value - narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us (...) with a meaning over an above the cumulative value erived from ading together levels of momentary welfare. In acting freely, we are writing a sentence in the story of our lives, and the value of acting freely is thus a species of the value of artistic creativity or self-expression (understood appropriately). Finally, I contend that the fact that our lives are stories need not entail that they have endings, or that immortality would necessarily be unimaginable or essentially different from ordinary, finite human life. Yes, a certain sort of narrative understanding of our lives as a whole would be impossible in the context of immortality; but much of what we care about, and value, in our stories might remain. (shrink)

I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and morally (...) responsible. Rather, he would give up at least one of the formerly-thought-to-be a priori truths that are elements in his argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the relevant sort of freedom. Thus, according to van Inwagen, our status as free and morally responsible agents would not be held hostage to the physicists or hang on a thread I think that van Inwagen’s strategy for securing our freedom and responsibility is unattractive. Somewhat tendentiously, I have called the rejection of an a priori ingredient in the incompatibilist’s argument, contingent upon learning that causal determinism is true, ‘metaphysical fip-flopping.’ -/- And it does seem that van Inwagen’s approach is implausible insofar as he is open to such metaphysical fip-fopping. That he is open to it—that he would fip-fop if he became convinced of the truth of causal determinism—is a problem for his actual philosophical position. Or so I will argue. (shrink)

In the present article we argue that emotional interactions are not appropriately captured in present emotion research and theorizing. Emotional stimuli or antecedents are dynamic and change over time because they often interact and have a specific relationship with the subject. Earlier emotional interactions may, for example, intensify later emotional reactions to a specific person, or our anger reactions towards powerful or powerless others may differ considerably. Thus, we suggest that such social factors not only affect the intensity, but also (...) the nature of emotional experiences and expressions, and specifically the nature of the social movement (e.g., moving towards, away, or against). We discuss different processes that are implicated in the relation between the social environment and our emotions, describe how emotional expressions shape social behavior, and provide suggestions for incorporating the social dimension of emotion in future research. (shrink)

In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, (...) this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research. (shrink)

Nelson Pike’s article, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” is one of the most influential pieces in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Published over forty years ago, it has elicited many different kinds of replies. We shall set forth some of the main lines of reply to Pike’s article, starting with some of the “early” replies. We then explore some issues that arise from relatively recent work in the philosophy of time; it is fascinating to note that views suggested by recent work (...) in this area and related areas of metaphysics have implications for Pike’s argument - implications perhaps not previously noticed. (shrink)

This book attempts to reframe abortion rights by focusing not on a woman's right to choose abortion, but rather on a woman's right to consent to pregnancy. Drawing on legal, medical, and philosophical definitions of pregnancy, it disaggregates the consent to sexual intercourse from the consent to pregnancy and argues that men and women have equal right to bodily integrity, which is defined as the freedom from nonconsensual bodily intrusion. The work provides the grounds for a woman's right to an (...) abortion and state funding of abortions. (shrink)

1. bd. Descartes' leben, werke und lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1897.--2. bd. Spinozas leben, werke und lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1898.--3. bd. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leben, werke und lehre. 4. aufl. 1902.--4-5. bd. Immanuel Kant und seine lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1898-99.--6. bd. Fichtes leben, werke und lehre. 3. durchgesehene aufl. 1900.--7. bd. Schellings leben, werke und lehre. 3. aufl. 1902.--8. bd. l.-2. th. Hegels leben, werke und lehre. 1901.--9. bd. Schopenhauers leben, werke und lehre. 2. neu (...) bearb. und verm. aufl. 1898.--10. bd. Francis Bacon und seine schule. Entwicklungsgeschichte der erfahrungsphilosophie. 3. aufl. 1904. (shrink)

Arguments for veganism don’t make many vegans, or even many who think they ought to be vegans, at least when they’re written by philosophers. Others — such as the one by Jonathan Safran Foer — seem to do a bit better. Why? To answer this question, I sketch a theory of ordinary moral argumentation that highlights the importance of meaning-based considerations in arguing that people ought to act in ways that deviate from normal expectations for behaviour. In particular, I outline (...) an eclectic theory, where we draw on a variety of moral frameworks and don’t assume that morality is generally overriding. I suggest that meaning-based considerations help us sort through the array of reasons available to us, as well as explain why, in a particular case, what we ought to do morally is what we ought to do all things considered. (shrink)

Little is known about older persons’ expectancies (or anticipations) about the possible actions of home-care professionals, although such data have implications for the ethics of home care and home-care policies. From a longitudinal study of older women’s experience of home care, findings are reported concerning their expectancies of professional home-care providers. A descriptive phenomenological method was used to detail the structure of the experience and its context. Data were analyzed from a series of interviews with 13 women aged 82 to (...) 96 years. Among the five key structures of experience were ‘finding that someone has the job of helping me here’ and ‘determining where the helper’s field lies’. Two subsets within a category of expectancies were differentiated: speculations about helpers’ possible actions and expectancies about outcomes of helpers’ actions. As parameters of relational ethics, clients’ speculations and expectancies are appropriate bases for dialogue about older widows’ relationships with home-care professionals and the foci of home-care policies. (shrink)

Appeals to imagination to distinguish fiction from nonfiction have been persuasively challenged by philosophers such as Derek Matravers and Stacie Friend. This essay aims to uphold the importance of the fiction/nonfiction distinction by other means. Instead of relying on contrasting roles for imagination and belief, can we isolate kinds of experience that are paradigmatically sustained by fiction? Can status as fiction encourage, and help to explain, certain tendencies and qualities of experience? Several common aspects of experience, of what it is (...) like to experience something as fiction, are proposed: the experience of individuals as representative; a linked epistemic and aesthetic interest in detail; and openness to evaluative judgement. Nonfictional works can support these experiences, but they make most sense ethically and epistemically in the context of fiction. (shrink)

mischer Entwicklung: da werden selbst die Grundlagen der Einzel­ wissenschaften in Frage' gestellt, und der Forscher kann nicht umhin, sich iiber die Probleme der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis Gedanken zu machen. Heute leben wir in einer solchen Epoche gesteigerten erkenntnistheoretischen Interesses: Mathematiker, Astronomen, Phy­ siker, Biologen und Arzte fiihlen das Bediirfnis, sich mit philo­ sophischen Problemen auseinanderzusetzen, wie sich anderseits die Fachphilosophen immer mehr in die Problematik der Einzelwissen­ schaften vertiefen, urn die Geltung ihrer Gedankenkonstruktionen an der verwickelten Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften zu (...) erproben. Erkenntnistheoretische Darstellungen verfallen oft in den Fehler einseitiger Orientierung, indem sie entweder lediglich die psycho­ logische oder allein die logische Seite der Erkenntnistatigkeit ihren Betrachtungen zugrunde legen. Um dieser Gefahr mit allen ihren Folgen vorzubeugen, wurden vor dem eigentlichen erkenntnistheo­ retischen Abschnitt sowohl die psychologischen wie die logischen Grundlagen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis in besonderen Kapiteln besprochen. Die beste Methode, einen in einschlagigen Studien haufig anzutreffenden Psychologismus zu vermeiden, ist nicht die absicht­ liche Ignorierung der psychologischen Faktoren der Erkenntnistatig­ keit, sondern die Darstellung der Denkpsychologie und die daraus sich ergebende scharfe Grenzziehung zwischen Psychologie, Logik und Erkenntniskritik. Wenn die vorliegende Darstellung der Erkenntnislehre die philosophisch interessierten Wissenschaftler zum weiteren Nachden­ ken iiber die Grundlagen ihrer Sondergebiete anregt, so hat sie ihren Zweck erfiillt. Moge sie in bescheidenem MaEe dazu beitragen, das unter dem Eindruck agnostizistischer Stromungen ins Wanken geratene Selbst­ vertrauen der Wissenschaft wiederherzustellen und der Wissen­ schaft jene Stellung in unserem Wertsystem wiederzugeben, welche ihr, als der hochsten Leistung der menschlichen Vernunft, gebiihrt. (shrink)

English summary: The philosophy of play during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been largely neglected by scholars, despite the fact that influential thinkers, such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, perceived recreational play to be a vital part of a philosopher's life. By exploring a heterogeneous collection of diverse philosophical approaches to ludic practices, this innovative study provides the first in-depth discussion of the complexity of medieval and early-modern ludic philosophy. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship between (...) play and philosophy, which the influential Aristotelian discourse on play, initiated by Albert and Thomas, conceptualized as a contradictory dichotomy. By focusing on the manifold epistemic transformations which occurred during the Renaissance, this study analyses how philosophers in various contexts developed alternative or complementary theories of the connection between ludus and philosophia. German description: Die philosophische Geschichte des Spielens nach der Antike lasst man in der Regel mit Friedrich Schillers von Kant inspirierten Briefen Uber die asthetische Erziehung des Menschen beginnen, ohne die ihnen vorausgehende Vielfalt philosophischer Auseinandersetzung mit ludischen Praktiken naher zu betrachten. Vorliegende Studie versteht sich als erster Beitrag zur Erschliessung dieser bislang vernachlassigten spielphilosophischen Ansatze zwischen Mittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit. Dabei wird insbesondere das Verhaltnis von Spielen und Philosophieren in den Blick genommen, das schon bei scholastischen Autoren im Zentrum ludischer Reflexionen stand. So etablierten Gelehrte wie Albertus Magnus oder Thomas von Aquin bereits im 13. Jahrhundert eine strenge Trennung zwischen dem als Rekreation konzipierten Spielen und dem Ernst des Philosophierens, indem sie ludische Erholung mit Ruckgriff auf Aristoteles zum notwendigen Gegenstuck der Kontemplation erklarten. Die Arbeit zeigt, wie Philosophen zwischen Spatmittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit im Zuge vielfaltiger epistemischer Transformationen das Verhaltnis von philosophia und ludus komplementar oder alternativ zu diesem einflussreichen aristotelischen Deutungsschema bestimmten. Unter diesen heterogenen Ansatzen finden sich ein allegorisches Globusspiel des Nikolaus von Kues, die erste philosophischen Therapie ubermassiger Spielleidenschaft und eine naturphilosophische Beschreibung des Tennisspiels am rinascimentalen Hof von Ferrara. (shrink)

This volume, edited by three leading proponents and practitioners of human science psychology, serves as an invitation to readers new to this approach while also renewing that invitation to those who have long embraced and advanced research in the field from this perspective. It is a timely and important invitation. In 2009, the American Psychological Association declared psychology to be a core STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) discipline and advocated the teaching and practice of psychology with this natural science understanding (...) in mind, but in 2014 further reaffirmed alternative methods by adding a new journal, Qualitative Psychology. The varied essays in this volume, certainly, bolster the view that a purely STEM-centered vision would ignore much about the very experience of being human.In fact, it would be dangerous to rely solely on the methods of the natural sciences to study human beings, who operate in the realm of meanings, lived experience, and complex and complicated relationships with self and others. We create societies and belief systems, orient ourselves in time, experience beauty and pain. The Qualitative Vision for Psychology: An Invitation to a Human Science Approach argues that because we have aspects that are distinctly and uniquely human -- we are not rats, hydrogen, or rocks, for example -- this necessitates a distinctly human science, one that regards persons as humans rather than objects of study. The laws and formulas of the natural sciences simply do not take into account that particularly human way of being in the world.There are few comprehensive books on psychology conceived as a human science, even though it has a long history with roots in phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology, and hermeneutics. In recent years, as these essays discuss, the field has been transformed through its contact with feminism, critical historical analysis, and deconstruction, and it has continued to examine new challenges. Further, we see here its specific applicability to issues as diverse as empathy, cultural history, apartheid, sexual assault, fetishes, and our natural environment. (shrink)

An accessible and enjoyable introduction to Zen Buddhist practice--in a reader-friendly question-and-answer format--by two highly regarded teacher-writers. The question-and-answer format makes this introduction to Zen especially easy to understand--and also to use as a reference, as you can easily look up just the question you had in mind. The esteemed Zen teacher Norman Fischer and his old friend and teaching colleague Susan Moon (both of them in the lineage of Shunryu Suzuki, author of Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind) give this (...) collaborative effort a playful tone: Susan asks a question on our behalf, Norman answers it, and then Sue challenges him. By the time you get through their conversations, you'll have a good basic education in Zen--not only the history, theory, and practice but also the contemporary issues, such as gender inequality, sexual ethics, and the tension between Asian traditions and the modern American reality. (shrink)

This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one interprets (...) one’s personal ideals in an individualistic or collective manner, the degree to which one’s commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals is rigid or flexible, and the worthiness of one’s personal ideals. This framework, I argue, illuminates the nature and moral significance of virtuous and vicious forms of the character trait of pride. (shrink)

Conversations in Metaphysics: Ever Ancient, Ever New introduces students to metaphysics through a set of contemporary readings based on classical metaphysical texts, thinkers, and concepts. It challenges readers to consider and seek possible answers to questions of metaphysics relative to human knowledge and the nature of reality. Organized historically, the readings endeavor to define and probe the concepts of metaphysics, existence, being, God, evil, and morality from antiquity to the present. The historical lens provides students with deeper context for the (...) contemporary readings and helps them establish a basic knowledge of metaphysics and its place within philosophical tradition. In later readings, students are invited to explore how metaphysics relates to religion, science, and technology in the modern world, as well as how metaphysics has shaped and continues to shape the reality of our universe. Rich with engaging material and endless opportunities for critical thought, Conversations in Metaphysics is an ideal ancillary text for courses in philosophy that call attention to metaphysics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Dialectic IV convenes contributions with new takes on the long held proposition that architects are providers of design services. They service everyone from the status quo all the way to the subaltern. We know well how architects have historically fashioned themselves to be able to procure the most valued building commissions a people have to offer. There are temples, churches, and shrines, palaces and private villas, and surely monuments, state institutions, and corporate headquarters. But how have the members of the (...) same profession managed to fashion themselves as the custodians of the public good? (shrink)

Nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in the… nervous system which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, or, memory.WittgensteinIn a recent essay it was emphasized that brain and mind appear to the mind as complementary and reciprocally recursive domains of a hermeneutic circle (Fischer, 1987). An outstanding and not yet recognized feature of this hermeneutic circle is that interpretation within this (...) circle is not rule-governed and hence appears self-organized: individual features of the world (or the brain) become intelligible in terms of the whole context (of the mind)… while the entire context becomes intelligible through individual features (or brain functions). How, or from where then is significance arising? (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that we need to consider the ‘change- makers’ if we want to provide a comprehensive theory of persistence. The classical theories of persistence, endurantism and perdurantism in all their flavours, are content with avoiding the looming contradiction in the context of Leibniz’s Law. They do not account for how change is brought about. I argue that this is not sufficient to constitute a theory of persistence and I will introduce produrantism as a new access (...) towards a comprehensive approach. (shrink)

This chapter first talks about LEGO modal epistemology. Modal epistemology has the two parts. Some of it is the study of how one knows that some things are contingent and others necessary. The other part of modal epistemology concerns how much one know about what is contingent and necessary. The chapter then talks about what went wrong with the imagination‐based story. Whatever the story about how one knows what he/she can build, it had better be one that factors in his/her (...) background knowledge, since that is what makes the imagination useful. With working knowledge of those little pieces, one can make judgments about what can and can not be done with them. Crucially, there are various ways to make those judgments. The chapter further focuses on a segment of the LEGO community that might seem a bit fussy: purists. (shrink)

Public, private, non-profit and for-profit nursing education enterprises in the U.S. are competing with one another in a newly complex and volatile educational landscape, placing academic leaders into situations fraught with moral, ethical and legal compromise with few precedents for guidance. This case study provides a richly contextualized narrative exploration of ethical and legal challenges to one leader’s moral courage, a fictionalized exploration drawn from multiple sources over time, to form a composite that is nonetheless firmly rooted in the complexity (...) and competitiveness characteristic of nursing education today. Our purpose is three-fold: 1) to direct the reader to moral and ethical questions that require thoughtful discourse and analysis among current and future academic nursing leaders; 2) to raise the issue of the need for regulations and oversight that reflect the changing realities of today’s increasingly complex and competitive educational arena; and 3) to encourage nursing education leaders to share additional cases that resonate for them, and in so doing, to expand the wellspring of ideas from which we can all draw in becoming more effective and morally courageous leaders. (shrink)

The article sheds light on psychological and work science aspects of the design and utilization of service robots. An initial presentation of the characteristics of man–robot interaction is followed by a discussion of the principles of the division of functions between human beings and robots in service area work systems. The following aspects are to be considered: (1) the organisation of societal work (such as the different employment and professional profiles of service employees), (2) the work tasks to be performed (...) by humans and robots (such as handling, monitoring or decision-making tasks), (3) the possibilities and the limitations of realizing such tasks by means of information technology (depending, for example, on the motoric capabilities, perception and cognition of the robot). Consideration of these three design perspectives gives rise to criteria of usability. Current debate focuses on the (work science) principles of man–machine communication, though in future these should be supplemented with robot-specific criteria such as "motoric capabilities" or "relationship quality." The article concludes by advocating the convergence and combination of work science criteria with ideas drawn from participative design approaches in the development and utilization of service robots. (shrink)

Auf die metatheoretische Diskussion der deutschen Gegenwartspadagogik haben Kritische Theorie und Kritischer Rationalismus einen pragenden Einfluss. Die Untersuchung beleuchtet die Moglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Rationalitat anhand eines kritischen interparadigmatischen Vergleichs. Dieser ist thematisch konzentriert auf Probleme der erzieherischen Zielreflexion.".

Through the personal stories of managers running global business, this book takes an inside look into the dilemmas of managers who are asked to make profits ethically according to the dictates of their company's ethics code. It examines what companies `think" they are doing to help managers in those situations and how those managers are actually affected. Thanks to the boost from the 1991 Sentencing Guidelines which minimizes penalties for companies with ethics codes caught in ethical wrongdoing, more than 85% (...) of US companies and two thirds of all Canadian companies and half of all European companies now have Codes of Ethics. Yet, over and over, we hear of stories of personal dilemmas and conflicts experienced by individual managers navigating those business waters in other cultures. "Eileen Morgan does an excellent job of mapping the course for navigating the previously uncharted global ethical waters. By identifying best practices, she leads the reader on a journey from Surviving, to Understanding to Knowing the ethical issues that frequently confront international business people. This is a must read for anyone who wants to successfully compete in world markets." -Michael J. Litwin, Executive Vice President, Chief Credit Officer, Heller Financial, Inc. "Eileen Morgan has combined the pragmatic concerns of the individual manager with the moral concerns that come from personal-life history, cultural roots, and corporate ethical culture …This book focuses on the constructive task of formulating and using an "ethical map," and is sure to be a tonic to conscientious managers who want to navigate cross-cultural commerce with integrity. It has done a superb job of creating order out of the complexity of cross-cultural moral experience by insisting that the complexity must be honored and appropriated rather than ignored or suppressed." -Dr. Richard Beauchamp, Professor of Ethics, Christopher Newport University "In this groundbreaking book, Eileen Morgan has provided scores of real-life examples and developed a framework for approaching ethical leadership in international business. This is mandatory reading for anyone involved in global management today...This is an important book on an important subject." -Stephen H. Rhinesmith, Ph.D. Author, A Manager's Guide to Globalization "Eileen Morgan provides us with a much needed roadmap for how to walk the path of ethical leadership with practical feet. She reminds us that ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of every day leadership, and that we can all choose to be 'ethical pioneers' in our companies and our communities. Every leader engaged in global business can benefit from the lessons and stories included in this book." -Christi A. Olson, Ph.D. Chair, Telecommunications Management Department, Golden Gate University "Eileen Morgan's thoughtful analysis of 'ethical capital' should be read by anyone who does business in a global environment…Morgan's book presents the issue clearly, comprehensively and compellingly, demonstrating that ethics is an indispensable aspect of individual leadership and organizational credibility. …It provides a clear roadmap for business leaders who need to communicate their commitment to integrity and accountability to their employees, their partners, and their customer, making their 'ethical capital' one of their most valuable assets." -Nell Minnow, Principal, Lens, The Corporate Governance Investors "Eileen Morgan gives excellent insight into ethical practices. She focuses on business but her insights have general application. This book also describes differences in ethical interpretation that can arise between diverse cultures. Ms. Morgan has made an excellent contribution to understanding the benefit of positive ethical practices." -David C. Lincoln, Sponsor, Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics, College of Business, Arizona State University President, Arizona Oxides, LLC · First in-depth look at how managers in global companies actually bridge the gap between their organizations and their daily decisions · Explains the need for internal and external ethical operations¦and how organizations often create confusion rather than clarity with the label of "ethics". (shrink)

Brain functions are stochastic processes without intentionality whereas mind emerges from brain functions as a Hegelian “change from quantity”, that is, on the order of 1012 profusely interconnected neurons, “into a new quality”: the collective phenomenon of the brain's self-experience. This self-referential and self-observing quality we have in mind is capable of (recursively) observing its self-observations, i.e., interpreting change that is meaningful in relation to itself. The notion of self-interpretation embodies the idea of a “hermeneutic circle”, that is, (in interpretation (...) theory) the treatment of the whole in relation to its parts. (shrink)

Stereotypes shape inferences in philosophical thought, political discourse, and everyday life. These inferences are routinely made when thinkers engage in language comprehension or production: We make them whenever we hear, read, or formulate stories, reports, philosophical case-descriptions, or premises of arguments – on virtually any topic. These inferences are largely automatic: largely unconscious, non-intentional, and effortless. Accordingly, they shape our thought in ways we can properly understand only by complementing traditional forms of philosophical analysis with experimental methods from psycholinguistics. This (...) paper seeks, first, to bring out the wider philosophical relevance of stereotypical inference, well beyond familiar topics like gender and race. Second, we wish to provide philosophers with a toolkit to experimentally study these ubiquitous inferences and what intuitions they may generate. This paper explains what stereotypes are, and why they matter to current and traditional concerns in philosophy – experimental, analytic, and applied. It then assembles a psycholinguistic toolkit and demonstrates through two studies how potentially questionnaire-based measures can be combined with process measures to garner evidence for specific stereotypical inferences and study when they ‘go through’ and influence our thinking. (shrink)