The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of school principal trustworthiness components (i.e., ability, integrity, benevolence) in helping shape teacher trust and affective commitment within schools. Using data from 1,026 teachers in Spain and structural equation modeling (via EQS 6.3), this study establishes how a principal’s integrity and benevolence are key in determining, both directly and indirectly (via trust in the principal), teachers’ affective commitment to their school. It also reveals that the perceived ability of a principal (...) is not effective in generating trust or affective commitment to the school in teachers. As a contribution to the literature, these findings reveal that the ethical trustworthiness (benevolence, integrity) of principals is key in engendering trust and affective commitment to schools. Thus, to shape work environments that are high in trust and commitment, principals should focus on behaving in ways that make their integrity and benevolence manifest to their teachers. (shrink)

Evaluating the current locus equation under ideal conditions identifies important and unexpected parameter dependencies. Locus equation (LE) utility, either as a valid laboratory tool or possible invariant cue, depends on stringent specification of critical parameters and rigorous empirical testing.

Le funzioni del diritto -- I fini e i valori del diritto -- I mezzi e gli strumenti -- Le pratiche giuridiche -- Le trasformazioni del diritto --.

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

In a variety of synaesthesia, photisms result from affect-laden stimuli as emotional words, or faces of familiar people. For R, who participated in this study, the sight of a familiar person triggers a mental image of "a human silhouette filled with colour". Subjective descriptions of synaesthetic experiences induced by the visual perception of people's figures and faces show similarities with the reports of those who claim to possess the ability to see the aura. It has been proposed that the purported (...) auric perception may be easily explained by the presence of a specific subtype of cross-modal perception. We analyse the subjective reports of four synaesthetes who experience colours in response to human faces and figures. These reports are compared with descriptions of alleged auric phenomena found in the literature and with claims made by experts in esoteric spheres. The discrepancies found suggest that both phenomena are phenomenologically and behaviourally dissimilar. (shrink)

A menudo las fronteras académicas que nos definen y nos separan como investigadores, también delimitan nuestros trabajos hasta el punto de desconectarlos de manera acrítica de las realidades culturales que, por motivos múltiples y no siempre explícitos, nos proponemos estudiar, analizar, transformar, etc. Sabemos que las universidades, como el resto de instituciones sociales, han participado históricamente en el mantenimiento de las fronteras que construimos interesadamente los seres humanos al relacionarnos como tales, tanto a escala individual como colectiva: económicas, políticas, académicas, (...) familiares, personales, etc…. (shrink)

El artículo compara el modo como Aristóteles explica que un cuerpo llegue a vivir o que una mente llegue a entender, con el esquema explicativo que emplea Wittgenstein para dar cuenta de problemas como éstos: ¿qué hace posible que el signo adquiera significado, o que una acción sea el seguimiento de una regla? El interés se centra en la lógica de la explicación, y el propósito no es establecer relaciones de influencia, sino explorar analogías formales, con el objetivo de arrojar (...) luz sobre algunos conceptos centrales del pensamiento maduro de Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

Our analysis starts with a definition of emotions and how they work. We illustrate our discussion with examples, primarily related to anger. We devote special attention to the feelings that characterize our emotional experience, relying on ‘alexithymia’, a clinical condition, to argue for a perceptual theory of emotion in which emotional feelings are the means by which we identify and recognize our emotions. Finally, we consider the role of valence in the mechanism of the emotions, i.e. the way in which (...) emotions are generated, lead to the motivation to end/modify a situation that is perceived as negative or to prolong/reiterate a situation that is perceived as positive, and produce behaviours congruent with this motivation. Here we show that because emotions have multiple and ambiguous valences, one cannot rely on valence to determine, in abstraction, what motivation and behaviour a given emotion will trigger. (shrink)

Erasmo fue un gran re- novador de la teología a partir del estu- dio de la Sagrada Escritura y de los Pa- dres de la Iglesia mediante su redditio ad fontes. Esta tarea tiene una fecha de partida —la de preparación fue al me- nos de quince años— el annus mirabilis 1516 en el que publica su primera edi- ción del Nuevo Testamento o Novum Instrumentum y su hercúlea edición en nueve tomos de las obras completas u Opera omnia de (...) san Jerónimo. Dos hi- tos en su proyecto bíblico y patrístico que continuará a lo largo de sus últimos veinte años con la edición de más de una docena de Padres tanto griegos como latinos. No menos impor- tante es su labor de traductor —al latín obviamente— de Padres griegos como Crisóstomo, Basilio y Orígenes —aquí estudiados bles bien por ser las primeras en el pa- norama humanístico del siglo xvi bien por la calidad de su latín, que han me- recido figurar —el caso de Juan Crisós- tomo— aún bajo su nombre en la Pa- trología griega de Migne. En este ar- tículo asistimos a la búsqueda apasio- nada por parte de Erasmo de manuscri- tos para editar o traducir, al intercam- bio epistolar con humanistas e impreso- res, y al trabajo bien hecho hasta los úl- timos días de sus vida en su querida ciudad de Basilea, la de los impresores Froben, con la edición de Orígenes que preparaba para la Feria del Libro de Fráncfort —en otoño de 1536— a la que él no llegó —falleció el 12 de ju- lio— pero sí sus dos gruesos volúme- nes, hermoso legado póstumo. (shrink)

A partir del análisis de la obra La belleza ideal de Esteban de Arteaga se muestra cómo el autor representa, en el pensamiento español, un momento de enlace entre la estética del siglo XVIII y la del siglo XIX. Inmerso en un ambiente y tradición que interpreta racionalmente el gusto, pasará no obstante, a una comprensión subjetiva que se basa en el sentimiento. La obra se nos presenta, así, como un compendio de todos los problemas que se planteaban y debatían (...) en el siglo XVIII, tratados además de forma amena e interesante; al mismo tiempo que, intrínsecamente, es un intento de dar solución a esos problemas. Refleja también esas peculiares posiciones del exjesuita respecto a las cuestiones de su tiempo y, lo que puede ser más importante, con respecto a cuestiones aún no planteadas por su siglo que indican una sensibilidad próxima a tiempos posteriores a él. (shrink)

Crítica reformista e innovación sustantiva. Alcance y límites de los modelos normativos de deliberación para el análisis del presupuesto participativo de Porto Alegre.

La Fraternidad de la Flecha Dorada, fundada por la ocultista Maria de Naglowska en el París de 1932, fue una de las distintas órdenes mágicas de la Edad Contemporánea sobre las que se ha investigado en contextos relacionados con el satanismo, aunque en un número muy reducido de obras y nunca con demasiada profundidad. La fraternidad, que destacó por su sacerdocio exclusivamente femenino y el gran protagonismo de la magia sexual, se basaba en la particular e integradora visión teológica de (...) Naglowska, de carácter no dualista, que incluía una trinidad compuesta por Dios, Jesús y, por último, Satán. Sin embargo, ni Satán ni Lucifer ejercen el papel de figura central dentro de este sistema esotérico cuya autora tampoco parece haber ejercido algún tipo de influencia en las bases del fenómeno conocido como «satanismo contemporáneo». Expuesto este fondo, mi comunicación tendrá un objetivo doble: presentar los cimientos teóricos de la Fraternidad de la Flecha Dorada, así como algunos de los rituales destacados de esta orden, para, en segundo lugar, determinar su naturaleza y revisar, debido a las razones mencionadas, la etiqueta de «satanismo» que ha sobrevolado la misma, tratando de clasificarla. Para ello, centraré mi análisis en el marco de las Ciencias de las Religiones, más concretamente en el de los nuevos movimientos religiosos y el esoterismo occidental, abordando los textos de Maria de Naglowska utilizados por la fraternidad. Además, me apoyaré en investigaciones anteriores con el fin de recopilar los datos históricos necesarios para introducir a la orden y a su carismática suma sacerdotisa. (shrink)

La Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948 nació y tendió a la expansión del reconocimiento universal de la dignidad humana. Incorporando el pasado, tratando de comprender el sentido de la existencia e incluyendo al mundo en esa búsqueda, aspiró a lo categórico, a conocer la esencia, el valor intrínseco del ser humano, en relación con otros seres. Hoy, en su nombre, dada la actual ruptura con la tradición y la Historia, se ha extendido una nueva y paradójica concepción (...) de lo humano, emancipadora y homogeneizante. Clamando la reivindicación del “yo”, se ha producido una inconsistencia absoluta en la aplicación de la DUDH: no puede seguir llamándose universal una Carta subsumida y aplicada en un contexto radicalmente uniforme. (shrink)

Il concetto di "libertà" descrive uno dei valori fondamentali della società occidentale contemporanea. Tuttavia, sebbene tutti concordino circa la necessità di difendere la libertà, persone che incarnano convinzioni politiche, morali e sociali diverse interpretano la libertà in maniere differenti, se non perfino contrapposte. Nonostante queste evidenti divergenze, è opinione diffusa che questo concetto si caratterizzi alla sua base per una sorta di denominatore comune, a proposito del quale sussiste un’unanimità pervasiva e che delinea l’orizzonte di una comune battaglia. Questo studio (...) investiga questa opinione da un punto di vista cognitivo allo scopo di determinare come sia costituito e di quale informazione si componga il concetto astratto di “libertà”. La ricerca – che si rifà in parte alla teoria di G. Lakoff – identifica un nucleo cognitivo comune concreto del concetto e chiarisce come questo si contamini ideologicamente nel corso del suo sviluppo da concetto concreto a concetto astratto. Le conclusioni di questo studio evidenziano tuttavia come il nucleo universale del concetto sia eccessivamente indeterminato per costituire un denominatore comune politicamente rilevante che fornisca una base di accordo a proposito di un valore condiviso ed evidenzia alcuni limiti dell'impostazione data da Lakoff al problema, avanzando delle ipotesi per futuri sviluppi della ricerca su questi temi. (shrink)

_Abstract_: In this introduction to the thematic issue on _the future of the cognitive science(s)_, we examine how challenges and uncertainties surrounding the past and present of this discipline make it difficult to chart its future. We focus on two main questions. The first is whether cognitive science is a single unified field or inherently pluralistic. This question can be asked at various levels: First, with respect to the disciplines that should be included in the cognitive hexagon and their reciprocal (...) relationships: should we speak of cognitive science or of the cognitive sciences? Second, with regard to the conceptual and methodological changes (turns or revolutions) that have taken place within the cognitive project from its inception to the present day. Third, it pertains to cognitive psychology as a discipline. Before the emergence of cognitive science psychology was a fragmented discipline characterized by different traditions and approaches: has cognitive science been able to stem this fragmentation? Finally, we can question the unity of the cognitive architecture itself: is cognition produced by homogeneous or heterogenous mechanisms for information processing? We show that the issue of unity is addressed by several of the papers included in this thematic issue. In the second part of this introduction, we query the role that each component discipline should play in the cognitive project and in particular which should lead the project going forward, and why. Again, we show how this issue has been tackled by several articles featured in this collection. _Keywords_: Future of Cognitive Science; Cognitive Psychology; Pluralism and Cognitive Science; Philosophy and Cognitive Science; Fragmentation of Psychology _Quale futuro per la scienza cognitiva?_ _Riassunto_: In questa introduzione al fascicolo tematico dedicato al _futuro della scienza cognitiva_ prendiamo in considerazione sfide e incertezze che caratterizzano il passato e il presente di questa disciplina, rendendo difficile prevedere il suo futuro. Due le questioni principali su cui concentriamo l’attenzione. La prima: la scienza cognitiva è un ambito unitario o intrinsecamente pluralistico? Questo problema si manifesta a diversi livelli. In primo luogo, riguarda le discipline che dovrebbero comporre l’esagono cognitivo e le loro relazioni reciproche: dovremmo parlare di scienza cognitiva o di scienze cognitive? In secondo luogo, riguarda le trasformazioni (svolte o rivoluzioni) concettuali e metodologiche avvenute all’interno di questo progetto dalla sua nascita fino ai giorni nostri. In terzo luogo, riguarda la psicologia cognitiva. Prima della nascita della scienza cognitiva la psicologia era una disciplina frammentaria caratterizzata da diverse tradizioni e approcci: possiamo dire che la scienza cognitiva abbia posto rimedio a tale frammentazione? Infine, il problema dell’unità sorge anche in relazione all’architettura cognitiva stessa, considerando che la cognizione potrebbe o potrebbe non essere prodotta da meccanismi omogenei di elaborazione delle informazioni. Nella presentazione che segue si cerca di mostrare come l’unità, in tutte queste varianti, sia una questione affrontata da diversi articoli presenti in questo fascicolo tematico. Nella seconda parte di questa introduzione prendiamo in considerazione il problema del ruolo che ciascuna disciplina componente dovrebbe svolgere nel progetto cognitivo e, in particolare, quale dovrebbe guidare il progetto e perché, ponendo in evidenza come anche questa sia una questione centrale, tematizzata da diversi lavori presentati in questo fascicolo. _Parole chiave_: Futuro della scienza cognitiva; Psicologia cognitiva; Pluralismo e scienza cognitiva; Filosofia e scienza cognitiva; Frammentazione della psicologia. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be (...) rectified simply by replacing false beliefs with true ones. To address our misconceptions, we must rather act on the system of beliefs that supports them. In the first step of our analysis, we distinguish between misconceptions that are easy to dispel because they represent simple errors that occur against the background of a correct explanatory apparatus and misconceptions that are, on the contrary, very difficult to dispel because they are the product of pseudo explanations. We show that, in the latter case, misconceptions constitute an integral part of an incorrect explanation and the reasons that support such misconceptions are deeply misleading. In the second step, we discuss various approaches that have been adopted to address the problem of misconceptions. Challenging the notion that directly addressing and criticizing specific misconceptions is an effective approach, we propose that critical thinking is the most fruitful means to deal with misconceptions. We define the core competences and knowledge relevant for the practice of critical thinking and discuss how they help us avoid misconceptions that arise from accepting beliefs that form part of a mistaken explanation. (shrink)

Software vulnerabilities are the root cause for a multitude of security problems in computer systems. Owing to their efficiency and tight control over low-level system resources, the C and C++ programming languages are extensively used for a myriad of purposes, from implementing operating system kernels to user-space applications. However, insufficient or improper memory management frequently leads to invalid memory accesses, eventually resulting in memory corruption vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are used as a foothold for elaborated attacks that bypass existing defense methods. (...) In this paper, we summarise the main memory safety violation types (i.e. memory errors), and analyse how they are exploited by attackers and the main mitigation methods proposed in the research community. We further systematise the most relevant techniques with regards to memory corruption identification in current programs. (shrink)

Adults (more than 18 years old) are likely to reproduce the habits that they acquired during childhood and adolescence (from 6 to 16 years old). For that reason, teachers and parents have the responsibility to promote an active and healthy lifestyle in children and adolescents. Even though every school subject should promote healthy activities, Physical Education (PE) is the most important subject to foster well-being habits associated to healthy lifestyle during sport practice and other kinds of active tasks. Indeed, there (...) are many factors that influence the acquisition of healthy habits that should be taken into account when programs and activities are implemented in both educational and extracurricular context. In this sense, psychological and social factors are of utmost importance to achieve optimal experiences for an active and healthy lifestyle. However, due to the myriad of studies analyzing different factors in different contexts, there could be confusion when programs and pedagogical strategies are applied in educational or extracurricular contexts. The objective of this investigation is to analyze the state of art of the psychosocial factors which influence the engagement in physical activities and sport practice. The keywords used in this review were mainly: ‘Self-Determination Theory’, ‘motivation’, ‘Psychological need satisfaction, ‘physical activity and sport engagement’, ‘Elementary Education’, ‘Secondary Education’, ‘Physical Education’. The articles were selected according to the following criteria: (a) peer-reviewed original research published in international journals indexed in JCR or SJR, (b) published in English or Spanish, (c) about psychosocial factors which influence the physical activity and sport engagement, (b) in educational or extracurricular context. Research articles selected were found through nine databases. It was observed that physical activities and sport practice engagement are closely related to psychological factors. In particularly, intrinsic motivation was able to determine the active participation in any activity, including physical activity and sport practice during the implementation of Small-Sided Games and other kinds of pedagogical strategies (e.g., Pedagogical Models). Motivation was also closely related to flow state. Finally, these variables should be considered in order to organize effective programs to promote an active and healthy lifestyle in Physical Education classes. (shrink)

We examined how children’s strategy choices in solving complex subtraction problems are related to grade and to variations in problem complexity. In two studies, third- and fifth-grade children (N≈160 each study) solved multi-digit subtraction problems (e.g., 34 - 18) and described their solution strategies. In the first experiment, strategy selection was investigated by means of a free-choice paradigm, whereas in the second study a discrete-choice approach was implemented. In both experiments, analyses of strategy repertoire indicated that third-grade children were more (...) likely to report less-efficient strategies (i.e., counting) and relied more on the right-to-left solution algorithm compared to fifth-grade children who more often used efficient memory-based retrieval and conceptually-based left-to-right (i.e., decomposition) strategies. Nevertheless, all strategies were reported or selected by both older and younger children and strategy use varied with problem complexity and presentation format for both age groups. These results supported the overlapping waves model of strategy development and provide detailed information about patterns of strategy choice on complex subtraction problems. (shrink)

In order to properly distinguish between pastoral and psychotherapeutic counseling, one must clarify both the interpretive presuppositions underlying each of these professional practices and their respective societal contexts. As a common ground for both kinds of practice, at least insofar as they maintain a distance from the usual medical-scientific model of therapeutic intervention, an ontology of playing is recommended. More precisely, in order for counseling to truly come “into play,” any latent neo-pastoral power discourses must be critically exposed. Psychoanalytic counseling (...) is characterized by rules of abstinence and neutrality as well as by attention to unconscious dynamics, especially those of transference and countertransference. Pastoral counseling, even when it takes place outside of the Ignatian exercises, can still orient itself toward the Ignatian model of spiritual accompaniment, thus requiring a discernment of spirits and a reference to transcendence. Both pastoral and psychotherapeutic counseling can profit from each other. Both must be evaluated in terms of whether, in the course of an authentic communication, they succeed in proposing what truly profits the person seeking advice. All of this applies with special urgency to bioethical decision making and conflict resolution: Persons seeking pastoral advice desire an authentic exposition of the values of the Gospel and their church community in order to reach a well-founded conclusion in conscience. Other persons (or even the same ones) seeking psychotherapeutic help in a bioethical conflict situation desire an empathetic mirroring back of the biographic background framing their decision and of possible psychic consequences that may ensue from their acting accordingly. (shrink)

Ever since its beginning, Christianity ascribed an important role to care for bodily and psychic suffering. Up to modernity, psychological assistance was closely connected with theology. In modern times, philosophy and theology began to distance themselves from metaphysics and transcendence, thus opening the path for a purely psychological interpretation of religion and of religious life (cf. Kant, Schleiermacher). The founders of important psychological schools (Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, Erich Fromm, Fritz Perls, and Carl Rogers) offered purely naturalistic interpretations of (...) the human condition and discounted transcendence. Today, pastoral psychology is situated in a field of tension between a purely naturalistic psychology and openness to a spiritual dimension and to man’s vocation for transcendence. What those recent psychological schools contribute is important for a deeper understanding of man, but it remains merely partial as long as his spiritual dimension is disregarded. (shrink)

Memory, funerals, and the communion of the saints: growing old and practices of remembering / M. Therese Lysaught -- God bends over backward to accommodate humankind...while the Civil Rights Acts and the Americans with Disabilities Act require [only] minimum effort / Mary Jo Iozzio -- Radical solidarity: migration as challenge ofr contemporary Christian ethics / Kristin E. Heyer -- Catholic lesbian feminist theology / Mary E. Hunt -- Theology of whose body? Sexual conplementarity, intersex conditions, and La Virgen de Guadalupe (...) / Katie M. Grimes -- Social conscience and politics in the United States of America: reflections / Mary Jo Bane -- Pope Francis, women, and the church for the poor / Lisa A. Fullam -- Floodwaters and the ticking clock: the systematic oppression and stigmatization of poor, single mothers in American and Christian theological responses / Julie A. Mavity Maddalena --What causes inequity? / Dean Baker -- Engaging the U.S. Bishops' pastoral on crime and criminal justice: from atomism to community justice / Robert DeFina and Lance Hannon -- Reconstructing the moral claim of racially unjust mass incarceration / Alison Benders -- The systemic erasure of the Black/dark-skinned body in Catholic ethics / Bryan Massingale -- Anti-blackness and white supremacy in the making of American Catholicism / M. Shawn Copeland -- White privilege / Charles E. Curran -- The Black Lives Matter Movement: justice and health equity / Michael P. Jaycox -- Mujerista theology: a challenge to traditional theology / Ada María Isasi-Díaz -- Faith of our mothers; Catholic womanist God-talk / Diana L. Hayes. (shrink)

The foundation of the Christian counselling movement -- Christian counselling in the UK -- The aims of Christian counselling -- Integrating psychological and biblical truth -- Sigmund Freud--the founding father of psychotherapy -- The individual psychology of Alfred Adler -- Abraham Maslow--the man with new age tendencies -- Carl Rogers--a man who believed in himself -- Albert Ellis--the aggressive atheist -- The Bible's verdict on psychological 'truth' -- The case against Larry Crabb -- Self-esteem: the secular foundation -- Self-esteem and (...) the Christian counselling movement -- Self-esteem dogma in the light of scripture. (shrink)