Following his retirement from teaching in 1972 J. M. Bocheński entered into a creative phase of his scholarly career characterized by, among other things, a marked shift to ‘naturalism’ to the detriment of philosophical ‘speculation’ of any kind (comprising much of classical metaphysics, ‘world views’, ‘ideologies, ‘moralizing’—for him so many nefarious ‘superstitions’). During this period he examined issues which bear on the human condition in a way that was at once constructive and critical—constructive by virtue of the logical analyses of (...) such concepts as authority, critical by dint of his refusal to take seriously any so-called ‘anthropocentric’/‘humanist’ thinking attempting to secure a special standing for ‘Man’ in the world. These attitudes come to expression in his last work devoted to worldly wisdom, the practical rationality required to ensure a long and happy life. I examine, first, some of the background of this work, with an eye to the naturalism it is based on, provide a schematic overview of the contents of the study, and concentrate on a couple of key issues related to the question as Bocheński understood it. The salient issue concerns his insistence that whatever else it may be the wisdom that is conducive to the long and happy life is not to be confused, conceptually, with any sort of morality: worldly wisdom and the categorical commands of morality stand in no essential relation to each other and may indeed be contradictory … to the detriment of morality, according to Bocheński. Throughout, but especially in the concluding section, I express some doubts about the cogency of this position. (shrink)

In a comment to Richard Rorty, Andrzej Walicki underscored the contextual difference between philosophy in a society like the USA and in post-communist countries. Citizens of democratic societies live best with a sense of contingency, situational embeddedness, plural rationalities, and relative truth. In East/Central Europe (ECE), the demand is for epistemological and moral certainty. Walicki did not say how philosophers in ECE are meeting this demand. How do philosophers in post-communist societies respond to the demand for ‘objective and universal standards’ (...) when the prevailing sense is that they have as great a need for clear horizons as the cultures to which they are called on to contribute foundations? In this setting, many philosophers seek to go beyond reflection to ‘reflexivity’—to ascertain the socio-cultural and moral prerequisites of “philosophizing.”. (shrink)

With the dismantling of Marxist-Leninist ideology, fresh inspiration has been discernible in recent Soviet philosophy. This article argues that a major area of concern is the nature of the human being, a theme formerly dominated by the "social" conceptions inscribed into official historical materialism. Soviet philosophers are examining such categories as culture, spirit, consciousness, and personality with an eye to their common characteristics. For many, the latter is grounded in the nature of the person, the specificity of which lies in (...) a morally qualified unity of action, sentiment, and reason. The author brings together evidence for this thesis and discusses the arguments of the Soviet philosophers with an eye to their conceptual resources and models. (shrink)

I attempt to clarify the connection between two late texts by V.S. Solov'ëv: Justification of the Good and Theoretical Philosophy. Solov'ëv drew attention to the intrinsic connection between moral and intellectual virtues. Theoretical Philosophy is the initial -- unfinished -- sketch of the dynamism of mind seeking truth as a good. I sketch several parallels and analogies between the doctrine of moral experience set out in Justification and the account of the intellect's dynamism based on immediate certitude set out in (...) Theoretical Philosophy. Solov'ëv can thus be considered as a ‘virtue epistemologist’ in the current meaning given to this description. I conclude by suggesting that Solov'ëv's position on these questions does not easily cohere with the ‘impersonalism’ he appears to defend in Theoretical Philosophy. (shrink)

The author examines, historically and theoretically, issues related to the state and current tendencies of post-Soviet Russian philosophy. The accent falls on the meta-philosophical question, what is philosophy?, or as the Russians often say, what is philosophizing?. In the Russian case, this question has presently to be handled in a cultural context ridden with a sense of discontinuity following the Soviet collapse. The author sketches some concepts intended to shed light on the nature of the relation between a philosophical culture (...) and the wider socio-cultural context in which it is embedded. The model is applied to the case of post-Soviet philosophy in order to see if and to what extent the logic of Soviet philosophizing and its place in the Soviet socio-cultural order has affected current philosophical tendencies in Russia, above all at the meta-philosophical level. The author concludes with a summary and commentary of the views of A.S. Akhiezer. (shrink)

I attempt to clarify the connection between two late texts by V.S. Solov''ëv: Justification of the Good and Theoretical Philosophy. Solov''ëv drew attention to the intrinsic connection between moral and intellectual virtues. Theoretical Philosophy is the initial -- unfinished -- sketch of the dynamism of mind seeking truth as a good. I sketch several parallels and analogies between the doctrine of moral experience set out in Justification and the account of the intellect''s dynamism based on immediate certitude set out in (...) Theoretical Philosophy. Solov''ëv can thus be considered as a virtue epistemologist in the current meaning given to this description. I conclude by suggesting that Solov''ëv''s position on these questions does not easily cohere with the impersonalism he appears to defend in Theoretical Philosophy. (shrink)