We review the gravitational self-force program to analytically compute first-order metric perturbations in a Schwarzschild black hole spacetime in the case of a perturbing mass moving on a slightly eccentric equatorial orbit. The perturbed metric components should then be combined into gauge-invariant quantities to be associated with physical observables. In this way, for example, one determines the various “potentials” entering the Effective-One-Body model, i.e., a powerful formalism for the description of the gravitational interaction of two masses, which is currently successfully (...) used for the analysis of gravitational wave signals. (shrink)

Culture, narrative and law -- The narrative turn in the legal field -- Fact construction : contexts, roles and methods -- Rediscovering the role of the client -- The lawyer as translator -- The judge as a creative decision maker -- Laypeople in action I : natives' stories -- Laypeople in action II : foreigners' stories -- Collaborative lawyering with vulnerable clients : asylum seekers' stories.

Andrey Tarkovsky _Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema_ Translated by Kitty Hunter-Blair Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996 ISBN: 0-292-77624-1 255 pp.

This paper is part of a broader project in which I investigate autobiographical experiences and transcribed memories. Specifically, this essay analyzes the potential linkages between philosophical ideas and everyday social existence. First, I consider the correspondence between an anecdote from my own lived experience and the concept of Bildung—a multidimensional notion loosely translated as “formation,” “self-formation,” “cultivation,” “self-cultivation,” “self-development,” “cultural process,” and so on. Building on Hegel’s and Gadamer’s contributions to Bildungstheorie, I introduce readers to the concept. Then, in analyzing (...) my anecdote, I destabilize the concept and demonstrate that any act of Bildung can be trivialized easily by Rückbildung. The general scope of this essay is neither to contribute to the systematization of the concept of Bildung nor to discuss potential commonalities within the realm of interpretative contributions to this notion. Instead, I demonstrate that thinkers cannot measure this concept with a set of fixed criteria and, finally, I propose a critical understanding of Bildung through a dialogue of theoria and praxis. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

In Categories 12 (14b11–22), Aristotle famously claims that [1] true sentences and reality stand in a mutually implicative relationship, and that [2] reality causes the truth of sentences but not vice versa. In this paper, I first argue that Boethius’ reading of the above passage led medieval logicians to assess [1] and [2] within the framework of a theory of consequence. Then, I consider two important questions raised by Boethius and later logicians in relation to [1] and [2], and, namely, (...) whether the implication described in [1] really satisfies the requirement for consequence, and whether the truthmaking relation posited in [2] can be boiled down to the relation of consequence. Boethius himself, I argue, answered affirmatively to both questions and thus (much like some contemporary truthmaker theorists) committed himself to an account of truthmaking as entailment. I then consider criticisms to Boethius’ account found in the writings of William of Champeaux, two anonymous authors connected to the school of Jocelyn of Soissons, Peter Abelard, and the author of the Ars Meliduna. Here, I argue that the emergence of a concern for relevance drives the need for abandoning Boethius’ account as well as his conception of truthmaking as entailment. (shrink)

Uberto Decembrio's Four Books on the Commonwealth (De re publica libri IV, ca. 1420), edited and translated by Paolo Ponzù Donato, is one of the earliest examples of the reception of Plato's Republic in the 15th century. This humanistic dialogue provides a thoughtful insight on themes such as justice, the best government, the morals of the prince and citizen, education, and religion. Decembrio's dialogue is dedicated to Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, the 'worst enemy' of Florence. Making use (...) of literary and documentary sources, Ponzù Donato convincingly proves that Decembrio's thought, sharing many points with the Florentine humanist Leonardo Bruni, belongs to the same world of Civic Humanism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of Heidegger's philosophy and reveal a possibility of an other beginning, of which we can have only a premonition for now. The paper is very much a preparation for work which is currently underway.

Philosophy in schools in Australia dates back to the 1980s and is rooted in the Philosophy for Children curriculum and pedagogy. Seeing potential for educational change, Australian advocates were quick to develop new classroom resources and innovative programs that have proved influential in educational practice throughout Australia and internationally. Behind their contributions lie key philosophical and educational discussions and controversies which have shaped attempts to introduce philosophy in schools and embed it in state and national curricula. Drawing together a wide (...) range of eminent scholars and practitioners in the field of educational philosophy, this anthology, the first of its kind, provides not only a historical narrative, but an opportunity to reflect on the insights and experiences of the authors that have made history. The collection is divided into three parts. The overarching theme of Part I is the early years of Philosophy for Children in Australia and how they informed the course that the ‘philosophy in schools movement’ would take. Part II focuses on the events and debates surrounding the development and production of new materials, including arguments for and against the suitability of the original Philosophy for Children curriculum. In Part III, key developments relating to teaching philosophy in schools are analysed. This collection of diverse views, critical appraisals, and different perspectives of historical currents is intended to stimulate thought-provoking questions about theory and practice, and to increase general awareness both nationally and internationally of the maturation of philosophy in schools in Australia. It is also intended to encourage readers to identify emerging ideas and develop strategies for their implementation. (shrink)

Boethius and the ideology of the Roman Senatorial aristocracy -- The illness and the healer -- How does Philosophy convey her therapy? -- Christianity and the Consolation.

In this paper we introduce a variational principle from which the fundamental equations of classical physics can be deduced. This principle permits a sort of unification of the gravitational and the electromagnetic fields. The basic point of this variational principle is that the world-line of a material point is parametrized by a parameter a which carries some physical information, namely it is related to the rest mass and to the charge. In particular, the (inertial) rest mass will not be a (...) property of a material point, but it will be a constant of the motion which is determined by the initial conditions. In this framework the equality between the inertial and gravitational mass can be deduced. (shrink)

Traduzione di Ausgleichung eines auf Mißverstand beruhenden matematischen Streit. Il testo fu pubblicato per la prima volta nel 1796 in "Berlinische Monatsschrift", 2, pp. 368-370.

The new Coronavirus has been declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization. The sudden outbreak of this new virus and the measure of lockdown adopted to contain the epidemic have profoundly changed the lifestyles of the Italian population, with an impact on people’s quality of life and on their social relationships. In particular, due to forced and prolonged cohabitation, couples may be subject to specific stressors during the epidemic. In addition, living with a chronic health condition may add (...) specific challenges to the ones posed by the epidemic itself. The present cross-sectional study aimed to provide a picture of the challenges as well as the resources for both individual and relational well-being of Italian individuals in a couple relationship, with a specific attention to the comparison between individuals living with and without a chronic disease. Results showed that people with a chronic disease had lower psychological well-being and more fears and worries about the COVID-19. People with a chronic disease perceived fewer resources than healthy people. Moreover, the challenges are shown to be associated with less psychological well-being and high pessimism about the future. Instead individual, relational, and social resources play a protective role during the pandemic for both healthy and chronically ill people. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

The contrast between the strategies of research employed in reductionism and holism masks a radical contradiction between two different scientific philosophies. We concentrate in particular on an analysis of the key philosophical issues which give structure to holistic thought. A first (non-exhaustive) analysis of the philosophical tradition will dwell upon: a) the theory of emergence: each level of organisation is characterised by properties whose laws cannot be deduced from the laws of the inferior levels of organisation (Engels, Morgan); b) clarification (...) of the relations between the “whole” and the “parts” (Woodger, Needham); c) the ontological or epistemological nature of the emergent properties; are they a phenomenological reality or solely an artefact of the state of our knowledge? (Pepper, Henle, Hempel and Oppenheim); d) the proposition of the holistic theoretical and methodological model ( Novikoff, Feibleman). I then go on to examine the differences that exist between the reductionist and the holistic approaches at various levels of analysis: that is to say, the differences which affect their ontologies, methodologies and epistemologies respectively. I attempt to understand the spirit of a holistic approach to ecology by analyzing the major work of E.P. Odum Fundamentals of ecology (1953, 1959, 1971). I set forward what might be meant by the “holistic approach”, which is implicated in all the different levels of organisation at which the problem of “complexity” is debated. Ecology presents itself as an “holistic science” and Odum’s book offers a vision of the world which dates far back in the history of philosophy. By looking at the three different editions of this fundamental text on ecology, we may become aware of the evolution of Odum’s thought. In fact, only in the third and last edition is there a conscious appropriation of the holistic approach (by using the theoretical models of Feibleman who, for his part, refers to Novikoff). However, even when formally referring to the theory of emergence (that is to say the ontological nucleus of every holistic approach), Odum’s systemic analysis presents the same logical errors, which push him back into the reductionist domain. Above all, in his examination of the main concepts of “population”, “community” and “ecosystem”, there is a misunderstanding of the profound difference between “collective properties” and “emergent properties”. Moreover, the cybernetic models of Odum’s systemic analysis (introduced into ecology by Margalef), allowed him to vastly oversimplify his methodological task: in fact, neither how many levels nor which levels of organization are fundamental for the study of each individual level is clearly marked. Finally, Odum analyses the ecosystem as composed of energetic flux and cycles of matter, referring to the trophic-dynamic vision of Lindeman. That is to say, in my opinion, he juxtaposes a reductionistic methodology and epistemology to an holistic ontology. (shrink)

The classical holism-reductionism debate, which has been of major importance to the development of ecological theory and methodology, is an epistemological patchwork. At any moment, there is a risk of it slipping into an incoherent, chaotic Tower of Babel. Yet philosophy, like the sciences, requires that words and their correlative concepts be used rigorously and univocally. The prevalent use of everyday language in the holism-reductionism issue may give a false impression regarding its underlying clarity and coherence. In reality, the conceptual (...) categories underlying the debate have yet to be accurately defined and consistently used. There is a need to map out a clear conceptual, logical and epistemological framework. To this end, we propose a minimalist epistemological foundation. The issue is easier to grasp if we keep in mind that holism generally represents the ontological background of emergentism, but does not necessarily coincide with it. We therefore speak in very loose terms of the “holism-reductionism” debate, although it would really be better characterised by the terms emergentism and reductionism. The confrontation between these antagonistic paradigms unfolds at various semantic and operational levels. In definitional terms, there is not just emergentism and reductionism, but various kinds of emergentisms and reductionisms. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different "degrees of contingency". We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

Managing cardiac illness is not easy because it dramatically disrupts people’s daily life and both the patient and his/her spouse are at risk for experiencing distress, which, in turn, may affect the support provided by the partner as caregiver. The partner, in fact, is the main source of support, but his/her support may sometimes be inadequate. In addition, dyadic coping could likely be a moderating factor. The main aim of the present study was to examine the role that dyadic coping (...) plays in moderating the link between patient and partner cardiac illness-related distress and partner support. The study included 100 married couples faced with cardiac illness who completed a self-report questionnaire. We analyzed our data in PROCESS using multiple regressions in order to assess the moderating effects of DC responses in the relationship between the couple’s cardiac illness-related distress and partner support. With regard to patient distress, results showed that higher levels of patient anxiety and depression were linked with ineffective partner support. With regard to partner distress, higher levels of partner depression were linked with hostility; higher levels of partner depression and anxiety were associated with less partner support for patient engagement. Moreover, the association between distress and partner support was moderated by the quality of DC. In particular, low positive DC represented a risk factor for both the patient and the partner during a cardiac illness, as low positive DC exacerbated the link between patient and partner distress and less effective partner support styles. Also, higher levels of negative DC were risky for couples: The association between distress and less adequate partner supportive behaviors was stronger in the case of higher negative DC. These results imply a need for psychosocial interventions for couples in cardiac illness, especially for couples lacking relational competences, such as positive dyadic coping. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a lot of interest in scientific understanding. There was already a consensus in the philosophy of science about the fact that science provides understanding of the world, but until the 70s there was not a proper and systematic investigation of the matter. This investigation has been notoriously incremental in the last two decades. Nevertheless, there is still no agreed upon way of how to understand “understanding” . Faye’s contribution to the debate proves to be (...) a departure from the previous standard works on explanation and scientific inference. The author’s main purpose is, in his own words, describing “how our human cognitive capacities allow scientists to acquire an understanding of nature by means of representation, interpretation, and explanation” . He starts from a D .. (shrink)

Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to a practice-based characterization of scientific inference. We want to explore whether Brandom’s pragmatist–inferentialist framework can suitably accommodate several types of ampliative inference common in scientific reasoning and explanation (probabilistic reasoning, abduction and idealisation). First, we argue that Brandom’s view of induction in terms of merely permissive inferences is inadequate; in order to overcome the shortcoming of Brandom’s proposal, we put forward an alternative conception of inductive, probabilistic reasoning by appeal to the (...) notion of degrees of commitment. Moreover, we examine the sorts of inferential commitments operative in other types of ampliative inferences, such as abduction or reasoning involving idealizations and assumptions. We suggest that agents engaging in these forms of reasoning often undertake restricted inferential commitments, whose scope and reach are more limited that in the case of the commitments associated with full beliefs. (shrink)