In this essay I defend a variety of political perfectionism that I call negative perfectionism. Negative perfectionism is the position that if some design of the basic structure of society promotes objectively bad human living, then this should count as a reason against it. To give this hypothetical some bite, I draw on Rousseau’s diagnosis of the maladies of his society to defend two further claims: first, that some human lives are objectively bad, and, second, that some designs of the (...) basic structure promote objectively bad human living. It follows that we have should avoid such designs of the basic structure, which means that negative political perfectionism presents true requirements of justice. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz vertrete ich die These, dass die Betreuungsverbote und einschränkungen für Kleinkinder, die im Zuge der Corona-Pandemie in Deutschland galten und immer noch gelten, in bestimmten Fällen zu signifikanten Verlusten des Wohlergehens von Kleinkindern führen. Dabei beziehe ich mich auf Kleinkinder, die in Strukturen leben, in denen die außerhäusliche Betreuung einen gewichtigen Beitrag zur Kinderbetreuung leistet. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass für diese Kinder der Wegfall der Kinderbetreuung bedeuten kann, dass gewichtige aktuelle immaterielle Wohlergehensinteressen nur noch teilweise oder (...) gar nicht mehr befriedigt werden. Um diese Interessen und das Ausmaß ihrer Nichtbefriedigung zu beschreiben, greife ich auf das Konzept der Kindheitsgüter zurück und werde mich dabei auf drei gewichtige immaterielle Wohlergehensinteressen konzentrieren: das Interesse des Kindes an pädagogisch wertvollen Betreuungsstrukturen, das Bedürfnis des Kindes nach Austausch und Spiel mit Gleichaltrigen und das Interesse des Kindes, frei von Sorgen und Ängsten zu sein. Die anschließende kinderethische Auswertung dreier aktueller Studien zur Situation der Kinder und Familien unter den Bedingungen der Corona-Pandemie zeigt, dass besonders die Umstände während des Lockdowns im Frühjahr 2020, aber auch die fortbestehenden Einschränkungen bei der Kinderbetreuung sowie die veränderte Arbeitssituation der Eltern erheblich dazu beitragen, dass das Wohlergehen von Kleinkindern in dieser Hinsicht beeinträchtigt wird. Am Ende des Aufsatzes werde ich mich der Frage widmen, was bei der Ausgestaltung zukünftiger Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Corona-Pandemie aus kinderethischer Perspektive berücksichtigt werden sollte, um das Wohlergehen der Kleinkinder so gut wie möglich zu schützen. (shrink)

In line with the tradition running from Ancients through Christian thought, Kant affirms the idea of moral freedom: that true freedom consists in moral self-determination. The idea of moral freedom raises the problem of moral freedom: if freedom is moral self-determination, it seems that the wicked are not free and therefore not responsible for their wrongdoings. In this essay I discuss Kant's solution to this problem. I argue that Kant distinguishes between four modalities of freedom as moral self-determination and that (...) the problem of moral freedom disappears when these distinctions are brought to light. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the role of spatial delineations in Walzer’s theory of distributive justice. The argument put forward here is that Walzer’s concept of the existence of spheres of justice requires socio-spatial and territorial differentiations as a precondition. Walzer himself analyses different socially delineated places of distribution, such as the market (i.e. the economy) or the school (i.e. education). This contribution concentrates on the problem of distribution of political membership, advancing the thesis that we cannot understand Walzer’s approach (...) without giving consideration to his concept of concrete delimited territory. According to Walzer, distributive justice needs the framework of the territorial state, but this entity should not be identified with a centralized, ethnically homogenous nation state: One of the merits of Walzer’s theory of justice is to draw attention to the value of the locale. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the challenge presented by neoclassical liberals that the high-liberal assumptions and values imply that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. If the claim is true, then the high-liberal road from ideals of democracy and democratic citizenship to left-liberal institutions is blocked. Indeed, in that case the high-liberal is committed to an institutional scheme more along the lines of laissez-faire capitalism than property-owning democracy. To present and discuss this (...) challenge, I let John Rawls represent the high-liberal argument that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights and John Tomasi represent the neoclassical liberal argument that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. I show that Rawls’s argument is inadequate, but also that Tomasi’s argument fails. I thus conclude that high-liberalism is in a precarious situation, but is not yet undone by the neoclassical liberal challenge. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the challenge presented by neoclassical liberals that the high-liberal assumptions and values imply that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. If the claim is true, then the high-liberal road from ideals of democracy and democratic citizenship to left-liberal institutions is blocked. Indeed, in that case the high-liberal is committed to an institutional scheme more along the lines of laissez-faire capitalism than property-owning democracy. To present and discuss this (...) challenge, I let John Rawls represent the high-liberal argument that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights and John Tomasi represent the neoclassical liberal argument that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. I show that Rawls’s argument is inadequate, but also that Tomasi’s argument fails. I thus conclude that high-liberalism is in a precarious situation, but is not yet undone by the neoclassical liberal challenge. (shrink)

Some meritocratic defenders of capitalism rely on the principle that cooperators should receive a share of the product commensurate with their contribution. However, such defences of capitalism fail due to a dilemma. Either they rely on an understanding of contribution that arguably will be reflected by the capital-labour split in suitably idealized capitalist economies, but cannot serve as a plausible standard of merit; or they rely on an interpretation of contribution that is a plausible standard of merit, but which won’t (...) tend to be reflected by the capital-labour split in capitalist economies. (shrink)

The legend of Robin Hood exemplifies a distinct concern of justice neglected by theorists: the distributive results of systemic injustices. Robin Hood’s redistributive activities are justified by the principle that the distributive results of systemic injustices are unjust and should be corrected. This principle has relevance beyond the legend: since current inequalities in the US are results of systemic injustices, the US has good reason to take from the rich and give to the poor.

Is capitalism compatible with democratic equality? Rawls’s critique of welfare-state capitalism implies a negative answer. I argue that Rawls’s critique fails and that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. I articulate a social democratic interpretation of the ideal of democratic equality and show that it justifies welfare-state capitalism. This argument also implies that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality as interpreted by Rawls’s justice as fairness. So, whether we accept Rawls’s interpretation of democratic equality (...) or the social democratic alternative, welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. (shrink)

What is the nature and what is the role of trust between teacher and student in academic education at school? Providing a philosophically informed answer to these questions is the aim of this paper. In its first part, I present a relationship account of trust based on two fundamental assumptions: first, trust between teacher and student is essentially about them being in a trust relationship, and second, the reasons for trust are relationship dependent. The second part explores the role of (...) trust by looking at two aspects of academic education at school: the student's acquisition of knowledge from the teacher's testimony and the student's development of epistemic confidence, the latter being a key constituent of competent epistemic agency. Drawing on findings from developmental psychology, I explain how trust is involved in successful academic education at school. My aim is to provide a detailed conception of trust in the teacher–student relationship, as well as a conclusive argument for the importance and the value of trust in academic education at school. (shrink)

I articulate and defend a Rousseauvian theory of alienation and argue that thus construed non-alienation is a requirement of justice. On the Rousseauvian account, alienation is a process whereby social and economic conditions produce a particular sort of moral-psychological failure. Alienation is undesirable in itself, but it also makes the alienated person miserable, wicked, and unfree. Since our social and economic conditions are chosen, we should choose those that do not have these undesirable consequences.

Driven by a sharp increase in claims for reparations, reparative justice has become a topic of academic debate. To some extent this debate has been marred by a failure to realize the complexity of reparative justice. In this essay we try to amend this shortcoming. We do this by developing a taxonomy of different kinds of wrongs that can underwrite claims to reparations. We identify four kinds of wrongs: entitlement violations, unjust exclusions from an otherwise acceptable system of entitlements, and (...) two kinds where a social practice systematically fails to embody an acceptable system of entitlements. In deliberation about what is required to repair a historical injustice the weight of backward- and forward-looking considerations is a function of the distinctive features of the injustice in question. Hence, the first step in adjudicating claims for reparation is to identify what kind of wrong the claim arises from. From the taxonomy of wrongs we are thus able to construct what we call the Field of Reparative Justice, which illustrates how the structure of deliberation for reparative justice tracks the distinctive features of different kinds of wrongs. (shrink)

The central idea of Rawls’s theory of justice is the idea of democratic society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens. The moral powers of democratic citizens are the capacities presupposed by this idea. Rawls identifies two such powers, the capacity for a conception of the good and the capacity for a sense of justice. I argue that the idea of democratic citizenship presupposes also a third moral power: the capacity for working. Since the basic rights (...) are the rights necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers of citizenship; and since the capacity for working is such a moral power; and since access to work, education, and healthcare are necessary for the development and exercise of the capacity for working; access to work, education, and healthcare are basic rights. (shrink)

The relationship between teacher and student is an important element of school education and as such irreplaceable: If we want schools to be good places for those who teach and learn there, we must make sure that the educational relationships between teachers and students are good, too. In research about school education, surprisingly little attention is paid to the normative dimension of the relationship between teacher and student. This lacuna points to a desideratum in the philosophy of education: More should (...) be said about the normative structure of the teacher-student relationship, its role in teaching and learning, and its final value for teacher and student. Answering these fundamental philosophical questions is the core of this book. It offers a normatively rich concept of a good teacher-student relationship that is based on the analysis of two major relationship goods: trust and care. Moreover, the book explains the instrumental value of a good educational relationship for the student’s achievement of epistemic aims of school education as well as the final value of such a relationship for teacher and student. (shrink)

Libertarians often rely on arguments that subordinate the principle of liberty to the value of its economic consequences. This invites the question of what a pure libertarian theory of justice—one that takes liberty as its overriding concern—would look like. Grotius's political theory provides a template for such a libertarianism, but it also entails uncomfortable commitments that can be avoided only by compromising the principle of liberty. According to Grotius, each person should be free to decide how to act as long (...) as her actions do not violate the equal liberty of others. According to this principle, however, people are free to enter any contract and alienate any rights, permitting even contracts of slavery or the alienation of rights of bodily integrity. Libertarians can escape this commitment to absolute freedom of contract only by adopting ad-hoc amendments to the principle of liberty. (shrink)

Working from Fredric Jameson’s quote and recognizing his suggestion of a need for ‘the invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping’ as an integral part of what comes after postmodernism,...

According to both common wisdom and long-standing tradition, the ideal of peace is central to the morality of war. I argue that this notion is mistaken, not because peace is unachievable and utopian, though it might be for many of today’s asymmetrical conflicts; nor because the pursuit of peace is counterproductive, though, again, it might be for many of today’s conflicts; the problem, rather, is that the pursuit of peace is not a proper objective of war.

What is a just distribution of economic benefits and burdens? Principles of distributive justice help us answer this and related questions about how we should design the economic system. Principles of distributive justice guide our perception and judgment by telling us what facts to care about and when and why these facts reveal justice or injustice in the distribution of some good or burden. Thus, these principles bridge the gap between basic normative categories of right and wrong and facts about (...) our social world, guiding our attempts to build more just societies. This chapter presents and discusses the main principles of distributive justice—the principles of equality, sufficiency, liberty, utility, priority, merit, and equality of opportunity. (shrink)

Justice as mutual advantage appears to show inadequate concern for those that are insufficiently useful to others, implying that those that are most in need of the protections of justice fall outside the scope of justice as mutual advantage. Vanderschraaf offers a novel reply to this objection. He presents a game–the Indefinitely Repeated Provider-Recipient Game–which establishes that in some situations justice as mutual advantage can show concern for the vulnerable. This finding, however, does not match the problem raised by the (...) vulnerability objection, for the objection says that in all relevant situations, justice requires equal basic concern for all–vulnerable and non-vulnerable alike. (shrink)

Talbott grounds human rights in a moral epistemology that supports metaphysical immodesty but requires epistemic modesty. Metaphysical immodesty provides prescriptive confidence, while epistemic modesty prevents moral imperialism. I offer some reasons for doubting that Talbott’s moral epistemology yields the desired result. Insofar as Talbott aims for a determinate conception of human rights that could serve as the backbone of a system of international law, Talbott must deal with issues of reasonable disagreement, and for these issues, epistemic modesty provides no guarantee (...) against moral imperialism. In particular, I outline two sources of reasonable disagreement, that no social world is without loss and the complexity of the concept of autonomy, which illustrate how Talbott’s prescriptive confidence borders on moral imperialism. (shrink)

Holt argues that Rawls’s first principle of justice requires democratic control of the economy and that property owning democracy fails to satisfy this requirement; only liberal socialism is fully democratic. However, the notion of democratic control is ambiguous, and Holt has to choose between the weaker notion of democratic control that Rawls is committed to and the stronger notion that property owning democracy fails to satisfy. It may be that there is a tension between capitalism and democracy, so that only (...) liberal socialism can be fully democratic, but if so, we should reject, rather than argue from, the theory of democracy we find in justice as fairness. (shrink)

While empirical pragmatic research in the Spanish-speaking world has covered most of the Hispanosphere, Central America remains a very underrepresented region. This study serves to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing data collected from eighteen role-plays in Masaya, Nicaragua and Panama City, Panama. In the role-play situation, the interlocutor requests advice from the participant regarding a serious issue in her marriage. The advice-giving strategies are classified according to a categorization adapted from Blum-Kulka’s request strategy taxonomy, allowing for a (...) pragmatic analysis using Spencer-Oatey’s Rapport Management approach. Results indicate strong similarities between participants from Nicaragua and Panama, both electing to respect all components of the association principle and to violate the equity principle, especially its autonomy control component. In this advice-giving context between best friends, both groups prefer to impose their opinions and suggestions rather than respect the person’s right to be treated fairly, as well as to maintain a rapport-enhancing orientation rather than preserve their right to associate with others. The results show similarities with other research on directives in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Venezuela and Spain, cultures typically associated with less mitigation, positive politeness, conventional indirectness and high involvement. (shrink)

How should we design our economic systems? Should we tax the rich at a higher rate than the poor? Should we have a minimum wage? Should the state provide healthcare for all? These and many related questions are the subject of distributive justice, and different theories of distributive justice provide different ways to think about and answer such questions. This book provides a thorough introduction to the main theories of distributive justice and reveals the underlying sources of our disagreements about (...) economic policy. It argues that the universe of theories of distributive justice is surprisingly simple, yet complicated. It is simple in that the main theories of distributive justice are just four in number, and in that these theories each offer a distinct, well-defined theoretical approach to distributive justice; yet it is complicated in that the main theories disagree at several distinct, fundamental levels, and in that it is possible to spin innumerable new theories from the elements of the four main theories. (shrink)