7 found
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  1. Categories of Scientific Theories.Hans Halvorson & Dimitris Tsementzis - 2018 - In Elaine Landry (ed.), Categories for the Working Philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    We discuss ways in which category theory might be useful in philosophy of science, in particular for articulating the structure of scientific theories. We argue, moreover, that a categorical approach transcends the syntax-semantics dichotomy in 20th century analytic philosophy of science.
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  2.  85
    Theoretical Equivalence in Classical Mechanics and its Relationship to Duality.Nicholas J. Teh & Dimitris Tsementzis - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 59:44-54.
    As a prolegomenon to understanding the sense in which dualities are theoretical equivalences, we investigate the intuitive `equivalence' of hyper-regular Lagrangian and Hamiltonian classical mechanics. We show that the symplectification of these theories provides a sense in which they are isomorphic, and mutually and canonically definable through an analog of `common definitional extension'.
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  3.  19
    A Syntactic Characterization of Morita Equivalence.Dimitris Tsementzis - 2017 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 82 (4):1181-1198.
    We characterize Morita equivalence of theories in the sense of Johnstone in terms of a new syntactic notion of a common definitional extension developed by Barrett and Halvorson for cartesian, regular, coherent, geometric and first-order theories. This provides a purely syntactic characterization of the relation between two theories that have equivalent categories of models naturally in any Grothendieck topos.
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  4. Foundations and Philosophy.Dimitris Tsementzis & Hans Halvorson - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    The Univalent Foundations of mathematics take the point of view that all of mathematics can be encoded in terms of spatial notions like "point" and "path". We will argue that this new point of view has important implications for philosophy, and especially for those parts of analytic philosophy that take set theory and first-order logic as their benchmark of rigor. To do so, we will explore the connection between foundations and philosophy, outline what is distinctive about the logic of the (...)
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  5.  92
    Univalent Foundations as Structuralist Foundations.Dimitris Tsementzis - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3583-3617.
    The Univalent Foundations of Mathematics provide not only an entirely non-Cantorian conception of the basic objects of mathematics but also a novel account of how foundations ought to relate to mathematical practice. In this paper, I intend to answer the question: In what way is UF a new foundation of mathematics? I will begin by connecting UF to a pragmatist reading of the structuralist thesis in the philosophy of mathematics, which I will use to define a criterion that a formal (...)
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    A Meaning Explanation for HoTT.Dimitris Tsementzis - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):651-680.
    In the Univalent Foundations of mathematics spatial notions like “point” and “path” are primitive, rather than derived, and all of mathematics is encoded in terms of them. A Homotopy Type Theory is any formal system which realizes this idea. In this paper I will focus on the question of whether a Homotopy Type Theory can be justified intuitively as a theory of shapes in the same way that ZFC can be justified intuitively as a theory of collections. I first clarify (...)
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  7.  46
    What is a Higher Level Set?Dimitris Tsementzis - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica:nkw032.
    Structuralist foundations of mathematics aim for an ‘invariant’ conception of mathematics. But what should be their basic objects? Two leading answers emerge: higher groupoids or higher categories. I argue in favor of the former over the latter. First, I explain why to choose between them we need to ask the question of what is the correct ‘categorified’ version of a set. Second, I argue in favor of groupoids over categories as ‘categorified’ sets by introducing a pre-formal understanding of groupoids as (...)
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