This paper sets out to give sufficient detail to the notion of mental simulation to allow an appraisal of its contribution to ‘mindreading’ in the context of the ‘false-belief tasks’ used in developmental psychology. We first describe the reasoning strategy of ‘modified derivation’, which supports counterfactual reasoning. We then give an analysis of the logical structure of the standard false-belief tasks. We then show how modified derivation can be used in a hybrid strategy for mindreading in these tasks. We then (...) formulate the hypothesis that children become able (around the age of 4 years) to pass these tasks when they acquire the counterfactual reasoning ability required in this strategy. We find this to be consistent with various empirical findings. We then discuss the implications for the theory/simulation debate, meta-representation and pretence. (shrink)

This volume, derived from the Royal Institute of Philosophy 1992 conference, brings together some of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of cognitive science to explore current and potential advances in the philosophical understanding of mind and cognition. Drawing on work in psychology, computer science and artificial intelligence, linguistics and philosophy, the papers tackle such issues as concept acquisition, blindsight, rationality and related questions as well as contributing to the lively debates about connectionism and neural networks. The collection as (...) a whole reflects the theoretical and methodological dynamism of this interdisciplinary field. (shrink)

The syndrome of autism was first systematically identified in the 1940's, and has been the focus of a broad range of work since that time. Its symptomatology is seemingly diverse, and involves a rough division between 'personal' and 'nonpersonal' tendencies. In the personal category are difficulties in understanding and interacting with other persons, socialisation, empathy and communication. In the non-personal category are difficulties in adaptability, occasional special abilities, and a wide range of peculiarities in learning, generalisation, pursuit of narrow interests, (...) and so on. Some tendencies, such as peculiarities in the use of language, seem to span both categories. A central question in the theory of autism, therefore, is whether these two categories of impairment share a common pattern or character. It is true that received sets of diagnostic criteria, drawn from empirical observation, give the impression of a split syndrome in which non-personal and personal tendencies occur together but are different in nature. However, we cannot simply trust the language games which inform the presentation of these observations: as Wittgenstein repeatedly argued, forms of words and 'analogies in language' can have the effect of obscuring both similarities and differences between things. The main thesis of the present paper is that there does exist a pattern common to these two areas of impairment, in that both involve dilogical structures. (shrink)

Annotation. Despite their importance, FOR have been generally underinvestigated. As the first book devoted to the theme, it suggests the exciting idea of a computer model that could change its FOR, and then evaluate its FOR relative to a particular task. The book looks at the influence on understanding, insight, expertise and the advance of knowledge of the forms of representation we use. This book will be welcomed by researchers in the fields of Cognitive Science and AI in particular, and (...) Psychology and Philosophy in general. (shrink)