The theory of intentionality is the most important core of the theoretical inheritance of E. Husserl’s phenomenology. Starting from this awareness, Levinas carries out a deep research within the phenomenology in order to see whether «intentionality exhausts modalities in which the thought is meaningful». This paper will try to show how the French-Lituan philosopher, going over the genetic phenomenology research which comes to a precategorial issue, can point out the «pre-intentional», or better the «non-intentional», the original «passivity» of conscience which (...) is not the negation of subjectivity, but instead the possibility of «giving» of transcendency. This «would not be a missed immanency», but would have in sociality – responsibility of the neighbour – the own spiritual excellency, which is the perfection of God. (shrink)

Il «nuovo» pensiero non è più cronologicamente nuovo ad oltre ottant’anni dalla sua nascita e, tuttavia, forse oggi manifesta un carattere di novità e di urgenza maggiore di allora, come si suol dire una «rinascita» che giustifica l’interrogativo sul suo «futuro». La particolare situazione in cui ci troviamo a pensare e soprattutto a vivere, le nuove domande che le mutate condizioni storico-culturali pongono alla filosofia, possono trovare un modello di risposta se ci si volge indietro a quella particolare stagione della (...) filosofia tedesca che abbraccia i primi tre decenni del Novecento e che fu tragicamente strozzata e azzittita dal nazionalsocialismo. Non si tratta di affermare un ysteron-proteron, sarebbe troppo semplicistico, decisamente acritico e storicamente e filosoficamente inaccettabile. Accade però, nella storia, che dei fermenti non riescano a produrre frutti perché la temperie del tempo non lo permette oppure perché «inattuali», non pienamente adeguati al tempo, e rimangono quindi latenti finché non si verificano le condizioni ottimali per il loro sviluppo, divenendo in tal modo «adeguati » al tempo. È appunto quanto si è verificato con tutti gli autori che si ritrovano accomunati da un «dialogisches Prinzip», se vogliamo riprendere l’espressione di Martin Buber e che si è concretizzato nelle varie figure rappresentative e nei vari pensatori a cui lo stesso Rosenzweig farà riferimento nel suo breve excursus storico, come, neues Denken, Begegnungsphilosophie, Beziehungsphilosophie, Sprachdenken. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, Gaus’ ground for the ideal of persons as free and equal is described. Doubts are raised about the appropriateness of the use of his account of this ideal as endogenous to our moral practice. Th e worries are related to the use of the concept of having a reason that Gaus makes in his book, as well as to the aptness of his account of our moral practice from the viewpoint of our moral (...) phenomenology. Some doubts are raised in relation to the pertinence of Gaus’ concept of having a reason from the perspective of the motivation of the public reason project. In the second part of the paper, a summary is off ered of Gaus’ model of public justification and some of its consequences are discussed. Th e primary intention here is to show that, contrary to Gaus’ view, egalitarian liberalism, and not classical liberalism, is the most appropriate result of such a model of justification. (shrink)

In diesem Paper möchten wir den unterschiedlichen epistemologischen Vorzügen auf den Grund gehen, die wir in der Arbeit mit einigen Kunstwerken erlangen, wobei unser Schwerpunkt in der narrativen Kunst liegt. Wir behaupten, die narrativen Künste könnten in gewissem Sinne dem Zeugnis ähneln, insofern sie Informationen besorgten, die epistemologisch wertvoll für kognitive Agenten wie uns seien. Wir identifizieren zumindest zwei breite Kategorien dieser epistemologischen Vorzüge, die Erste schließt „Tatsachenangaben“ ein und ist in diesem Sinne vergleichbar mit dem paradigmatischen Fall des Zeugnisses, (...) wo die Aussagen des Zeugen als Wissensquelle, als bloße Faktenaneignung für sein Publikum zu dienen vermögen . Dies dagegen ist nicht die eigenartigste und distinktivste Art der epistemologischen Werte, die uns die Kunst verschafft. Die andere hat es mit der Bewusstseinssteigerung sowie Verständnisvertiefung bezüglich gewisser Fragestellungen zu tun, entweder durch spezifische, kraftvolle und involvierende Art der Tatsachenvermittlung , oder eben durch die Präsentierung der Haltung, Einstellung oder Ansicht des Künstlers, welche sich für uns als erhellend oder herausfordernd herausschälen könnten. (shrink)

James Allan’s book A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law is an interesting and first–rate attempt of using a humean theory as a model for a contemporary sceptical view in ethics and philosophy of law. In presenting Hume’s theory, Allan explicitly declares that he is not interested in an exegeses of Hume’s theory, but he intends to use it as a critical tool for contemporary moral discussions. Allan’s books surely represents a major contribution to contemporary moral discussions, and some of (...) his topics deserves a further discussion, as his discussion of Thomas Nagel, his criticism to moral intuitionism, the fact of whether his naturalistic reduction leads to scepticism or to naturalistic realism. (shrink)

This paper is about the notions of the artistic, aesthetic, cognitive and moral value of art and their interconnectedness. The main concern is to try to advocate the cognitivist claim about the artistic value of artworks’ contribution to the advance of knowledge, as well as for the relevance of the moral dimension for artistic value. This is a discussion of the intersection of the debate about moral and aesthetic value. The central part of the paper is focused on a debate (...) with Peter Lamarque. The problem of immoral art-works and their cognitive value is discussed at the end of this paper in order to show that they are counterexamples of the thesis of artistic relevance of the moral dimension. (shrink)

Auf die bloße Ankündigung der Möglichkeit menschlichen Klonens formulierten die Moralisten kritische Argumente gegen die Zulässigkeit der Einführung dieser Praxis. Ein kritischer Blick auf diese Argumente zeigt jedoch, dass sie nicht wohl fundiert sind, d.h. dass sie nicht als legitime Argumente in der Debatte um das in einem Staat öffentlich zulässige zu verwenden sind, denn sie stützen sich auf falsche Prämissen oder sie sind unvereinbar mit Erlaubnissen im Hinblick auf andere Formen der menschlichen Reproduktion. Jedes Argument zugunsten des Verbotes menschlichen (...) Klonens wird mindestens anhand eines der folgenden Mittel analysiert: Steht es im Einklang mit den Grundprinzipien zeitgenössischer Demokratien ; stützt es sich auf wohl fundierte und weitgehend akzeptierte Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Forschungen; ist es kohärent mit den üblichen und allgemein anerkannten moralischen Vorstellungen, die mit anderen Formen menschlicher Reproduktion verbunden sind. Das Hauptargument, das als gute Grundlage zum Verbot menschlichen Klonens angesehen wird, ist die moralische Pflicht, künftigen Personen keinen Schaden zuzufügen. Das Ergebnis des Verwerfens traditioneller moralischer Argumente gegen das menschliche Klonen bedeutet keine allgemeine Rechtfertigung menschlichen Klonens, es zeigt nur, dass neue oder präziser ausgeklügelte Argumente zu erbringen sind, wenn menschliches Klonen verboten werden soll. (shrink)

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument against suicide based (...) on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment. (shrink)

Pitanje ovoga članka jest treba li nacionalnu pripadnost uvrstiti na popis primarnih dobara, odnosno, postoji li snažna veza između nacionalne pripadnosti i primarnih dobara o kojima se govori u klasičnoj liberalnoj formulaciji do mjere da njezina zaštita zaslužuje uvrštenje među njih. O ovom pitanju, na izravan ili manje izravan način, raspravljaju vodeći autori liberalne nacionalističke paradigme. U ovom tekstu posebno se raspravlja pretpostavljena veza između zaštite nacionalne pripadnosti i primarnog dobra društvenih osnova samopoštovanja. Unatoč određenoj potrebi javnog priznanja nacionalne pripadnosti, (...) utemeljenje njezine zaštite na razini primarnih dobara, barem kada je riječ o argumentu koji se poziva na društvene osnove samopoštovanja, nije uvjerljivo.The issue regarded in this article is whether we have to include national belonging in the list of primary goods, i.e., whether there is a strong connection between national belonging and primary goods about which the classical liberal theory speaks, such that the protection of national belonging must be included in the list of primary goods. Leading authors in the liberal nationalist paradigm, more or less directly, discuss about this issue. In this paper, the supposed connection between the protection of national belonging and the social bases of selfrespect is specifically discussed. Despite the reasons for some public protection of national belonging, its foundation at the level of primary goods, at least as far as it concerns the argument that relies on the social bases of selfrespect, is not plausible. (shrink)

The paper is mainly concerned with the problem of whether the question of extension of lifespan may be included in the constitutional essentials of a well ordered society; either as a right that must be protected, or as a prohibition. More precisely, when put in the terms of a possible prohibition, the question is about whether there are reasons that may be endorsed in the basic legislative institutions of a society, as a matter of the constitutional essentials of a state, (...) as a ground for the prohibition of research or technological practice, with the aim of sensibly extending human lifespan. It may appear as obvious that, if the answer to this question is not positive, freedom to engage in these activities immediately follows. However, this is not true. Even if there is no possibility to establish a prohibition at the level of constitutional essentials, it may still be possible to legislate at lower levels for a prohibition. As a consequence, there is another problem, i.e. the question of whether we may establish, as a matter of constitutional essentials, the right to develop research , and make use of technological resources, with the aim of sensibly extending human lifespan. Two kinds of arguments are analysed. The one saying that extension of lifespan is damaging, because it threats human nature; and the one saying that extension of lifespan is not helpful, because it leads to a life of boredom and tediousness. (shrink)

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument against suicide based (...) on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment. (shrink)

It is from the mere announcement of the possibility of human cloning that moralists have formulated critical arguments against the permissibility of introducing this practice. A critical survey of these arguments, however, shows that they are not well founded, i.e. that frequently they are not such that they can be used as legitimate arguments in the debate about what is publicly permissible in a state, that they rely on mistaken premises, or that they are non coherent with permissions in relation (...) to other forms of human reproduction. Each argument in favor of the banning of human cloning is analyzed by at least one of these means: whether it is coherent with the fundamental principles of contemporary democracies , whether it relies on well-founded and widely accepted results of scientific researches, and whether it is coherent with the usual and widely shared moral attitudes related to other forms of human reproduction. The most important argument that is taken as a good foundation for the prohibition of human cloning is the moral duty not to harm future persons. The result of the rejection of traditional moral arguments against human cloning does not represent an overall justification of human cloning, it only shows that new, or more sophisticated, arguments must be found if human cloning is to be banned. (shrink)

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument against suicide based (...) on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment. (shrink)

Cremaschi’s book presents a critical exposition of the development of contemporary moral philosophy. A virtue of the book rarely found in other philosophical survays is the parallel representation of the themes discussed both in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and in the continental one. The final part of the book is devoted to recent developments in applied ethics.

Cohen-Almagor's book represents a remarkable contribution to the discussion of the right to die with dignity. It offers the discussion of a wide range of topics. They include: the terminology respectful of human dignity ; the question of autonomy; the sanctity-of life – quality of life debate; criticism of some extreme quality-of-life position; criticism of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between critical and experiential interests and the consequences this author draws from it; active and passive euthanasia; the Dutch experience and the Oregon (...) Death with Dignity Act; and many others. The book is discussed from a basically sympathetic view, where some details are focused on as meriting some further examination. Some remarks are offered to indicate the complexity of the definition of autonomy; a defense of Dworkin's argument is offered; an insistence on the necessity to rely on moral conferring features is remarked. (shrink)

Elvio Baccarini has responded generously to my book Medical Ethics: Ordinary Concepts, Ordinary Lives , but I would like to respond to three of his criticisms: first, about the role that theory ought to play in, and in relation to, moral experience; second, about my defence of a doctor’s right to conscientiously object to performing legal abortions; and third, to the reality of posthumous harm. Baccarini claims that I have overstated my claims, and drawn illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from (...) people’s ordinary language. However, I argue that moral language is special precisely because of the way it expresses an irreducible personal perspective. (shrink)

In this chapter, we investigate whether psychopathy is a mental disorder. We argue that addressing this question requires engaging, at least, with three principal issues that have conceptual, empirical, and normative dimensions. First, it must be established whether current measures of psychopathy individuate a unitary class of individuals. By this we mean that persons classifed as psychopaths should share some relevant similarities that support explanation, prediction, and treatment. Second, it must be proven that psychopathy harms the person who has it. (...) Third, it must be established that the harm associated with psychopathy is relevant for the ascription of disorder status. Regarding this latter issue, we argue that psychopathy should be considered a disorder if its harmfulness derives from certain incapacities or limited capacities. These incapacities should affect basic competences that are justifably required for conducting a preferable type of life. Within this framework, we tentatively advance the hypothesis that some normatively justifed conclusions and empirical evidence about psychopathy, that needs nonetheless to be further investigated, might support the claim that people with psychopathy have a mental disorder. (shrink)

We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian argument, we conclude that we can (...) justify to a psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the application of this prescription to other psychopaths. (shrink)

In contemporary debates on euthanasia, physician assisted suicide and withholding and withdrawing life prolonging treatments, besides commonly used reasons, which are based on presumption of freedom and avoidance of pain, there is also an idea of a duty to die. Given that individuals are also members of society, and that they have families and loved ones, it is necessary to discuss cases when illness causes severe burdens for lives of loved ones. We consider that patient’s just assessment of duty to (...) die can be legitimate candidate for justification of procedure of acceleration of death, taken care of necessary conditions of justified social support for patients and necessary aliment from family and society. In this paper we examine main features of duty to die thesis, extract objections, and offer guidelines for continued discussion. We also want to express the importance of establishing social circumstances and preconditions for protecting the individuals.U suvremenim raspravama o eutanaziji i liječnički potpomognutom samoubojstvu, te odustajanju od tretmana, osim uobičajenih razloga koji se temelje na slobodi i izbjegavanju patnje osobe koja traži ubrzavanje smrti, postoji i teza o dužnosti umiranja. S obzirom na to da je pojedinac ujedno i član zajednice, odnosno da ima obitelj i voljene, nužno je raspraviti o slučajevima kada bolest izaziva značajne teškoće za život njegovih bližnjih. Smatramo kako i pacijentova pravedna prosudba o dužnosti umiranja može biti legitiman kandidat za opravdanje postupaka ubrzavanja smrti, uz nužne preduvjete pravedne društvene podrške pacijentu i dužne skrbi od strane obitelji i društva. U ovom tekstu razlažemo osnovne značajke teze o dužnosti umiranja, izdvajamo prigovore i dajemo smjernice za nastavak rasprave te izražavamo važnost ustanovljavanja društvenih okolnosti i preduvjete za zaštitu pojedinaca. (shrink)

Sulla scia di un percorso già segnato da appuntamenti importanti e coinvolgenti istituzioni e studiosi italiani e stranieri, centri di studi specializzati, il Volume che qui si presenta raccoglie i contributi del Convegno Internazionale di Studi dedicato a: Lévinas e la cultura del XX secolo, tenutosi a Napoli tra il 10 ed il 12 aprile 2000: G. Lissa, S. Trigano, I. Kajon, E. Méir, S. Petrosino, E. D’Antuono, M. Signore, M. Zarader, D. Cohen-Lévinas, J. Colette, E. Baccarini, D. Banon, (...) P. Amodio, E. Arseneva, è. Levine, F. Ciaramelli, M. Caporale, G. Giannini. (shrink)

U ovom radu raspravljamo odnos Rawlsovog političkog liberalizma i istine. Budući da je politički liberalizam teorija koja izbjegava sva kontroverzna epistemološka i metafizička pitanja, jednako tako izbjegava i pitanje svoje istinitosti i koncept istine uopće. Usredotočili smo se na tri autora koji tvrde da politički liberalizam ne može izbjeći pitanje istine. Prvi autor je perfekcionist, Joseph Raz, koji pokušava pokazati da je Rawlsova teorija nekoherentna ukoliko se ne bavi pitanjem istinitosti neke moralne doktrine na kojoj mora počivati. Drugi, David Estlund, (...) tvrdi da je teorija filozofski neodrživa ako se ne poziva na istinitost svog fundamentalnog načela. Treći, Joshua Cohen, pokazuje nemogućnost izbjegavanja nekog koncepta istine ako se u političkoj teoriji pozivamo na vjerovanja i opravdanje. Nastojimo dokazati tvrdnju o praktičko-političkoj i filozofskoj ograničenosti njihove kritike Rawlsove teorije. Temeljna intencija članka je opovrgnuti kritike koje se upućuju Rawlsu te time ojačati njegov prijedlog političkog liberalizma. Pri tome nastojimo i nadopuniti nedorečenosti u Rawlsovom prijedlogu te zbog toga nudimo preciznije određenu sliku političkog liberalizma u odnosu na njegovu izvornu.In this paper we discuss the relation between Rawls’ political liberalism and truth. Since political liberalism is a theory that avoids all controversial epistemological and metaphysical questions, it equally avoids the question of its truth and a concept of truth generally. We are focusing on three authors which claim that political liberalism can not avoid the question of truth. First, Joseph Raz, a perfectionist who claims that Rawls’ political theory is incoherent unless it is not concerned with the truth of some moral doctrine on which it must be derived. Second, David Estlund, who claims that Rawls’ theory is philosophically untenable unless it does not consider its fundamental principle as true one. Third, Joshua Cohen, indicates the impossibility of avoiding some concept of truth if political theory is invoking concepts such as beliefs and justification. We are pointing on theirs practical-political and philosophical limited range in criticizing Rawls’ theory. The basic intention of the article is to confute criticisms addressed to Rawls and, in this way, to strengthen his proposal of political liberalism. At the same time, we try to resolve issues deriving from indeterminacies in Rawls’ proposal. For this reason we offer a picture of political liberalism that is more determinate than his original proposal. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous souhaitons étudier les différents avantages épistémologiques qu’on tire de certains ouvrages artistiques, en nous focalisant sur les arts narratifs. Nous affirmons que, dans un certain sens, les arts narratifs peuvent ressembler au témoignage, dans la mesure où ils fournissent des informations susceptibles d’être épistémologiquement précieuses aux acteurs cognitifs que nous sommes. Nous distinguons au moins deux catégories larges de ces avantages épistémologiques. La première comprend « l’énoncé des faits » et dans ce sens représente le pendant (...) du cas paradigmatique de témoignage où, ce que le témoin dit, peut être source de connaissance pour le public qui de cette manière reçoit simplement les faits . Cependant, cette sorte d’avantage épistémologique n’est pas la plus originale ou la plus pertinente qu’on puisse tirer de l’art. L’autre catégorie concerne l’accroissement de la conscience ou l’approfondissement de la compréhension de certains phénomènes, soit en rapportant les faits d’une façon spécifique, puissante et engageante , soit en présentant la position, l’attitude ou l’opinion de l’artiste, qui puissent nous être révélateurs ou provocateurs. (shrink)

In this paper we want to explore different epistemological benefits that we gain by dealing with some artworks, and our focus is on narrative arts. We claim that there is a sense in which narrative arts can be similar to testimony, in that they provide information which can be epistemologically valuable for cognitive agents such as we are. We identify at least two broad categories of these epistemological benefits, the first one includes ‘facts stating’ and in that sense is parallel (...) to the paradigmatic case of testimony in which what the testifier says can be a source of knowledge as mere acquisition of facts for his audience . This, however, is not the most peculiar and distinctive kind of epistemological benefits we can gain from art. The other one has to do with raising awareness, of deepening our understanding about some issues either by a specific, powerful and involving way of providing us facts , or by presenting us the stance, the attitude, the opinion of the artist that can be enlightening, or challenging for us. (shrink)

U ovom radu želimo istražiti različite epistemološke koristi koje dobivamo putem nekih umjetničkih djela, pri čemu smo primarno usredotočeni na narativne umjetnosti. Tvrdimo da u određenom smislu, narativne umjetnosti mogu biti slične svjedočanstvu, utoliko što pružaju informacije koje mogu biti epistemološki vrijedne za kognitivne djelatnike kakvi smo mi. Razlikujemo barem dvije šire kategorije tih epistemoloških vrijednosti, od kojih prva uključuje ‘navođenje činjenica’ i u tom je smislu pandan paradigmatskom slučaju svjedočanstva u kojem ono što informator govori može biti izvor znanja (...) za publiku koja time naprosto dobiva činjenice . Međutim, to nije najsvojstvenija i najznačajnija vrsta epistemoloških vrijednosti koje dobijemo iz umjetnosti. Druga kategorija tiče se povećavanja svijesti ili produbljivanja razumijevanja o nekom fenomenu, koji se može odvijati na dva načina: ili pružanjem činjenica na specifično snažan i prožimalački način , ili prezentiranjem stajališta, stava ili mišljenja umjetnika koji nam može biti prosvjetljujući ili pak predstavljati izazov našem stajalištu. (shrink)