In part I of this paper I argue that on his theory of the mind as the idea of an actually existing body Spinoza is unable to account for the ability of the mind to have adequate knowledge, and I suggest that his theory of the eternity of the mind can be viewed as his solution to this problem. In part II I deal with the question of the meaning of ‘eternity’ in Spinoza, in regard both to God and the (...) human mind, and I sketch a line of thought which I believe may have provided him with further motivation for his theory that a part of the mind is eternal. (shrink)

Genevieve Lloyd's Spinoza and the Ethics is written as a guidebook for novice readers of Spinoza. Why is such a book needed when there are already a number of others which can well serve the function of introducing Spinoza's philosophy to new readers? The answer is that Lloyd's book is distinctive in two ways. First, it provides a unique perspective on Spinoza, emphasizing aspects of his philosophy which are not typically rationalist. And second, Lloyd has made a particular effort not (...) only to introduce Spinoza's main doctrines, but also to acquaint readers with the diversity of the secondary literature devoted to them. (shrink)

It is argued, first, that although Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect does show evidence of a foundationalist approach to the justification of knowledge, there are good reasons to think he came to find such an approach unsatisfactory; and second, that the Ethics notion of certainty as adequate knowledge of one's knowledge is a justificational concept which is holistic in that any instance of such certainty depends on knowledge of the entire basic metaphysical system. Finally it is (...) shown that Spinoza's having come to hold a nonlinear view regarding the justificational structure of knowledge explains why he chose to present his philosophy in the geometric form, and why he never succeeded in formulating a method of discovery. (shrink)