The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...) However, the “state of war” ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist. (shrink)

In the modern debate in metaethics and moral psychology, moral rationalism is often presented as a view that cannot account for the intimate relation between moral behaviour on one hand and feelings, emotions, or desires on the other. Although there is no lack of references to the classic rationalists of the 18th century in the relevant discussions, the works of these writers are rarely ever examined detail. Yet, as the debate in Kant scholarship between “intellectualists” and “affectivists” impressively shows, a (...) more thorough analysis of what the classic rationalists actually have to say about moral motivation is suited to cast serious doubts on the idea that moral rationalism must crucially neglect the affective–conative side of human psychology. The aim of this paper is to analyse the conceptions of moral motivation that were embraced by Kant's rationalist predecessors—Clarke, Wolff, Burnet, Balguy, and Price—which have not attracted a similar amount of attention by specialists so far. The claim I will defend is that none of those early rationalists actually embraces the motivational thesis that is often taken to be characteristic of moral rationalism, a thesis I shall refer to as strong rationalism about (moral) motivation. (shrink)

The paper critically discusses the deontological interpretation of Hobbesian contractual obligation which has been advocated by commentators such as Brian Barry, D. D. Raphael and Bernd Ludwig. According to this interpretation, the obligation to comply with contracts and covenants is fundamentally different from the obligation to observe the laws of nature. While the latter is taken to be a prudential obligation that is logically dependent upon the individual aim of self-preservation, the former is viewed as an absolute or unconditional moral (...) obligation that solely follows from the fact that the individual has bound himself to the performance or omission of certain actions. As can be shown, the deontological interpretation suffers from inherent problems and does not provide an appropriate interpretation of the Hobbesian texts. In particular, it can be demonstrated that the attempt to use Hobbes's concept of 'freedom as deliberation' in order to explain how obligations arise from contractual agreements faces serious difficulties. (shrink)

Much in contemporary metaethics revolves around the two positions known as ‘motivational internalism’ and the ‘Humean theory of motivation’. The importance of these positions is mostly due to their role in what is considered to be the most powerful argument for metaethical non-cognitivism: the so-called ‘motivation argument’. In my paper, I want to argue that widely accepted renditions of the MA, such as the rendition recently forwarded by Russ Shafer-Landau, are flawed in two senses. First, they fail to sufficiently distinguish (...) between conceptual claims and empirical psychological claims, thereby somewhat obscuring the status of the argument and its conclusion. Secondly, they start from definitions of motivational internalism that are, in crucial respects, too strong. Motivational internalism is usually formulated as the claim that moral judgements necessarily motivate; as I want to argue, however, the claim that moral judgements potentially motivate is all the motivational internalism a noncognitivist defender of the MA is ever going to need. (shrink)

This paper discusses the juridical interpretation of Hobbes’s state of nature argument, which has been defended by commentators such as Georg Geismann, Dieter Hüning or Peter Schröder. According to the juridical interpretation, the primary reason why the Hobbesian state of nature needs to be abandoned is not that everybody’s self-preservation is constantly threatened. It is that, due to the universal right to all things, the jural order of the state of nature includes some kind of logical contradiction. The purpose of (...) the paper is to show that the juridical interpretation does not do justice to Hobbes’s actual argument and that it starts from a false presupposition: being a Hohfeldian ‘liberty-right’, the right to all things can consistently be granted to all individuals at the same time. (shrink)

The eighteenth century debate between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists has seen a striking renaissance in the past decades, not least because of research into the nature of moral judgement conducted by empirical scientists such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. A claim that is often made in the current discussion is that the evidence made available by such empirical investigations refutes rationalist conceptions of moral judgement and vindicates the views of Hume or other moral sentimentalists. For example, Jesse (...) Prinz and Hanno Sauer have recently argued that the available data demonstrates that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgement and that the best or the only way to make sense of these findings is to conclude that moral judgements are constituted by emotions. The aim of this paper is to thoroughly examine this argument and the underlying empirical evidence and to show that there is currently no compelling evidence for the truth of either the necessity or the sufficiency thesis and that, even if both theses were true, they would fail to provide a sound basis for a plausible sentimentalist constitution claim. (shrink)

Die Theorie des Thomas Hobbes hat in der Vergangenheit stark abweichende Deutungen erfahren und Anlass zu zahlreichen lang anhaltenden Debatten geliefert. Die Diskussion hat jedoch allgemein darunter gelitten, dass Hobbes' Schriften von der berwiegenden Anzahl der Interpreten wie ein in sich zusammenh ngender Textkorpus behandelt und die Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Werken nicht hinreichend gew rdigt worden sind. In besonderem Ma e trifft das auf die Naturzustandstheorie zu, die im Zentrum der Hobbes'schen Argumentation steht und in gro em Ma f (...) r die Entstehung und das Fortdauern der genannten Debatten verantwortlich zu machen ist. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die verschiedenen Fassungen der Naturzustandstheorie endlich einer umfassenden vergleichenden Analyse zu unterziehen, und zwar unter konsequenter Einbeziehung des gerade in der deutschen Hobbes-Forschung kaum beachteten Textes des lateinischen Leviathan. Wie sich eindrucksvoll zeigt, vermag der eingehende Vergleich der Schriften nicht nur einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verst ndnis von Hobbes' philosophischer Entwicklung und zur Bestimmung des Stellenwertes des lateinischen Leviathan zu leisten. Er liefert auch einen wichtigen Beitrag zur kritischen Bewertung der vorliegenden Hobbes-Interpretationen und zur Aufl sung einiger zentraler Debatten. (shrink)

: The aim of this paper is to analyse the status of Locke’s state of nature and to examine whether the distinction between different theoretical perspectives can help to resolve the apparent contradictions between Locke’s ‘peaceful’ and his ‘warlike’ description of the natural state, a claim that has been made by commentators such as R. Ashcraft, J. Dunn and H. Aarsleff. Though, it is argued, distinguishing different state of nature accounts in Locke is essential for an appropriate understanding of Locke’s (...) argument, the attempt to thereby free Locke of the charge of inconsistency fails. The reason is that the ‘peaceful’ and the ‘warlike’ description are equally part of Locke’s anthropological analysis. They can, therefore, not be reconciled by distinguishing between a ‘moral’ account of the state of nature on the one hand and an empirical account on the other. (shrink)

One important trend in the debate over expressivism and cognitivism is the emergence of ‘hybrid’ or ‘ecumenical’ theories. According to such theories, moral sentences express both beliefs, as cognitivism has it, and desire-like states, as expressivism has it. One may wonder, though, whether the hybrid move is as novel as its advocates seem to take it to be—or whether it simply leads us back to the conceptions of early expressivists, such as Charles Stevenson or Richard Hare. Michael Ridge has recently (...) argued that we ought not to see Hare as a hybrid expressivist because Hare’s approach allows for moral sentences that do not express any descriptive beliefs at all. Yet, Ridge’s reading has been challenged by John Eriksson, who even goes as far as to claim that modern hybrid expressivists should follow in Hare’s footsteps because it is Hare’s framework that actually provides a solution to the so-called ‘Frege-Geach problem’. In the present paper, I first want to show that we can defend Eriksson’s reading with regard to the official version of Hare’s theory. I will, secondly, argue that, in line with what we may take to be Ridge’s critical perspective on Hare, this official version faces serious difficulties, resulting from the possibility of unknown speaker standards. Thirdly, I will demonstrate that a modern reconstruction of Hare in terms of what I will refer to as ‘de dicto beliefs’, though in principle possible, will not allow us to solve the ‘Frege-Geach problem’. (shrink)

Expressivism has been dominating much of the metaethical debate of the past three decades. The aim of this book is to address a number of questions that have been neglected in the previous discussion.These primarily concern the psychological commitments and the methodological status of expressivism as well as important differences and similarities between the approaches of the 'classic' expressivists Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn und Gibbard.

Es gibt keine Gesellschaft, die nicht von der modernen Wissenschaft und ihren Folgen betroffen wäre. Es besteht auch keine ernsthafte Hoffnung, dass sich die weltweiten Herausforderungen wie Klima, Ungleichheit oder Migration ohne wissenschaftliche Forschung und Reflexion bewältigen ließen. Jede Gesellschaft und jede Regierung sind daher auf die Wissenschaft angewiesen. Für Demokratien stellt sich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Politik und Wissenschaft allerdings noch einmal in besonderer Weise, erscheint die Wissenschaft dort doch als etwas, das alle angeht und über das (...) deswegen öffentlich verhandelt werden muss. Der Band 'Öffentliche Vernunft? Die Wissenschaft in der Demokratie' widmet sich der Frage, mit welchen Schwierigkeiten sich die Idealvorstellung eines öffentlichen und vernunftgeleiteten Diskurses über die Relevanz wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse in modernen Demokratien konfrontiert sieht. Anhand so unterschiedlicher Fragestellungen wie den Problemen wissenschaftlicher Politikberatung, dem Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und medialer Öffentlichkeit, den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer citizen science und der Rolle von Ethik und Politik in der Universität eröffnen die versammelten Beiträge neue Perspektiven auf das komplexe Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Politik und medialer und nicht-medialer Öffentlichkeit. (shrink)

A pioneering work in the philosophy of mind, Content and Consciousness brings together the approaches of philosophers and scientists to the mind--a connection that must occur if genuine analysis of the mind is to be made. This unified approach permits the most forbiddingly mysterious mental phenomenon--consciousness--to be broken down into several distinct phenomena, and these are each given a foundation in the physical activity of the brain. This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent (...) work in the area. (shrink)

In this book by the award-winning author of Just Healthcare, Norman Daniels develops a comprehensive theory of justice for health that answers three key questions: what is the special moral importance of health? When are health inequalities unjust? How can we meet health needs fairly when we cannot meet them all? Daniels' theory has implications for national and global health policy: can we meet health needs fairly in ageing societies? Or protect health in the workplace while respecting individual liberty? Or (...) meet professional obligations and obligations of justice without conflict? When is an effort to reduce health disparities, or to set priorities in realising a human right to health, fair? What do richer, healthier societies owe poorer, sicker societies? Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly explores the many ways that social justice is good for the health of populations in developed and developing countries. (shrink)

In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

How should medical services be distributed within society? Who should pay for them? Is it right that large amounts should be spent on sophisticated technology and expensive operations, or would the resources be better employed in, for instance, less costly preventive measures? These and others are the questions addreses in this book. Norman Daniels examines some of the dilemmas thrown up by conflicting demands for medical attention, and goes on to advance a theory of justice in the distribution of health (...) care. The central argument is that health care, both preventive and acute, has a crucial effect on equality of opportunity, and that a principle guaranteeing equality of opportunity must underly the distribution of health-care services. Access to care, preventive measures, treatment of the elderly, and the obligations of doctors and medical administrations are fully discussed, and the theory is shown to underwrite various practical policies in the area. (shrink)

From the contents:0K. Eggers / A. Stollberg: Vorwort? Antike und Mittelalter? M. Nanni: Musikalische Energeia? 17. bis 19. Jahrhundert? I. Mai Groote:?ut energiam habeat Musica?: Vorstellungen vom Zusammenwirken von Text, Rhythmus und Musik im 17. Jahrhundert? L. Holtmeier: La mécanique des doigts? Energie und Körperlichkeit in der französischen Musiktheorie? A. Stollberg: Schwunglinien und Wellenkurven. Zur Theorie der Melodik im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert? M. Schneider: Tugend-Energie. Charakterkraft und Erzählform in Wielands Agathon und Schlegels Lucinde? B. Specht: Die?geheimere (...) Werkstätte des Physikers?. Naturdynamik und Fragmentästhetik bei Johann Wilhelm Ritter? C. Torra-Mattenklott: Die energetische Wirkung der Künste bei E. T. A. Hoffmann? N. Noeske: Dämonische Energien zwischen Arzt und Patientin: Virtuosität als magnetisches Fluidum 20. und 21. Jahrhundert? E. Neswald: Thermodynamik als Weltanschauung um 1900. (shrink)

Reasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an (...) account of reasoning with impossible worlds, by treating such reasoning as reasoning employing counterpossible conditionals, and provides a semantics for the proposed treatment. (shrink)

Précis for a book symposium, with contributions from Meg Wallace, Louis deRosset, and Chris Tillman and Joshua Spencer.

Our ability to locate moral responsibility is often thought to be a necessary condition for conducting morally permissible medical practice, engaging in a just war, and other high-stakes endeavors. Yet, with increasing reliance upon artificially intelligent systems, we may be facing a wideningresponsibility gap, which, some argue, cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility. How then, if at all, can we make use of crucial emerging technologies? According to Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach, the advent of so-called ‘artificial moral (...) agents’ (AMAs) is inevitable. Still, this notion may seem to push back the problem, leaving those who have an interest in developing autonomous technology with a dilemma. We may need to scale-back our efforts at deploying AMAs (or at least maintain human oversight); otherwise, we must rapidly and drastically update our moral and legal norms in a way that ensures responsibility for potentially avoidable harms. This paper invokes contemporary accounts of responsibility in order to show how artificially intelligent systems might be held responsible. Although many theorists are concerned enough to develop artificial conceptions ofagencyor to exploit our present inability to regulate valuable innovations, the proposal here highlights the importance of—and outlines a plausible foundation for—a workable notion ofartificial moral responsibility. (shrink)

This two-part volume collects the complete fragments and most important testimonies for the leading presocratic philosophers. The Greek and Latin texts are translated on facing pages and accompanied by a brief commentary for each philosopher.

Science, engineering and technology are still male-dominated fields, and thus all over Europe much effort is expended on activities which, it is hoped, will lead to a sustainable gender balance. Scholarly work has frequently focused on the topic of how to motivate women to enter SET fields or to choose a corresponding education. In contrast to this one-sided approach, recent scholarly contributions have begun to emphasize the vital role of gendered structures and indirect exclusion mechanisms of technological institutions and their (...) professional self-understandings which discourage women from entering or staying in SET organizations. In particular, taken-for-granted knowledge as a mechanism for maintaining specific norms and values is considered a primary hindrance towards more inclusive and less oppressive organizational cultures. Since this taken-for-granted knowledge is often implicit, a primary goal of research can be said to make the invisible visible. Thus this article presents selected empirical results of a research project which makes use of an investigative tool called mind-scripting. Here the aim is to identify the main barriers, in terms of unquestioned taken-for granted knowledge, currently hindering an open and critical review of gendered structures and gender codes in the SET field, or in organizations in general, particularly with respect to professional norms. (shrink)

In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible (...) in any domain, and it’s hard to see why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. I will argue that when we get clearer about what sort of psychological state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve the puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is always irrational. (shrink)

One of the world’s leading philosophers offers aspiring thinkers his personal trove of mind-stretching thought experiments. Over a storied career, Daniel C. Dennett has engaged questions about science and the workings of the mind. His answers have combined rigorous argument with strong empirical grounding. And a lot of fun. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking offers seventy-seven of Dennett’s most successful "imagination-extenders and focus-holders" meant to guide you through some of life’s most treacherous subject matter: evolution, meaning, mind, (...) and free will. With patience and wit, Dennett deftly deploys his thinking tools to gain traction on these thorny issues while offering readers insight into how and why each tool was built. Alongside well-known favorites like Occam’s Razor and reductio ad absurdum lie thrilling descriptions of Dennett’s own creations: Trapped in the Robot Control Room, Beware of the Prime Mammal, and The Wandering Two-Bitser. Ranging across disciplines as diverse as psychology, biology, computer science, and physics, Dennett’s tools embrace in equal measure light-heartedness and accessibility as they welcome uninitiated and seasoned readers alike. As always, his goal remains to teach you how to "think reliably and even gracefully about really hard questions." A sweeping work of intellectual seriousness that’s also studded with impish delights, Intuition Pumps offers intrepid thinkers—in all walks of life—delicious opportunities to explore their pet ideas with new powers. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)