Jacques Lacan comments repeatedly on anamorphic art as it exemplifies for him how the mind from a certain angle perceives through law-like patterns the world that would otherwise be nothing but a chaos of arbitrary multiplicities. The angle, though, has a certain effect on what is perceived; an effect that, as such, cannot be perceived within the realm of experience. The article tries to make the link between diffraction laws of perception more explicit in the subject-object dichotomy and refers for (...) that purpose to the work of both Hegel and Lacan. A reference to Hegel is necessary, as Hegel was not only one of Lacan’s own most important sources of insights, but the author who first focused on justified true belief through a theory of a missed encounter between truth and knowledge. (shrink)

How can a set throw itself into itself and remain a set and an element of itself at the same time? This is obviously impossible, as Bertrand Russell has prominently shown. One simply cannot pic a trash-can up and throw it into itself. Now, Hegel, Benjamin, and Badiou take a different position on the subject when they refer time and time again to "concrete universality" as an oxymoronic structure that touches ontologically upon their theoretical philosophies as well as their practical (...) philosophies. The article tries to show how both philosophers affirm the mentioned paradox as central for the understanding of Dialectical Materialism in its classical as well as in its contemporary understanding. (shrink)

Several debates of the last years within the research field of contemporary realism – known under titles such as "New Realism," "Continental Realism," or "Speculative Materialism" – have shown that science is not systematically the ultimate measure of truth and reality. This does not mean that we should abandon the notions of truth or objectivity all together, as has been posited repeatedly within certain currents of twentieth century philosophy. However, within the research field of contemporary realism, the concept of objectivity (...) itself has not been adequately refined. What is objective is supposed to be true outside a subject’s biases, interpretations and opinions, having truth conditions that are met by the way the world is. The volume combines articles of internationally outstanding authors who have published on either Idealism, Epistemic Relativism, or Realism and often locate themselves within one of these divergent schools of thought. As such, the volume focuses on these traditions with the aim of clarifying what the concept objectivity nowadays stands for within contemporary ontology and epistemology beyond the analytic-continental divide. With articles from: Jocelyn Benoist, Ray Brassier, G. Anthony Bruno, Dominik Finkelde, Markus Gabriel, Deborah Goldgaber, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, Johannes Hübner, Andrea Kern, Anton F. Koch, Martin Kusch, Paul M. Livingston, Paul Redding, Sebastian Rödl, Dieter Sturma. (shrink)

Badiou and Wittgenstein focus in their works on potentialities of innovation in the realm of thought as well as in the realm of politics. These innovations manifest themselves especially when two seemingly contrasting jurisdictions of thought—present in politics and logic—meet and merge. For Badiou a set-theoretical process of enforcement may change pre-established templates of a political doxa. For Wittgenstein it is the spontaneity of concept-formations that crisscross referential relations within the “space of reasons” and through performative enactments make visible unexpected (...) places of unprompted innovation. For both Wittgenstein and Badiou, the subject is of vital importance in this union of politics and logic. It is both a “limit of the world” as well as a “supernumerary agency.” Characterized as such, it can provoke new worlds to appear with the aid of what I will call self-proclaimed logics of scission. (shrink)

Badiou and Wittgenstein focus in their works on potentialities of innovation in the realm of thought as well as in the realm of politics. These innovations manifest themselves especially when two seemingly contrasting jurisdictions of thought – present in politics and logic – meet and merge. For Badiou a set-theoretical process of enforcement may change pre-established templates of a political doxa. For Wittgen-stein it is the spontaneity of concept-formation that crisscross referential relations within the “space of reason” and through performative (...) enactments makes visible unexpected places of unprompted innovation. For both Wittgenstein and Badiou, the subject is of vital importance in this union of politics and logic. It is both a “limit of the world” as well as a “supernumerary agency”. Characterized as such, it can provoke new worlds to appear with the aid of what I will call in the following paragraphs self-proclaimed logics of scission. (shrink)

Als im Jahr 1992 die Frage aufgeworfen wurde, ob der französische Philosoph Jacques Derrida den Ehrendoktortitel der University of Cambridge verliehen bekommen sollte, lehnte ein Teil der Jury-Mitglieder die Vergabe ab. Man könne nicht, so hieß es damals, einen Denker würdigen, der in seinen Schriften vormalig Gedankenspiele inszeniere und »überall seine eigenen Urteile wieder umstößt«. Die zuletzt zitierten Worte wurden so nicht geäußert, da sie aus dem dritten Jahrhundert von dem griechischen Philosophen Porphyrius stammten und gegen den 〉theoretischen Gründungsvater〈 des (...) Christentums, Paulus, gerichtet waren. Porphyrius war in seiner Kritik an Paulus nicht weniger kleinlich als die oben erwähnten Jurymitglieder. Es sei die Inkohärenz eines Denkens, das er bei Paulus kritisiere und das »jeder Bildung entbehre«. Denn »beinahe wie ein Schwert wetzt er [Paulus] seine Zunge und zerstückelt ohne Schonung die Glieder des Gesetzes, er, der an vielen Stellen den Gehorsam gegen das Gesetz eingeschärft und das Leben nach demselben für lobenswert erklärt hat.«. (shrink)