Rationalists including Nagel and Korsgaard argue that motivation to the means to our desired ends cannot be explained by appeal to the desire for the end. They claim that a satisfactory explanation of this motivational connection must appeal to a faculty of practical reason motivated in response to desire-independent norms of reason. This paper builds on ideas in the work of Hume and Donald Davidson to demonstrate how the desire for the end is sufficient for explaining motivation to the (...) means. Desiring is analyzed as having motivation towards making the end so, which is analyzed as engaging in mental activity aimed at facilitating that end. I conclude that it is constitutive of an agent’s desiring an end that he is motivated towards what he believes to be means. (shrink)

Proponents of nonviolent tactics often highlight the extent to which they rival arms as effective means of resistance. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, for instance, compare civil resistance favorably to armed insurrection as means of bringing about progressive political change. In Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos cites their work in support of the claim that similar methods—organized according to Gene Sharp's idea of “civilian-based defense”—may be substituted for regular armed forces in the face of international aggression. I deconstruct (...) this line of pacifist thought by arguing that it builds on the wrong binary. Turning away from a violence-nonviolence dichotomy structured around harmfulness, I look to Richard B. Gregg and Hannah Arendt for an account of nonviolent power defined by non-coercion. Whereas nonviolent coercion in the wrong hands still has the potential to subvert democratic institutions—just as armed methods can—Gregg's and Arendt's conceptions of nonviolent power identify a necessary bulwark against both forms of subversion. The dangers of nonviolent coercion can be seen in the largely nonviolent attempts at civil subversion by supporters of Donald Trump during Trump's attempts to overturn the results of the U.S. presidential election in 2020, while the effectiveness of noncoercive, nonviolent power is illustrated by the resistance of U.S. democratic institutions to resist them. (shrink)

Disgust is an essential human emotion that has remained mostly neglected, even in modern, "emotional turn" scholarship.

Forty-five years ago, while still an undergraduate student at Western Washington University’s Fairhaven College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Terrence Deacon produced as his honours thesis a programmatic manifesto for re-situating the semiotic logic of Charles Sanders Peirce “out of the realm of philosophy and [revealing instead] its necessary association with the information sciences and its close parallels with current systems theories”. Deacon’s project, then and now, has been to show how, within the context of naturally occurring physical processes, Peirce’s essential insight (...) regarding a “mode of being which consists in the fact that future facts of secondness will take on a determinate general character” can be, and is continuously, manifested in living systems. Considering this explication to be the “hard problem of biosemiotics”, I therefore read the current target article as a progress report, and an extremely encouraging one, of Deacon’s ongoing efforts to develop a “proof of principle” model for the naturalistic origin and biologically instantiated logic of this ‘causalis in futuro’ mediation process unique to living systems. (shrink)

I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see (...) that world model as residing in its belief base , while then representing the actual world as possibly different, i.e., forming a new world-model. This suggests particular computational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably could be discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into artificial systems that may need such capabilities. Consciousness, then, is not an epiphenomenon at all, but rather a key part of the functional architecture of suitably intelligent agents, hence amenable to study as much as any other architectural feature. I also argue that ignorance of how subjective states could be essentially functional does not itself lend credibility to the view that such states are not essentially functional; the strong self-reference proposal here is one possible functional explanation of consciousness. (shrink)

This article concerns primarily the concepts of God in process theism, especially as they appear in the later writings of A. N. Whitehead and in the works of Charles Hartshorne. The article concludes with a brief discussion of arguments for God's existence in process thought and a note on the historical influences on, and anticipations of, process theism.

Drawing on convergent work in a broad range of disciplines, this article uses the tipping point paradigm to frame a new account of how early human ancestors may have first broken free from, as Bickerton calls it, the “prison of animal communication.” Under building pressure for an enhanced signaling system capable of supporting joint attentional-intentional activities, a cultural tradition of disambiguated indexical pointing (a finger point disambiguated by a facial expression, vocalization, or other gesture), combined with increasingly sophisticated mindreading circuitry (...) and prosocial tendencies, may have sparked the first in the series of biocultural explosions that led from a simple protolanguage to fully modern human language. This account successfully integrates at least ten other competing hypotheses, and is shown to pass nine important tests that have been proposed for language origin scenarios of its type. (shrink)

Stefanie Rocknak has written an ambitious and challenging book1 in which she argues for a new interpretation of Hume's account of how we come to believe in external objects, and what it is we believe in. I am hampered by the fact that she and I seem to agree on so little. Thus, my criticisms run the danger of simply not seeing what she is up to.A preliminary terminological point: where Rocknak uses the word "object," I will often use the (...) word "body," since I think Hume sometimes uses "object" in a more general sense that includes perceptions.If I understand correctly, Rocknak's Hume argues that we come to believe in bodies through a special kind of causal reasoning. We reason what must exist in order to cause... (shrink)

A defense is provided of the following translation of Phaedo 104d1-3: "Would they not, Cebes, be those things which, whatever they possess, force it to have not only their own form, but also in every case that of one of its opposites?".

There is growing recognition in Phaedo scholarship of a parallel between the deuteros plous passage and the introduction to Simmias' speech: both speak of attempting to discover or to learn the truth about things, and then, if that proves impossible, to resort to divine or human logoi, the former being the "safer" of the two. It is contended that that model governs Socrates reply to Cebes: he first tried to discover the truth about causes by himself; then he tried to (...) learn it from Anaxagoras; and then, having failed in both endeavors, he resorted to logoi, both "divine" in the hypothesis of the forms and "human" in the hypothesis of intermediates, the former being the "safest" recourse. Finally, a defense is provided for the thesis that in calling the deuteros plous "deuteros," Socrates is being ironical. (shrink)

Dynamic interaction is said to occur when two significanrly different fields A and B come into relation, and their interaction is dynamic in the sense that at first the flow of ideas is principally from A to B, but later ideas from B come to influence A. Two examples are given of dynamic interactions with the philosophy of mathematics. The first is with philosophy of scicnce, and thc sccond with computer science. Theanalysis cnables Lakatos to be charactcrised as thc first (...) to devclop the philosophy of mathematics using ideas taken from thc philosophy of science. (shrink)

Food Regime scholars conclude that we now live in a ‘Corporate Food Regime’. 1 Characterised by market liberalisation and the deregulation of the financial industry, the political economy of our Fo...

In The Really Hard Problem , Owen Flanagan maintains that accounting for meaning requires going beyond the resources of the physical, biological, social, and mind sciences. He notes that the religious myths and fantastical stories that once "funded" flourishing lives and made life meaningful have been epistemically discredited by science but nevertheless insists that meaning does exist and can be fully accounted for only in a form of systematic philosophical theorizing that is continuous with science and does not need to (...) invoke myth. He sees such a mode of thought as a new, empirical-normative science, which he labels eudaimonistic scientia , that evades the disenchantment produced by natural scientific accounts of meaning. I argue that such an empirical-normative science does not provide us with a scientific account of meaning but is itself simply another way of making sense of one's life that is open to scientific explanation. Such an explanation will be deflationary in the sense that it presumes no greater scheme of things for meaning beyond the span of human existence (collective and possibly individual) but not disenchanting in that it does not explain away the flourishing lives human persons and communities create for themselves. (shrink)

The cultural logic contained within Emile Durkheim's work, specifically categories he puts forth in Suicide, creates the ground for Horrible Workers. This book is constructed to allow its readers to study the cases of Max Stirner, Arthur Rimbaud, Robert Johnson, and the Charles Manson Circle independently of one another or in a comparative fashion. Each case demonstrates in what ways particular social experiences lead to what have been perceived as unique forms of cultural expression.

In what ways are Vico and Joyce similar? To what extent is Vico an influence on Joyce? And in what ways can Vico's philosophy be newly understood when seen in relation to Joyce's use of it? This book suggests ways to see both thinkers anew.

In this text, the authors propose an emotional health model based on a philosophical and psychological interpretation of human behavioral motivation which departs from traditional approaches in certain aspects while retaining other elements that seem meaningful. The model is predicated on the thesis that at least part of the reason for the current state of affairs is that educational and mental health institutions have been developed on the basis of misleading assumptions about the causes of behavior. Popular assumptions regarding human (...) behavior are challenged as inimical with respected scientific principles and sound logic. Contents: Conceptions of Life; Holonic Nature of Existence; Life: A Holarchic Contingency; Purpose 101; Epistemology; Mind 153; Mind: Information Channels; Mental Components; Emotion 255; Conflict, Control, and the Emergent Self; Behavior; Emotional Health and the Counseling Process; Behavior/Belief Alteration; Primary PreventionóA Look to the Future. (shrink)