1.  34
    God’s punishment and public goods.Dominic D. P. Johnson - 2005 - Human Nature 16 (4):410-446.
    Cooperation towards public goods relies on credible threats of punishment to deter cheats. However, punishing is costly, so it remains unclear who incurred the costs of enforcement in our evolutionary past. Theoretical work suggests that human cooperation may be promoted if people believe in supernatural punishment for moral transgressions. This theory is supported by new work in cognitive psychology and by anecdotal ethnographic evidence, but formal quantitative tests remain to be done. Using data from 186 societies around the globe, I (...)
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  2.  94
    The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation.Terence C. Burnham & Dominic D. P. Johnson - 2005 - Analyse & Kritik 27 (1):113-135.
    Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly (...)
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    The Elephant in the Room: Do Evolutionary Accounts of Religion Entail the Falsity of Religious Belief?Dominic D. P. Johnson, Hillary L. Lenfesty & Jeffrey P. Schloss - 2014 - Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 1 (2):200.