Lorazepam has been repeatedly shown to induce memory impairments. The effects of this benzodiazepine on the processes involved in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy have not as yet been explored. An experimental procedure that delineates the role of monitoring and control processes was used. Fifteen lorazepam and 15 placebo subjects were examined using a semantic memory task that combined both a forced- and a free-report option and a no-incentive and an incentive condition. Memory accuracy was lower in the lorazepam (...) than in the placebo group. Lorazepam impaired control sensitivity (the extent to which volunteering of answers is affected by the confidence judgments). While the absolute aspect of monitoring was impaired (calibration scores), both the discriminative aspect (the ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect answers) and the response criterion setting (the confidence threshold set for volunteering a report) were spared. The pharmacological dissociation between monitoring effectiveness and control sensitivity indicates that these two components involve distinct processes. (shrink)

English summary: Antonio Pellizzari (1747-1845) completed his Italian translation of Francis Bacons De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum in hopes that it would prove useful for Italian youth. It would remain unpublished for two centuries, partly because Bacons work had been place on the Churchs Index of prohibited books. The present edition offers a reproduction of the original manuscript as well as a thorough historical analysis of the translator in his chronological and intellectual context. Italian description: La prima traduzione italiana del (...) De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum (1623) di Francis Bacon e rimasta inedita per due secoli: il traduttore, il canonico trevigiano Antonio Pellizzari (1747-1845), aveva gia dato alle stampe la prima versione italiana del Novum organum (1788) e, ammiratore del filosofo inglese, si era deciso all' impresa di tradurre la piu vasta opera baconiana, con il titolo di Della dignita e degli aumenti delle scienze, convinto che quest' opera avrebbe giovato pur qualche poco la gioventu italiana. Il manoscritto della traduzione, completo di note ed indici, pronto per la stampa, rimase inedito per le lungaggini dovute alla necessaria richiesta dell'imprimatur al S. Uffizio: l' opera infatti era stata messa all' Indice dalla Sacra Congregazione (nel 1669) con la formula donec corrigatur; l' autorizzazione giunse, firmata dal Prefetto dell' Indice Angelo Maj, nel 1847, due anni dopo la morte del pur longevo Antonio Pellizzari. In questo volume si pubblica una trascrizione annotata del manoscritto 1408 del Della dignita e degli aumenti delle scienze conservato nella Biblioteca Comunale di Treviso, corredata, sulla base di carteggi inediti e di fondi manoscritti talora considerati perduti, di una ricostruzione storica della figura del traduttore, inserito nel piu ampio contesto della cultura veneta fra Settecento e Ottocento, segmento significativo per la storia della diffusione della filosofia moderna. (shrink)

I. Introduction In 1966 two sociologists, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, published a small yet influential book, titled The Social Construction of Reality, in which they argue that reality is socially constructed and that it is the task of the sociology of knowledge to analyze the process in which this occurs (1966: 1). They acknowledge in their Introduction that “reality” and “knowledge” are two terms with a long philosophical history, and they are careful to claim they are not using (...) t... (shrink)

In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised (...) rigorously and two models are provided that demonstrate that the new thesis is indeed tenable within a standard possible world semantics based on selection functions. Unlike the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics the selection functions cannot be understood in terms of similarity. A probabilistic account of selection is defended in its place. -/- I end the paper by suggesting that this approach overcomes some of the objections often leveled at accounts of indicatives based on the notion of similarity. (shrink)

My task in Beyond Liberal Democracy in Schools was to develop a relational, pluralistic social political theory that moves beyond liberal democracy. I find Dewey is a key source to help us find our way out of liberal democracy’s assumptions and show us how to move on. He offers us the possibilities of moving beyond individualism, with his theory of social transaction and he shows us how to move beyond rationalism in his arguments for truths as warranted assertions. A transactional (...) description of selves-in-relation-with-others describes us as becoming individuals out of our social settings. At the same time that we are becoming individuals within a social setting, we are continually affecting that social setting. Individuals are not aggregates with separate boundaries that have no relation to one another. In fact, the ‘self’ is fictive, and contingent. Our ‘selves’ are multifarious and fractured, due to repressive forces imposed upon us by others as well as supportive forces offered to us by others. Others bind us and help us become free at the same time. The democratic theory I develop is a radical democratic theory that represents feminist and multicultural concerns. This theory is radical because of my efforts to present an anti-racist theory that critiques basic foundational-level assumptions embedded within both individualism and collectivism. The theory moves beyond modernism and critical theory as it seeks to address postmodern concerns of power and exclusionary practice without appealing to grand narratives such as Reason, the Scientific Method, or Dialogue. I follow Dewey’s social transactional lead and describe our world as one that is pluralistic, relational, and in process as we continually contribute to the on-going constructing of knowing. I argue, in agreement with Dewey , that a democracy is a mode of associated living, not just a view of political democracy, and that it needs to be struggled for on all fronts, with all our social institutions, including: political, economic, educational, scientific, artistic, religious, and familial. This comprehensive view of democracy is consistent with the transactional relational assumption I describe, for it recognizes that social institutions are no more autonomous and separate from each other than individuals are separate from each other. For this essay, I explore education’s role in helping us understand how connected we all are to each other, moving us closer to living in a world we may someday call a democracy. (shrink)

Das Novum Organum (1620), das zentrale Hauptwerk der berühmten Instauratio Magna (Große Erneuerung der Wissenschaften) Francis Bacons (1561-1626), markiert den radikalen Bruch der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft mit den antiken und mittelalterlichen Traditionen des Denkens. Methodische "Forschung" sowie "Fortschritt" und soziale "Wohlfahrt" als Erkenntniszweck - das sind die Grundthemen, denen Bacon erstmals Bestimmtheit gab.

Recent studies have shown that schizophrenia may be a disease affecting the states of consciousness. The present study is aimed at investigating metamemory, i.e., the knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, in patients with schizophrenia. The accuracy of the Confidence level (CL) in the correctness of the answers provided during a recall phase, and the predictability of the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) when recall fails were measured using a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Nineteen outpatients (...) were paired with 19 control subjects with respect to age, sex, and education. Results showed that patients with schizophrenia exhibited an impaired semantic memory. CL ratings as well as CL and FOK accuracy were not significantly different in the schizophrenic and the control groups. However, FOK ratings were significantly reduced for the patient group, and discordant FOK judgments were also observed more frequently. Such results suggest that FOK judgments are impaired in patients with schizophrenia, which confirms that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by an impaired conscious awareness of one's own knowledge. (shrink)

From Parmenides to the present, philosophers have been attracted by characterizations of being as being uttered or utterable, formulated or formulable. But what for Parmenides was presumably a valid co-entailment between antecedently understood concepts reappears in contemporary thought as a proffered explication of what it is to be. Without presuming to discredit Parmenidean views in general, my purpose here is to examine certain members of a modern family of theories of existence that fall into place around Quine’s. Depending on the (...) methodology of explication espoused, the theories in this family are either semantic commentaries on ideal languages, or they are themselves interpreted formalized languages. The former may be called, after Quine, theories of ontological commitment. The theories of the latter sort I wish to consider are called, after Karel Lambert, free logics, i.e., logic systems the singular terms of which are free of existential import. My conclusion about theories of both kinds is that, while unexceptionable on their own terms, from a broader point of view they beg the question of what it is to be. In arguing that these theories thus fail to clarify the concept of existence, I believe I am not so much propounding a new insight as articulating an objection many thinkers have felt in the face of views akin to Quine’s. (shrink)

Das Novum Organum (1620), das zentrale Hauptwerk der berühmten Instauratio Magna (Große Erneuerung der Wissenschaften) Francis Bacons (1561-1626), markiert den radikalen Bruch der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft mit den antiken und mittelalterlichen Traditionen des Denkens. Methodische "Forschung" sowie "Fortschritt" und soziale "Wohlfahrt" als Erkenntniszweck - das sind die Grundthemen, denen Bacon erstmals Bestimmtheit gab.

Das Novum Organum (1620), das zentrale Hauptwerk der berühmten Instauratio Magna (Große Erneuerung der Wissenschaften) Francis Bacons (1561-1626), markiert den radikalen Bruch der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft mit den antiken und mittelalterlichen Traditionen des Denkens. Methodische "Forschung" sowie "Fortschritt" und soziale "Wohlfahrt" als Erkenntniszweck - das sind die Grundthemen, denen Bacon erstmals Bestimmtheit gab.

Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...) salient is the probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The biggest challenge to this thesis comes from the 'static' triviality arguments developed by Stalnaker, Hajek and Hall. It is argued that these arguments rely on invalid principles of conditional logic and that the thesis is consistent with a reasonably strong logic that does not include the principles in question. (shrink)

My aim has been to adapt Quine's criterion of the ontological commitment of theories couched in standard quantificational idiom to a much broader class of theories by focusing on the set-theoretic structure of the models of those theories. For standard first-order theories, the two criteria coincide on simple entities. Divergences appear as they are applied to higher-order theories and as composite entities are taken into account. In support of the extended criterion, I appeal to its fruits in treating the various (...) examples considered above and to the healthy intuitions of the non-noneists among us. Don't O(m) and E(m) comprise just the things we should have though existed according to a particular interpretation m of a language or a theory? Whatever the answer (and it will hardly be unanimous), I hope to have pointed the way towards a recognition of ontology as a worthwhile branch of modern theory. (shrink)

1. Anderson and Belnap's most explicit characterization of the fallacy of modality is as follows: "Modal fallacies arise when it is claimed that entailments follow from, or are entailed by, contingent propositions." The view which Nelson attributes to Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand, is "that necessary propositions are entailed only by necessary ones, never by contingent ones." Anderson and Belnap speak of "entailments," whereas Nelson generalizes to "necessary propostitions." The move is far from innocent, as we shall see. (...) For though Anderson and Belnap hold that every true entailment is a necessary proposition, not every necessary proposition is an entailment. In order to grasp the implications of this distinction more clearly, let us see how Anderson and Belnap's statement of the modal fallacy might legitimately be restated in terms of necessity. To that end we must draw a related distinction between necessary propositions and necessity propositions. A expresses a necessary proposition iff A → A → A holds. A expresses a necessity proposition iff A is of the form B → C. The particular form of these definitions is dependent on the fact that entailment rather than necessity is primitive in Anderson and Belnap's system; the forms in parentheses are the equivalents in terms of necessity. Now it follows from these definitions that every entailment is a necessity proposition and that every necessity proposition is an entailment. The modal fallacy may thus be equivalently characterized as the claim that a necessity proposition is entailed by a contingent proposition. That this is different from Nelson's formulation is clear from the following considerations. First, not every necessary proposition is a necessity proposition; example: "Either it is raining or it is not raining." Second, not every necessity proposition is a necessary proposition; example: any false necessity proposition. Thus the possibility is left open that some necessary proposition might be entailed by a contingent one. This is exactly the case with Nelson's example 2, "That every polychromatic surface is red entails that every polychromatic surface is colored." This might well be a theorem in a suitable extension of E. Such cases do not, however, arise among the theorems of EI. In that limited system, all that a contingent proposition can entail is itself. (shrink)

Aeschines of Sphettus.--Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates.--Forms and numbers: a study in Platonic metaphysics.--The philosophy of Proclus.--The analysis of [Epistémé] in Plato's seventh epistle.--St. Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher.--Francis Bacon.--Some features of Bulter's ethics.--David Hume and the miraculous.--Knowing and believing.--Is goodness a quality?

Dialogues, by Plato.--Nichomachean ethics, by Aristotle.--Novum organum, by Francis Bacon.--Principles of philosophy, by René Descartes.--Ethics, by Baruch Spinoza.--An essay concerning human understanding, by John Locke.--The critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant.--The world as will and idea, by Arthur Schopenhauer.--Beyond good and evil, by F. W. Nietzsche.--Pragmatism, by William James.--Creative evolution, by Henri Bergson.

This book is a eulogy of Sir Francis Bacon and of his ostensible prophetic insight into the nature of knowledge; it attempts to reinstate him in a position of relevance to contemporary times. Bacon is cast as an innovator in the history of ideas for having espoused experiment and inductive knowledge rather than "scholastic system building." The booklet, however, evokes the uneasy feeling that, according to the author, almost any significant thinker of the past would be just as (...) relevant in facing the "modern dilemma." The reader searches in vain for an explanation of why Bacon ignored the possibility of a mathematically-based philosophy-something, being of no little significance to the development of modern science, that Eiseley needs to consider if his contention is to be persuasive.—C. E. B. (shrink)

'dealing with a special problem and limited in its proof. . .shows how Aristotelian Bacon was in his methodology'; Vickers 1992, 505 dislikes intensely.

For--whatever our eventual sphere of control--the realm of fact is there first and always for our docility. Observ- ing is mental submission. Bacon is right: to master nature we must first obey her. Facts are to be received, learned, set in order: but who will say they are to be understood? They cannot be deduced: they are what they are. Here we meet the problem of these lectures. If man is to fathom his destiny, not to say guide it, (...) must his thinking not penetrate world fact as well as world law? And is this possible? (shrink)

Art, Mimesis and the Avant-Garde explores the relationship between art and philosophy. Andrew Benjamin argues for a reworking of the task of philosophy in terms of the centrality of ontology. It is in relation to this centrality, understood through the differences between modes of being, that art, mimesis, and the avant-garde come to be presented. A fundamental part of this book is the original interpretations of important contemporary painters and their themes: Lucian Freud's self-portraits, Francis Bacon 's use of (...) mirrors, R. B. Kitaj and Jewish identity, Anselm Kiefer and iconoclasm. Apart from painting, Benjamin considers architecture, literature, and the philosophical writings of Walter Benjamin and Descartes in elaborating the various aspects of ontological difference. Benjamin develops the theory of the avant-garde as a philosophical category rather than a historical marker, thus bringing the worlds of contemporary art criticism and contemporary philosophy closer together. (shrink)

Error is a neglected epistemological category in the history of science. This neglect has been driven by the commonsense idea that its elimination is a general good, which often renders it invisible or at least not worth noticing. At the end of the sixteenth century across Europe, medicine increasingly focused on “popular errors,” a genre where learned doctors addressed potential patients to disperse false belief about treatments. By the mid-seventeenth century, investigations into popular error informed the working methodology of natural (...) philosophers, rather than just physicians. In 1646, Thomas Browne published Pseudodoxia Epidemica, a large volume on popular error. Despite Browne’s formal training as a physician, this work examined only a few medical errors and instead aspired to be an encyclopedia of error. Pseudodoxia Epidemica was highly popular, running to six editions, and was known by the Fellows of the Royal Society. Influenced by Browne, alongside Bacon’s theory of the idols, natural philosophic practice in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century developed a focus on error that revised traditional attention to the discovery of knowledge. Fellows such as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke proposed new ways to secure truth under the far-reaching influence of Bacon’s refutations of “natural human reason” distorted by false idols, of syllogistic logic, and of “theories,” his label for traditional philosophical systems that bias thought toward falsity. In three parts, this article traces the progression in early modern scientific approaches to handling error, and especially medical error – from physicians’ efforts to identify and eradicate it through collaborative effort, to the striking tension in Browne’s work between seeking to eliminate error while also showing a marked tolerance for it, to the Royal Society’s Baconian objective of instrumentalizing error to find truth. Error emerges as its own epistemic category that serves as a driving force toward knowledge production. (shrink)

The main thrust of this book, novel and yet convincing, is that medieval philosophy cannot be studied without noting the importance its participants paid to political matters. The selections are mostly whole sections of different works, thus enabling the reader to form his own judgments without fear that he is reading the philosophical interpretations of the editors. Writings of al-Fârâbî, Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, Abravenel, Aquinas, Roger Bacon and Dante are among the twenty-five entries.--C. E. B.

For thirty years at least, I have designated myself as a zoologist interested in the “philosophical aspects of biology”. But I have now to admit that not until within the last two or three years have I recognized that logic, particularly in its inductive aspect, is involved in such interest.For me as a zoologist with a predilection for natural history, observation has had a place of wide application and of implicit confidence. Until recently, I had rested in the supposition that (...) after all of the devices practiced by naturalists to insure certainty of their observations, nothing further was needed so far as the information and understanding they gained was concerned. I had gone ahead with my reasoning, my logic, with no more qualms about the trustworthiness of the “inductive” than of the “deductive” side of it. I had not taken seriously the assertion, made years ago in my hearing by an eminent philosopher, that no one can be a philosopher without being skeptical and critical of the use of his senses in getting knowledge. Latterly, however, I have come to see that traditional philosophers take themselves very seriously in such assertions. This realization has been due to the discovery that the recent advances in physics and mathematics have led most of the leaders in these fields to believe that observation and the inductive side of logic may be left where they were a hundred years ago. These scientists seem to be about where John Stuart Mill was in his effort to improve Lord Bacon's effort for a better understanding of both observation and induction. (shrink)

Includes the introductory sections of the Great Instauration and the essay "Preparative Toward a Natural and Experimental History," with a fine introduction covering Bacon's life, times, and work. -- A. E. F.

Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism explores the multi-faceted and formative impact of Gilles Deleuze on the development and our understanding of modernist thought in its philosophical, literary, and more broadly cultural manifestations. Gilles Deleuze himself rethought philosophical history with a series of books and essays on individual philosophers such as Kant, Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, and Bergson and authors such as Proust, Kafka, Beckett and Woolf, on the one hand, and Bacon, Messiaen, and Pollock, among others, in other arts. This volume (...) acknowledges Deleuze's profound impact on a century of art and thought and the origin of that impact in his own understanding of modernism. Understanding Deleuze, Understanding Modernism begins by "conceptualizing" Deleuze by offering close readings of some of his most important works. The contributors offer new readings that illuminate the context of Deleuze's work, either by reading one of Deleuze's texts against or in the context of his entire body of work or by challenging Deleuze's readings of other philosophers. A central section on Deleuze and his aesthetics maps the relationships between Deleuze's thought and modernist literature. The volume's final section features an extended glossary of Deleuze's key terms, with each definition having its own expert contributor. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn 1651, Alexander Ross published an attack on Thomas Browne's Pseudodoxia Epidemica, Bacon's Natural History and William Harvey's De generatione. Ross's work, Arcana Microcosmi, defended Aristotelian natural philosophy against the ‘new philosophy’ that figures like Bacon, Harvey and Browne represented. Though Ross's attacks on these authors make up no more than half of the treatise’s contents, the book’s paratextual materials emphasise scientific debate. While Ross's authorial approach advocates reading exclusively ancient authorities for the sake of glossing and transmitting (...) their knowledge to a wider public, in order to argue against the new philosophy Ross must engage with its textual production. Furthermore, his works advertise their focus on Bacon, Harvey and Browne, which would have attracted a readership drawn to new scientific approaches to knowledge formation. Ross's polemic represents an effort to model his devotion to ancient authority while also generating a reading public that would resist the new approach to reading that the new philosophy proposed. (shrink)