L'A. souhaite apporter des rectifications à propos des remarques de P. Yannopoulos sur la Vie de S. Fantin. Le voyage d'Athènes à Larissa a du être accompli par voie terrestre et non pas par bateau. Fantin et ses amis ne venaient pas directement d'Italie, mais de la rive orientale de l'Adriatique. A Larissa, Fantin prophétise la conquête de la ville par les ennemis puis descendit au bord de la mer où il embarqua pour Thessalonique. Ces remarques voudraient contribuer à une (...) meilleure appréciation de cette Vita à la fois si riche d'informations et si mystérieuse par ses silences. (shrink)

The papers in Richard Vallée's Words and Contents span twenty-one years. The author navigates the discovery and exploration of different expressions and perspectives on language in this volume. Beginning with referring expressions and later addressing context sensitivity, the book examines how specific words contribute to the contents of utterances and the philosophical issues that surround them.

The paper considers the recently published British Medical Association Guidance on ethical issues arising in relation to rationing of treatment during the COVID-19 Pandemic. It considers whether it...

We investigate the way physical laws objectively refer to the entities they are about. Laws of mathematical physics do not refer directly to the “real world” but to an ideal specific domain of objects, which we term “scope”. In order to find out which real objects physical laws deal with, reference to the scope is not sufficient. We need in addition the search for domains to which laws apply — i. e. “empirical domains”— in order to establish their reference to (...) the “real world”. It is just in such empirical domains that we are able to discover the real entities physical laws objectively refer to. “Physical reality” turns out to be not something “given” but rather something “to come out” of the very process of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

On history of Buddhist philosophy; contributed articles.

[The Catcher in the Rye's] catalogue of characters, incidents, expressions could be extended indefinitely, all of them suggesting that Holden's sickness of soul is something deeper than economic or political, that his revulsion at life is not limited to social and monetary inequities, but at something in the nature of life itself - the decrepitude of the aged, the physical repulsiveness of the pimpled, the disappearance and dissolution of the dead, the terrors of sex, the hauntedness of human aloneness, the (...) panic of individual isolation. Headlines about Korea, Dean Acheson, and the cold war seem, if not irrelevant, essentially wide of the mark - if we define the mark as the heart and soul of Catcher. James E. Miller, Jr., author of "Henry James in Reality" and numerous books and articles on American literature, responds in this essay to Carol and Richard Ohmann's "Reviewers, Critics, and The Catcher in the Rye. The Ohmann's answer will appear in our summer issue. (shrink)

E. Rae Harcum argues that Christians do not have to give up their religious faith to keep the contributions of science. He confronts the relation between the human body and its non-material parts—the mind and spirit—and provides a way of looking at these metaphysical issues.

1.1. Universitet. Chto on myslit? -- 1.2. Universitet. Chto on mozhet? -- 1.3. ... i chego ne mozhet? -- 2.1. Nauka. Zachem ėto nuzhno? -- 2.2. Obrazovanie. Kakoe obrazovanie? -- 2.3. Akademicheskie vobody. Dli︠a︡ chego? -- Zakli︠u︡chenie -- Chto pochitatʹ ob Universitete?

Let’s say that you are omniprescient iff you always believe—occurrently and with maximal confidence—all and only truths, including ones about the future. Several philosophers have argued that an omniprescient being couldn’t engage in certain kinds of activity.[1] In what follows, I present and assess the most promising such argument I know of—what I’ll call the Serious Deliberation Argument (SDA). It concludes that omniprescience rules out serious deliberation—i.e., trying to choose between incompatible courses of action once you know that none is (...) conclusively favored by your reasons.[2] The SDA—which (I’ll argue) should disturb many traditional theists—derives from an argument due to Tomis Kapitan[3]; and my favored objection to the SDA—roughly: that it fails because dependent on the alleged incompatibility of omniprescience and freedom—superficially resembles a reply to Kapitan’s argument due to David Hunt.[4] Along the way, then, I’ll briefly discuss Kapitan’s argument, and Hunt’s reply, to show how they differ from the SDA and my favored objection to it. I begin by presenting the Serious Deliberation Argument. (shrink)

There has been apparently a universal agreement among commentators on Antigone that either Sophocles was wrong in having the early sun rise over Dirke, west of Thebes, or that he chose Dirke rather than Ismenos, which flows to the east, as the most representative waterbed. But, curiously enough, they fail to realize that Sophocles nowhere in the above passage mentions the sun, but rather the sunlight, , eyelid, may not necessarily mean but eyelashes, i.e. the outward-bound sunbeams.

Este ensaio pretende levantar as seguintes questões: 1. de que modo é possível reconstituir o sentido de moral segundo um amor-próprio cujo conteúdo é dado menos por um isolamento ou negaçáo do outro do que por um trabalho pessoal sobre si mesmo, em vista de um êthos , de uma ética? 2. em que medida o valor da moral hoje em dia pode ser deslocado da lei universal para uma atitude de diferença, da normalidade do comportamento para o cultivo de (...) si e, por fim, da verdade sobre o sujeito para uma subjetivaçáo ascética que náo exige a prerrogativa de uma identidade, mas a transformaçáo de si na relaçáo consigo e com os outros? Tais questões sáo levantadas a partir de Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault e Fernando Savater. Palavras-chave: Amor-próprio, Estética da existência, Ética, Identidade. (shrink)

That accent as well as quantity plays a certain rô1e in the structure of early Latin dramatic verse is no new doctrine. It has been present in some form or other to the minds of most writers on Plautine and Terentian prosody since the time of Bentley, who in his Schediasma de metris Terentianis laid the foundations of modern research into this somewhat thorny subject. Unfortunately, however, the question has been complicated from the very first by the introduction of a (...) third term into the discussion, viz. the term ictus, with the result that the fundamental issue has been obscured and to some extent side-tracked. Bentley was himself responsible for this result; for it was he who introduced into his text of Terence those ictus-marks which have figured in most texts of Plautus and Terence down to the present day. And his whole theory of Terentian verse was dominated by the postulate that it was delivered on the stage with a stress of the voice falling rhythmically on the ‘rise’ of each foot: e.g. Malúm quod ísti dí deaéque omnés duínt. (shrink)

M. Tullius Cicero was the first among the Roman thinkers, who made the pro_blematic of culture and civilization his serious concern. His investigations led him to the belief that the culture, seen as a whole of traditions, norms and values, is in_separable from artes, i. e. the spiritual phenomena in science and art. From his awarness of the necesssity to create the Roman culture in this sense of inseparability resulted his ambitious philosophical project: the Romans should accept the spiritual experience (...) of the Greeks and develop it in philosophical writings in Latin language. To all doubts and prejudices hostile to this intention he thus responded by philosophical and linguistic writings based on his conviction, that the Latin language is able to express even the most complicated philosophical ideas and concepts and that the human interaction is possible. (shrink)

J. P lonka at WSP in Opole, in 1980 and 1981. We shall consider algebras o type : T ! N; E, R, S denote the set of all identities of type and the set of all regular identities of type , respectively . If is a set of identities of type , then E() denotes the set of all identities which can be proved from ; R() = \ R, S() = \ S. denotes the variety generated by . (...) Similarly, for a given variety V of algebras of type we shall consider varieties R and S dened by the set R of all regular identities satised in V and the set S of all symmetric identities satised in V , respectively. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to analyze succinctly the concept of faith through the very penetrating gaze of the Danish philosopher Sören Kierkegaard. Faith is analyzed by Kierkegaard from absurdity, resignation and the paradox of faith. In the same way, his concept of faith is carved with a chisel that would complete all his philosophy, that is, to touch human reality away from any abstract thought, trying at all times that his examination be seen on a personal dimension in (...) his rigorously individual coret. (shrink)