Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear (...) and elegant introduction traces Husserl’s philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl. (shrink)

It is a trite fact that changes do occur, yet is it logically contradictory to deny that they do? If Zeno and McTaggart were right, then there is no logical contradiction in such a denial, although this is incompatible with the way in which we normally think of the world. Supporters of the 'block view' of the universe believe that there is a sense in which all events may be said to be contemporaneous, like episodes in a book, so that (...) there is no `objective' past or future.The aim of this book is not to demolish belief in the existence of objective change, but to elucidate the conditions under which it makes sense to suppose that changes occur. The book pays particular attention to the existence of selves as one such condition, and concludes that the naturalistic account of change is defective and leaves the sceptic victorious. (shrink)

It is a trite fact that changes do occur, yet is it logically contradictory to deny that they do? If Zeno and McTaggart were right, then there is no logical contradiction in such a denial, although this is incompatible with the way in which we normally think of the world. Supporters of the `block view' of the universe believe that there is a sense in which all events may be said to be contemporaneous, like episodes in a book, so that (...) there is no `objective' past or future. The aim of this book is not to demolish belief in the existence of objective change, but to elucidate the conditions under which it makes sense to suppose that changes occur. The book pays particular attention to the existence of selves as one such condition, and concludes that the naturalistic account of change is defective and leaves the sceptic victorious. (shrink)

Arguments for and against social equality have been advanced on various grounds, but the central issue remains to what extent, if at all, the pursuance of social equality should be seen as morally binding. Why should it be incumbent upon everyone to treat it as a moral virtue? The paper considers some of the best known egalitarian views and argues that the case tor equality as a morally binding principle has not been made.

Since its first publication in 1970 this book has become one of the most widely read introductory books on phenomenology and is used as a standard text in many universities from Germany to Korea and China. Praised for its accessibility and clarity the book has attracted a wide readership both within and outside the academia. Its author has over the years published a number of other books on Philosophy in which he has developed important theories of his own. This clear (...) and elegant introduction traces Husserl's philosophical development from his early preoccupation with numbers and his conflict with Frege to the transcendental phenomenology of his mature period. There is also a brief critical exposition of the views of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre and other philosopher influenced by Husserl. (shrink)

This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgement.

It should perhaps be stressed at once that to reject the "attributive" view of truth does not imply that the predicative use of the word "true" is illegitimate or in some sense ungrammatical. It would indeed be absurd to make such a claim. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the predicative use of "true" gives no justification for interpreting truth as an attribute or as a characterizing feature of an object, even if the concept (...) of an object is widened to include linguistic items. It is useful to remember that the adverb "truly" as well as the adjective "true" can occur as part of grammatical predicates. Furthermore, "true" can occasionally be replaced by the substantive with ease. Thus we say "What he said is true" and also "He spoke the truth." Witnesses in court swear to speak "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." The elasticity of common usage which allows one to express the same thought now with the help of the adjective and now with the help of the noun much too frequently tends to be ignored in discussions about truth. Yet this elasticity itself is a clear warning against interpreting truth too rashly as an attribute. (shrink)

First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a 'nature', lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivčevic argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivčevic states that calling 'x' true involves a property ascription does so only (...) in the sense that 'x' enters into truth and is part of a 'truth event'. (shrink)