Applied Christian Ethics addresses selected themes in Christian social ethics. Part one shows the roots of contributors in the realist school; part two focuses on different levels of the significance of economics for social justice; and part three deals with both existential experience and government policy in war and peace issues.
Opening address, by C.W. Morris.--Address of the chairman, H.W. Chase.--Spinoza: his personality and his doctrine of perfection, by E.L. Schaub.--Spinoza's political and moral philosophy, by T.V. Smith.--Spinoza and religion, by S.B. Freehof.
Three times in Book 1 chapter 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says desire partakes of reason in a way. There is a consensus view in the literature about what that claim means: desire has no intrinsic rationality, but can partake of reason by being blindly obedient to the commands of reason. I argue this consensus view is mistaken: for Aristotle, adult human desire has its own intrinsic rationality, and while it is to be obedient to reason, it is not (...) blind obedience, for when reason tells desire to obey, it includes an explanation supporting its order which desire can at least potentially understand. Thus, the nature of human desire, and also of the characteristic interaction of desire and reason, is much different than it is standardly taken to be. (shrink)
Maas hat einfach den von Heinrich Kirn im Jahr 1880 edierten Text ohne jede eigene Bearbeitung und weitere Aufbereitung abgedruckt . Selbst die seit 1947 bekannten zusätzlichen neun Handschriften , hat Maas nicht auf ihre Qualität und Bedeutung geprüft, sondern sie S. 116f. nur aufgezählt. Nützlich ist die beigefügte englische Übersetzung, doch hatte bereits J. F. Collins im Jahr 1998 eine solche Übersetzung im Internet zugängig gemacht . Rückverweise vom Text auf die Einleitung oder erläuternde Sachanmerkungen zu Text und Übersetzung (...) finden sich nicht. Und auch die Bezüge der Einleitung auf den Text sind nicht präzis. Der Schwerpunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung liegt also nicht auf Text und Übersetzung der Instituta, sondern auf der Einleitung zum Text , was ja schon die Titelgestaltung des Buches vermuten läßt. (shrink)
Nature Network Groups hosted an invited workshop on 'Theories of Consciousness' during the second semester of 2009. There were presentations by each of 15 authors active in the field, followed by debate with other presenters and invitees. A week was allocated to each of the theories proposed; general discussion threads were also opened from time to time, as seemed appropriate. We offer here an account of the principal outcomes. It can be regarded as a contemporary, 'state of the art' snapshot (...) of thinking in this field. (shrink)
This text explores the notion that home is both a place and a condition of spirit. While a person may have a place that is home, he or she may also be nostalgic for an inner spiritual home, beyond human grasp. It combines autobiographical essays, with philosophical and religious explorations.
In §§28-31 of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege forwards a demonstration that every correctly formed name of his formal language has a reference. Examination of this demonstration, it is here argued, reveals an incompleteness in a procedure of contextual definition. At the heart of this incompleteness is a difference between Frege’s criteria of referentiality and the possession of reference as it is ordinarily conceived. This difference relates to the distinction between objectual and substitutional quantification and Frege’s vacillation between the two.
Saul Kripke has proposed an argument to show that there is a serious problem with many computational accounts of physical systems and with functionalist theories in the philosophy of mind. The problem with computational accounts is roughly that they provide no noncircular way to maintain that any particular function with an infinite domain is realized by any physical system, and functionalism has the similar problem because of the character of the functional systems that are supposed to be realized by organisms. (...) This paper shows that the standard account of what it is for a physical system to compute a function can avoid Kripke's criticisms without being reduced to circularity; a very minor and natural elaboration of the standard account suffices to save both functionalist theories and computational accounts generally. (shrink)
