Zunächst werden die Kernthesen von Habermas' Diskursethik vorgestellt, insbesondere der Universalisierungsgrundsatz U und das diskursethische Prinzip D. Eine ausführliche Analyse zeigt dann, daß Habermas' Argumentationen für diese Prinzipien in mehrfacher Hinsicht ungültig sind. Die Betrachtung früherer Varianten dieser Argumentationen und späterer Kommentare Habermas' macht zudem eine gewisse Wendung Habermas' weg von der Transzendentalpragmatik hin zum Intuitionismus und eine Abschwächung seines Begründungsanspruchs bis hin zu dessen Annullierung deutlich. Eine Kritik an vier Interpretationen von U selbst und an den beiden Hauptinterpretationen (...) von D erweist diese Moralkriterien als in vielerlei Hinsicht unbrauchbar und als bloß formelhafte Vereinigung schwer zu vereinender Ideale. (shrink)

First, the approaches of 'Diskursethik' (Discourse ethics) and of Modern Political Economy are described. While the latter investigates political decision processes, the former is concerned with the discourse process which takes place before a decision is made. This is shown by using referenda as an example. The discourse which takes place before referenda obviously does not conform to the ideal conditions defined in Diskursethik, but discourse and decisions in the context of referenda come nearer to the intentions of (...) Diskursethik and Political Economy than other decision procedures which are used in representative democracies. (shrink)

The book introduces a conception of discourse ethics, an intersubjectivist version of Kantian ethics. Analyzing contributions from Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Albrecht Wellmer, Robert Alexy, Klaus Günther, Rainer Forst, Marcel Niquet and others, it reconstructs critical discussions on the justification of the principle of morality (part I) and on the various proposals on how to apply it (part II). It defends an alternative model of how discourse ethics can provide guidance under non-ideal circumstances and avoid both arbitrariness and (...) rigorism. (shrink)

The book discusses recent developments in Discourse Ethics and argues for a new proposal of how to spell out its core ideas. It finds that its basic principles ("D" and "U") are too specific: they focus on norms, identify those affected with those participating in discourse and use the narrow vocabulary of interests and consequences. It proposes instead: (D1) Only those claims are valid that can be defended against any objection of any possible agent. Discourse Ethics should be understood as (...) a normative framework for ethical argumentation that allows for a plurality of moral principles and for reflections on their suitability for specific contexts. It demands that one acts according to one's best reasons. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel geht es um die Beziehungen zwischen der von Jürgen Habermas entwickelten Diskursethik und den Studierendenseminaren, die der Ulmer Arbeitskreis „Ethik in der Medizin“ veranstaltet. Zunächst erfolgt eine Darstellung der Kernaussagen der philosophischen Diskursethik. Sie liefert eine formale Argumentationsprozedur, mit der es möglich ist, die Legitimität strittig gewordener Normen im Diskurs zu prüfen. Anschließend wird das in Ulm von Baitsch und Sponholz entwickelte Modell der Seminare „Ethische Entscheidungskonflikte im ärztlichen Alltag“ vorgestellt. Da sich die Ulmer Seminare (...) unter anderem auf die Diskursethik als theoretischen Hintergrund berufen, werden die Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede beider Konzepte untersucht. Der Hauptunterschied ist der zwischen einem Begründungs- und einem Anwendungsdiskurs. Gemeinsam sind den Ansätzen die grundsätzlich kognitivistische Einstellung und die „Spielregeln“ des Diskurses. (shrink)

Neste artigo o autor procura mostrar por que o princípio de universalização de Habermas não pode ser fundamentado reflexivamente, como o autor da Teoria do agir comunicativo sugere, bem pode ser considerado como um princípio central de uma filosofia moral.

With the publication of Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) and of his essays “A Reply to my Critics” (1982), “Diskursethik — Notizen zu einem Bugründungsprogramm” (1983), “Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln” (1983), and “Über Moralität und Sitdichkeit — Was macht eine Lebensform ‘rational’?” (1984), Habermas has considerably developed and systematized his views on ethics. Up to Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), ethics had been of interest to Habermas mainly insofar as certain concepts related to it — such as (...) the ideal speech situation, communicative action, presuppositions of argumentation, etc. — were crucial for the purpose of grounding a universalistic point of view in philosophy and in social theory. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Artikel geht es um die Beziehungen zwischen der von Jürgen Habermas entwickelten Diskursethik und den Studierendenseminaren, die der Ulmer Arbeitskreis „Ethik in der Medizin“ veranstaltet. Zunächst erfolgt eine Darstellung der Kernaussagen der philosophischen Diskursethik. Sie liefert eine formale Argumentationsprozedur, mit der es möglich ist, die Legitimität strittig gewordener Normen im Diskurs zu prüfen. Anschließend wird das in Ulm von Baitsch und Sponholz entwickelte Modell der Seminare „Ethische Entscheidungskonflikte im ärztlichen Alltag“ vorgestellt. Da sich die Ulmer Seminare (...) unter anderem auf die Diskursethik als theoretischen Hintergrund berufen, werden die Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede beider Konzepte untersucht. Der Hauptunterschied ist der zwischen einem Begründungs- und einem Anwendungsdiskurs. Gemeinsam sind den Ansätzen die grundsätzlich kognitivistische Einstellung und die „Spielregeln“ des Diskurses. (shrink)

Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’. Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of a particular, historically (...) evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility”. In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. (shrink)

More than 20 years ago, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel started the philosophical research program of Discourse Ethics. This led to a broad discussion about the correct justification and application of basic principles of Discourse Ethics, from which several comprehensive new conceptions emerged in recent years. The authors of this anthology discuss central problems of the previous designs in a constructive way, they carry out alternative designs and thus open up new perspectives for discourse ethics. Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Einleitung - William (...) Rehg: Discourse Ethics and Individual Conscience - Thomas Webler und Seth Tuler: Fairness an Competence in Citizen Participation: Theoretical Reflections from a Case Study - Nadia Mazouz: Das Gute Leben in der Diskursethik - Adela Cortina: Virtualitäten in einer erneuerten Diskursethik für die Bioethik - Micha H. Werner: Kants pflichtenethischer Rigorismus und die Diskursethik: Eine maximenethische Deutung des Anwendungsproblems - Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Diskursethik als kognitivistisches Rahmenkonzept - Konrad Ott: Noch einmal: Diskursethik - Hans Schelkshorn: Dialogische Vernunft und die Grundlagen interkultureller Ethik; Thesen zu einer Revision der Diskursethik - Matthias Kettner: Diskursethik: Moralische Verantwortung für diskursive Macht. (shrink)

Zur Anwendung der Diskursethik in Politik, Recht und Wissenschaft suggests that something like a critique of practical reason, or at least its foundations—from the perspective of transcendental semiotics—is in the works, and in addition that it is something possible, desirable and even necessary. The suggestion is that a semiotically transformed transcendental philosophy, as the theoretical aspect of a philosophical system, has its complement in a practical philosophy whose main tenets have come to be known as discourse ethics, or the (...) discourse theory of ethics. Historically, Karl-Otto Apel was the first to formulate some of the main arguments of a communicative, discursive, semiotical, or pragmatic theory of morality, and he did so as far back as the late sixties and early seventies. In the United States, in contrast to European and Latin American countries where Apel's work is better known, Habermas' name is the one most frequently associated with the discourse theory of ethics. This state of affairs may be due to a dearth of translations of primary sources, though Benhabib's and Dallmayr's The Communicative Ethics Controversy provides an excellent selection of primary texts. Consequently, today in the United States we stand not only quite behind the times in terms of the primary sources of discourse ethics, but also of the growing secondary literature on the subject. Neither Apel, nor Habermas, can be said to provide the only discourse-ethical approach within philosophy and political theory, exhaust the consequences and possibilities of an application of discourse ethics by their respective attempts to link it directly to either a theory of politics, or a theory of the democratic state that is circumscribed by both a specifically German historical horizon and a European-First World outlook. Indeed what makes this book particularly interesting, helpful, and above all timely is that it makes a conscious effort to represent the various positions that fall under the rubric of communicative, or discourse oriented practical philosophy, and the many ways in which problems of practical philosophy can be approached—while it attempts to give us a distinct sense that this approach has in fact graduated to an international status, that is, that it is no longer, if it ever was, exclusively an affair of German philosophy. (shrink)

To combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil (...) of insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior. (shrink)

To combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil (...) of insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior. (shrink)

Se analiza la ética del discurso de Habermas para considerar dentro de la reflexión ética el cambio que la ciencia y la tecnología generan en la sociedad. La Diskursethik no considera la historicidad del ser humano y mantiene la posición kantiana que separa lo racional de lo fenoménico. Ante la negación para conceder un valor a la ciencia que no sea su sometimiento a los dictados de la razón teórica, se presentan los rasgos fundamentales de una ética dinámica que (...) contemple el futuro de la humanidad y la naturaleza como su terreno propio. The Diskursethik of Jürgen Habermas is analysed in order to consider, in the field of Ethical reflection, the change that Science and Technology drive into Society. It is pointed out that Diskursethik does not take into account the historicity of human being and suscribes a kantian position that separate rationality fromphenomenology. Facing Habermas's denial to recognize a value to science different from its submission to dictum of theoretical reason, this paper offers the main features of a dynamical ethics which sees the future of humanity and nature as its own object. (shrink)

Se analiza la ética del discurso de Habermas para considerar dentro de la reflexión ética el cambio que la ciencia y la tecnología generan en la sociedad. La Diskursethik no considera la historicidad del ser humano y mantiene la posición kantiana que separa lo racional de lo fenoménico. Ante la nega..

This article discusses Seyla Benhabib’s transformation of Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. It focusses on her interpretation of communicative moral reason by reference to actual „moral conversations“. While she does not draw on universal pragmatics, Benhabib still claims that her ethical theory represents a form of universalism. This study argues that this claim is misleading: Benhabib’s discourse ethics points to a culture of moral judgment that is essentially open to different kinds of moral thinking. Such a culture, however, needs moral humility (...) and cannot appropriately be called „universalism“. (shrink)

The so-called structuralistic view of theory-formation is applied to the discourse-theory of normative validity in order to shed some light on the relation between the core and some basic application of discourse ethics. First, metatheoretical notions as core, model and intended paradigmatic applications will be introduced. Second, the two supreme principles of discourse ethics will be justified and a basic model will be explained. Two possibilities to define the very core of this ethical theory will be distinguished. In the following (...) section, special attention is given to three paradigmatic applications of the theory. It is argued for the moral validity of some basic norms of action including several types of moral and legal rights. The article ends up with a discussion on conceptual modifications which are due to the enlargement of the scope of discourse ethics and with some brief remarks on the state of discourse ethics being a comprehensive ethical theory. (shrink)