Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. Decision choice follows probability estimates and errors in choice derive mainly from errors in judgment. In the studies reported here we use the Monty Hall dilemma to illustrate that judgment and choice do not always go together, and that such a dissociation can lead to better decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that in certain decision problems, exceeding working memory limitations can actually improve decision choice. We show across (...) four experiments that increasing the number of choice alternatives forces people to collapse choices together, resulting in better decision-making. While choice performance improves, probability judgments do not change, thus demonstrating an important dissociation between choice and probability judgments. We propose the Collapsing Choice Theory (CCT) which explains how working memory capacity, probability estimation, choice alternatives, judgment, and regret all interact and effect decision quality. (shrink)

Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. Decision choice follows probability estimates and errors in choice derive mainly from errors in judgment. In the studies reported here we use the Monty Hall dilemma to illustrate that judgment and choice do not always go together, and that such a dissociation can lead to better decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that in certain decision problems, exceeding working memory limitations can actually improve decision choice. We show across (...) four experiments that increasing the number of choice alternatives forces people to collapse choices together, resulting in better decision-making. While choice performance improves, probability judgments do not change, thus demonstrating an important dissociation between choice and probability judgments. We propose the Collapsing Choice Theory (CCT) which explains how working memory capacity, probability estimation, choice alternatives, judgment, and regret all interact and effect decision quality. (shrink)

The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity assumption. (...) Section 2 suggests three major reasons for the emergence of this assumption in the seventeenth century: the mental-physical gap, the causal theory of perception, and epistemological considerations regarding the status of the sensory given. In the last section a critical discussion is presented. The passivity assumption is found to have serious empirical and theoretical flaws. (shrink)

The relationship between emotions and argumentation is not always clear. I attempt to clarify this issue by referring to three basic questions: (1) Do emotions constitute a certain kind of argumentation?; (2) Do emotions constitute rational argumentation?; (3) Do emotions constitute efficient argumentation? I will claim that there are many circumstances in which the answer to these questions is positive. After describing such circumstances, the educational implications of the connection between emotions and argumentation will be indicated.

Students systematically and deliberately apply rule‐based but erroneous algorithms to solving unfamiliar arithmetic problems. These algorithms result in erroneous solutions termed rational errors. Computationally, students' erroneous algorithms can be represented by perturbations or bugs in otherwise correct arithmetic algorithms (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Langley & Ohilson, 1984; VanLehn, 1983, 1986, 1990; Young S O'Sheo, 1981). Bugs are useful for describing how rational errors occur but bugs are not sufficient for explaining their origin. A possible explanation for this is that rational (...) errors are the result of incorrect induction from examples. This prediction is termed the “induction hypothesis” (VanLehn, 1986). The purpose of the present study was to: (a) expand on post formulations of the induction hypothesis, and (b) use a new methodology to test the induction hypothesis more carefully than has been done previously. The first step involved teaching participants a new number system called NewAbacus, a written modification of the abacus system. The second step consisted of dividing them into different groups, where each individual received an example of only one port of the NewAbacus addition algorithm. During the third and final step, participants were instructed to solve both familiar and unfamiliar types of addition problems in NewAbacus. The induction hypothesis was supported by using both empirical and computational investigations. (shrink)

The broad, ancient notion of the “soul” was replaced by Descartes with a more narrow notion of the “mind.” As well as limiting the scope of the soul, Descartes separated it from the body, giving the soul a substantive status. These two features gave rise to severe conceptual problems which remain unsolved till the present day. I believe that retaining some features of the ancient notion of the “soul”—particularly those found in Aristotle’s view—may resolve many of these problems. As an (...) alternative approach I suggest the following three assumptions concerning the nature of the soul : the soul consists of dispositional and actualized states and not of internal, isolated entities; physiological and mental states are not actually separate but belong to two different levels of description, hence the relation between them is that of correlation and not of causality; mental and physical states can be arranged along a spectrum ranging from simple to more complex states. This approach treats mental properties just as common sense and science treat other natural properties. Thus, many of the traditional problems concerning the mind-body gap disappear. Though the approach presented here returns, in some aspects, to the ancient, broad notion of the soul, I will continue to use the term “mind” which is used more today. (shrink)

Three common strategies used by informal logicians are considered: (1) the appeal to standard cases, (2) the attempt to partially formalize so-called "informal fallacies," and (3) restatement of arguments in such a way as to make their logical character more perspicuous. All three strategies are found to be useful. Attention is drawn to several advantages of a "stock case" approach, a minimalist approach to formalization is recommended, and doubts are raised about the applicability, from a logical point of view, of (...) a principle of charitable construal in the reconstruction of arguments. (shrink)

In many circumstances compromises seem to be of great value to our well-being; compromises can help us avoid disputes and fights and enable us to live peacefully with each other. However, compromises can also require us to surrender some of our values. These two opposing aspects implicit in compromise express the need to be sensitive to external circumstances and in particular to the wishes of other people, and at the same time to be willing to relinquish something of value. So (...) are compromises, and in particular romantic compromises, good or bad for our well-being? McIntyre’s view in general and Aristotle’s distinction between extrinsically and intrinsically valuable activities in particular, are very useful in this regard. Compromises can be characterized as involving dissatisfied acceptance of a gap between a perceived feasible desire and our actual situation. The acceptance of the gap is merely behavioral stemming from unfavorable external circumstances. It is not psychologically accepted, as deep down we are not happy with the compromise, and still yearning for a better solution. Romantic compromises are particularly hard to accept in light of the prominent place of the Romantic Ideology, in which ideal love can overcome all obstacles and hence there is no place for compromises. (shrink)

Jesus has been accused of committing a fallacy (of denying the antecedent) at John 8:47. Careful analysis of this text (1) reveals a hitherto unrecognized valid form of argument which can superficially look like the predicate-logic analogue of denying the antecedent; (2) shows that determining whether a published text can be fairly charged with committing a fallacy may require (but often does not get) extensive and detailed analysis; (3) acquits Jesus of the charge; and thereby (4) conflnns a claim by (...) Michael Burke that published arguments can seldom be fairly charged with denying the antecedent, or analogous fallacies. (shrink)

In this work I reject the contention that there is a perceptual stage which is devoid of contributions from the agent's cognitive framework. This contention is expressed in two different noncognitive views of perception. The traditional sensory core view which has prevailed since the seventeenth century; it claims that there is a stage of pure sensory core which precedes the interpretive percepts . The recent ecological approach whose main representative is J. J. Gibson; it claims that not only a certain (...) perceptual stage, but the whole perceptual process, is devoid of cognitive contributions. Before I deal with these views, I discuss the basic features of cognition in general. ;Cognition is concerned with the establishment of relations and order; it is a purposive placing of a cognized object into a meaningful order. Cognition begins with modifying a given order for the purpose of making it fit into a given meaningful framework. Throughout the work I show that, contrary to the aforementioned noncognitive views, perception fulfills this depiction of cognition. ;In the discussion of the sensory core view, I illustrate its main assumptions in various philosophical writings, and then indicate main reasons for its appearance in the seventeenth century. These reasons stem from the intermediate role sensation was supposed to have in the mental-physical gap. Sensations were considered to be primitive mental entities with physical causes; their physical origin prevents them from containing complex mental features such as the cognitive ones, and, thus, they are regarded as pure. This stage of pure sensation was postulated primarily out of theoretical considerations. Those did not coincide with the empirical and phenomenological description of that stage; hence, the empirical characterization and the phenomenological status of that stage were constantly modified. The various suggestions for describing that stage are examined and criticized from both empirical and theoretical respects. The empirical evidence presented indicates that there is no qualitative difference between perceiving what is regarded as pure sensations and what is regarded as inferential perceptions. The theoretical criticism points out that the assumption regarding pure sensation is not necessary for an adequate explanation of perception; and, since it has no empirical grounds, it is superfluous. ;After rejecting the sensory core view, I examine the ecological approach. This view rejects the traditional sensation-perception distinction and contends that we do not have to assume the existence of cognitive activities that interpret meaningless sensations into meaningful perceptions, since the perceiver directly encounters meaningful features. I claim that this solution is similar to Kant's approach, and, therefore, it has to pay a price which is similar to that which Kant pays, viz. the relational nature of the perceptual environment. The neglect of this feature results in unsolvable difficulties in central notions of the ecological approach. ;I conclude the work by suggesting a crude outline for approaching perception; in many respects it is close to Aristotle's view. I contend that causal explanations of the physiological processes cannot wholly explain perceiving; these processes are necessary supportive bases for perceiving and not the causes which precede and produce it. Accordingly, we should not assume the existence of separate percepts in the agent's head. The cognitive system is an integral part of the perceptual system; hence, perception may be conceived of as direct understanding. (shrink)

Answering the question, ‘Who is a rational agent?’ is of utmost importance for all moral theories which conceive of the rational agent as their basic moral unit. Surprisingly enough, these theories do not pay much attention to this question, and assume, without offering detailed discussions, certain characterizations of the rational agent. In this paper, I examine what kind of attribute ‘rational’ is. In light of this examination I claim that the rational moral theories are based on a mistaken characterization of (...) the rational agent. (shrink)

We investigate the connection between $\triangle^1_3$-stability for random and Cohen forcing notions and the measurability and categoricity of the $\triangle^1_3$-sets. We show that Shelah's model for $\triangle^1_3$-measurability and categoricity satisfies $\triangle^1_3$-random-stability while it does not satisfy $\triangle^1_3$-Cohen-stability. This gives an example of measure-category asymmetry. We also present a result concerning finite support iterations of Suslin forcing.

The increasing frequency and scope of financial crises has made global financial stability one of the major concerns of economic policy and decision makers. Under this highly complex environment, supervision of the financial system has to be thought of as a systemic task, focusing not only on the strength of the institutions but also on the interdependent relations among them, unraveling the structure and dynamic of the system as a whole. In recent years, network science has emerged as a leading (...) tool for the investigation of complex systems. Here we review several applications of network science in finance and economics, and discuss existing challenges and future directions which will substantiate network science as a key tool for financial academics, practitioners, and policy and decision makers. (shrink)

Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent’s knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which KDTs relate knowledge and (...) rational action. In this paper, I suggest a new axiomatic method for justifying KDTs and providing them with stronger normative foundations. I argue that such theories may be derived from constraints on the relation between knowledge and preference, and that these constraints may be evaluated relative to intuitions regarding practical reasoning. To demonstrate this, I offer a representation theorem for a KDT proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) and briefly evaluate it through its underlying axioms. -/- In section 1, I present knowledge-based decision theories generally and the versions of such theories suggested in the literature. In section 2, I argue that KDTs and theories of practical reasoning conjoined with Knowledge-Reasons norms generate constraints on the same relation—the relation between knowledge and preference. In section 3, I present a formal framework in which constraints on this relation may be expressed and from which KDTs may be derived. In section 4, I present a representation theorem for a specific KDT. In section 5, I briefly evaluate the axioms of the theory, and in section 6, I conclude. (shrink)