Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral--Technische Universit'at Berlin, 1988).

Background Genuine uncertainty on superiority of one intervention over the other is called equipoise. Physician-investigators in randomized controlled trials need equipoise at least in studies with more than minimal risks. Ideally, this equipoise is also present in patient-participants. In pediatrics, data on equipoise are lacking. We hypothesize that 1) lack of equipoise at enrolment among parents may reduce recruitment; 2) lack of equipoise during participation may reduce retention in patients assigned to a less favoured treatment-strategy. Methods We compared preferences of (...) parents/patients at enrolment, documented by a questionnaire, with preferences developed during follow-up by an interview-study to investigate equipoise of child-participants and parents in the BeSt-for-Kids-study. This trial in new-onset Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis-patients consists of three strategies. One strategy comprises initial treatment with a biological disease-modifying-antirheumatic-drug, currently not standard-of-care. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23 parents and 7 patients, median 11 months after enrolment. Results Initially most parents and children were not in equipoise. Parents/patients who refused participation, regularly declined due to specific preferences. Many participating families preferred the biological-first-strategy. They participated to have a chance for this initial treatment, and would even consider stopping trial-participation when not randomized for it. Their conviction of superiority of the biological-first strategy was based on knowledge from internet and close relations. According to four parents, the physician-investigator preferred the biological-first-strategy, but the majority stated that she had no preferred strategy. In phase 2, preferences tended to change to the treatment actually received. Conclusions Lack of equipoise during enrolment did not reduce study recruitment, mainly due to the fact that preferred treatment was only available within the study. Still, when developing a trial it is important to evaluate whether the physicians’ research question is in line with preferences of the patient-group. By exploring so-called ‘informed patient-group’-equipoise, successful recruitment may be enhanced and bias avoided. In our study, lack of equipoise during trial-participation did not reduce retention in those assigned to a less favoured option. We observed a change for preference towards treatment actually received, possibly explained by comparable outcomes in all three arms. (shrink)

Seven unknown letters from 1823 to 1831 are published. The famous discoverer of the mammal's egg and founder of the modern embryology Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876), born as a German in Estonia and then anatomist and zoologist at Königsberg University, wrote them to his publisher Ludwig F. Froriep in Weimar and his son and successor. Robert F. Baer offered his co-work with a dictionary of natural history (which he criticized), he proposed a map of all research voyages everywhere in (...) the world, and he sent a few small papers about local birds. To Robert F. Baer gave some recommendations concerning his career; he asked for details of a death elephant, and he told that they were awaiting the cholera. (shrink)

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...) respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...) still seems to be considerable potential for exchange and dialogue if the situation is compared with their intimate relationship in central strands of early realist phenomenology. The philosopher perhaps most representative of this ecumenical approach is Husserl’s early student Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). From the very early stages of his philosophical career, Hildebrand has developed one of the most original, comprehensive and nuanced accounts of emotions at whose core is a detailed examination of their connection to value. While his central concern with the ethical significance of our affective life is in many ways continuous with Scheler’s work and draws crucially on Reinach’s philosophy of mind, Hildebrand’s own reflections considerably expand on and substantially modify the picture of the ontology and normative role of emotions defended by these authors. In this article, I reconstruct Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject. (shrink)

Comment penser la morale – sans verser dans l'incantation de l'obligation ou en appeler à la crainte suscitée par la sanction? La proposition de Guyau consiste à concevoir l'histoire de la philosophie morale comme traversée par une antinomie structurale (idéalisme versus naturalisme) qu'un évolutionnisme élargi peut dépasser. La morale qui en découle sera anomique, inventive et sans modèle suprême – sans obligation ni sanction.

Excerpt from Eine Philosophie des Schönen in Natur und Kunst Qbort Gefühl hat eine hreifache $beheutnng: '. Uian her= fteht harnnter oft mißbräuchlicherweife hen 'zaftfinn, ron hem hier offenbar nicht hie Siehe ift, 2. Hie i8irfung her äußeren unh her inneren Ginhriicfe auf hie (c)e_cle alß Saft ober 11nlnft. Ibieö ift her eingig berechtigte Gebrauch heß %orteß. 3. Gefühl begeichnet auch oft verworrene Grfenntnié, eine 9lrt fl)2ittelhing 5wifchen Grfennen unh ßegehren, nicht flieht, nicht E)iacht, fonbern Dämmerung tmh biefem swiefchlächtigen qbortfinn (...) herhanfen wir hie äfthetifche Gefühlßtheorie. Sinn ift bei her RunftanaAbout the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Les pensées de Michel de Montaigne et de René Descartes sur le péché offrent des réponses alternatives à ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui "l'anthropologie négative" qui caractérise l'Occident chrétien à la Renaissance. Comblant un manque dans la tradition critique, cette étude du concept de péché et de ses corrélats suit un schéma clinique et thérapeutique en analysant ce mal, mais aussi ses symptômes, ses causes et ses traitements. Se dévoile alors un processus de sécularisation qui marque l'avènement des Temps modernes, car (...) chez Montaigne et Descartes, la religion chrétienne est réintégrée dans une nouvelle pensée morale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In diesem Band legt der bis zuletzt in Münster lehrende Philosoph und katholische Theologe Klaus Müller einen Gesamtentwurf seines Denkens und Schaffens vor. In seinem Plädoyer für einen kritischen Panentheismus präsentiert er nicht nur die große Bandbreite seiner Forschungsthemen, wie Subjektphilosophie und Selbstbewusstseinstheorie, das Verhältnis von Glauben und Vernunft, Medientheorie und Cyberphilosophie, sondern er spitzt sie hier auf die Gottesfrage zu, die immer schon sein Lebensthema war. Wie kann heute eine intellektuell redliche Rede von Gott gelingen, ohne sich solcher Begriffe (...) wie Schöpfer, Personalität Gottes oder Freiheit des Menschen zu entledigen? Ausgehend von einer Zeitdiagnose, die diese und andere Herausforderungen der christlichen Gottesrede aufdeckt, zeigt sich, dass der hier entfaltete Lösungsvorschlag unter dem Label "Panentheismus" bereits aus zahlreichen verschütteten oder vernachlässigten Quellen unterschiedlicher Epochen schöpfen kann. Ausführlich lotet der Band das theologische Wagnis dieser Denkform aus, insofern er die Konsequenzen eines kritischen Panentheismus und die einhergehenden Transformationsprozesse im Blick auf Trinität, Christologie, Pneumatologie, Schöpfungslehre, Theodizee, Ekklesiologie, Eschatologie entfaltet. Auf beeindruckende Weise legt Klaus Müller in diesem Werk das Potential eines kritischen Panentheismus für Philosophie und Theologie, aber auch für den persönlichen Glauben eines Einzelnen frei. (shrink)