Gian-Carlo Rota a su concilier un travail mathématique exemplaire et des recherches philosophiques largement inspirées par la phénoménologie husserlienne. Son œuvre philosophique nous semble avoir de fait deux composantes : l’une s’intéresse majoritairement à des phénomènes universels. L’autre se déploie de façon plus subtile en filigrane de ses travaux mathématiques ; sans être thématisée comme telle – comme contribution philosophique –, elle alimente très lar-gement l’aura de Rota dans la communauté mathématique et justifie le rôle qu’il y joue de père (...) fondateur d’une école combinatoire. L’analyse de ces différents moments de sa pensée permet de mieux en cerner les ressorts, l’unité et la portée.Gian-Carlo Rota was able to combine a remarkable mathematical work with philosophical research largely inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology. His philosophical work has two components. One focuses mainly on universal phenomena in mathematics. The other unfolds in a more subtle way in his mathematical work; without being characterized as a proper philosophical contribution, it feeds largely the aura of Rota in the mathematical community and contributes to justify his role of founder of a school of combinatorics.The analysis of these different moments of his thought allows to understand better its origins, unit and scope. Gian-Carlo Rota ha saputo coniugare il propio lavoro matematico esemplare ad una ricerca filosofica in gran parte ispirata dalla fenomenologia di Husserl. La sua opera filosofica ha secondo noi due componenti: una riguarda principalmente i fenomeni universali. L’altra si sviluppa in modo più sottile nel suo lavoro matematico e, senza diventare un tema in quanto tale – come vero e pro-prio contributo filosofico –, alimenta in gran parte l’aura di Rota nella co-munità matematica, contribuendo a giustificare il suo ruolo di fondatore di una scuola combinatoria. L’analisi di questi diversi momenti del suo pensi-ero permette di identificarne meglio le origini, l’unità e la portata.This article is in French. (shrink)

The relationship of embryonal carcinoma (EC) cells, the stem cells of germ cell‐ or embryo‐derived teratocarcinoma tumors, to early embryonic cells came under intense scrutiny in the early 1970s when mouse chimeras were produced between EC cells and embryos. These chimeras raised tantalizing possibilities and high hopes for different areas of research. The normalization of EC cells by the embryo lent validity to their use as in vitro models for embryogenesis and indicated that they might reveal information about the relationship (...) between malignancy and differentiation. Chimeras also showed the way for the potential introduction of genes, selected in EC cells in vitro, into the germ line of mice. Although EC cells provided material for the elucidation of early embryonic events and stimulated many studies of early molecular differentiation, after years of intense scrutiny, they fell short as the means of genetic manipulation of the germ line, although arguably they pointed the way to the development of embryonic stem (ES) cells that eventually fulfilled this goal. (shrink)

This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia' resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued, rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience and their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally important insight of Kant. (...) From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptual thought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousness that it is an illusion to imagine that there are any `easy' problems of consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms. (shrink)

An examination of the philosophical issues surrounding prudential value: what it is for something to be good for a person; and well-being: what it is for someone's life to go well. It critically analyzes competing approaches, and proposes a new subjective account that addresses key weaknesses of existing theories.

In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither (...) of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and hence they have no objective reality. (shrink)

Revisitation of the much debated issue of the mind-body relation in Origen, with new insights, discussion of evidence, and of scholarship.

In this essay, I consider whether there is a place for trust in the American constitutional order and what it means if there is. In particular, I argue that a constitutional way of life requires a certain kind of trust, what I shall call civic trust, which I describe as an attitudinal disposition to engagement and cooperation with others in the shared project of constitutional self-governance. Civic trust is a specific conception of trust; it has a public as well as (...) a private character and it is an essential component of a healthy and successful constitutional regime. In short: civic trust is a constitutional good. Its absence in our public life is not only a marker but also a cause of constitutional dysfunction. (shrink)

Recent publications on digital health technologies highlight the importance of ‘responsible’ use. References to the concept of responsibility are, however, frequently made without providing clear definitions of responsibility, thus leaving room for ambiguities. Addressing these uncertainties is critical since they might lead to misunderstandings, impacting the quality and safety of healthcare delivery. Therefore, this study investigates how responsibility is interpreted in the context of using digital health technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), telemonitoring, wearables and mobile apps. We conducted a scoping (...) review with a systematic search in PubMed, Web of Science, Embase, CINAHL and Philosopher’s Index. A total of 34 articles were included and categorized using a theoretical framework of responsibility aspects, and revealed two main findings. First, we found that digital health technologies can expand and shift existing ‘role responsibilities’ among caregivers, patients and technology. Second, moral responsibility is often equated with liability or accountability, without clear justification. Articles describe new ways in which physicians can be held accountable, particularly in the context of AI, and discuss the emergence of a ‘responsibility gap’ where no-one can be fully responsible for AI-generated outcomes. The literature also shows that m-Health technologies can increase patients’ accountability for their own health. However, there was limited discussion in the reviewed literature on whether these attributions of accountability are appropriate. We conclude with implications for practice and suggestions for expanding the theoretical framework of moral responsibility, recommending further study on responsibility of collectives and artificial entities, and on the role of virtue in digital health. (shrink)

In his Treatise on the Astrolabe Chaucer engaged simultaneously in two kinds of translation—translating from one language to another and translating highly specialized knowledge into a form that could be more easily understood by nonspecialists. These two simultaneous translations are linked to one another using the reader persona of Chaucer’s ten-year-old son. Chaucer uses a child as the ideal audience (or reader) to communicate both aspects of his translation. This article demonstrates how Chaucer’s vocabularies, including words adopted from Arabic, allowed (...) him to use English as a language for scientific knowledge and for articulating and creating new communities of scientific readers and practitioners. To do so, Chaucer introduced the concept of experience as a necessary component of acquiring natural knowledge: using the astrolabe is as important as reading about it. I demonstrate that while he maintained the centrality of experiential knowledge to understanding nature, Chaucer also established English as a scientific language, arguing that the concept of experience and the role of the English language in scientific inquiry are linked. (shrink)

This book is a clear, comprehensive guide to the philosophic and religious concepts of the world's outstanding philosophers. Here are the great thoughts and ideas of the Western mind, selected and explained with magnificent precision by an eminent scholar. It is an illuminating portrait of man's intellectual and moral struggle to understand the world and the meaning of human life and destiny. Plato Aristotle Augustine Aquinas Luther Descartes Kant Rousseau Marx Nietzsche.

This essay charts the author’s philosophical journey from schoolboy enthusiasms for Sartre, Plato, and Buddhism to the equally intercultural themes of his writings over the last few decades. It tells of his disillusion with the dominant style of philosophy in 1960s Oxford and of the liberating effect of working for three years in the USA. The author relates the revival of his interest in Existentialism and how his reading of Heidegger led to an increasing appreciation of Asian traditions of thought. (...) The essay explains why it is important for philosophers to be acquainted with non-western traditions. This importance is illustrated by the ways in which the author draws upon various world philosophies in his recent writings on, for example, mystery, our relationship to nature, and the significance of beauty. (shrink)

What is silence? Is it a loss, an omission? Is it a stopping of the mouth, of the voice? An empty place where no meaning has come forward…or perhaps at times quite the opposite, an absence-as-presence Deleuze, 1990; Derrida, 1976)? Might silence evoke much more about what we assume is our monological, unitary reality, indexing possibilities yet unseen? This paper outlines the ways in which silence is typically understood according to scholarly orthodoxy: as omission in human communication or a silencing (...) of minoritized individuals or communities by those in power. It then moves to critique the preeminence of whitestream Western-centric academic authority, which self-perpetuates via the exclusion of outsider ways of doing, being and knowing such as those brought forward by silence, constituting a loss of meaning and knowledge from the social imaginary. This paper suggests that the pursuit of an articulate unknowing regarding silence as a creative, disruptive force beyond the control of rationality is a means of engaging with radical possibilities for a different, juster world. It proposes a socio-diologic politics of the real that welcomes silence as an unsettling of our current thinking about what is and will be possible, as well as who does and does not matter. It concludes by illustrating the ingenious force of silence in examples of subversive art that expose the hegemonizing, rational version of reality sold by academics and powerholders, bringing forward into the imagination what prospects for change, justice, and social transformation yet await. (shrink)

Universalism from Christian beginnings to Julian of Norwich.

In this paper, I first of all define various kinds of ontological dependence, motivating these definitions by appeal to examples. My contention is that whenever we need, in metaphysics, to appeal to some notion of existential or identity-dependence, one or other of these definitions will serve our needs adequately, which one depending on the case in hand. Then I respond to some objections to one of these proposed definitions in particular, namely, my definition of (what I call) essential identity-dependence. Finally, (...) I show how a similar approach can be applied in the theory of truthmaking, by offering an account of the truthmaking relation which defines it in terms of a type of essential dependence. I also say why I think that this approach is preferable to one which treats the truthmaking relation as primitive. More generally, my view is that accounts of dependence or ‘grounding’ which treat these notions as primitive are less satisfactory than my own position, which is that in all cases a suitable definition is forthcoming if we look hard enough. (shrink)

This edited volume presents new lines of research dealing with the language of thought and its philosophical implications in the time of Ockham. It features more than 20 essays that also serve as a tribute to the ground-breaking work of a leading expert in late medieval philosophy: Claude Panaccio. Coverage addresses topics in the philosophy of mind and cognition, concepts, logic and language, action theory, and more. A distinctive feature of this work is that it brings together contributions in both (...) French and English, the two major research languages today on the main theme in question. It unites the most renowned specialists in the field as well as many of Claude Panaccio’s former students who have engaged with his work over the years. In furthering this dialogue, the essays render key topics in fourteenth-century thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical community without being anachronistic or insensitive to the particularities of the medieval context. As a result, this book will appeal to a general population of philosophers and historians of philosophy with an interest in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. (shrink)

THE PASSAGE CITED IN THE TITLE IS commonly said to deal with puzzles or paradoxes about size and other measurable attributes of bodies. Nearly all recent commentators seek to interpret this portion of the dialogue as supporting or otherwise cohering with the Protagorean position Socrates expounds in the Theaetetus. On the present analysis, however, the support or harmony is mere appearance. The puzzles Socrates brings up are indeed associated with entities rejected by Protagoras. Socrates certainly uses the puzzles to foster (...) Theaetetus's trust in Protagorean doctrine. All the same, Socrates' procedure should not be taken at face value. The passage, which is an important digression, is fundamentally quite critical of the Protagorean position. (shrink)