Between the two horns of Jørgensen's dilemma, the authors opt for that according to which logic deals not only with truth and falsity but also with those concepts not possessing this semantic reference. Notwithstanding the “descriptive” prejudice, deontic logic has gained validity among modal logics. The technical foundation proposed consists in an abstract characterization of logical consequence. By identifying in the abstract notion of consequence the primitive from which to begin, it is possible to define the connectives - even those (...) of obligation - by means of the rules of introduction or elimination in a context of derivation. (shrink)

1. EI dilema de Jørgensen. 2. La salución propuesta. 3. Breve historia de un prejudicio filosófico. 4. Normas sin lógica. 4.1. Imperativos sin lógica. 4.2. Normas y proposicienesnormativas. 4.3. Proposiciones normativas y normas verdaderas. 4.4. Mundos posibles. 4.5. Validez e invalidez. 4.6. La racionalidad del legislador. 5. La noción abstracta, sintáctica y semántica de consecuencia. 5.1. La noción abstracta de consecuencia. 5.2. La noción sintáctica de consecuencia. 5.3. La noción semántica de consecuencia. 5.4. EI sentido dado por las reglas de (...) uso en un contexto. 5.5. Qué operadores para la lógica. 5.6. Solo en un contexto la parte cobra sentido. 6. La lógica deóntica. 7. De donde la solución del dilema interesa a toda la lógica. 8. Consecuendas para la informática. (shrink)

The paper develops a phenomenology of hyper-reading (i.e. the act of reading hypertexts) moving from the prejudicial approach to such texts, developing the three moments of presence, boredom and authority and concluding with some remarks on the freedom of readers in the act of navigation of hypertexts – especially those on the Web.

Russo, E. A. Consideraciones metodológicas acerca de la teoría del derecho.--Martino, A. A. En torno a la norma fundamental.--Warat, L. A. La función metodológica de la norma fundamental kelseniana.--Russo, E. A. Las fuentes en la aplicación judicial del derecho.--Warat, L. A. Los conceptos normativos en Kelsen y la desmitificación del modelo napoleónico.--Russo, E. A. Derecho subjetivo y derecho objetivo.--Warat, L. A. Interpretación de la ley.--Martino, A. A. Valores: ética y metaética.

A noção de “interesse público” parece ter uma tradição antiga e profícua nos estudos políticos, em particular nas pesquisas sobre mídia, comunicação e política. No entanto, parece haver um aparente paradoxo entre a própria noção de “interesse” e a ideia de algo “público”: como uma ação ou decisão política pode contemplar a miríade de interesses de grupos e indivíduos diversos? Este artigo delineia alguns aspectos da noção de “interesse” no debate atual sobre comunicação política. Com base em uma pesquisa bibliográfica, (...) este artigo argumenta que, nas últimas décadas, as principais obras sobre o tema têm dedicado menos espaço à noção de 'interesse público' como uma entidade única em favor de uma visão mais nuançada e identitária cultural, noção que contempla a pluralidade de uma esfera pública repleta de novas formas de ativismo e demandas coletivas por espaço, igualdade e visibilidade. (shrink)

The following paper explores the categorisation of groups. Indeed, there are different ways to distinguish human groups from one another: on the one hand, sociological analyses focus their attention on the distinction between being inside and outside of groups; on the other hand, collective action theories mainly focus on the distinction between collectives and aggregates, based on the kind of action that groups can perform, i.e., joint or not. In this paper, we offer an alternative view by adopting the agent’s (...) perspective and creating a scale based on the importance the agent attributes to his or her membership to different groups. While this perspective seems to lose objectivity as it does not allow the formulation of an unambiguous scale that applies to all individuals, it does allow us to understand the process of identification and the consequent phenomenon whereby very often we act in accordance with other people’s actions, in a collective way, without prior coordination. A practical example based on the so-called “acting white” will be explored in order to test the paper’s proposal. The analysis intends to offer a common ground on the basis of which it would be possible to have further inquiries on the social dimension of self-experience. (shrink)

Dox ed episteme: il senso comune e la fenomenologia -- Una filosofia dell'esperienza -- Intenzionalità e realta.

La brillantezza di molti edifici contemporanei può essere espressa attraverso l'immagine di uno specchio che riflette ciò che sta intorno, impedendo ogni contatto tra interno ed esterno. Ciò porta verso uno scenario articolato e ambiguo, che rappresenta il punto di contatto tra la riflessione architettonica e le formule sempre più spettacolarizzanti della comunicazione mediatica. L'estetica che prende forma da questo “paradigma dello specchio” perde il suo riferimento a una nozione pubblica e condivisa di bellezza, a favore di una sua considerazione (...) come oggetto di scambio individuale. Il concetto di “i-Aesthetics” prova a sintetizzare tale quadro, che diventa sempre più influente in riferimento al giudizio sull'architettura e al legame complessivo che instauriamo con lo spazio. (shrink)

La tesi che vorrei discutere in questo saggio può essere sintetizzata nel modo seguente: l'aspetto più significativo dell'intermedialità è legato al suo potenziale di riqualificazione del rapporto tra immagine e realtà. Intendo analizzare questa tesi facendo riferimento alla teoria estetica fenomenologica. La mia ipotesi è che vi sia una relazione essenziale tra i processi di obbiettivazione dell'esperienza intuitiva descritti da Husserl e le strategie di elaborazione intermediale dell'immagine. L'intermedialità può produrre effetti di autenticazione dell'immagine perché interviene su quelle dinamiche di (...) costituzione della realtà che sono più originarie dal punto di vista fenomenologico.Procederò dunque come segue: in primo luogo farò riferimento a due testi fondamentali di Husserl in cui vengono stabilite le linee guida di una estetica fenomenologica, Le lezioni sulla sintesi passiva e il secondo libro delle Idee. Nel rileggere questi due testi, così inesauribili, mi soffermerò esclusivamente sul problema della costituzione, attraverso l'esperienza percettiva, della realtà del percepito. In secondo luogo analizzerò la nozione di intermedialità, mettendola in relazione con le analisi fenomenologiche sviluppate a partire da Husserl. In Italia è stato Pietro Montani a proporre con forza l'idea di una connessione tra il problema delle «prestazioni referenziali» dell'immagine e l'intermedialità. Cercherò dunque di ricostruire alcuni passaggi fondamentali del suo discorso teorico facendo riferimento in modo particolare al libro L'immaginazione intermediale. Infine rischierò una esemplificazione concreta proponendo una lettura di un breve film di Iñárritu in cui il nesso tra intermedialità e realtà delle immagini è «messo in opera» in modo esemplare. (shrink)

How has it been possible that the adoption of the passport – a measure closely associated to the Ancien Régime despotism – was generalized with the French Revolution? The article traces a genealogy of the identification regime that organized the government of mobility from within the liberal conceptual apparatus. The metamorphoses of police apparatus studied by social history are here considered in the light of constitutional debates of the Revolution. The concluding paragraph frames the political-economic implication of the emergence of (...) a modern rationality of identification in order to suggest a field of analysis and of historical periodization that I define «mobility regime». (shrink)

Heidegger understands technology as a mode of revealing, i.e., a way of discovering and comprehending reality, which is not merely the result of human invention and operation, but rather a destiny which surpasses and addresses the human being, insofar as its root lay deep in the very advent of philosophy, of the West and it position toward being as a whole. How can we still have interest in such ontological conception of technology as a destiny? What is its topical relevance (...) for the present? What is its contribution to think the transformative action of technology, i.e., the opportunity and threat it brings with it? (shrink)

Il multiculturalismo è un modello culturale e politico-istituzionale per la gestione della diversità in una società multietnica, la cui base teorica viene dal relativismo culturale. Come nessuna cultura può pretendere una validità universale, il processo di storicizzazione della razionalità occidentale segna la fine della pretesa metafisica di dire la verità dell’uomo e del mondo, nononstante si crede che il fare della scienza è l’accadere della verità. Nel gestire la diversità e nell’assicurare la tolleranza risiede la «necessità» del multiculturalismo. Sua debolezza (...) teorica risiede paradossalmente nell’incapacità di pensare la differenza. Universale non è la cultura, che è sempre particolare, ma l’ umano . Solo l’affermazione di questa dimensione universale dell’esperienza può fondare il rispetto della singolarità dell’altro, di sua infinita alterità e differenza. L’umano si dice sempre in una cultura determinata. La struttura universale dell’esperienza è al tempo stesso in e al di là di ogni cultura, insieme trascendente e immanente, trans-immanente . Questa identità strutturale è costitutivamente assegnata a una emergenza molteplice. In questo contesto, si può parlare di una ragione che, in nome di una fedeltà all’esperienza, si dispone a ripensare il problema dell’universalità, il rapporto tra il singolare e l’universale. Palavras-chave : Multiculturalismo, relativismo culturale, cultura, Universale, singolare Resumo O multiculturalismo é um modelo cultural e político-institucional para a gestão da diversidade numa sociedade multiétnica, cuja base teórica procede do relativismo cultural. Como nenhuma cultura pode pretender uma validade universal, o processo de historicização da racionalidade ocidental marca o fim da pretensão metafísica de dizer a verdade do homem e do mundo, não obstante se acredite que fazer ciência já seja o acontecer da verdade. A necessidade do multiculturalismo reside no administrar a diversidade e no assegurar a tolerância. Sua fraqueza teórica se encontra paradoxalmente na incapacidade de pensar a própria diferença. Universal não é a cultura, que é sempre particular, mas o humano . Somente a afirmação desta dimensão universal da experiência pode fundar o respeito da singularidade do outro, de sua infinita alteridade e diferença. O humano se diz sempre numa cultura determinada. A estrutura universal da experiência está, ao mesmo tempo, em e além de cada cultura, ao mesmo tempo transcendente e imanente, trans-imanente . Esta identidade estrutural é constitutivamente assinalada a uma experiência múltipla. Nesse contexto, pode-se falar de uma razão que, em nome da fidelidada à experiência, dispõe-se a repensar o problema da universalidade, a relação entre o singular e o universal. Palavras-chave : Multiculturalismo, relativismo cultural, cultura, Universal, singularMulticulturalism is a cultural and political-institutional framework for managing diversity in a multiethnic society, whose theoretical basis proceeds of cultural relativism. As no culture can claim to universal validity, the historicizing process of western rationality points out the end of metaphysical pretension of telling the truth about man and the world, although one believe that doing science is already the case for truth. The necessity of multiculturalism lies in managing diversity and in ensuring tolerance. Its theoretical weakness is paradoxically unable to think of difference itself. Culture always emerges as being the particular as the human appears as being the universal. Only the statement of this universal dimension of experience can establish the respect of other's uniqueness, of his infinite otherness and difference. The human is always understood within a specific culture. The universal structure of experience is at the same time, in and beyond each culture in particular, at the same time immanent and transcendent, there is to say, trans-immanent. This structural identity is constitutively marked by a multiple experience. In this context, one can speak of a reason that in the name of fidelity to experience is willing to rethink the problem of universality, the relationship between the singular and universal. Key words : Multiculturalism, cultural relativism, culture, Universal, singular. (shrink)

In De anima, III, Aristotele studia tre operazioni sensibili : percezione dei sensibili comuni, appercezione, discriminazione, cui la critica si riferisce come alla teoria del ‘senso comune’, identificando la αἴσθησις κοινή del De anima con la κοινὴ δύναμις dei Parva naturalia. Ma le due espressioni denotano aspetti ben diversi : la prima indica una capacità posteriore alla divisione della percezione nei cinque sensi, mentre la seconda è una capacità anteriore e radicale della percezione.

Even before turning to instruments, we already have a technical-cultural body, since our body always keeps track of the action of technology and culture. It is indeed thanks to both technology and culture that our body had become what it is, that is a human body, meaning a sort of biological paradox - a body unfit for survival, unspecialized and unadapted, but extremely plastic. This does not imply that the action that current technologies have upon our bodies, with their extraordinary (...) capabilities of manipulation, does not have any consequences or cause concerns. We do nothing alien to our "nature" when we expose ourselves to the action of technology, as well as we do nothing alien to us when we set limits to technology, and not only to it. The continuous process of self-limitation is in fact a necessity for men. And setting limits to the possible is also the only way to safeguard it. (shrink)

: Jennifer Radden argues that there cannot be delusional pain in depression, putting forward three arguments: the argument from falsehood, the argument from epistemic irrationality, and the argument from incongruousness. Whereas delusions are false, epistemically irrational, and incongruous with the person’s experience, feeling pain from the first-person perspective cannot be false or irrational, and is congruous with the person’s experience in depression. In this commentary on Radden’s paper, we share her scepticism about the notion of delusional pain, but we find (...) the arguments from falsehood and incongruousness ultimately unconvincing, given that delusions are not always false or incongruous. Rather, we develop the argument from epistemic irrationality, suggesting that, although some aspects of pain may exhibit informational plasticity and other characteristics shared by mental states that can be assessed for their rationality, the sensory component of pain does not. Keywords: Delusion; Pain; Epistemic Irrationality; Incongruousness; Falsity; Depression Riassunto: Jennifer Radden sostiene che non può esserci dolore delirante nella depressione, proponendo tre argomentazioni che si basano sulla falsità, l'irrazionalità epistemica e l'incongruenza. Mentre i deliri sono falsi, epistemicamente irrazionali e incongruenti con l'esperienza della persona, provare dolore in prima persona non può essere falso o irrazionale ed è congruo con l'esperienza di una persona che è depressa. In questo commento all’articolo di Radden, condividiamo il suo scetticismo nei confronti della nozione di dolore delirante, ma troviamo le argomentazioni basate sulla falsità e l’incongruenza in ultima analisi non del tutto convincenti, dato che i deliri non sono sempre falsi o incongrui. Piuttosto, sviluppiamo l’argomentazione basata sull’irrazionalità epistemica, suggerendo che, sebbene alcuni aspetti del dolore possano esibire plasticità e altre caratteristiche condivise da stati mentali che vengono valutati per la loro razionalità, la componente sensoriale del dolore non lo fa. Parole chiave: Delirio; Dolore; Irrazionalità epistemica; Incongruenza; Falsità; Depressione. (shrink)

This book examines the role of acts of choice in classical and intuitionistic mathematics. Featuring fifteen papers - both new and previously published - it offers a fresh analysis of concepts developed by the mathematician and philosopher L.E.J. Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism. The author explores Brouwer's idealization of the creative subject as the basis for intuitionistic truth, and in the process he also discusses an important, related question: to what extent does the intuitionistic perspective succeed in avoiding the classical (...) realistic notion of truth? The papers detail realistic aspects in the idealization of the creative subject and investigate the hidden role of choice even in classical logic and mathematics, covering such topics as bar theorem, type theory, inductive evidence, Beth models, fallible models, and more. In addition, the author offers a critical analysis of the response of key mathematicians and philosophers to Brouwer's work. These figures include Michael Dummett, Saul Kripke, Per Martin-Löf, and Arend Heyting. This book appeals to researchers and graduate students with an interest in philosophy of mathematics, linguistics, and mathematics. (shrink)

El presente trabajo está dedicado a rastrear la influencia del pensamiento plotiniano sobre el revival de la lírica irlandesa bajo la pluma de su más célebre poeta: William Butler Yeats. Los escritos del Irlandés, en efecto, contienen alusiones directas al filósofo neoplatónico que constituyen la ‘punta del iceberg’, por así decirlo, de una impronta profunda y trascendente de la filosofía eneádica sobre la literatura yeatseana. Nuestro trabajo, por lo tanto, procura examinar el significado de este ascendiente e intenta poner de (...) manifiesto los caracteres propios de la relación personal, textual y conceptual que Yeats establece con Plotino en sus escritos. (shrink)

Though “mysticism” in not a Plotinian idiom, it has been frequently used by scholars to identify an aspect of his philosophy. Thus, Plotinus’ mysticism comprises those passages of the Enneads in which he describes different transcendent experiences or presents his interpretation of these. Upon these two elements, we believe, Plotinus structures a coherent doctrine about the relation between man and the higher degrees of reality closely dependant, as well, on his metaphysical theory. In the present work we intend to provide (...) an accurate account of Plotinus’ mystical doctrine for which we will also need to analyse the singularities of the different mystical discourses present in the Enneads and outline and discuss the main streams of interpretation that scholars have suggested for this subject. (shrink)

Though “mysticism” in not a Plotinian idiom, it has been frequently used by scholars to identify an aspect of his philosophy. Thus, Plotinus’ mysticism comprises those passages of the Enneads in which he describes different transcendent experiences or presents his interpretation of these. Upon these two elements, we believe, Plotinus structures a coherent doctrine about the relation between man and the higher degrees of reality closely dependant, as well, on his metaphysical theory. In the present work we intend to provide (...) an accurate account of Plotinus’ mystical doctrine for which we will also need to analyse the singularities of the different mystical discourses present in the Enneads and outline and discuss the main streams of interpretation that scholars have suggested for this subject. (shrink)

A grande obra de Aristóteles sobre psicologia foi o De anima. Entretanto, nem por isso a obra Parva naturalia, também conhecida como De sensu et sensato, deixou de exercer um papel importante, entre os árabes e os pensadores ocidentais. No presente ensaio, procura-se mostrar como a tradução árabe desta última obra foi utilizada por Avicena, Ibn Bâjjia e, sob a influência deste último, por Averróis. No Epítome De sensu de Averróis, percebe-se, por exemplo, que os princípios teóricos são aristotélicos, mas (...) estão contaminados pelo termo “espiritual”, que não é utilizado pelo filósofo grego. No Ocidente Latino, essa leitura averroísta terá influência sobre Alberto Magno e Tomás de Aquino. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Parva naturalia. De anima. Filosofia da mente entre pensadores árabes e ocidentais latinos. Averróis. Percepção espiritual. (shrink)

In Parts of Classes [Lewis 1991] David Lewis attempts to draw a sharp contrast between mereology and set theory and to assimilate mereology to logic. He argues that, like logic but unlike set theory, mereology is “ontologically innocent”. In mereology, given certain objects, no further ontological commitment is required for the existence of their sum. On the contrary, by accepting set theory, given certain objects, a further commitment is required for the existence of the set of them. The latter – (...) unlike the sum of the given objects – seems to be an abstract entity whose existence is not directly entailed by the existence of the objects themselves. The argument for the innocence of mereology is grounded on the thesis of “Composition as identity”. Lewis analyses two different versions of the thesis: the first is the Strong composition thesis, according to which certain objects are their sum, where the use of “are” would mean that composition is literally identity. The second version is the Weak composition thesis, according to which composition is analogous, under some aspects, to identity. He criticises the first version of the thesis and argues for the second one. In the paper we argue that (T1) arguments for the ontological innocence of mereology are not conclusive. An obvious objection to the Strong composition thesis is that – given certain objects Xs – they cannot be their sum because none of them is the sum. One could reply to this objection by observing that the “are” in the sentence “The Xs are their sum” is to be understood collectively and not distributively. But the crux is that the collective reading fails to generate a new entity, whereas mereology, in particular in Lewis’ use for the reconstruction of set theory as “megethology”, needs to consider sums as real objects. Besides, we contend that Lewis’ argument for the innocence of mereology based on the Weak composition thesis is a petitio principii. The reason is that the aspects of the analogy between composition and identity, which Lewis emphasises, obtain under the presupposition of the existence of sums. But this is just what a denier of innocence would refuse. (T2) Some arguments against the ontological innocence of mereology show a certain ambiguity in the innocence thesis itself. Some defences of the innocence seem to implicitly presuppose that the sum of certain objects Xs is not a genuine entity. Speaking of the sum of the Xs would be just another way of speaking plurally of the Xs. However, the relevant use of sums in mereology treats them as well determined objects. The relevant innocence thesis takes for granted that, though sums are genuine objects, nevertheless their existence does not require any further commitment. (T3) The innocence thesis, apart from Lewis’ defence, seems to depend on a general conception of the nature of objects and on how the notion of ontological commitment is understood. We think that the thesis is the manifesto of a realistic conception of parts and sums. This conception consists of the following clauses: (i) given any object x, it is well determined which parts it possesses; these are in turn objects whose existence is a necessary consequence of the existence of x. (ii) However any objects Xs are given, they automatically constitute a well determined object x which is their sum; (iii) We can refer singularly and plurally to parts and sums of given objects. Obviously, one might wonder if such a conception is really ontologically innocent. One could object that it is not innocent because clauses (i) – (iii) are not. For example, clause (i) could be considered as an ontological commitment to the existence of sums. But the innocence at issue does not concern the above-sketched conception. The innocence is embedded in the conception itself. In other words, someone who argues for clauses (i) – (iii) takes a point of view from which mereology appears to be innocent. For, such a point of view forces us to consider as well determined the parts of any object and does not allow us to separate the existence of certain objects form the existence of their sum. (T4) is the claim that the alleged innocence of mereology is subject to Quine’s notorious criticisms of the set-theoretical interpretation of second order logic. To the purpose, we construct a mereological model of a substantive fragment of set theory, i.e. the one that grounds the principal model semantics of second order logic. First, we construct a mereological model under the assumption of the existence of infinitely many atoms. Then, we replace this assumption with that of the existence of any infinite object (with or without atoms). Finally, let us make a general point about the innocence thesis of mereology. A conclusive argument for that would be a refutation of the thesis that there are only denumerably many entities. For, since the parts of an infinite object constitute a non-denumerable infinity, such an argument would entail that there could be no infinite without a non-denumerable infinity. However, the thesis that any genuine infinity is a denumerable one has had some important advocates. So, a conclusive argument for the innocence of mereology seems to be highly implausible. (shrink)

La tensión entre fidelidad a la tradición e innovación presente en el pensamiento plotiniano se manifiesta de modo patente en su propuesta metafísica. La ontología expuesta en las Enéadas, en efecto, es un claro ejemplo de la labor exegética mediante la cual Plotino toma las concepciones metafísicas platónico-pitagóricas precedentes y las sintetiza infundiendo nueva vitalidad en ideas antiguas. Para llevar a cabo su exégesis utiliza, incluso, conceptos aristotélicos que integra de un modo peculiar a su pensamiento platonizante. En el presente (...) trabajo, pues, nos proponemos esclarecer el procedimiento interpretativo que Plotino lleva a cabo en la formulación de su doctrina de lo Uno y de la relación entre esta hipóstasis y la Inteligencia. En nuestro análisis examinamos las nociones metafísicas que nuestro filósofo toma como punto de partida y brindamos una interpretación de la transformación que opera sobre ellas para arribar al sistema que dio origen a una nueva corriente de pensamiento platónico. The tension between innovation and fidelity to tradition present in the thought of Plotinus manifests itself clearly in his metaphysical conception. The ontology put forward in the Enneads, in fact, is a fine example of the exegetical work by which our thinker takes the preceding platonic-pythagorean metaphysics and synthesizes it, bringing new vitality into ancient ideas. To accomplish his exegesis he even employs Aristotelian concepts incorporating them in a peculiar way to his Platonizing thought. In the present paper, hence, we intend to elucidate the interpretive procedure that Plotinus carries out to arrive at his conceptions of the One and of the relationship between this hypostasis and Intelligence. In our analysis, we examine the metaphysical notions that our philosopher takes as starting points and we offer an interpretation of the transformation he operates upon them to reach the system that gave birth to a new current of Platonic thought. (shrink)

Leg rigidity is associated with frequent falls in people with Parkinson’s disease, suggesting a potential role in functional balance and gait impairments. Changes in the neural state due to secondary tasks, e.g., activation maneuvers, can exacerbate rigidity, possibly increasing the risk of falls. However, the subjective interpretation and coarse classification of the standard clinical rigidity scale has prohibited the systematic, objective assessment of resting and activated leg rigidity. The pendulum test is an objective diagnostic method that we hypothesized would be (...) sensitive enough to characterize resting and activated leg rigidity. We recorded kinematic data and electromyographic signals from rectus femoris and biceps femoris during the pendulum test in 15 individuals with PD, spanning a range of leg rigidity severity. From the recorded data of leg swing kinematics, we measured biomechanical outcomes including first swing excursion, first extension peak, number and duration of the oscillations, resting angle, relaxation index, maximum and minimum angular velocity. We examined associations between biomechanical outcomes and clinical leg rigidity score. We evaluated the effect of increasing rigidity through activation maneuvers on biomechanical outcomes. Finally, we assessed whether either biomechanical outcomes or changes in outcomes with activation were associated with a fall history. Our results suggest that the biomechanical assessment of the pendulum test can objectively quantify parkinsonian leg rigidity. We found that the presence of high rigidity during clinical exam significantly impacted biomechanical outcomes, i.e., first extension peak, number of oscillations, relaxation index, and maximum angular velocity. No differences in the effect of activation maneuvers between groups with clinically assessed low rigidity were observed, suggesting that activated rigidity may be independent of resting rigidity and should be scored as independent variables. Moreover, we found that fall history was more common among people whose rigidity was increased with a secondary task, as measured by biomechanical outcomes. We conclude that different mechanisms contributing to resting and activated rigidity may play an important yet unexplored functional role in balance impairments. The pendulum test may contribute to a better understanding of fundamental mechanisms underlying motor symptoms in PD, evaluating the efficacy of treatments, and predicting the risk of falls. (shrink)