Reseña de Wright, E. O. (2020). Cómo ser anticapitalista en el siglo XXI. Traducción Cristina Piña Aldao, Akal Pensamiento Crítico (150 páginas).

Academic incivility has contributed to (a) disruptions in learning, (b) poor mental health, (c) diminished academic achievement, and (d) increased financial costs. Understanding and characterizing human roles in academic incivility is foundational to developing plans and policies to mitigate the damaging effects of academic incivility. The purpose of this exploratory study is to characterize the roles of those involved in academic incivility in higher education. In this quantitative study of (N = 459) of higher education learners from 44 of 50 (...) states in the United States, a survey was deployed to investigate the role of self-esteem and advocacy beliefs in relationship to academic incivility roles (i.e., victim, perpetrator, bystander, and upstander). Statistical analysis included regression and correlations. Findings include that upstanders have higher self-esteem and perceptions of options to self-advocate than bystanders, victims, perpetrators, and victim/perpetrator. Likewise, respondents identified being involved in a plurality of incivility roles. Other findings included bystanders preferred faculty intervention in academic incivility incidences over self-advocacy. Those who endorsed being an incivility victim or victim/perpetrator were predictive of acknowledging having low self-esteem. (shrink)

E.O. Wright, using the labourtransfer and game theory approach of J. Roemer, provides a general framework for a comparative analysis of the different class systems, the historical variations of which are founded on the peculiar nature of the "asset" the dominant class appropriates.

Introduction / David F. Wright -- The natural ethic / Oliver O'Donovan -- Using the Bible in ethics / Howard Marshall -- From Christendom to pluralism / John Briggs -- Towards a theology of the state / Haddon Wilmer -- The challenge of Marxism / David Lyon -- Man in society / E. David Cook -- Human rights / John Gladwin -- Epilogue : tasks which await us / John Stott.

In this paper, the author revisits “the emotive theory of value” and argues that values are not entities but nothing other than “linguistic fictions”. Accordingly, valuations—i.e., valuing actions—can be defined as approving or disapproving attitudes of a subject to some object. In this perspective, values cannot be true or false: What we can do is just compare them with regard to strength. As a consequence, value judgments are to be understood as sentences which are used either to say that a (...) subject s values an object o positively or negatively, or to express (evince) a valuation. The author then shows some relations between normative and evaluative discourses. First, he claims that norms as well as valuations are not true or false. Second, he argues that both may be explained or justified, even if the former are usually justified teleologically whereas the latter are explained referring back to the subject's background and life‐style. Third, he notes that a legal order originates from the fact that valuations “crystallize” into norms. Finally, the author examines some further questions related to his analysis. In particular, he argues that the different realms of values, e.g., morals, aesthetics, politics, etc., do not correspond to different evaluative attitudes, but to different phenomena and diverse spheres of human life. (shrink)

Each group of selections in this text book is preceded by about ten pages of commentary by Harrington. These commentaries can be read either before the selections as a preparation setting forth the issues, or after the selections as an elucidation, isolating the selection's central concerns. All the selections, with the exception of Kierkegaard's, are from twentieth century thinkers. The contributors include Tillich, Herberg, G. E. Wright, Bultmann, D. M. Bailie, J. J. C. Smart, Wisdom, Hare, Sartre, Barth and (...) Vahanian. The book is divided into three main parts. The first part is basically doctrinal, exploring Biblical themes and contemporary views of revelation, God, man, Jesus, crucifixion, resurrection, and incarnation. The second part deals with aspects of the philosophy of religion including the connection between philosophy and theology, religious language, the existence of God, theistic proofs, and epistemological considerations. The third part, under the heading of "Challenges to Contemporary Man," is a potpourri of theological glamor issues including Existentialism and the death of God. Very often Harrington's commentary provides the reader with the classical aspects of the problem which the contemporary contributer is dealing with. There is a topically organized bibliography of suggested reading. There is no index.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Normative fragment of natural language make up sentences that express acts and describe norms. In this fragment there are criteria of logic thuth and relation of consequence between sentences which constitute a natural deontic logic. This paper adopts at ranslation function from the set of sentences of the normative fragment of natural language in to the set of formulae in the (...) formal language and claims that such function translates logically true sentences of the natural language into provable formulae of the formal calculus. With Von Wright's deontic calculus (1951), it does not fit and generates paradoxes, which are known as Prior's paradoxes. Cruz's paraconsistent deontic propositional calculus, D 1 (1993) avoids some paradoxes, except that generated by the formula OB-O (A- B). One builds a relevant deontic propositional calculus that aims to avoid these paradoxes and keeps intact all other fundamental features of deontic operators, since the formula B - (A - B) is improable in some relavant calculi.  . (shrink)

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...) de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias (...) in the estimation of the time at which an endogenous event, the conscious intention to perform a movement, occurred. Participants’ responses were affected systematically by the sensory modality of the stimulus and by the speed of the clock. Such findings demonstrate the variability in judging the time at which an exogenous event occurs and, by extension, suggest that such variability may also apply to the judging the time of occurrence of endogenous events. The reliability of participants’ estimations of when they formed the conscious intention to perform a movement in Libet et al.’s study is therefore questionable. (shrink)

No último século, os exegetas cristãos, para obter uma compreensão mais profunda dos escritos neotestamentários, despertaram progressivamente para a necessidade de conhecer as fontes, práticas e características da exegese judaica (do período do Segundo Templo e do período Rabínico). Esta mudança de perspectiva fez com que a exegese cristã entrasse em diálogo com o derás, a hermenêutica própria do judaísmo. Neste artigo apresentamos a complexa questão da definição e da distinção dos dois termos: derás e midrás. Seguimos o caminho histórico (...) percorrido pelos exegetas cristãos quanto à compreensão e à aplicação dos dois termos. Enfocamos, de modo particular, o debate sobre a compreensão do midrás/derás enquanto gênero literário específico (Wright) ou método exegético e hermenêutico (Bloch; Díez Macho; Le Déaut; etc). (shrink)

Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

The vexed question of the exact significance of the name of Mavortius in the old Putean MS. of Prudentius has again been called into court in the recent discussions of the Mavortian recension of Horace, and is fully treated in Dr. Bick's Horazkritik seit 1880, pp. 31–35. As Dr. Bick has done me the honour of subjecting my former articles on the question to his criticism, I feel called upon to say something in defence of the view I maintained. I (...) willingly grant him that perhaps I laid too strong a stress on the connection of the question with Horatian criticism; but I do so, I fear, not as a convert to his arguments in favour of the view that Put. is merely a copy of a MS. that had Mavortius' autograph written in it, and that therefore that name is part of a lost subscriptio, but precisely for the contrary reason, that I consider I was too much influenced by former advocates of that view. That there is no ground for assuming the name to be part of a lost subscriptio I am more than ever convinced, and my object here is to endeavour to show that the whole argument based on a false premise. (shrink)

DEATH is one of the central themes of existentialist writing. This is to be expected since the focal point of all its reflection is human existence. Existentialism explores the innermost depths of experienced selfhood. Inevitably, the authentic self must face the problem of man’s origin and destiny or, in Heideggerian terms, the beginning and ending of his Being-in-the-world. Death is a profoundly human problem, inseparably bound up with the psychological and ontological structure of the human mode of being or Dasein.

Oficina de sociólogo -- O artesanato sociológico em sete narrativas -- Desigualdade e diferença : ciladas da compreensão -- Funções heurísticas das anomalias do trabalho.