Topics at a Poynter Institute privacy conference in December 1992 ranged from the role and obligations of the journalist to the rights of victims. Journalists' responsibility to fulfill a dual role of truthtelling and minimizing harm to vulnerable people in society framed the discussion. The public' s curiosity and media obsessions with information about victims of sex crimes are the first topics to be explored. Bob Steele of the Poynter Institute sets the stage for the delicate balance. Helen Benedict, author (...) of Virgin or Vamp: How the Press Covers Sex Crimes, suggests some reforms regarding this area of news. Patricia Bowman, a victim's advocate, talks about her experience as the victim of the media and of a celebrated sex crime case. Elinor Brecher of the Miami Herald discusses a particularly vexing assignment she recently faced, and Tom French of the St. Petersburg Times expresses concern for the subjects of sensitive personal stories and recommends trying to inform them about the story and help them cope with the intrusion into their private life. In separate articles, J. T. Johnson of Sartor Associates in San Francisco and Nora Paul of the Poynter Institute offer insights into the paradox of individual privacy and public right/desire to know, particularly as the issues arise in today's information society. Finally, Robert Ellis Smith, publisher of Privacy Journal, outlines ways media can approach privacy issues and still feel they are on safe ground; he recommends self-restraint in place of government restrictions. The general theme of the Poynter Conference is restraint and concern for others' responsible usage of information that has the possibility to harm others. (shrink)

Political liberalism holds that some kinds of disagreement give rise to a duty of restraint. On this view, citizens ought to limit the considerations they invoke in political advocacy to those that meet a certain kind of publicity requirement. Many of the arguments for political liberalism's duty of restraint contain a grain of truth. But properly understood, these arguments instead support the duty of responsiveness, which directs citizens to respond to disagreement in a very different (...) way than the duty of restraint recommends. (shrink)

This essay critically assesses the central claim of Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: that public religious faith and public reason liberalism can be reconciled, because the values underlying public reason liberalism should lead us to endorse the ‘convergence view’, rather than the mainstream consensus view. The convergence view is friendlier to religious faith, because it jettisons the consensus view’s much-criticised ‘duty of restraint’. I present several challenges to Vallier’s claim. Firstly, if Vallier is right to reject (...) the duty of restraint then consensus theorists can also do so, and on the same grounds. Secondly, the independent force of the objections to the duty of restraint is unclear. Thirdly, Vallier has not successfully identified desiderata that unite all public reason liberals and favour convergence over consensus. Finally, even if convergence is in some ways friendlier to religious faith, this does not show that it will be attractive to religious citizens. (shrink)

It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls' ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls' ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls' ideal of public reason. Because it is (...) plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls' account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls' view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes. (shrink)

This article demonstrates a priori cosmopolitan values of restraint and harm limitation exist to establish a cosmopolitan “no-harm” duty in warfare, predating utilitarianism and permeating modern international humanitarian law. In doing so, the author exposes the atemporal and ahistorical nature of utilitarianism which introduces chaos and brutality into the international legal system. Part 2 conceptualises the duty as derived from the “no-harm” principle under international environmental law. Part 3 frames the discussion within legal pluralism and cosmopolitan ethics, (...) arguing that divergent legal jurisdictions without an international authority necessitates a “public international sphere” to mediate differences leading to strong value-commitment norm-creation. One such norm is the “no-harm” duty in warfare. Part 4 traces the duty to the Stoics, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, African traditional culture, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Parts 5 and 6 explain how the duty manifests in principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. (shrink)

This article argues that congregations should be seen as grassroots public moral agents, on the ground working to bring what they discern as God's preferred future into being. Deliberations among congregations of all social backgrounds are a way of doing ethics "polycentrically," without a dominant center. Because cultural and social boundaries are permeable and people in various social groups can imaginatively enter the worlds of people unlike themselves, they can engage those perspectives morally on an equal footing. The essay addresses (...) ethicists' participation in congregations' moral deliberation and action, and concludes with a plea for theological ethicists to consider congregations in their work. (shrink)

Chapter 12, on duties and moral obligations, has a clear function: accounting for the specificity of the Right, after the Good, and before the Virtues. Still, the same chapter leaves the reader with three different but related perplexities, which is the subject-matter of the present chapter: (1) Why would Dewey say, quite early in his career, that James’s treatment of obligation was “the simplest and best” and never use it again in his own writings, and in particular, in this chapter? (...) (2) Since we have previous versions of Dewey’s treatment of obligation in 1891 and 1908, are there some groundbreaking arguments or new concepts in the “new” analysis of duty and the Right? (3) Why is Chapter 12’s ending so “dark”? Why would Dewey devote a chapter to duties to conclude that “the new forms of lawlessness and the light and loose way in which duties are held cannot be met by direct and general appeal to a sense of duty or to the restraint of an inner law”? (shrink)

Despite moves to enhance the autonomy of clients of health care services, the use of a variety of physical restraints on the freedom of movement of frail, elderly patients continues in nursing homes. This paper confronts the use of restraints on two grounds. First, it challenges the assumption that use of restraints is necessary to protect the welfare of frail, elderly patients by drawing on a range of data indicating the limited efficacy of restraints. Secondly, it argues that the (...) class='Hi'>duty to respect individual autonomy extends to a duty to respect the autonomy of patients who are elderly, frail and living in nursing homes. (shrink)

Some of the most pressing contemporary social problems result from the amalgamation of a mass of actions that are not intentionally coordinated. Although these essentially aggregative harms are foreseeable, it is unclear what moral duties individuals have with regards to them. This paper offers a new analysis of these problems and uses a nonideal contractualist approach to argue in favour of two kinds of duties for individuals. Collectivization duties that require individuals to act responsively with a view to ensuring that (...) there are effective governance agents that reliably, fairly, and efficiently prevent these outcomes in the long-term and duties of restraint that require individuals to avoid action of a kind that is likely to come together with other actions to cause serious EAH in the immediate future when restraint with regards to actions of this kind could help prevent the outcome from occurring. (shrink)

Most public reason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. (...) If successful, this argument would defuse prominent objections to public reason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’. (shrink)

The item was in the news. A public official said that he would hire a male rather than a female driver, because following the growing influence of the #MeToo movement, hiring a man would be safer. That way nobody would accuse him of harassment. The official’s declaration aroused justified public criticism. Being a public official, he must be committed to equality-in-hiring practices. But suppose that it were a private individual, who wanted to do his utmost to keep away from temptation. (...) It might seem that there is nothing wrong with that: he is free to hire whomever he wishes, and his caution is justified: planning ahead and resisting temptation are marks of rationality and personhood, in Harry Frankfurt’s sense of the term. But why should one be so cautious to begin with? Challenging other philosophical analyses of temptation, I argue that temptations are hardly irresistible. We should all take responsibility for our actions and behavior. It is a moral duty to control ourselves and not let others pay the price for our shortcomings. This notion is both Kantian, as it emphasizes autonomy, and Aristotelian: it urges us to work on our virtues. (shrink)

Douglas T. Going above and beneath the call ….

On what we may call the institutional approach to justice, the most important duty of justice that individuals have is the duty to establish just institutions when they are absent. How should we understand this institutional duty in relation to more personal moral actions, such as taking direct personal action to mitigate institutional failures? Is this institutional duty a necessary responsibility of justice? Is it sufficient? I will discuss this question in the context of climate change: (...) what responsibilities of justice do individual actors have when their state is not complying with an ideal of just emissions? Do they have the duty to do what they reasonably can to reduce their personal direct emissions, perhaps even picking up the slack of non-compliers? Or is their duty of justice primarily that of doing their part to establish a just regulatory framework? I will examine some options of personal responsibility in response to climate change and argue that the most important duty is that of working to bring about better institutions. Taking direct personal action can be helpful, but not when they distract us from working towards institutional reform. (shrink)

Justifications for state authority are typically directed towards the good of those subject to that authority. But, because of their territorial nature, states exercise coercion not only towards insiders but also towards non-members. Such coercion can take the form of denying outsiders the right to enter a territory or to settle in it permanently, as well as various restraints on trade and association. When coercion is directed at insiders, it often comes packaged with various claims about distributive justice, including claims (...) to the effect that being subject to coercion entitles citizens to certain distributive guarantees (social minimum, difference principle). This paper asks three questions: can states acquire the moral right to coerce non-citizens (including in the form of a denial of the right to traverse or enter territory)? are outsiders ever morally bound to submit to the commands of states along these lines? does the right coercively to exclude outsiders bring with it any distributive obligations similar to those entailed by the state’s subjection of co-citizens? The possibility that a right to exclude must be coupled with a duty of compensation to those excluded will be canvassed. (shrink)

This book uses Kant's idea of imperfect duty to extend the theory of the firm. Unlike perfect duty which is contractual or otherwise legally binding, imperfect duty consists of those commitments of choice that pursue some moral value, but that have practical limits to their pursuit. The author presents a broad view of the imperfect duties of management, defined as a nexus of all commitments to do good involving relations internal and external to the firm. This nexus (...) consists of three overlapping categories of (i) building a virtuous managerial community, (ii) pursuing reasoned managerial discourse, and (iii) diligent and reasoned pursuit of the body of routine managerial duties such as capital budgeting and internal controls. Specific applications of the nexus theory for stakeholder relations via fair negotiation, and for analysis of the effects on the managerial team of perquisite consumption are presented. This book has major implications for research in business ethics and allows critical insights into managerial decision making. (shrink)

Scholars who favor shareholder primacy usually claim either that managers should not fulfill corporate duties of beneficence or that, if they are required to fulfill them, they do so by going against their obligations to shareholders. Distinguishing between structurally different types of duties of beneficence and recognizing the full force of the normative demands imposed on managers reveal that this view needs to be qualified. Although it is correct to think that managers, when acting on behalf of shareholders, are not (...) required to fulfill wide duties of charity, they are nevertheless required to fulfill a variety of narrow duties of beneficence. What is more, the obligation to fulfill these duties arises precisely because they are acting on behalf of shareholders. As such, this article 1) refines our understanding of the duties of corporate beneficence and 2) helps to identify which duties of beneficence are imposed on managers when they are acting on behalf of shareholders. (shrink)

Introduction Hospital delirium is a frequent, serious, costly, and underrecognized acute disorder of attention and cognition. Therefore, the prevention of hospital delirium is not only desirable for patients, caregivers, healthcare professionals, and the health system itself, but also a moral duty. Objective To identify and synthetize the main ethical aspects that arise related to the prevention of hospital delirium in patients 65 years and older. Methods A scoping review was carried out in Embase, Medline, and Web of Science. Articles (...) published in English or Spanish analyzing any pharmacologic, non-pharmacologic, or multicomponent intervention for prevention of delirium in hospitalized patients aged 65 years and over were included. Results Twenty-seven studies were included. Based on the frequency of appearance and the relevance, our findings were organized into three main areas. The first one was related to the principle of nonmaleficence and collected findings about the iatrogenic causes of hospital delirium and the use of restraints systems. The second area analyzed the impact of delirium in patients, families, and healthcare professionals from a relational ethics perspective, and addressed the family presence as a factor to prevent delirium. Finally, the third area is related to the quality of care. Conclusion Prevention of delirium in hospitals is essential to avoid the discomfort and potential clinical complications of patients, as well as the suffering of their relatives, caregivers, and healthcare professionals. Policymakers and healthcare managers are encouraged to make the required efforts to prevent delirium in hospitalized older patients. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is perhaps the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, and certainly one of the most original in the entire Western tradition. Given the inaccessibility of his work, it is remarkable that he has inspired poems, paintings, films, musical compositions, titles of books -- and even novels. In his splendid biography, Ray Monk has made this very compelling human being come alive in a way that perfectly explains the fascination he has evoked. Wittgenstein's life was one of great moral (...) and spiritual depth. Although his work addresses problems of logic, language, mind, and knowledge, he often described it as having an ethical point, and once said that he "could not help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." In successfully bridging the gap assumed by many to exist between Wittgenstein's life and his work, Monk's biography helps to explain the interest in Wittgenstein's later philosophy on the part of Buddhist scholars. (shrink)

This chapter offers a plea for the media to reframe its coverage of campus controversies from free expression to academic freedom. These freedoms are entwined, but distinct. Freedom of expression is extended to all persons with no expectation of quality control, apart from legal prohibitions against defamation, threats, etc. By contrast, academic freedom is a cluster of freedoms afforded to scholarly personnel for a particular purpose – namely, the pursuit of universities’ academic mission to seek truth and advance understanding in (...) the service of society. An academic freedom framing better reflects the distinctive social purpose around which universities are organized, as well as universities’ duty of care to employees and students. While universities have a legal and moral duty of care to all employees and students, the unjust, exclusionary past and present of higher education arguably makes that duty particularly acute in the case of equity-deserving (e.g., racialized, Indigenous, disabled or 2SLGBTQ+) people. Finally, academic freedom framing for campus media stories is less monolithic than free expression framing, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of campus controversies while keeping universities accountable to the public they serve. In this chapter, I survey three very different campus controversies at a single Canadian university, and the media response each received. I show how an academic freedom frame for those stories would have produced better reportage while reducing opportunities for bad actors to manipulate both universities and the media. At the end of the day, the real crisis at universities isn’t the cancellation of ill-judged events that were never a part of the academic mission; it is the ongoing erosion of academic freedom. (shrink)

I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy of collective agents are duties of justice (...) in virtue of the roles these agents have taken up. (shrink)

Prologue: The moral order from Hobbes to Hutcheson -- "The duties of man as they may be deduced from nature" : James Logan's unpublished venture into moral philosophy, an analysis -- Epilogue: Logan and Benjamin Franklin.

Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the (...) duty, notably, self-deception (§2). Finding none of Kant's solutions to the problem of self-deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self-knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3). (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non-reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non-reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

Informal political representation can be a political lifeline, particularly for oppressed and marginalized groups. Such representation can give these groups some say, however mediate, partial, and imperfect, in how things go for them. Coeval with the political goods such representation offers these groups are its particular dangers to them. Mindful of these dangers, skeptics challenge the practice for being, inter alia, unaccountable, unauthorized, inegalitarian, and oppressive. These challenges provide strong pro tanto reasons to think the practice morally impermissible. This paper (...) considers the question: On what conditions is the informal political representation of oppressed and marginalized groups permissible? By responding to skeptics’ challenges, I develop a systematic account of moral constraints that, if adopted, would make such representation permissible. The account that emerges shows that informal political representatives (IPRs) must aim to fulfill two sets of sometimes conflicting duties to the represented: democracy within duties, which concern how the representative treats and relates to the represented, and justice without duties, which concern how the representative’s actions advance the aims of the representation. (shrink)

Debates over how best to ensure appropriate conduct in battle typically draw a binary distinction between rule compliance and rule violation. This framing is problematic, excluding a critical third element of battlefield conduct, supererogation—that is, positive acts that go beyond what is demanded by the explicit rules of war. This article investigates this moral category of action; specifically, situations in which combatants refrain from taking the life of an enemy despite their moral and legal license to do so. It first (...) considers the moral tension between the duty of combatants to kill and battlefield mercy, and goes on to explore the factors that motivate the latter. The article then shifts to consider the significance of supererogation to the ongoing efforts to moderate the conduct of contemporary war. As the article illustrates, supererogatory restraint is constituted by values that when cultivated also incentivize adherence to the more explicit rules and standards of the battlefield. This is demonstrated through analysis of the conduct of Western special forces. The concept of supererogation is of further use when evaluating the origins and implications of “moral injury.” This is verified empirically in the context of armed unmanned aerial vehicles. (shrink)

Shared views regarding the moral respect which is owed to children in family life are used as a guide in determining the moral permissibility of nontherapeutic clinical research procedures involving children. The comparison suggests that it is not appropriate to seek assent from the preadolescent child. The analogy with interventions used in family life is similarly employed to specify the permissible limit of risk to which children may be exposed in nontherapeutic research procedures. The analysis indicates that recent writers misconceive (...) how certain moral principles, such as respect for personal autonomy, require us to act toward children. The results are also used to assess proposed federal regulations on research with children. (shrink)

The agency objection to applying distributive justice globally is that principles of distributive justice need to apply to the behaviour of a special kind of institutional agent of distributive justice because of the special powers of that agent. No such agent exists capable of configuring cooperative arrangements between all persons globally, and so distributive justice does not apply globally. One response to institutional views of this kind is that they do not rule out Natural Duties of Justice that fall on (...) all of us to bring about institutional agencies capable of global distributive justice. In this article I argue that this move presupposes a particular, teleological, conception of justice whilst institutional accounts most plausibly rest on a non-teleological one. I provide an argument for favouring the non-teleological conception. I also show why alternative ways of arguing for global Natural Duties of Justice do not get around this controversy. The debate is at the level of presuppositions about justice, and relying on a partisan conception is question begging. (shrink)

A challenge to Kant’s less known duty of self-knowledge comes from his own firm view that it is impossible to know oneself. This paper resolves this problem by considering the duty of self-knowledge as involving the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. First, I argue that, although Kant places severe restrictions on the possibility of knowing oneself as one is, he admits the possibility of knowing oneself as one appears using methods from (...) empirical anthropology. Second, I show that empirical knowledge of oneself is fairly reliable and is, in fact, considered as morally significant from Kant’s moral anthropological perspective. Taking these points together, I conclude that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge exclusively entails the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge. (shrink)

Conjoined with the claim that there is a moral right to privacy, each of the major contemporary accounts of privacy implies a duty of ignorance for those against whom the right is held. In this paper I consider and respond to a compelling argument that challenges these accounts (or the claim about a right to privacy) in the light of this implication. A crucial premise of the argument is that we cannot ever be morally obligated to become ignorant of (...) information we currently know. The plausibility of this premise, I suggest, derives from the thought that there are no epistemically ways in which we can cause ourselves to become ignorant of what we already know. Drawing on some recent work in the epistemology and psychology of self-deception and forgetting, I seek to undermine this thought, and thus provide a defense against the challenging argument, by arguing that there are indeed such ways. (shrink)

Duty of candour legislation was introduced in Scotland in 2018. However, literature and experience of duty of candour when applied to infection control incidents/outbreaks is scarce. We describe clinician and parental perspectives with regard to duty of candour and communication during a significant infection control incident in a haemato-oncology ward of a children’s hospital. Based on the learning from this incident, we make recommendations for duty of candour and communication to patients and families during future infection (...) control incidents. These include the need to consider a crisis management approach, the importance of not underestimating psychological harm in incidents of a prolonged duration and embedding the existing legislation pertaining to the rights of the child. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Defining the Term “Citizens Labeled with Cognitive Disabilities” The Scope of Moral Personhood: The Potentiality View The Fully Cooperating Assumption How Are the Two Moral Powers Acquired? The Enabling Conditions Personhood as Requiring Enabling Conditions Blocking Developmental Pathways to Moral Personhood The Causal Relationship Between Epistemic Claims and the Concrete Lives of People with Disabilities First Objection: Responding to the Epistemic Difficulty Second Objection: The Argument from Marginal Cases Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

The political liberalism of Rawls and Larmore is presented as uniquely able to solve the problems of modern political theory. In the face of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, a legitimate liberal state can legislate solely on the basis of a modular conception of justice affirmed from within each reasonable conception. However, it is argued that this view, while restrictive, has to permit the promotion of its own pre-conditions. This demanding duty of civic restraint (...) requires citizens who have been educated for citizen virtue in the context of associational life in civil society. This challenge to expand liberalism to cover its own preconditions at the level of a moral background culture, has usually been levelled by one kind of republican/communitarian (Charles Taylor) or so-called "ethical liberals". It can be met by the adoption of a liberal republicanism that operates within the constraints of Rawls' political liberalism but nevertheless explains and justifies why such a view must treat traditional republican themes such as active citizenship and the importance of associational life. The solution lies in treating these values as option values, in a sense that is explained. (shrink)

칸트의 덕론에서 도덕적 완전성은 덕의 심정을 계발하여 도덕적 목적들을 완전하게 달성하는 것이며 도덕적 완전성의 의무를 따르는 사람은 유덕한 사람이다. 본 논문에서는 도덕적 완전성의 의무에 대한 칸트의 설명들을 검토하면서 칸트의 덕개념이 가진 성격과 이러한 성격이 덕윤리적 논의에서 갖는 의의를 고찰한다. 먼저 도덕적 완전성은 덕에 대한 의무지움에 이르고 이에 따라 덕의무들을 완전하게 준수하는 것이라는 점과 이 의무가 완전하지만 불완전한 의무와 자기개선의 의무라는 두 성격을 가진다는 점을 살펴본다. 그러고 나서 도덕적 완전성의 의무가 완전하지만 불완전한 의무로서 갖는 성격을 통해 하나뿐이지만 다수가 존재한다는 칸트의 덕개념의 (...) 의미를 파악한다. 또한 이러한 덕개념이 덕의 고귀한 가치와 현실적합성을 모두 확보하고자 한다는 점에서 덕들의 통일성 논쟁에서 의의를 갖지만 형식적 덕이 어떤 덕인지 그 실체를 명확하게 파악하기 어렵다는 문제를 안고 있음을 밝힌다. 다음으로 자기개선의 의무로서 도덕적 완전성의 의무는 칸트의 덕개념이 이상적 덕개념에 속함을 뜻하지만 하나의 완전함에서 다른 완전함으로의 지속적인 전진이라는 자기개선의 과정은 칸트의 덕개념이 도달 불가능한 이상과 도달 가능한 것으로서의 성격을 이중적으로 담고 있음을 보여준다고 주장한다. 그리고 이러한 칸트의 덕개념이 전형적인 이상적 덕개념의 난점을 해결할 수 있는 반면 도달 불가능한 이상으로서의 도덕적 완전성에서 완전성이 어떤 성격의 것인지 불분명하다는 점에서 이러한 완전성에 대응하는, 객관적으로 고려된 덕이 무엇인지 명확하게 파악하기 어렵다는 문제에 직면함을 살펴본다. (shrink)

Background Despite its negative impact on patients and nurses, the use of restraint in somatic health care continues in many settings. Understanding the reasons and justifications for the use of restraint among nurses is crucial in order to manage this challenge. Aim To understand nurses’ justifications for restraint use in neurosurgical care. Research design A qualitative, descriptive design was used. Data were analysed with inductive qualitative content analysis. Participants and research context Semi-structured interviews with 15 nurses working (...) in three neurosurgical departments in Sweden. Ethical considerations Approved by The Regional Ethics Committee, Stockholm, Sweden. Findings The analysis resulted in three categories. The category Patient factors influencing restraint use describes patient factors that trigger restraint, such as a diminished decision-making competence, restlessness, and need for invasive devices. The category Specific reasons for justifying restraint describes reasons for restraining patients, such as restraint being used for the sake of the patient or for the sake of others. The category General reasoning in justifying restraint describes how nurses reason when using restraint, and the decision to use restraint was often based on a consequentialist approach where the nurses’ weighed the pros and cons of different alternatives. Discussion Nurses with experience of restraint use were engaged in a constant process of justifying and balancing different options and actions. Restraint was considered legitimate if the benefit exceeded the suffering, but decisions on which restraint measures to use and when to use them depended on the values of the individual nurse. Conclusion How nurses reason when justifying restraint, why they use restraint, and who they use restraint on must be considered when creating programs and guidelines to reduce the use of restraint and to ensure that when it is used it is used carefully, appropriately, and with respect. (shrink)

Normative political theorists have been growing more and more aware of the many difficult questions raised by the discretionary power inevitably left to public administrators. This article aims to advance a novel normative principle, called ‘principle of restraint’, regulating reform of established administrative agencies. I argue that the ability of public administrators to exercise their power in accordance with the requirements of public reason is protected by an attitude of restraint on the part of potential reformers. Specifically, they (...) should refrain from any reform of an administrative agency that involves a switch to a considerably more loosely interconnected system of values underlying the work of that agency. To illustrate the importance of the principle of restraint, I examine a case from British health policy, showing that a recent reform of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence well exemplifies the serious problems brought by any violation of that principle. (shrink)

WHAT DOES RESPECT REQUIRE OF RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CITIZENS AS they support coercive public policies? In his recent work, Christopher Eberle argues against the doctrine of restraint, a norm that requires citizens to refrain from supporting laws for which public reasons are unavailable. Against Eberle, I defend the doctrine of restraint as a necessary corollary to liberal democratic respect. For this defense, I draw from one imaginary case, Robert Audi's example of "sacred dandelions" and laws banning lawn maintenance, and (...) one real-world dispute, current debates about same-sex marriage policies. I argue that the doctrine of restraint when coupled with an inclusive definition of public reason better accords with our intuitive sense of what respect requires in both cases. (shrink)

It is popularly believed that if A owes B a duty of care in negligence, A will not actually have a legal duty to be careful: A will merely be required to pay damages to B if she suffers loss as a result of A's being careless. We can call this the cynical view of duties of care and those who adopt it, cynics. However, it is possible to take a different view of duties of care in negligence, (...) according to which if A owes B a duty of care of some description, A will actually have a legal duty to be careful. We can call this the idealistic view of duties of care in negligence and those who adopt it, idealists. This article explains the importance of the debate between idealists and cynics over the nature of duties of care in negligence and goes on to argue that the cynical view of duties of care in negligence is, in fact, wrong and that the idealistic view of such duties should be preferred. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory of justice imply that we have different duties of justice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues of justice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential for developing the (...) two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have a duty of justice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society. (shrink)

Articulating the public's widespread unease about animal biotechnology has not been easy, and the first attempts have not been able to provide an effective tool for navigating the moral permissibility of this research. Because these moral intuitions have been difficult to cash out, they have been belittled as representing nothing more than fear or confusion. But there are sound philosophical reasons supporting the public's opposition to animal biotechnology and these arguments justify a default position of resistance I call the Presumption (...) of Restraint . The Presumption of Restraint constitutes a justificatory process that sets out the criteria for permitting or rejecting individual biotechnology projects. This Presumption of Restraint can be overridden by compelling arguments that speak to a project's moral and scientific merit. This strategy creates a middle-of-the-road stance that can embrace particular projects, while rejecting others. The Presumption of Restraint can also serve as a model for assessing moral permissibility in other areas of technological innovation. (shrink)

Background Escalating levels of obesity place enormous and growing demands on Health care provision in the (U.K.) United Kingdom. Resources are limited with increasing and competing demands upon them. Ethical considerations underpin clinical decision making generally, but there is limited evidence regarding the relationship between these variables particularly in terms of treating individuals with obesity. Research aim To investigate the views of National Health Service (NHS) clinicians on navigating the ethical challenges and decision making associated with obesity management in adults (...) with chronic illness. Research design A cross-sectional, multi-site survey distributed electronically. Participants A consensus sample of nurses, doctors, dietitians and final year students in two NHS Trusts and two Universities. Ethical considerations Ethical and governance approvals obtained from a National Ethics Committee (11NIR035), two universities and two teaching hospitals. Results Of the total ( n = 395) participants, the majority were nurses (48%), female (79%) and qualified clinicians (59%). Participants strongly considered the individual to have primary responsibility for a healthy weight and an obligation to attempt to maintain that healthy weight if they wish to access NHS care. Yet two thirds would not withhold treatment for patients with obesity. Discussion While clinicians were clear about patient responsibility and obligations, the majority prioritised their duty of care and would not invoke a utilitarian approach to decision making. This may reflect awareness of obesity as a multi-faceted entity, with responsibility for support and management shared amongst society in general. Conclusions The attitudes of this sample of clinicians complemented the concept of the health service as being built on a principle of community, with each treated according to their need. However limited resources challenge the concept of needs-based decisions consequently societal engagement is necessary to agree a pragmatic way forward. (shrink)

The article takes up the difficult problem of the so-called disobedience of judges against the background of the experiences of the Polish departure from constitutional democracy in 2015–2020. The special role and responsibility of a judge in the state imposes restrictions on her freedom of opinion in the public sphere. Openly manifesting opposition to government policy, which in the case of an ordinary citizen is only the implementation of human rights and freedoms, may be described as controversial and contrary to (...) applicable ethical regulations. The main thesis of this paper is the assertion that although judges who act as impartial arbitrators in disputes should generally refrain from ostentatiously opposing the actions of political authorities, they are not deprived of the possibility of protest. Also in the exercise of office, and not outside the sphere of their duties, judges should take into account overriding moral values that should be implemented by the legal order, and not the values or declarations guiding the government policies. The integrity of the judge, which prescribes restraint in statements and actions in the public sphere, as well as the care for the dignity of the office held, should not be confused with absolute subordination to the legislature or the executive, even if the judge is obliged to apply the law. The traditional attitude of the members of the judiciary, consisting in focusing only on the application of the law in individual cases and the lack of any political involvement, is being reviewed in the face of the spread of majoritarianism and the law abuse as normal techniques of exercising public authority. The disobedience of judges—although difficult to defend at first sight—may seem to be the only possible way to draw public attention to the corruption of the state system. The ‘disobediant’ judges can even be assigned the role of ‘whistleblowers’, which should help to ease their legal liability or their future rehabilitation. (shrink)

Corporations wield power in today’s economies, and political theories of the corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the state/society to create wealth, in the competitive (...) structure of the market. However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy. This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as ‘proximate beneficiaries’, to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status. (shrink)